Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 420 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Khatki Yunus Mamadbhai

2013-07-19

K.J.THAKER, K.S.JHAVERI

body2013
JUDGMENT : K.J. Thaker, J. The present appeal, under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgment and order dated 10.07.1992 passed by the Sessions Judge, Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 94 of 1991 whereby the accused have been acquitted of the charges levelled against them under sections 302 read with section 114 of Indian Penal Code. 2. The facts in brief as per the prosecution are that on 07.05.1991, at about 09.00 am the accused persons in connivance with each other poured kerosene on the victim-Bai Mariyam who was the wife of accused no. 1 and set her on fire. Accused no. 2 is the elder brother of accused no. 1. The victim was being set on fire was admitted at Sayla Primary Health Centre and the dying declaration was recorded there by the police. However, the victim was shifted to C.J. Hospital, Surendranagar for further treatment. A complaint was registered against the accused vide C.R. No. I-0-91 for the offence under section 307 and 114 of Indian Penal Code. During the treatment and while shifting the injured victim to Ahmedabad hospital, she expired. Accordingly the offence was converted to offence under section 302 read with section 114 of Indian Penal Code. 2.1. After the investigation was completed, charge-sheet was filed against the accused. Thereafter, as the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the same was committed to the Sessions Court. After recording the evidence of prosecution witnesses and after recording the statement of the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., and hearing arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondents of all the charges levelled against them by judgment and order dated 10.07.1992. 2.2. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court the appellant State has preferred the present appeal. 3. Ms. Chetna M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the appellant-State has submitted that the trial court committed an error in releasing the respondents - accused. It was contended by Ms. 2.2. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court the appellant State has preferred the present appeal. 3. Ms. Chetna M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the appellant-State has submitted that the trial court committed an error in releasing the respondents - accused. It was contended by Ms. Shah, that the judgment and order of the Sessions Court is against the provisions of law; the Sessions Court has not properly considered the evidence led by the prosecution and looking to the provisions of law itself it is established that the prosecution has proved the whole ingredients of the evidence against the present respondents. Learned APP has also taken this court through the oral as well as the entire documentary evidence. 3.1. Ms. Shah has further submitted that the deceased was conscious and in a fit state of mind to record her dying declaration as is evident from the evidence of witnesses and therefore her dying declaration ought to have been considered by the trial court. She has submitted that the panchnama of scene of offence does in no way suggest that this is a case of suicide. 3.2. Mr. Shah further submitted that the trial court ought to have considered that there was a motive for the alleged offence committed by the accused inasmuch as they were on loggerheads with the deceased’s family as the wife of the deceased’s brother (sister of accused) had returned to her parental house. She submitted that looking to the burn injuries on the hands of accused no. 2, the statement recorded by the deceased in her complaint as well as dying declaration seems to be correct. 3.3. Ms. Shah has also submitted that considering the gross offence of bride burning, the accused should not be allowed to go scott-free when the deceased was the wife of accused no. 2. She has submitted that this Court may consider this case seriously in view of the clinching evidences against the accused and award suitable punishment so as to be a deterrent to the society at large. 3.4. In support of her submissions Ms. 2. She has submitted that this Court may consider this case seriously in view of the clinching evidences against the accused and award suitable punishment so as to be a deterrent to the society at large. 3.4. In support of her submissions Ms. Shah has relied upon the following decisions: (i) Panneerselvam v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2008) 17 SCC 190 ; (ii) Kamalavva and another v. State of Karnataka reported in (2009) 13 SCC 614 ; (iii) Ongole Ravikanth v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2009) 13 SCC 647 ; (iv) Shudhakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2012) 7 SCC 569 ; (v) M. Sarvana Alias K.D. Sarvana v. State of Karnataka reported in (2012) 7 SCC 636 . 4. Mr. P.B. Goswami, learned advocate appearing for the respondents-accused has supported the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial court and submitted that the same does not call for any interference by this Court. Mr. Goswami submitted that the deceased had tried to commit suicide. He submitted that she was not in a fit state of mind to give her dying declaration as she was under sedation and that the dying declaration itself is doubtful. He submitted that the panch witnesses have turned hostile. He also submitted that in fact the accused persons were not home as is borne out from the evidence of the daughter of deceased. 4.1. He has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions: (i) Habib v. State of Uttar Pradesh with Manuwa v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 2013 SC 1764 ; (ii) State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Khaja Hussain reported in (2009) 15 SCC 120 ; (iii) Smt. Kamla v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1993 SC 374 . 5. At the outset it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala and anr, reported in (2006)6 SCC, 39, the Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala and anr, reported in (2006)6 SCC, 39, the Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: “54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the court below.” 5.1. The very same principle is observed in the case of Habib (supra) as relied upon by learned advocate for the respondent. The Apex Court in para 10 of the said judgment has observed as under: “10. We are of the view that the High Court has correctly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence, including the evidence of P.W. 6, the Chief Medical Officer and rightly came to the conclusion that the trial court had committed an error in discarding their evidence. This Court in State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh and others (2005) 9 SCC 94 also recorded that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court is entitled to re-appreciate the evidence on record if the court finds that the view of the trial court acquitting the accused was unreasonable or perverse. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to the innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. However, the paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented as noted in the judgment of this Court in V.N. Ratheesh v. State of Kerala (2006) 10 SCC 617 .” 6. It is true that it is a settled position of law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to the innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. It is true that it is a settled position of law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to the innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. In the present case, going by the records of the case and the evidence of witnesses, we do not find that the view taken by the trial court is just and proper. We have analysed the evidence in great detail to find that the prosecution version is cogent and credible. Even in an acquittal appeal the touch stone is that whether there is an iota of evidence which would permit the appellate court to take a different view. In the present case, there are four clinching evidences. (i) The first and foremost evidence is the dying declaration which has been sought to be relied upon by the learned trial court, the grounds which are not germane to criminal jurisprudence. It is required to be noted that the victim in her dying declaration has categorically stated that there was a dispute going on between the accused and the deceased for the last one week. She has mentioned the role of both the accused and there seems to be no reason to disbelieve the version given in the dying declaration. (ii) The second being the medical evidence which categorically shows that the deceased was in such a state of mind that she could have given the dying declaration. In this regard it shall be relevant to peruse the testimony of P.W. 4, Dr. Kamuben Rathod, the medical officer who treated the deceased. She has clearly mentioned in her deposition that while she was dressing the wounds of the deceased, the Executive Magistrate came there and asked if the victim was conscious and in a fit state of mind. She has stated that she had endorsed that the victim was in a fit state of mind and therefore the Executive Magistrate proceeded to record the dying declaration after sending everyone out of the room. The evidence of P.W. 5, Shri Chaturbhai Damor who is the Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration of the victim also supports the testimony of P.W. 4. The evidence of P.W. 5, Shri Chaturbhai Damor who is the Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration of the victim also supports the testimony of P.W. 4. He has deposed that he had verified from P.W. 4 regarding the consciousness and fitness of the victim and after receiving suitable endorsement from the doctor that the victim was conscious and oriented to give her dying declaration, the Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. It is also stated by this witness that he started recording the dying declaration at around 10.15 am and completed the same at around 10.30 am. The thumb impression of the victim was also appended on the dying declaration. (iii) The evidence on record as far as burn injuries on husband collaborates her say in the FIR as well as dying declaration that the victim had tried to hold her husband. The arrest panchnama shows that the accused - husband of victim was having certain burn injuries on the hand. The victim in her dying declaration as well as the FIR has mentioned that she had tried to hold the accused after being set on fire but he released himself from her hold and went away. The arrest panchnama at Ex. 28 shows that the accused no. 2 had sustained minor burn injuries on his left wrist and he himself had stated that those were sustained by him in the course of the said incident. (iv) The presence of both the accused-convicts is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the motive is also established beyond reasonable doubt. From the statement of brother of the deceased as recorded by P.W. 11, Purshottam Mer, PSI it is borne out that the brother of deceased’s wife - Sharifa who happens to be the sister of the accused had left the matrimonial house and was living at her parental house at Dhrangadhra. This led to frequent altercations between the accused persons and the deceased. This fact has emerged from the evidence of witnesses and the deceased herself that the accused persons had taunted her to get out of the house. 6.1. The aforesaid evidences are so clinching that the learned trial court ought not to have acquitted the accused as the prosecution had proved the case against the respondents on the basis of dying declaration and evidence on record. 6.1. The aforesaid evidences are so clinching that the learned trial court ought not to have acquitted the accused as the prosecution had proved the case against the respondents on the basis of dying declaration and evidence on record. The fact that there was a settlement between the parties appears to have weighed heavily with the learned trial judge. The examination of defence witnesses who was the daughter of the accused, her evidence also shows the presence of the accused at the scene of offence. 7. Mr. Goswami, learned advocate for the respondents accused has sought reliance upon the case of State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), the Apex Court has observed that where there are variations in two dying declarations which are not trivial in nature, the acquittal of respondent did not warrant any interference. 7.1. Learned advocate for the respondent has also relied upon the case of Smt. Kamla (supra), wherein the Apex Court has held that in the circumstances where the dying declarations are inconsistent, it is not possible to pick out one statement wherein the accused is implicated and base the conviction on the sole basis of such a dying declaration. 7.2. We are afraid the aforesaid decisions would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case as the dying declaration in this case is amply proved by cogent evidence and the principles enunciated for basing conviction on the basis of section 32 of Evidence Act are reiterated herein before. 8. However, a catena of decisions of the Apex Court on dying declaration would permit us to take a different view in the matter. In such cases, motive will go in the oblivion and all the facts and the evidence when weighed will complete the chain that it was the accused who had committed the murder of the victim. 8.1. Our aforesaid view gets support from the latest decision of the Apex Court cited by the learned APP in the case of Krishan v. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 3 SCC 280 wherein the Apex Court has held that it is not an absolute principle of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction of an accused. Where the dying declaration is true and correct, the attendant circumstances show it to be reliable and it has been recorded in accordance with law, the deceased made the dying declaration of her own accord and upon due certification by the doctor with regard to the state of mind and body, then it may not be necessary for the court to look for corroboration. In such cases, the dying declaration alone can form the basis for the conviction of the accused. But where the dying declaration itself is attended by suspicious circumstances, has not been recorded in accordance with law and settled procedures and practices, then, it may be necessary for the court to look for corroboration of the same. 8.2. Similarly in the case of Panneerselvam (supra) the Apex Court has observed as under: “7. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence. 8. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” 8.3. On the other hand, in the case of Ongole Ravikanth (supra), the Apex Court has held as under: “28. It is well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction. But at the same time due care and caution must be exercised in considering weight to be given to dying declaration inasmuch as there could be any number of circumstances which may affect the truth. 29. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the courts have always to be on guard to see that the dying declaration was not the result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is the duty of the courts to find that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the dying declaration. In order to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, the courts have to look for the medical opinion. [See: Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992)2 SCC 474 , K. Ramachandra Reddy and anr. v. The Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618 , Darshan Singh @ Bhasuri and Ors. v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 411 , Kanchy Komuramma v. State of A.P. (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 118, Maniram v. State of M.P. (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 539, Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 and Nallapati Sivaiah v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur, A.P. AIR 2008 SC 19 ].” 8.4. In the case of Shudhakar (supra) the Apex Court has held that a “dying declaration” is the last statement made by a person at a stage when he is in serious apprehension of his death and expects no chances of his survival. In the case of Shudhakar (supra) the Apex Court has held that a “dying declaration” is the last statement made by a person at a stage when he is in serious apprehension of his death and expects no chances of his survival. At such time, it is expected that a person will speak the truth and only the truth and that normally in such situations, courts attach intrinsic value of truthfulness to such statement. It is also held that once such statement has been made voluntarily, it is reliable and is not an attempt by deceased to cover up truth or falsely implicate a person, then courts can safely rely on such dying declaration and it can form the basis of conviction, more so where version given by other prosecution evidence, there is no reason for courts to doubt truthfulness of such dying declaration. 8.5. In the case of M. Sarvanna (supra), the Apex Court has held in para 16 as under: “16. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002)6 SCC 710 , the Court while dealing with the argument that the dying declaration must be recorded by a magistrate and the certificate of fitness was an essential feature, made the following observations. The court answered both these questions as follows: “3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a Magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a Magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.” In that view of the matter, it is clear that the dying declaration being voluntary and made in a fit state cannot be discarded. 9. Hence, the evidence of Dr. Kamuben and Executive Magistrate who had recorded the dying declaration could not have been disbelieved by the learned trial court. We are unable to accept the submission made by learned advocate for the respondents that there was little time gap between Sayla and Surendranagar and that there was no morphin injection given to the deceased. However, the evidence of doctor is quite clinching to show that the deceased was conscious till 11’o clock. Moreover, a perusal of the evidence of P.W. 12, Dr. Jayeshkumar Gandhi also shows that while the victim was brought to C.G. Hospital, Surendranagar she was conscious and in a fit state of mind. Therefore, there is no reason not to disbelieve the dying declaration and complaint lodged by the victim. 10. In the present case, when the Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration pursuant to the Vardhi received by him after taking opinion from the doctor, this Court finds no reason to disbelieve him more particularly when he has no axe to grind against the accused and being a public officer we find no reason as to why he will implicate a person falsely. 11. Moreover, from the panchnama of place of offence, it is found that the door of the room was not forcibly opened. The deceased in her dying declaration also mentioned that the accused may not be allowed to attend her funeral which shows the amount of hatred and disgust she had for the accused persons. 11. Moreover, from the panchnama of place of offence, it is found that the door of the room was not forcibly opened. The deceased in her dying declaration also mentioned that the accused may not be allowed to attend her funeral which shows the amount of hatred and disgust she had for the accused persons. Merely because some of the witnesses have turned hostile, their hostility cannot demolish the value and reliability of the dying declaration of the deceased. 12. In the case of Kushal Rao v. The State of Bombay reported in 1958 AIR SC 22, the Apex Court has observed as under: “On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made ; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions - and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human, memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the. circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it-; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.” 12.1. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the dying declaration has been proved in accordance with law, is a truthful version of the events that occurred and the circumstances leading to the death of the victim narrated by the victim in a fit state of mind and without any force or coercion. There is no room for any doubt regarding the veracity of the dying declaration and the manner in which the victim was done to death by the accused. 13. Thus we are of the opinion that the trial court committed an error in acquitting the respondents-accused. The respondents-accused are required to be held guilty for the offence punishable under section 302 read with section 114 of Indian Penal Code and therefore we are inclined to allow this appeal filed by the State. 14. Accordingly, the judgment and order dated 10.07.1992 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 94 of 1991 is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents - accused are convicted of the offence charged against them under Section 302 read with Section 114 of Indian Penal Code. 15. However, as far as the quantum of sentence to be imposed upon the respondents-accused is concerned, considering the fact that conviction under section 302 of Indian Penal Code carries a minimum sentence of life imprisonment, with a view to give a fair chance to the respondents-accused, office to issue bailable warrant in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand Only) against the respondents-accused making it returnable on 02.08.2013 and notice to remain present before this Court for hearing of quantum of sentence to be imposed upon them. FURTHER ORDER: 1. 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand Only) against the respondents-accused making it returnable on 02.08.2013 and notice to remain present before this Court for hearing of quantum of sentence to be imposed upon them. FURTHER ORDER: 1. On 19.07.2013, after the judgment was completed and guilt of the accused was recorded, the matter was adjourned to 02.08.2013 for enabling the accused to remain present before the Court. On 02.08.2013, the matter was adjourned to today. 2. The accused are present in the court today. They are heard on quantum of sentence. The Court does not find that any ground is made out for imposing the sentence less than the minimum prescribed. Having taken into consideration all the relevant facts, this Court deems it proper to award minimum sentence to both the accused for the offence under section 302 r/w section 114 of Indian Penal Code . 3. As the judgment and order of acquittal dated 10.07.1992 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 94 of 1991 is quashed and set aside, both the accused are directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life under section 302 r/w section 114 of Indian Penal Code. However, life imprisonment would not be till last breath and the case of the accused may be reviewed by the State after 14 years of their serving sentence. The period already undergone by them during trial be given set off as per Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. At this stage, learned advocates for the accused prayed for a reasonable time to surrender. Accordingly, the accused are granted time of four weeks to surrender before the authorities. The appeal stands allowed accordingly. Appeal allowed.