Judgment T.S. Sivagnanam, J. 1. This appeal by the assessee is directed against the order passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal), Chennai in Final Order No.129/2007 dated 13.2.2007. 2. The assessee is a company engaged in the manufacture of hot re-rolled products falling under Chapter 72 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The case of the assessee is that due to financial constraints, they had closed down their operations with effect from 1.4.1998. The products manufactured by the assessee, were subjected to compounded levy under Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, vide notification dated 1.8.1997. The annual capacity of the assessee was determined in terms of Rule 3 of the Hot Re-rolling Steel Mills Annual Capacity Determination Rules, 1997, as 8794.656 Metric Tonnes. The annual capacity having been so fixed, the assessee availed the benefit of the scheme under Rule 96ZP of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, as it stood during the relevant point of time. It is admitted case of the assessee that they were unable to continue to pay the Central Excise Duty under the said scheme. This led to the issuance of two show cause notices viz. first one dated 10.6.1998, for the period from September, 1997 to March, 1998 for a sum of Rs.14,68,564/- and the second one dated 18.5.1999, for the period from April, 1998 to March, 1999 for a sum of Rs.26,38,800/-, in all, demanding Rs.41,07,364/- together with interest in terms of Rule 96ZP of the said Rules. Admittedly, the assessee did not submit any reply to the show cause notices, but participated in the adjudication proceedings. The Original Authority by order dated 3.10.2001, confirmed the proposal made in the notices dated 10.6.1998 and 18.5.1999. 3. Challenging the said order, the appellant preferred appeal to the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, it appears that the appellant engaged a Consultant to represent them; but, the Consultant did not appear before the Tribunal on more than one occasion and therefore, the Tribunal proceeded to consider the matter on merits by perusing the records and hearing the departmental representative. The Tribunal by order dated 13.2.2007, confirmed the order passed by the Original Authority. The Tribunal by order dated 13.2.2007, confirmed the order passed by the Original Authority. Aggrieved by the same, the assessee has put forth this appeal, which has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: "a) Whether the Tribunal was justified in refusing to accede to the appellant's request for adjournment on the ground that the appellant was all along represented by a Company Secretary and not by a Consultant? b) Whether the Tribunal was justified in upholding the demand contrary to Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1994 on the ground that Rule 96ZP of the Central Excise Rule, 1944 was contained where no period of limitation is prescribed? c) Whether Rule 96ZP of Central Excise Rule, 1944 and Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are the charging provisions and also provide for machinery for recovery of due?" 4. We have heard Mr.C.Saravanan, learned Counsel appearing for the assessee, and Mr.V.Sundareswaran, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3. 5. The first contention of the assessee is that notices were issued covering two spells viz. from September, 1997 to March, 1998 and April, 1998 to March, 1999. It is submitted that it cannot be disputed that the assessee stopped production with effect from 1.4.1998 and therefore, the question of demanding duty for the period beyond 1.4.1998, is not sustainable and consequently, the demand of Rs.26,28,800/- is not tenable. Learned Counsel for the assessee further submitted that the notices dated 10.6.1998 and 18.5.1999, are clearly barred by limitation as the authorities invoked Section 11A of the Act for its issuance. Therefore, it is contended that the entire proceedings are vitiated and the demand is not sustainable. Learned Counsel further submitted that though the procedure under Section 3A of the Act read with Rule 96ZP of the Rules, is a special scheme, the notice of demand of duty cannot be issued except by following the procedure under Section 11A and if the said provision is to be made applicable, then the demand is wholly barred by limitation. 6. 6. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3, contended that the issue raised by the assessee, is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of HANS STEEL ROLLING MILL V. COMMISSION OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHANDIGARH reported in 2011 (265) E.L.T. 321 (SUPREME COURT), and the Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of its earlier decision in the case of COMMISSIONER V. VENUS CASTINGS PVT. LTD. reported in 2000 (117) E.L.T. 273 (SUPREME COURT), which has also been followed by the Tribunal in the impugned order. Therefore, it is contended that the procedure under compounded levy scheme, is a separate procedure and the question of applying Section 11A to such scheme is not tenable and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the time limit prescribed under one scheme, could be unwarranted for another scheme and the time limit under Section 11A is not an exception. Learned Standing Counsel further submitted that though the assessee claims that the Unit has stopped production from 1.4.1998, no intimation was given to the department and therefore, the assessee cannot plead that they are not liable to pay duty beyond 1.4.1998. 7. Learned Standing Counsel further submitted that on 27.7.1998, the assessee had written to the Superintendent of Central Excise, Pappireddipatty, stating that they are proposing to start production program by 3.8.1998 onwards and they have stopped production from 1.4.1998 and this letter clearly shows that they have not intimated the Department immediately after stopping production and the procedure required to be followed, has not been followed. On the above submission, the learned Standing Counsel seeks to sustain the order passed by the Tribunal. 8. The first issue to be considered, is as to whether Section 11A of the Act has any application to the case on hand, in the light of the fact that the assessee has availed the benefit of a specially compounded levy scheme as envisaged under Rule 96ZP of the Rules. Learned Counsel for the assessee would submit that the show cause notices have been issued under Section 11A of the Act. A reading of the show cause notices issued, would make it clear that the demand has been made under Rule 96ZP of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 read with Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Similarly, the penalty has also been demanded under Rule 96ZP(3) of the Rules. A reading of the show cause notices issued, would make it clear that the demand has been made under Rule 96ZP of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 read with Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Similarly, the penalty has also been demanded under Rule 96ZP(3) of the Rules. Therefore, it would be factually incorrect to contend that the notices issued to the assessee, were under Section 11A of the Act. In fact, this very issue as raised by the assessee herein, came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hans Steel Rolling Mill (supra). The question before the Apex Court was whether the provisions of time limit that are contained in Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, are applicable to the recovery of amounts due under the compounded levy scheme for Hot-RE-rolling Mills, under the Annual Capacity Determination Rules, 1997, because otherwise, it is a separate scheme for collection of Central Excise Duty for the goods manufactured in the country. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the appellant therein is availing facilities under the compounded levy scheme (as that of the case on hand) under Rule 96ZP of the Rules. It has been further held that the appellant therein opted for and filed declarations furnishing details about the annual capacity of production and duty payable on such capacity of production. The Supreme Court pointed out that it has to be taken into consideration that the compounded levy scheme for collection of duty based on annual capacity production under Section 3 of the Act and Hot Re-roling Steel Mills Annual Capacity Determination Rules, 1997, is a separate scheme from the normal scheme for collection of central excise duty on goods manufactured in the country and under the same Rules, Rule 96P stipulates the method of payment of duty and it contains a provision regarding time and manner of payment and it also contains provisions regarding the payment of interest and penalty in the event of delay in payment or non-payment of the dues and this being a comprehensive scheme in itself, the general provisions in the Act and Rules are excluded. The Hon'ble Apex Court took note of its earlier decision in the case of COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JAIPUR VI. RAGHUVAR (INDIA) LTD. The Hon'ble Apex Court took note of its earlier decision in the case of COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JAIPUR VI. RAGHUVAR (INDIA) LTD. reported in 2000 (118) E.L.T. 311 , wherein, it was held that Section 11A of the Act is not an omnibus provision, which stipulates limitation for every kind of action to be taken under the Act and Rules, and an example was cited with regard to the Modvat Scheme and was further held that even in that particular scheme, Section 11A of the Act had no application with regard to the time limit in the administration of that scheme. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further took note of the decision in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs V. Venus Castings (P) Ltd. (supra) and held that it has squarely laid down the principle that compounded levy scheme is a separate scheme altogether and the assessee opting for the scheme, is bound by the terms of that particular scheme and Section 11A of the Act has no application for recovery under the different schemes. 9. On a perusal of Rule 96ZP of the Rules, it is evidently clear that it is a procedure of self-assessment where the manufacturers of hot re-rolled products falling under the different sub-headings in the Central Excise Tariff Act, are bound to debit the amount calculated at the rate of Rs.400/- per metric tonne at the time of clearance from the factory in the account-current maintained under Rule 173G(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, and the duty liability is to be complied as detailed in Clauses I and II under Rule 96ZP of the Rules. In terms of sub-rule (1A) of Rule 96ZP, if a manufacturer removes any of the said products without complying with the requirements of that sub-rule, such goods are liable to confiscation and the manufacturer shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding three times the value of goods or Rs.5,000/-, whichever is greater. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 96ZP starts with a non-obstante clause and in fact, it is a facility given to the manufacturer, by which, the manufacturer, may, in the beginning of each month from 1st day of September, 1997 to 31st day of March, 1998 or any other financial year, pay a sum equivalent at the rate of Rs.300/- multiplied by the annual capacity in metric tonnes. We term this as a facility in the light of Clause I(a) to Rule 96ZP, which mandates the amount to be paid at the rate of Rs.400/- per metric tonne by 31st day of March, 1998. Thus, in the light of the above factual and legal position, it has to be necessarily held that imparting the elements of the scheme of tax administration/recovery under Section 11A to a specially compounded levy scheme as provided under Rule 96ZP, would be wholly arbitrary and it would disturb the very functioning of the special scheme and the time limit prescribed under the special scheme, cannot be done away with by the time limit specified under the normal procedure under Section 11A. 10. For all the above reasons, we reject the contention of the assessee that they can raise the plea of limitation under Section 11A. In fact, the Tribunal noticed that at any earlier point of time, the assessee never raised such a plea. 11. Coming to the next contention that the manufacturing activities were closed down from 1.4.1998, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3, submitted that the assessee is guilty of not informing the department about the stopping of the production and only in July, 1998, they sent a letter to the Superintendent of Central Excise, Pappireddipatty, stating that they proposed to commence operations in August, 1998. Furthermore, it is submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that these contentions were never raised before the adjudicating authority and therefore, the assessee cannot be permitted to canvass the same before this Court. 12. As already stated, the amount of duty payable for the period from April, 1998 to March, 1999 is Rs.26,38,800/-. It is specific contention of the assessee that they stopped production activities from 1.4.1998. When the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal against the order in original, the department had given written instructions to the departmental representative who appeared before the Tribunal. In the said instructions dated 2.6.2003, there is a reference to the Range Officer's report. A reading of the said report shows that the appellant has stopped their production on and from 1.4.1998 and the Unit is defunct since then. In the said instructions dated 2.6.2003, there is a reference to the Range Officer's report. A reading of the said report shows that the appellant has stopped their production on and from 1.4.1998 and the Unit is defunct since then. This has been further reiterated in the Range Officer's report, stating that they have not reopened their Unit thereafter (2003) and the Unit has incurred an accumulated loss of Rs.4,45,97,581/- as on 31.3.2002 as per the balance sheet filed with the Income Tax Department. There is no challenge to the Range Officer's report or there is any contention raised on behalf of the department, that the finding of fact as recorded in the said report, is either false or incorrect. From a perusal of the order in original, it is seen that the Original Authority has recorded a finding that HT power supply was disconnected with effect from 12.6.1998; but, however, rejected the contention by observing that based on the disconnection of power supply, they cannot presume that the assessee has stopped production since the assessee has not intimated the department. Learned Standing Counsel produced a copy of the letter of the assessee dated 27.7.1998, written to the Superintendent of Central Excise, Pappireddipatty. In the said letter, the assessee has specifically stated that they have stopped production from 1.4.1998. These factual statements made by the assessee, and the report of the Range Officer having not been denied, we accept the contention of the assessee that there were no production activities on and after 1.4.1998. In fact, the Range Officer has also written that the Unit was not reopened till June 2003. In the light of the above uncontraverted facts, we deem it appropriate that these facts should be taken into consideration by this Court, otherwise, it may lead to miscarriage of justice, more so, when these facts are borne out by records of the department and not produced by the assessee for the first time before this Court. Accordingly, we hold that the demand for payment of duty for the period from April, 1998 to March, 1999 to the tune of Rs.26,38,800/- is not sustainable in law and the order of the Tribunal in that regard is set aside. 13. Accordingly, we hold that the demand for payment of duty for the period from April, 1998 to March, 1999 to the tune of Rs.26,38,800/- is not sustainable in law and the order of the Tribunal in that regard is set aside. 13. Learned Counsel for the assessee by placing reliance on their letter dated 3.6.1998, addressed to the Superintendent of Central Excise, Pappireddipatty, submitted that they have a credit balance both capital goods and inputs, as on 31.8.1997, to the tune of Rs.7,68,866.95. 14. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the department, contended that the compounded levy scheme being a special scheme, the question of adjusting the said credit does not arise, while disputing the averment of the assessee that they had credit in their hand by way of Modvat Credit. Learned Standing Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, PONDICHERRY V. SHARADHA CASTINGS (P) LTD. reported in 2012 (277) E.L.T. 37 (MADRAS), wherein, the Division Bench after referring to Rule 57H(7) of the erstwhile Central Excise Rules, 1944, which refers to the manufacturer, who opts for exemption from payment of whole of the duty, and states that such manufacturer shall be required to pay an amount equivalent to the credit, if any, allowed to him in respect of the inputs lying in stock, observed that the case of the department is not that the respondent therein is a manufacturer, who opted for exemption from payment of whole of the duty, and with that observation, upheld the order of the Tribunal, which held that the assessee had come under the compounded levy scheme with effect from 1997 and when they switched over to this, the credit lying unutilised, be in the inputs or in the final products, lapsed in terms of sub-rule (17) of Rule 57F. 15. In the light of the undisputed fact that the assessee has availed the benefit of a specially compounded levy scheme and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sharadha Castings (P) Ltd.,(supra), the question of adjustment of the modvat credit as against the liability under Rule 96ZP, does not arise. However, it is open to the assessee to seek for reversal of credit, if any, lying to their credit, if so permitted under law. 16. However, it is open to the assessee to seek for reversal of credit, if any, lying to their credit, if so permitted under law. 16. For all the above reasons, this civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated above. No costs.