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2013 DIGILAW 4231 (MAD)

Sterling Holiday Resorts [India] v. Murli Khemchand

2013-12-18

P.N.PRAKASH, S.RAJESWARAN

body2013
Judgment : P.N. Prakash, J. 1. The petitioners [hereinafter would be referred to as "the accused"] who are the accused in CC.No.65 of 2012 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ootacamund are before us to quash the said proceedings initiated against them by way of a private complaint filed by the respondent, M/s.P.M. Associates [hereinafter would be referred to as " the complainant"] for alleged offences u/s.447 and 380 IPC. 2. It would be appropriate to narrate a few facts admitted by both sides in order to appreciate the rival contentions. The accused were the owners of 6.99 acres of land with buildings, furniture and fixtures thereon and were running a Holiday Home in Ooty. They had mortgaged the said property with both movables and immovables with the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited [IFCI] for the purpose of raising loan. They had defaulted in repayment of loan. Therefore, IFCI brought their properties to sale in exercise of their powers under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 [SARFEASI Act] and the complainant purchased the same sometime in 2011 for a total consideration of Rs.20,00,10,000/-. A Sale Certificate dated 16.09.2011 was executed in favour of the complainant by IFCI. It is the case of the complainant in the private complaint that on 09.12.2011 and 10.12.2011, the accused had removed movables worth Rs.6 crores from the said property in lorries and thereby, they had committed the offences u/s.447 and 380 IPC. It is the further case of the complainant that he lodged a complaint on 15.12.2011 with the D1 Police Station in Ooty, based on which, a First Information Report was registered which later came to be closed on 02.03.2012 as "Mistake of Fact" after due notice to the complainant. Therefore, it is the case of the complainant that he has no other alternative remedy except to prefer a private complaint to prosecute the accused for the aforesaid offences. 3. Per contra, Mr.Ar.L.Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the counsel on record for the accused admitted that the complainant had purchased the property on 16.09.2011 under SARFEASI Act from IFCI and subsequent to that, when the accused paid the mortgage amount to IFCI, they had cancelled the Sale Certificate given to the complainant on 08.02.2012 and also refunded the sum of Rs.20,00,10,000/- to the complainant. Aggrieved by that, the complainant preferred WP.No.4088/2012 before this Court wherein he has stated in no uncertain terms in his affidavit that he was not given possession of the property by IFCI and that the prayer in the writ petition itself was to quash the order of IFCI dated 08.02.2012 and for further directions to hand over possession of the property with the movables to him. While this writ petition was pending, the complainant's complaint dated 15.12.2011 was registered as First Information Report in Cr.No.180/2012 on 20.02.2012 for an offence u/s.380 IPC. Thereafter, on 02.03.2012, the police treated the complaint as "Mistake of Fact" after issuing notice to the complainant. Thereafter, the complainant has filed the present private complaint which has been taken on file by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ootacamund, in CC.No.65/2012, to quash which they are now before us. 4. Under normal circumstances, this quash petition should have been listed before a learned Single Judge. It appears from the records that the quash petition came up before the Portfolio Judge and during the course of arguments, it was brought to his notice that WP.No.4088/2012 filed by the complainant is pending before the Division Bench and therefore, the learned Single Judge directed that the quash petition may also be heard and disposed of along with WP.No.4088/2012. It was also brought to our notice that WP.No.4088/2012 was finally disposed of on 23.08.2013 by the Division Bench which allowed the prayer of the complainant to set aside the order of cancelling the Sale Certificate dated 16.09.2011 issued to the complainant. Aggrieved by the order in WP.No.4088/2012, the accused have filed SLP [Civil] No.27591 - 592/2013 in the Apex Court in which the following order has been passed on 16.09.2013: "Notice shall be issued to unrepresented respondents only. In the meanwhile, status quo shall be maintained concerning the subject property in all respects." No orders were passed by the earlier Division Bench in the quash petition because, both counsels seem to have requested the Division Bench to give priority to the writ petition and soon after the order in WP.No.4088/2012 was passed, one of the Judges of the Division Bench [Hon'ble Ms. Justice K.SUGUNA] retired. Hence, this quash petition is before us. 5. Justice K.SUGUNA] retired. Hence, this quash petition is before us. 5. The short point that arises for consideration in this quash petition is whether the complaint discloses the commission of the offences u/s.447 and 380 IPC for the learned Magistrate to proceed with against the accused. 6. Mr.Shanmugam, learned counsel for the complainant drew our attention to the following averments in the Possession Notice dated 21.08.2009 given by IFCI:- "The borrower having failed to repay the amount, a notice is hereby given to the borrower and the public in general that the undersigned has taken over the possession of the property described herein below in exercise of powers conferred on him under section 13[4] of the said Act, 2002 read with Rule 8[1] and 9 of the said Rule on this 21st day of August 2009. The borrower in particular and the public in general is hereby cautioned not to deal with the property and any dealings with the property will be subject to the charge of the IFCI for an amount of Rs.17,71,78,492/- as on 30.10.2007 with further interest thereon at the contractual rate." He submitted that since his complaint dated 15.12.2011 did not evoke any response from the police, he filed Crl.OP.No.1760/2012 u/s.482 Cr.P.C., before this Court seeking for a direction to the police to register a case against the accused. Accordingly, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Crl.OP.No.1760/2012 by order dated 10.02.2012, has directed the police to register a case based on the complaint dated 15.12.2011 and to take up the investigation. We find from the order of the learned Single Judge that he has very categorically stated that the final report needs to be filed only if there are adequate grounds available. In compliance with the said order, the police registered a case in B-1 Town Central Police Station Cr.No.180/2012 for an offence u/s.380 IPC and after investigation, they closed the same as "Mistake of Fact" on 02.03.2012, after giving due notice to the complainant. Thereafter, the complainant has filed the impugned complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ootacamund, narrating the same facts. Thereafter, the complainant has filed the impugned complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ootacamund, narrating the same facts. It was the complainant's grievance that the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ootacamund was also not taking any action on the private complaint and therefore, he once again approached this Court in Crl.OP.No.17096/2012 wherein a learned Single Judge, by order dated 29.07.2012, has given a direction to the learned Judicial Magistrate to expeditiously apply his mind and decide about the further course of action in the matter. Pursuant to the said direction, the learned Judicial Magistrate, has taken cognizance of the offence and issued summons to the accused, aggrieved by which, they have come by way of the present quash petition. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the complainant that this Court should not interfere in the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance in the light of the two orders passed by this Court in the two proceedings stated above. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied upon the following judgments:- [a] A.R.ANTHULAY Vs. RAMDAS SRINIWAS NAYAK AND ANOTHER [1984 CRI. L.J. 647] ; [b] JAGDISH RAM Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [AIR 2004 SUPREME COURT 1734] ; and [c] PANCHABHAI POPOTBHAI BHUTANI AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [2010 CRI. L.J. 2723]. [BOMBAY FULL BENCH JUDGMENT]. 7. These judgments were cited by the learned counsel for the complainant to drive home the point that this Court should be slow in interfering with the order of cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate and should not stifle the prosecution at its nascent stage. Lastly, he would vehemently contend that the ruling relied upon by the learned Senior counsel for the accused reported in 2006 [4] CTC 60 [INDIAN OIL CORPORATION Vs. NEPC LIMITED] was a judgment of section 378 IPC and not one u/s.380 IPC. It is his contention that for the offence u/s.378 IPC, punishment is provided by section 379 IPC but whereas section 380 IPC deals with theft in dwelling house and it is different from section 378 IPC. 8. Per contra, Mr.Ar.L.Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the accused repelled the contentions of the learned counsel for the complainant and placed reliance on the following rulings:- [a] INDIAN OIL CORPORATION Vs. NEPC LIMITED [2006 [4] CTC 60] [B] M/S.PEPSI FOODS LTD AND ANOTHER VS. 8. Per contra, Mr.Ar.L.Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the accused repelled the contentions of the learned counsel for the complainant and placed reliance on the following rulings:- [a] INDIAN OIL CORPORATION Vs. NEPC LIMITED [2006 [4] CTC 60] [B] M/S.PEPSI FOODS LTD AND ANOTHER VS. SPECIAL JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE AND OTHERS [AIR 1998 SUPREME COURT 128[1]] ; [c] SUNIL KUMAR Vs. M/S.ESCORTS YAMAHA MOTORS LIMITED AND OTHERS [AIR 2000 SUPREME COURT 27] ; [d] G.SAGAR SURI AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [2000 [2] SUPREME COURT CASES 636]; [e] HARSHENDRA KUMAR VS. REBATILATA KOLEY AND OTHERS [2011 [3] SUPREME COURT CASES 351] ; and [f] CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI AND OTHERS Vs. K.C.PALANISAMY AND OTHERS [2013 [3] CTC 512]. 9. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the complainant that this quash petition should not be entertained in view of the findings given in the earlier two orders passed by the learned Single Judges of this Court, [of which we have already stated above], on a careful reading of those two orders, we found that in none of the orders there is any finding to the effect that the accused are offenders in the first place. As regards the order in Crl.OP.No.1760/2012, the learned Single Judge has clearly stated in his order dated 10.02.2012, that it is a matter to be investigated by the police and added a rider "file the final report provided adequate grounds are available". The police, in compliance with the order, registered a case in Cr.No.180/2012 and after investigation, they came to a conclusion that the case is "Mistake of Fact". The complainant also admits that he has filed protest petition and also he has filed the present private complaint against the accused. Similarly, in the order in Crl.OP.No.17096/2012, a learned Single Judge, by order dated 29.07.2012 has directed as follows:- "2. In my considered opinion, when a private complaint has been filed, it is for the Magistrate to expeditiously apply his mind and to decide about the further course of action in the matter. But, the learned Magistrate is keeping it pending. If that be so, the learned Judicial Magistrate is directed to consider the complaint of the expeditiously and then proceed in accordance with law." Till this stage, the accused have no say. But, the learned Magistrate is keeping it pending. If that be so, the learned Judicial Magistrate is directed to consider the complaint of the expeditiously and then proceed in accordance with law." Till this stage, the accused have no say. After the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and issued summons to the accused, the accused have now come up with the present quash petition to quash the proceedings. Therefore, the two earlier orders of the learned Single Judges will not, in any way, take away the statutory right of the accused to approach this Court u/s.482 Cr.P.C., challenging the order of cognizance by the learned Magistrate. 10. The learned counsel for the complainant cited the rulings referred to above and contended that this Court should not stifle the prosecution and should give an opportunity to the complainant to prove his case before the learned Magistrate. There is no quarrel about this proposition that the High Court u/s.482 Cr.P.C., should be very circumspect and careful while dealing with a petition to quash the proceedings. The drock case on this aspect is STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS Vs. BHAJAN LAL AND OTHERS [1992 Supp [1] SCC 335] which has been consistently followed by the Apex Court in subsequent judgments also. Therefore, we should have to see whether the private complaint filed in this case discloses commission of cognizable offence or not and whether it is an abuse of process of Court. 11. In this regard, Mr.Ar.L.Sundaresan, learned counsel for the accused has submitted a catena of rulings which we have referred to above, in support of his contention that the complaint in question is definitely an abuse of process of Court and therefore, it should be quashed. He further contended that this case falls within the parameter Nos.1 and 3 adumbrated in BHAJAN LAL's case. They are: "[1] Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. [3] Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused." 12. [3] Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused." 12. Now we have to analyse whether the impugned private complaint discloses the commission of cognizable offence and further, is it an abuse of process of Court? 13. Possession is nine points of the law [STATE OF U.P. Vs. HARI RAM - 2013(4) SCC 280 ]. Mr.Shanmugam, learned counsel for the complainant relied upon the averments in the Sale Certificate dated 21.08.2009 [extracted above] and contended that IFCI Limited has taken over possession of the properties and therefore, the same is not with the accused. At this juncture, we posed a question to ourselves as to whether, Can we look into documents produced by the accused? The answer to this question has been settled by the Apex Court in STATE OF ORISSA Vs. DEBENDRANATH PADHI [2004 AIR SCW 6813] and HARSHENDRA KUMAR D. VS. REBATILATA KOLEY AND OTHERS [2011 [3] SCC 351]. These judgments have clarified that the High Court in exercise of its powers u/s.482 Cr.P.C., and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, can look into the documents produced by the accused which are unimpeachable and of sterling quality in nature. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, several affidavits were filed by the complainant himself in support of his prayer in WP.No.4088/2012. These documents are also before us since this quash petition was tagged along with WP.No.4088/2012 and thus they came to our notice. It has been the consistent stand of the complainant in WP.No.4088/2012 that he has not been in possession of the property in question and that he has been seeking for a mandamus to direct IFCI Limited and the accused herein to give possession. The prayer in WP.No.4088/2012 itself is to quash the order of IFCI dated 08.02.2010 cancelling the Sale Certificate and for further directions to the respondents 1 and 2 to hand over actual physical possession of the properties, both movable and immovable, to him. Even if we close our eyes to the affidavit filed by the complainant in WP.No4088/2012, we cannot feign ignorance to the document filed by the complainant along with the private complaint. Even if we close our eyes to the affidavit filed by the complainant in WP.No4088/2012, we cannot feign ignorance to the document filed by the complainant along with the private complaint. One of the documents relied upon by the complainant in his private complaint is the copy of the complaint dated 15.12.2011 given by him to the police which later came to be close as "Mistake of Fact". In the said complaint dated 15.12.2011, he has averred, "However, because of certain proceedings are pending between the IFCI Limited, taking advantage of the pendency of proceedings and in view of the fact that physical possession of the properties purchased by us, has not been handed over to us, the said company Sterling Holidays Resorts [I] Limited and its directors R.Subramanian, S.Siddarth Shankar and Ramesh Ramanadhan have illegally and unauthorisedly removed our properties like washbasin, doors, windows etc." Even in the police complaint dated 30.01.2012, alleged to have been given by IFCI Limited which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the complainant, it is averred therein that "all the movable and immovable property of the accused company is therefore, in the symbolic possession of IFCI Limited and the accused company is prohibited from dealing with or disposing of the same in any manner whatsoever". Therefore, from the complainant's own documents, it is crystal clear that physical possession of the said properties were never with, and now also it is not with, the complainant. To make out an offence u/s.447 IPC, the accused should have trespassed into the land in possession of the complainant. Similarly to sustain the complaint for offence u/s.380 IPC, the property must have been taken away from the possession of the complainant. From a bare reading of these two penal sections, it will be abundantly clear that the complainant must have been in actual physical possession of the property in question and not a right to have the property. The argument of Mr.Shanmugam, learned counsel for the complainant that the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in NEPC's case [referred to above] would apply to an offence u/s.378 IPC, whereas this is a case u/s.380 IPC where a theft has been committed by the accused from a dwelling unit by taking away the movable property. This argument requires to be merely stated only to be rejected. The definition of theft is given in section 378 IPC. This argument requires to be merely stated only to be rejected. The definition of theft is given in section 378 IPC. It is the Genus and 380 IPC is one Specie of the offence of theft. Theft is defined in section 378 IPC as "involves removal of property from the possession of another". Possession is a concomitant incidence of theft is no more res integra. In STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. VISHWANATH TUKARAM UMALE AND OTHERS [ AIR 1979 SC 1825 ] it is clearly stated that "It is an essential element of offence of theft that the movable property should have been moved out of the possession of any person without his consent. That is possible only if the person moving the property had taken it out of the possession of the person concerned and transferred it to his own possession in order to move if for the purpose of taking it dishonestly. It follows that transfer of possession of the property, however transient, is an essential ingredient of an offence of theft." Assuming for a moment that the accused had removed some movables from the property in their possession, at the most it may be a blameworthy conduct, but that cannot be an offence u/s.380 IPC. Symbolic possession is not actual physical possession. We cannot import the concept of symbolic possession into the definition of theft in Section 378 IPC and expand its contours. 14. In the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in NEPC's case reported in 2006 [4] CTC 60, the facts are somewhat similar to the facts of this case. In that case, NEPC India Limited had hypothecated 2 Aircrafts belonging to them with the India Oil Corporation for the repayment of the fuel supplied by IOC. During the pendancy of the hypothecation, it was alleged by IOC that NEPC had removed the engines from the 2 Aircrafts and thereby, they had committed offences u/s.378 and 403 IPC. Repelling the contentions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an offence u/s.380 IPC was not made out as the Aircrafts were never in the possession of IOC. Applying the said ratio in this case, the properties in question were never in the possession of the complainant and therefore, the complaint is misconceived and is an abuse of process of Court. Repelling the contentions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an offence u/s.380 IPC was not made out as the Aircrafts were never in the possession of IOC. Applying the said ratio in this case, the properties in question were never in the possession of the complainant and therefore, the complaint is misconceived and is an abuse of process of Court. As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the accused, the parameter Nos.1 and 3 laid down in BHAJAN LAL's case, which we have extracted above, applies to the facts of this case. 15. Before parting, even Lord Macaulay, the author of the Indian Penal Code found it difficult to draw the discerning line in the understanding of common folks between theft and breach of trust as could be seen from Note N of the Introduction Report on the Indian Penal Code. Ultimately he said, ".. In theft, as we have defined it, the object of the offender always is to take property which is in the possession of a person out of that person's possession; nor have we admitted a single exception to this rule." "Again a carrier who opens a letter intrusted to his charge, and takes thence a bank-note, would be commonly called a thief. It is certain that his offence is not morally distinguishable from theft. Here, however, as before, we think it expedient to maintain our general rule; and we therefore designate the offence of carrier not as theft, but as criminal breach of trust." 16. Accordingly, the criminal original petition is allowed and the proceedings in CC.No.65/2012 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ootacamund, initiated against the petitioners is hereby quashed.