JUDGMENT : N.V. Anjaria, J. The following substantial question of law was framed at the time of admission of this appeal for consideration. "What is the scope of jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit of the plaintiff in view of the finding of the revenue authorities as affirmed in appeal under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879? 2. This appeal challenges the judgment and decree dated 26th march 1990 of the learned Joint District Judge, Jamnagar whereby he dismissed the Civil Regular Appeal No.45 of 1984 before him and in turn confirmed the judgment and decree dated 30th August 1983 passed in Regular Civil Suit No.154 of 1979 by the learned 3rd Joint Civil Judge (S.D.) Jamnagar. 3. It is in the context and background of the facts set out in the succeeding paragraphs that the above question arises the respondent herein, since deceased now through his heirs, was the original plaintiff who in his aforesaid suit prayed for declaration and permanent injunction that the suit lands were of his ownership and occupancy since the times of his forefathers. It was the case in the plaint that the plaintiff was resident of village Sankaria, Taluka Khambhaliya, District Jamnagar, that he was the owner of the lands bearing Survey Numbers 59, 77, 82 and 86 admeasuring 23 Acres and 25 Gunthas situated in the sim of village Sankaria and that he was in possession of the said land since more than 100 years from the times of his forefathers. It was the case of the plaintiff that in respect of Survey Numbers 77, 82 and 86, an Entry in the records of the erstwhile Navanagar State were recorded and in the Samvat Year 1967 and onwards the forefathers of the plaintiffs were shown in possession. It was stated that the records showed the names of the father as well as the father of the grandfather of the plaintiff. It was the case that the forefathers remained in possession continuously and at no point of time left the possession of the suit lands. 3.1. It was further stated that in the year 1954, the Mamlatdar filed encroachment case No.31 of 1954 against the father of the plaintiff wherein the order was passed on 5th December 1954 and fine was imposed. 3.1. It was further stated that in the year 1954, the Mamlatdar filed encroachment case No.31 of 1954 against the father of the plaintiff wherein the order was passed on 5th December 1954 and fine was imposed. Against the said order of removal of the encroachment, an appeal was filed before the Deputy Collector, which came to be dismissed. However, further appeal before the Collector from the order of Deputy Collector was allowed. The Collector by his order dated 30.05.1958 remanded the matter to Mamlatdar, Khambhaliya to proceed under section 37 of the Land Revenue Code. The Mamlatdar, in the said proceedings passed order dated 30th October 1962 that the land was of the ownership of the Government. The plaintiff thereafter preferred appeal before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal being No.414 of 1973. The Tribunal remanded the matter again to the Mamlatdar by order dated 30th February 1975. The Mamlatdar undertook inquiry under section 37(2) of the Land Revenue Code and again came to conclusion by order dated 26th December 1975 that the land was of the ownership of the Government. The plaintiff initiated another round of challenge before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by preferring Appeal No.199 of 1976, which came to be dismissed by the Revenue Tribunal as per order dated 14th October 1976. 3.2. The suit was contested by the defendant State. In the Written Statement (Exh.14) it was contended that the suit was bad for want of notice under section 80, that the plaintiff having not exhausted all the remedies, the suit was barred under the provisions of Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act. It was further contended that the ownership of the Government was established pursuant to enquiry by the competent authority under section 32 of the Code. The defendant did not admit the say of the plaintiff that the suit lands were running in the name of plaintiff's father and grandfather in the old revenue records of erstwhile Navanagar State. In nutshell, the defendant asserted its ownership and contended that the plaintiff was a trespasser on the land not entitled to continue in possession. 4. Heard learned A.G.P. Mr. Janak Raval for the appellant State and learned advocate Mr. A.H. Desai for the respondents. 4.1. It was submitted by learned A.G.P. that the respondent-plaintiff before instituting the suit, had failed to establish his case before the revenue authorities. 4. Heard learned A.G.P. Mr. Janak Raval for the appellant State and learned advocate Mr. A.H. Desai for the respondents. 4.1. It was submitted by learned A.G.P. that the respondent-plaintiff before instituting the suit, had failed to establish his case before the revenue authorities. He contended that once the Revenue Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the civil court would be very much narrow. It was submitted that both the courts were in clear error in recording the finding contrary to the findings recorded by the Revenue Tribunal. He further submitted that in any view the ownership of the Government was established in the proceedings under section 37(2) of the Bombay Revenue Code. Therefore, it was submitted that there was no cause for the plaintiff to seek relief of declaration in respect of his ownership of the suit lands in the civil court and there was no scope that civil court could grant such declaration. 4.2. On the other hand, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the jurisdiction of the civil court was not barred even after the decision in the revenue proceedings by the revenue authorities including the Tribunal. Once that was the position, learned advocate submitted, that the civil court will have full jurisdictional scope to decide go the dispute aspects of the matter and decide the case and claim of the plaintiff on the basis of the evidence led before him. He submitted that in that sense it could not be said that the scope of the jurisdiction of the civil court was narrow or that the civil court would be bound by and decision taken by the revenue authorities. He submitted, taking the court through the record, that by no stretch of reasoning, the plaintiffs could have been be treated as trespassers on the land. It was submitted that on the contrary the enquiry ordered by the Collector was with regard to the ownership of the suit lands. He relied on amongst other documents the order at Exh.36 and submitted that the declaration of his ownership granted by both the courts below was proper and legal. 5. Before adverting to the facts the controversy here, the question of law may be addressed. Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 regarding Civil Court, jurisdiction reads as under. He relied on amongst other documents the order at Exh.36 and submitted that the declaration of his ownership granted by both the courts below was proper and legal. 5. Before adverting to the facts the controversy here, the question of law may be addressed. Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 regarding Civil Court, jurisdiction reads as under. "The Court shall (subject to the provision herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation (I): A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decisions of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. Explanation (II): For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place." Whereas, section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act,1876 provides thus: "Section 11 : Suits not to be entertained unless Plaintiff has Exhausted Right of Appeal : No civil Court shall entertain any suit against the Government on account of any act or omission of any Revenue Officer unless the plaintiff first proves that previously to bringing his suits he has presented all such appeals allowed by the law for the time-being in force, as within the period of limitation allowed for bringing such suits it was possible to present." 5.1. There is no gainsaying that even after the decision of the Revenue Tribunal, the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to try the suit and adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties. The limiting fetter is the rider operating from section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act,1876. It provides that no civil court shall entertain any suit against the Government on account of any act or omission of any revenue officer in as much as the plaintiff first proves that previously to bring his suit he had presented all such appeal allowed by the law for the time being in force. 5.2. What is provided in section 11 of the Act has its own purpose to serve. 5.2. What is provided in section 11 of the Act has its own purpose to serve. An aggrievement of the party arising out of an act omission on part of revenue authority must be taken to its logical end by exhausting the appeal remedies which may be available, before civil court's jurisdiction could be invoked in that regard. The section in its purport and import enacts a bar to that extent. The jurisdiction of civil court is not ousted as such, but is pushed back until the remedies of appeal allowed by the law are availed of. In other words, it is a kind of conditional bar on civil court's jurisdiction, and need not be viewed as total fetter thereon. The legislative intent appears is that issue or question falling under the revenue laws should attain finality and in the decisional process in the revenue jurisdiction, the party should not be allowed to make the civil court intervene or interpose. This, indirectly also subserve the object of shortening the litigation and avoiding multiplicity of litigation. The difference between the revenue jurisdiction and the civil jurisdiction and the kind of rights which could be agitated in the said two distinct realm also explain the logic. 5.3. In Sankalchand Jaychandbhai Patel v. Vithalbhai Jaychandbhai Patel, 1997 (2) GLR 1041 it was held as under: "6. A reading of the section would clearly indicate that there is a prohibition on the Civil Court to entertain any suit against the Government, on account of any act or omission of any Revenue Officer, unless the plaintiff first proves that he previously brought it by way of an appeal before the competent authority and within the time prescribed. Without availing of that remedy, he cannot present the suit against the State. The question is whether Section 11 applies to the inter se claim of the private parties It would be seen that the learned single Judge has construed Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, and concluded that Section 11 prohibits entertainment of the suit between private parties unless the plaintiff has exhausted right of appeal or revision prescribed therein and available to him before he resorts to the suit challenging the order passed by the Revenue Officer. A reading of Section 11 does not indicate any prohibition on private parties inter se to avail of the remedy of a suit provided under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.). Section 9 of C.P.C. does not expressly or by necessary implication, prohibits the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit based on title. [para 6] 7. It is settled law that mutation entries are only to enable the State to collect revenues from the persons in possession and enjoyment of the property and that the right, title and interest as to the property should be established de hors the entries. Entries are only one of the modes of proof of the enjoyment of the property. Mutation entries do not create any title or interest therein. Therefore, the view taken by the learned single Judge, with due respect, is not correct in law. The Civil suit is clearly maintainable. The High Court rightly granted injunction restraining the appellants from alienating the land. Even otherwise, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 lis pendens always stands in the way of the purchaser of the land subject to the result in revision." [para 7] 5.4. The above observations explain the nature of the revenue jurisdiction and the nature of rights which are decided in the proceedings before the revenue authorities. In Dallumiya Lalmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, ( 1971 GLR 668 ), the Division Bench of this court examined the challenge to the order made by the Mamlatdar pursuant to an inquiry made under section 37(2) of the Code. The court held that until a civil court in a competent suit makes inconsistent declaration and gives relief, the order would be a competent order which attracts both the bar of limitation as well as of exhaustion of alternative remedy of appeal as envisaged by section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act. In State of Gujarat v. Kolvada Grampanchayat, 2001 (2) GLR 1245 this court considered the provisions of section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act and observed that unless the plaintiff proves he has availed of the remedy of appeal available under the law for the time being in force, no civil court shall entertain the suit against the order made by any revenue officer. In that case, the question was whether the land which was subject matter of lis could be said to be covered by sub-section (4) of Section 96 of the Gram Panchayats Act, which refers to any open site or waste vacant or grazing land. The Collector had passed order in that regard and it was held that since the issue was to be dealt by the Collector under the provisions of Bombay Land Revenue Code, the suit to set aside the order of the Collector was barred unless all the remedies of appeal were exhausted. 6. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the plaintiff-respondent claimed declaration about the ownership of the land bearing Survey Nos.59, 77, 82 and 86. The dispute in the suit instituted before the Civil Court was therefore one of title of the suit properties. For adjudicating the issues of ownership and incidental rights, the civil court's jurisdiction was clearly attracted. Once the civil court's jurisdiction was opened up in the suit of the plaintiff, it cannot be said that since the matter had earlier gone to the revenue authorities, the jurisdiction of the civil court was delimited thereby. The civil court exercising jurisdiction under section 9 of the Code would be within its competence to try the suit full-fledged un-truncated by the decisions which were rendered by the revenue authorities. This is not to say that the decision and the material produced before the revenue authorities in the remedies exhausted before the institution of the suit, were irrelevant or not germane. However, the nature of dispute tried before the revenue authorities in the revenue jurisdiction had a different complexion. In that different kinds of rights were propagated and determined which could be determined by the revenue authorities only. A pure question of title, for instance, as arises in the present case, could not have been finally gone into by the revenue authorities. Therefore, though whatever material considered by the revenue authorities in respect of the subject matter, the same could also be considered by the civil court while trying the suit, but the civil court could not be tied down by the findings and decisions which may have been taken by the revenue authorities. Therefore, though whatever material considered by the revenue authorities in respect of the subject matter, the same could also be considered by the civil court while trying the suit, but the civil court could not be tied down by the findings and decisions which may have been taken by the revenue authorities. In other words, the civil court may at the best be guided by the material which was before the revenue authorities and the decisions taken by those authorities, but the civil court would not be glided by those materials and findings in its adjudicatory process of the suit. 7. On a closure scrutiny of the facts of the present case, the rights of the plaintiff were found to be flowing from one of the order (Exh.36) which was an order of the Mamlatdar in Case No.17 of 1975. As already noted at one point of time the matter was remanded by the Collector for the purpose of enquiry under section 37(2) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code before the Mamlatdar. The order passed by the Mamlatdar therein is at Exh.36. The ownership of the property of the plaintiff is discernible and traceable from the findings recorded in the suit order itself. 7.1. Admittedly, the suit lands were originally owned by the ancestors of the plaintiff. Even the appellant State Government did not dispute that position. The order (Exh.36) mentioned that it was evident from the evidence produced by the State Government itself that the land was belonging to the ancestors of the plaintiff since the times of Navanagar State. It was however recorded that the land was thereafter forfeited. At the same time, it was also stated that whether the possession was resumed back or not was not possible to be ascertained, even though the land was shown to be Government land. There was nothing on record to show that the ancestors of the plaintiffs were ousted from the possession of their land. Nor it came out anywhere from the evidence that they themselves relinquished the possession. If the lands were forfeited, for resumption of possession, some communication or notice must have been given. No such communication or notice came forth from the revenue authorities. Nor it came out anywhere from the evidence that they themselves relinquished the possession. If the lands were forfeited, for resumption of possession, some communication or notice must have been given. No such communication or notice came forth from the revenue authorities. It was also admitted that in the measurement register, the name of the ancestors of the plaintiff were inserted and it was recognised that their ownership existed since earlier times and for long it existed. Therefore, the order (Exh.36) of the Mamlatdar accepted clear trappings of ownership of land also recognised long continued and uninterrupted possession of the land on their part. However, it was then reasoned that aspect namely the virtue of long possession and plaintiff's ownership could be accepted only by regularising the possession but it was not the subject matter of the proceedings, it was observed. 8. It was thus established that the possession of the plaintiff of the said Survey Number lands had continued uninterrupted since the time of his ancestors and his ancestors were shown as owners of the said land in the Khatavahi of the years 1917 to 1922 of the erstwhile State. In passing the order under section 37(2) of the Land Revenue Code, that the ownership was of the Government, the authorities had no evidence. The Mamlatdar proceeded on the footing that at one point of time, the land was declared as Government waste land, but admitted that the possession continued and further noted that the ownership was traceable in the record of the erstwhile State Navanagar in the Khatavahi of the erstwhile State. Therefore, in passing the order under section 37(2) the Mamlatdar mixed up the two issues of ownership and possession, though holding that both were with the plaintiff. In the appeal Revenue Tribunal confirmed the Mamlatdar's order, which was an error in respect in that way, when the civil court perceived the matter and the right of the plaintiffs in its civil jurisdiction, it was entirely justified in allowing the suit on the basis of evidence considered by it. 8.1. In the suit, the plaintiff examined himself at Exh.33 and deposed that he was doing agricultural business since the time of his forefathers and the land was in their possession since the said earlier times. 8.1. In the suit, the plaintiff examined himself at Exh.33 and deposed that he was doing agricultural business since the time of his forefathers and the land was in their possession since the said earlier times. It came in his evidence that his forefathers namely Bhim Maya and Maya Kumbha were shown as owners in the revenue records of the erstwhile Navanagar State. 8.2. The trial court as well as the first appellate court concluded on the basis of evidence on record that the forefathers of the plaintiff or plaintiff were not divested of the possession of the suit lands at any point of time. For reaching to such a conclusion, the court had before it the evidence in nature of Exh.23 being the certified copy of Panipatraks for the Samvat Years 1974-78, which proved that the plaintiff's father and grandfather were in possession of the suit land and were cultivating. The revenue records of the suit land at Exh.29, 30, 31 and 32 were also produced to show that since 1966-67 the possession of the suit lands was with the forefathers of the plaintiff. These aspects proved on evidence before the both the courts below when considered with the contents, findings and reasoning of Exh.36 order of the Mamlatdar referred to above, clearly established that the suit lands originally belonged to the forefathers of the plaintiffs and the plaintiff had after them was the owner in possession. Both the courts further recorded that there was no evidence produced by the defendant- State to rebut the evidence produced by the plaintiff or to dislodge ownership of the land traced for the plaintiff as above and against his established possession. It was held that the appellant-defendant could not discharge its burden. 9. Both the courts below concurrently held in favour of the plaintiff while granting the declaration of ownership in respect of the said lands. The declaratory relief was granted on the basis of the material which proved the plaintiff's case as regards ownership of the land. The decree passed by the trial court granting declaration and confirmed by the first appellate court were eminently just and proper orders. No interference is required by this court in the impugned judgment and order in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction. 10. The present appeal is therefore devoid of any merits and stands dismissed. The Registry shall sent back the record and proceedings. No interference is required by this court in the impugned judgment and order in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction. 10. The present appeal is therefore devoid of any merits and stands dismissed. The Registry shall sent back the record and proceedings. Appeal dismissed.