Judgment : K. Vinod Chandran, J. 1. The petitioner claims to be espousing the cause of the unemployed youth of the Vypeen Island, situated in the State of Kerala. The petitioner’s concern seems to be in the establishment of a project by the respondents 8 and 9, a private company and an individual, admittedly not coming within the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The project is to come up in the reclaimed land of 27 acres allegedly handed over by the Government of Kerala and the Cochin Port Trust to the said respondents. Such project, if implemented, according to the petitioner, would generate employment, particularly to the unemployed youth in the Vypeen Island and generally to the unemployed youth of the State of Kerala. The petitioner relies on Article 16 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India to advance his case. 2. The petitioner contends that the right to employment is guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. But a reading of the said Article would clearly indicate that it deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Immediately we notice that the petitioner seeks implementation of a project by a private individual and a Private Limited Company on the ground that such project would generate employment to the youth of Kerala. Obviously, any employment generated thereon would not be public employment as understood in legal parlance or specifically by Article 16. Under the guise of generation of employment, that too in the private sector, the petitioner seeks to force our hand in interfering with the tender entered into by the State and its instrumentalities with private parties. 3. We are often faced with the situation of public interest litigation challenging action of the State in awarding tenders, etc. and getting a dismissal; pre-empting genuine litigations and litigants from challenging an illegal or arbitrary action. As in the instant case, the tender awarded by the State to the private party; as we understand from the frugal material provided, would be on specified conditions, which the State or the awardee; is entitled to enforce or resile from. The present litigation, we apprehend, is aimed at stultifying such enforcement of conditions spelt out in the tender and the terms of the award. 4. The present litigation, we apprehend, is aimed at stultifying such enforcement of conditions spelt out in the tender and the terms of the award. 4. The petitioner would rely on tender notifications published in newspapers and some controversies between the awarder and the awardee, as disclosed, again, from newspaper reports, to move this Court seeking positive directions for implementation of the project; all with the avowed object of generating employment. The collective right of gaining employment, if the project is implemented, is merely illusory and in any event cannot be enforced. The implementation itself is dependent upon various factors, not; at least for the present, in the realm of this Court. The ballooning jurisdiction in public interest litigations and why it should not be allowed to burst was lucidly stated in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, [ (2000) 10 SCC 644 ]: “230. Public interest litigation (PIL) was an innovation essentially to safeguard and protect the human rights of those people who were unable to protect themselves. With the passage of time PIL jurisdiction has been ballooning so as to encompass within its ambit subjects such as probity in public life, granting of largesse in the form of licences, protecting environment and the like. But the balloon should not be inflated so much that it bursts. Public interest litigation should not be allowed to degenerate to becoming publicity interest litigation or private inquisitiveness litigation. 231. While exercising jurisdiction in PIL cases the court has not forsaken its duty and role as a court of law dispensing justice in accordance with law. It is only where there has been a failure on the part of any authority in acting according to law or in non-action or acting in violation of the law that the court has stepped in. No directions are issued which are in conflict with any legal provisions. Directions have, in appropriate cases, been given where the law is silent and inaction would result in violation of the fundamental rights or other legal provisions. 232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the court’s jurisdiction”. 5. 232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the court’s jurisdiction”. 5. The observations of the Supreme Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 ] are also very apposite: “110. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the courts, innumerable days are wasted which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we are second to none in fostering and developing the newly invented concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, unrepresented and unheared; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from the undue delay in service matters, Government or private persons awaiting the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorised collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenus expecting their release from the detention orders etc, etc. – are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the courts and having their grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either for themselves or as proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation, and get into the courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the Court never moves which piquant situation creates a frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they lose faith in the administration of our judicial system”. Today, a hawks-eye has to be maintained not as much to ferret out real motives but so much, as not to miss out on genuine litigations; lest we fail to redress real public injury and vindicate legitimate public interest. Apart from meddlesome interlopers, as was noticed, we are also not oblivious of the calculated attempts to challenge State action or that of its instrumentalities, on frivolous grounds to pre-empt genuine litigants and actions. This is a conscious attempt, to then; resist further litigations on the ground of the challenge being already repelled; and to clothe such actions assailed, with the cloak of approval of the Court. 6. The reliefs sought for in the present writ petition are extracted hereunder: “(i) Direct the respondents 1, 2 and 3 to file a report before this Hon’ble Court the reason for non functioning of the project proposed by 8th and 9th respondents; (ii) Direct the 1st respondent to file a report as to whether any negligence or omission from the part of the 1st respondent is caused for the non functional of the Bolgaty project by 8th and 9th respondents. (iii) Direct the respondents 8 and 9 to file a statement with regard the volume of employment opportunities to be created by their project for the unemployed youth if the project is functional; (iv) Direct the respondents 8 and 9 to file a statement with regard to any idea of withdrawal from the project and it so, the reason for the idea of withdrawal from the project; (v) Direct the 3rd respondent to file a status report of the project before this Hon’ble Court”. All the reliefs are with respect to filing of reports by the State and its instrumentalities and statements by the party respondents. We are dismayed with the manner in which the above writ petition is filed and are even apprehensive of the real intention behind the filing of such public interest litigation with reliefs, as extracted above, intended at precipitating issues, with the junction of the Court; which we are definite, is not “a cause contributive to the general welfare of the public” which is the spirit behind ‘public interest litigations’. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balco Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [ (2002) 2 SCC 333 ] held financial or economic decisions taken by Government in exercise of its administrative power cannot be challenged in PIL unless there is violation of Article 21 and persons adversely affected are unable to approach the Court. It is well settled that the Courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction does not transgress into the field of policy making [ vide Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra)] much less in contractual matters. 7. The limitation in public interest litigation has been succinctly stated in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1981 (Supp) SCC 87]: “24. But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective. Andre Rabie has warned that “political pressure groups who could not achieve their aims through the administrative process” and we might add, through the political process, “may try to use the courts to further their aims”. Andre Rabie has warned that “political pressure groups who could not achieve their aims through the administrative process” and we might add, through the political process, “may try to use the courts to further their aims”. These are some of the dangers in public interest litigation for the court to bear in mind that there is a vital distinction between locus standi and justiciability and it is not every default on the part of the State or a public authority that is justiciable. The court must take care to see that it does not overstep the limits of its judicial function and trespass into areas which are reserved to the Executive and the Legislature by the Constitution. It is a fascinating exercise for the court to deal with public interest litigation because it is a new jurisprudence which the court is evolving, a jurisprudence which demands judicial statesmanship and high creative ability. The frontiers of public law are expanding far and wide and new concepts and doctrines which will change the complexion of the law and which were so far as embedded in the womb of the future, are beginning to be born”. The contours of judicial review cannot be thrown to the winds even in a public interest litigation. We notice with despair the large number of public interest litigations coming to the Court and being withdrawn on queries being put to the petitioners. Even in the present writ petition when we put queries regarding the sustainability of the reliefs claimed, the counsel immediately sought for withdrawal of the writ petition, especially when we expressed our mind that such writ petitions should be dismissed with exemplary costs. 8. We record our deep displeasure, but considering the plea made by the petitioner, permits withdrawal of the writ petition, but expressing our views on merits solely on the sustainability of the public interest litigation. The observations made are not to be understood at all as findings on the aspect of the tender and the proceedings thereto; and this is the sole reason why we permit the writ petition to be withdrawn. We record that we have not heard any of the respondents, but for hearing the learned Government Pleader, as an officer of the Court. We record that we have not heard any of the respondents, but for hearing the learned Government Pleader, as an officer of the Court. We are constrained to make the above observations for reasons explicit as aforementioned and since the frivolous grounds speak eloquent of the bona fides of the petitioner, who styles himself to be a pro bono public. Writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn, at the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner.