Judgment : L. Narasimha Reddy, J. 1. The 1st respondent herein filed OS No.195 of 1989 in the court of Chief Judge-cum-II additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, against the appellants herein and certain others, initially for the relief of perpetual injunction. Later on, it got the prayer amended for recovery of a sum of Rs.11,67,719/- with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. 2. The 1st appellant is a limited company, having its Head Office in the State of Gujarat and the 2nd appellant is its division operating in the State of Karnataka. They intended to establish a cement factory in Gulbarga District. Part of the construction work worth about a sum of Rs.30,00,000/- was assigned to the 1st respondent under an agreement entered into the May 1983. The contract provided for submission of bank guarantee by the 1st respondent. Through a notice, dated 10.12.1983, the appellants terminated the contract with the 1st respondent. Apprehending that the bank guarantee furnished by it may be invoked by the appellants, the 1st respondent initially field a suit for the relief of perpetual injunction. Later on, the relief of recovery of a sum of Rs.11,67,719/-was incorporated. The 1st respondent pleaded that though it executed the work, till the termination of the contract, it was not paid the amount therefor. 3. The appellants filed a written statement opposing the suit. According to them, the termination came into effect from the date of the letter i.e., 10.12.1983. It was also stated that they would not be liable to pay any amount for the work said to have been executed by the 1st respondent beyond 10.12.1983. However, it was admitted that they are under obligation to pay a sum of Rs.88,000/- to the 1st respondent. The trial Court partly decreed the suit for a sum of Rs.5,40,117/- through its judgment, dated 1.10.1992. The same is challenged in this appeal. 4. It is relevant to mention that the 1st respondent has also filed CCCA No.18 of 1983 feeling aggrieved by the denial of part of relief to it. The appeal was dismissed on 6.3.2002 for non-payment of batta and the said order bas become final. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellants submits that a specific plea as to lack of territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court was raised and the same was not dealt with in the manner required under law. The appeal was dismissed on 6.3.2002 for non-payment of batta and the said order bas become final. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellants submits that a specific plea as to lack of territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court was raised and the same was not dealt with in the manner required under law. On merits, learned Counsel submits that once the contract was terminated through letter, dated 10.12.1983, the relationship between the parties ceased and the 1st respondent was not at all entitled to execute any works beyond that date, much less to claim any amount for it. He contends that the trial Court has arrived at the conclusion as to payment of amount to the 1st respondent, without there being proper evidence. 6. Learned Counsel for the contesting respondents, on the other hand, submits that the contract was signed at Hyderabad, though the work was to be executed at Gulbarga and thereby, the trial Court has the territorial jurisdiction. He contends that the termination of contract would become effective only from the date of service on the 1st respondent and the 1st respondent is entitled to be paid for the works done by it upto the date of receipt of the letter of termination. 7. The appellants assigned the work contract to the 1st respondent. The dispute arose as regards the execution of work and the appellants have terminated the contract. That resulted in filing of the suit for the reliefs mentioned above. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration on the basis of the pleadings before it : 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for any amount towards the value of civil work done and whether he performed it till 6.1.1984 and if so to what amount he is entitled to? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest if so at what rate? 3. Whether the suit is filed mis-joinder of cause of action? 8. On behalf of the 1st respondent, PW1 was examined and Exs.A1 to A11 were filed. On behalf of the appellants, DWs1. to 3 were examined and Exs.B1 to B12 were filed. The suit was partly decreed. 9. The points that arises for consideration in this appeal are : (1) Whether the trial Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit? And (2) Whether the decree passed by the trial Court suffers from any legal or factual infirmity? 10. to 3 were examined and Exs.B1 to B12 were filed. The suit was partly decreed. 9. The points that arises for consideration in this appeal are : (1) Whether the trial Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit? And (2) Whether the decree passed by the trial Court suffers from any legal or factual infirmity? 10. It is true that the head office of the appellants is in the State of Gujarat, their branch is in the State of Karnataka and the work was to be executed in Gulbarga District. The basis for the 1st respondent in instituting the suit in a Court at Hyderabad is that the agreement was signed at that place. There is some dispute as to whether the parties signed the contract at Hyderabad. However, a perusal of Ex.A1, the letter of acceptance, dated 26.5.1983 discloses that it was addressed to the 1st respondent with its address at Hyderabad. If that is to be treated as conveying the acceptance and bringing about the contract, naturally the place has to be taken as Hyderabad. In addition to that, the bank guarantee which is required to be furnished under the contract, was furnished from a bank at Hyderabad. Though a plea was raised and an issue was framed, the appellants did not adduce any evidence on it and the trial Court was left with no alternative, except to hold the issue in favour of the 1st respondent. We are not inclined to take any different view. 11. Coming to Point No.2, the record discloses that the appellants themselves admitted that they are under obligation to pay a sum of Rs.88,000/- to the 1st respondent, despite the termination of the contract. Taking note of the controversy as to the quantum of work, executed by the 1st respondent, the trial Court appointed a Commissioner. In his report, the Commissioner mentioned the works executed by the 1st respondent item wise and indicated the value. After assessing the report and evidence before it, the trial Court arrived at the conclusion that as against Rs.11,67,719/- claimed by the 1st respondent, it is entitled for only a sum of Rs.5,49,117/-. This includes the admitted amount of Rs.88,000/-. When such was a meticulous and detailed assessment by the trial Court, we fail to under stand as to how it suffers from any infirmity. 12. This includes the admitted amount of Rs.88,000/-. When such was a meticulous and detailed assessment by the trial Court, we fail to under stand as to how it suffers from any infirmity. 12. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is that the contract shall be deemed to have been terminated on the date of the letter i.e. 10.12.1983, marked as Ex.A3 and non on 29.12.1983 i.e. the date of receipt of it by the 1st respondent. It is very difficult to accept this contention. The mere signing of a letter of termination does not by itself, bring about severance of relation. It is only when the intention of one of the parties to the contract to terminate the sale is conveyed to the other, that the event takes place. In the instant case, the letter of termination reached the 1st respondent only on 29.12.1983. Naturally it is entitled to be paid for the works executed up to that date. 13. Assuming that the work was done beyond the date of termination, the appellants cannot enrich themselves with the works done by the 1st respondent. If they had any serious objection, they ought to have prevented the 1st respondent from undertaking any works beyond the date of termination. When law recognizes the obligation of even a person, who received any goods or service gratuitously, the appellants cannot be extricated from their liability to pay the value for the works executed by the 1st respondent. 14. We do not find any merits in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. 15. The miscellaneous petition filed in this appeal shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.