Judgment :- Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J. The appellants were the land losers. Their lands were acquired by the State for the purpose of setting up colliery. Eastern Coalfields Limited was the owner of the colliery. Under the Land Losers Scheme each one of the land losers family was assured compassionate appointment that the Coal Company could not provide. They modified the scheme offering coal at a particular rate and quantity so that they could deal with the same by making profit as and by way of alternative means of livelihood. Initially four writ petitioners filed the writ petition being WP No. 1339(w) of 1999 inter-alia claiming a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the Coal Company to forthwith allot and supply adequate quantity of coal to the petitioners under the Land Losers Scheme in respect of 62 acres of land at the rate of 1600 metric ton per acre. On our request, the appellant furnished a copy of the writ petition. Perusal of the same would denote, the petitioners offered 62 acres land to meet the requirement of the colliery. On a combined reading of the petition it appears, those four petitioners were the absolute owners of the lands. In paragraph 1 of the petition they would claim, they were the owners of the land whereas in paragraph 2 they would contend, they offered land measuring about 62 acres. Page 16 of the writ petition was the notice to demand justice where the four writ petitioners made claim, they agreed and sold 62 acres of land to the company during the period 1988-1990 for which they would be entitled to 32 employments as per the Land Losers Scheme. As and by way of alternative proposal, they would contend, if employment was not possible they would be ready to settle the issue with the Coal Company at the rate of 1600 metric ton coal per acre. Since the Coal Company did not actively consider such proposal four writ petitioners filed the said writ petition. The learned Single Judge by an order dated October 7, 1999 disposed of the writ petition with a direction upon the Respondent to allot coal at the rate of 1600 metric ton per acre for 62 acres. The order was passed in absence of the respondents. The learned Single Judge by an order dated October 7, 1999 disposed of the writ petition with a direction upon the Respondent to allot coal at the rate of 1600 metric ton per acre for 62 acres. The order was passed in absence of the respondents. The Coal Company made an application for modification that came up before the learned Single Judge when His Lordship disposed of the application for modification along with the writ petition that had been possibly disposed of by the earlier order. The learned Single Judge passed the order on February 15, 2001 asking the Coal Company to decide the matter in accordance with law “Accepting Mr. Paul and the other members of his family who were not represented at the time of hearing in connection with the plots mentioned in the writ petition and shall pass a reasoned order”. Thus we find, by the order dated October 7, 1999 the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition by directing allotment of coal. W hen the Coal Company applied for modification His Lordship modified the order by directing the Coal Company to consider the representation. While doing so, the learned Judge observed, Coal Company would consider “Mr. Paul and other members of his family”. Pertinent to note, all the four writ petitioners were having a common title “Paul” hence, it is not clear to us whether “Mr. Paul” would mean one of the petitioners having three other writ petitioners as his family members or the learned Judge wanted to mean some other family members who were not parties to the writ petition. However, learned Judge was consistent on 62 acres of land. Accordingly, the authority considered the representation by an order dated April 19, 2001 appearing at page 206 of the paper book. From the reasoned order it appears, the Coal Company called all the four writ petitioners for hearing along with “other petitioners” who signed the representation on March 9, 2001. We are told by Mr. Talukdar appearing for the appellants, they were nineteen in numbers. The concern authority verified the records and found, the original writ petitioners did not own 62 acres. They were in fact owners of 11.99 acres of land. The next batch of the petitioners, who signed the representation on March 9, 2001 that Mr. Talukdar claimed to be nineteen in numbers, were the owners of 28.79 acres of land. The concern authority verified the records and found, the original writ petitioners did not own 62 acres. They were in fact owners of 11.99 acres of land. The next batch of the petitioners, who signed the representation on March 9, 2001 that Mr. Talukdar claimed to be nineteen in numbers, were the owners of 28.79 acres of land. There was a third batch of owners being the residuary part of 62 acres which is actually 59.505 acres, measuring about 18.75 acres. They were fifteen in numbers as claimed by Mr. Talukdar. The authority considered the representation and ultimately rejected their claim on the ground, the writ petitioners and their family members being the first and second batch did not own the entire plot of land being 59.505 acres. Being aggrieved, twenty three petitioners being the first and second batch filed a second writ petition being W P No. 14367(w) of 2001. The learned Single Judge by an order dated December 3, 2001 dismissed the writ petition by observing, the land had been acquired after payment of adequate compensation hence, the writ petitioners did not have any right either to obtain job or to be allotted coal. In fact, there had been no such policy for allotment of coal. Being aggrieved, twenty three writ petitioners filed an appeal; the Division Bench heard the appeal and disposed it off by judgment and order dated January 23, 2007 appearing at page 222-233 of the paper book. The Division Bench presided over by one of us (Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J), considered the issue and observed, the second batch did not have any right to claim any relief that the learned Single Judge denied principally on the ground, they did not pursue their right by filing writ petition at the initial stage. The Division Bench rejected the contentions of the appellants, the authority misconstrued the order of learned Single Judge and rejected the claim erroneously. The Division Bench observed as follows: “The first part of the submission of Mr. Sen could be appreciated in an appeal if preferred at all from the first or the second order. We are unable to accept Mr. Sen.’s contention to the extent that the hearing officers misconstrued the order while deciding the representations. By the first order the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition by directing allotment of coal as per the modified policy. We are unable to accept Mr. Sen.’s contention to the extent that the hearing officers misconstrued the order while deciding the representations. By the first order the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition by directing allotment of coal as per the modified policy. By the second order the learned Single Judge directed the representations to be considered without touching the earlier order. If these two orders are read together, consideration of representation would only mean that the hearing officer was to find out whether the claim of the writ petitioners for benefit of 62 acres of land was correct or not. The hearing officer correctly understood the situation and decided the controversy, in our view, rightly.” From the paragraph quoted supra, it is apparent, the Division Bench rejected the claim of the second batch of petitioners on the ground, they sat over their rights. Consideration of representation that the learned Judge permitted by the modified order, would mean only, the hearing officer was to find out whether the claim of the writ petitioners for benefit of 62 acres was correct or not. The Division Bench however, permitted the claim of the original petitioners. The Division Bench observed, once the learned Judge directed the Coal Company to consider the case of the first batch of the petitioners and their claim could be sustained to the extent of 11.99 acres, they should get benefit to that extent. While doing so, the Division Bench made a comparative study with the other batch and observed as follows: “We are however, inclined to accept Mr. Sen’s second contention and the order of the learned Single Judge, in our view, could not be extended to the friends and relatives of the writ petitioners. They kept their eyes wide open and did not approach this Court. Hence, no benefit could be achieved by those parties who did not venture to approach this Court. In our view, the writ petitioners being the appellants herein would be entitled to the benefit of 11.99 acres of land at the rate so fixed by His Lordship in the first order.” The appellants accepted the order and did not prefer any appeal. Appellant being the second batch of petitioners did not prefer any appeal. In our view, the writ petitioners being the appellants herein would be entitled to the benefit of 11.99 acres of land at the rate so fixed by His Lordship in the first order.” The appellants accepted the order and did not prefer any appeal. Appellant being the second batch of petitioners did not prefer any appeal. The Coal Company filed a Special Leave Petition that the Apex Court dismissed on December 3, 2007 as would appear from the order appearing at page 124. On April 23, 2008 sixty seven writ petitioners that would include second and third batch numbering nineteen and fifteen, filed a third writ petition being WP No. 7603 of 2008 inter-alia claiming for identical benefit that the learned Single Judge specifically rejected and such decision reached finality at the Apex Court level. The learned Single Judge heard the third writ petition and dismissed it by judgment and order dated January 10, 2013. Being aggrieved, the appellants being sixty seven in numbers filed the instant appeal that we heard hear on the above mentioned dates. Mr. Samit Talukdar learned Senior Counsel argued on behalf of the appellants. Mr. Talukdar would put emphasis on the passing reference made by the Division Bench in the second paragraph as quoted above that the Division Bench made while making a comparative study between two batches. Mr. Talukdar would contend, the Division Bench was of the view, the second batch could not be extended relief as they did not file any earlier writ petition. They filed an independent writ petition subsequently. The learned Single Judge should have allowed the same. According to Mr. Talukdar, the learned Single Judge did not dismiss the writ petition on merit. The learned Judge observed, it would be hit by res judicata that would be having without any support of law. He would contend, the principle of Order II Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure or Order XXIII would have no application. He would rely upon the following decisions to contend, once the right was alive, no amount of delay would cause any prejudice to the rights of the petitioners that the learned Judge rejected. Per contra, Mr. Pradip Kumar Dutta learned Senior Counsel would contend, the Division Bench observation was clear and unambiguous. The order reached finality after dismissal of the Special Leave Petition hence, the learned Judge was right in rejecting the writ petition. Per contra, Mr. Pradip Kumar Dutta learned Senior Counsel would contend, the Division Bench observation was clear and unambiguous. The order reached finality after dismissal of the Special Leave Petition hence, the learned Judge was right in rejecting the writ petition. He would also contend, the writ petition was inordinately delayed as the appellants filed the same after about fifteen months. He confronted Mr. Talukdar’s contention that it had been filed immediately after the Apex Court decision, by contending, the appellants accepted the order of the Division Bench hence, the decision of the Apex Court would not have any role of play causing delay in filing of the writ petition. We do not find any serious argument being advanced by Mr. Talukdar on the third batch of the writ petitioners who for the first time joined hand with the second batch while filing the writ petition in 2008. We have considered the rival contentions. With deepest regard we have for Mr. Talukdar, either he was totally confused with the observation of the Division Bench quoted supra, or he would be stretching his argument beyond limit without having support of law. The first paragraph quoted supra, was the logic of the Division Bench that rejected the claim of the nineteen petitioners. The second paragraph was attributed to support the logic of allowing the appeal in part for four petitioners. While doing so, a comparative study was made between the two batches. Such comparative study could not be taken in isolation making a desperate attempt to gain support in favour of nineteen petitioners. In the first paragraph quoted supra, the Division Bench rejected claim of nineteen petitioners on the following grounds: First order of the learned Single Judge directed allotment to the four petitioners only. By the second order the learned Judge directed a representation to be made without touching the earlier order hence, if both the orders could be read together, consideration of representation would mean only to find out whether the original petitioners did have the benefit of 62 acres. Accordingly, the hearing officers understood the situation and decided the controversy that the Division Bench found “rightly”. In the second paragraph the Division Bench observed, the friends and relatives could not be extended the benefit as they kept their eyes wide open and did not approach the Court. Accordingly, the hearing officers understood the situation and decided the controversy that the Division Bench found “rightly”. In the second paragraph the Division Bench observed, the friends and relatives could not be extended the benefit as they kept their eyes wide open and did not approach the Court. When the Division Bench denied relief in 2007 on the ground, the second batch did not approach contemporaneously, we fail to understand, how a specific writ petition could cure the defect on that score. Learned Judge very rightly brought the issue of res judicata. Even if the principle of res judicata would not be applicable, the issue would be hit by constructive res judicata. The division Bench decided the issue finally. Nineteen petitioners accepted the view. They did not approach higher up against the specific finding of the Division Bench. We fail to understand, how the learned Single Judge could upset. Such order of the Division Bench that would be hit by the comity of Court even if we ignore the issue of res judicata. The matter could be viewed from the another angle. In the judgment and the order of the Division Bench, the Division Bench did not specifically grant leave to the second batch to file independent writ petition. If that be so, how there could be a fresh writ petition asking for the identical relief before the learned Single Judge that the Division Bench specifically rejected. Mr. Talukdar relied on the following decisions: 1. State of Maharashtra and another Vs. National Construction Company, Bombay and another reported in 1996 Volume-I Supreme Court Cases Page- 735. 2. Gangadhara Palo Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer and another reported in 2011 Volume- IV Supreme Court Cases Page-602. In the decision in the case of Gangadhara Palo (supra), the Apex Court observed, dismissal of a Special Leave Petition by giving reason would definitely suggest a merger of the High Court order into the order of the Supreme Court. The doctrine of merger would however, not be applicable when a Special Leave Petition is dismissed without any reason. We are unable to apply the ratio decided in the instant case as we do not find any scope. Nobody has argued before us, the doctrine of merger would apply in the instant case. The Division Bench judgment and order was delivered in 2007. The appellants accepted the said decision by not preferring any appeal higher up. We are unable to apply the ratio decided in the instant case as we do not find any scope. Nobody has argued before us, the doctrine of merger would apply in the instant case. The Division Bench judgment and order was delivered in 2007. The appellants accepted the said decision by not preferring any appeal higher up. The respondent filed a Special Leave Petition that the Apex Court dismissed the writ petition. Hence, the order reached finality. The doctrine of merger has no application. In the case of State of Maharashtra (supra) the second suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it would involve identical question that would arise in the first suit. The Apex Court found, while earlier suit was dismissed on the technical ground of non-joinder of necessary party the plea of res judicata would not apply. In the instant case, the Division Bench considered the claim on merits and found it inordinately delayed. Moreover, they were not parties to the writ petition filed in 1999 that permitted hearing of representation. Hence, the Division Bench rejected second batch on two grounds: i) They were not parties to the writ petition hence; benefit of the order could not be extended to them. ii) They were sitting on the fence keeping their eyes wide open. The petition was grossly delayed. Had the second issue not been there, we would have accepted the contention of Mr. Talukdar. The land that the Coal Company purchased, was during the period 1988-1990. The original petitioners filed the first writ petition was in 1999. Hence, the claim was delayed by nine years. The Division Bench ignored such delay as the parties accepted the order directing consideration of the representation. Such accepted position could not be extended to others who were not present. Hence, the second batch was not considered having approached after eleven years, that is 2001. The Division Bench found it inordinately delayed and in our view, very rightly, hence, on all counts, the claim of the second batch could not be sustained. The case of the third batch was even worse, their approach was made only in 2008 i.e. after eighteen years. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. The case of the third batch was even worse, their approach was made only in 2008 i.e. after eighteen years. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on their usual undertaking. Dr. Mrinal Kanti Chadhuri, J: I agree.