Judgment :- B.P. Dharmadhikari, J. Respondent No. 1 before this Court is a Nationalized Bank and Respondent No. 2 is its Zonal Officer. Communication dated 28.08.2012 issued by Respondent No. 2 to present petitioner informing him that in view of the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of Banking Regulations Act, 1949, (hereinafter referred to as 1949 Act) his candidature for the post of Clerical cadre in Respondent No. 1 – Bank stood cancelled, has been questioned by the petitioner in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The contention is, the Competent Court has given him benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 1958 Act) and in view of the provisions of Section 12 thereof, he cannot be subjected to any disqualification on account of said disqualification. 2. The judgment and order delivered by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandur Bazar, in Regular Criminal Case No. 133 of 2003 on 06.02.2008 is not in dispute. The petitioner Amit along with one Rahul were charged and the said Court has found both of them guilty of an offence under Section 379 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution proved that on 27.05.2003 at about 1715 hrs. the petitioner and other accused with common intention and dishonest intention moved motor vehicle of the complainant without his consent. The said Court instead of punishing them, used its powers under Section 3(4) of 1958 Act, released them on entering a bond of Rs.15,000/- each with surety to appear and receive sentence when called upon to do so during a period of one year and in the meantime to keep peace and be of good behaviour. The bond was also to contain a condition that both accused shall be under the supervision of District Probation Officer for a period of one year amongst other conditions. 3. Shri Chandurkar, learned counsel for the petitioner in this background submits that Section 12 of 1958 Act opens with non-obstante clause and, therefore, it overrides all other laws which envisage any disqualification on account of such conviction. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Divisional Personnel Officer vs. T.R. Chellappan, reported at (1976) 3 SCC 190 , Union of India vs. Bakshi Ram, reported at (1990) 2 SCC 426 , for said purpose. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Divisional Personnel Officer vs. T.R. Chellappan, reported at (1976) 3 SCC 190 , Union of India vs. Bakshi Ram, reported at (1990) 2 SCC 426 , for said purpose. Without prejudice to these contentions, he has submitted that in reply filed before this Court, the respondents have came up with a story of suppression of material informations while seeking employment. The learned counsel submits that as this is not the reason disclosed in the order of termination/ cancellation of candidature, the same cannot be looked into by this Court and such reason cannot be supplemented by filing an affidavit in reply. He is drawing support from the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MohinderSingh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, reported at 1978 SC 851. As 1958 Act is later in point of time, i.e. after 1949 Act, the 1958 Act has to prevail. 4. Shri Deo with Shri Gosavi, learned counsel for the respondents oppose the petition. They rely upon the preliminary submissions and submit that conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude is not in dispute. The provisions of Section 10 of 1949 Act are very clear and hence the petition as filed is misconceived. The petitioner was informed on 25.03.2011 that his selection was contingent upon Police verification of his character and antecedents. His appointment and confirmation thereafter in the Bank was subject to receipt of satisfactory report from the Police authorities. Thus, when the petitioner did not disclose his conviction and the fact of his probation while securing employment, he cannot make a grievance about cancellation of his candidature. The learned counsel submits that Section 12 of 1958 Act expressly refers to disqualification attached to conviction of an offence “under such law” hence, 1949 Act is not envisaged therein. He has relied upon the judgment in the case of Harichandvs. Director of School Education, reported at AIR 1998 SC 788 , for said purpose. In addition, he also seeks to rely upon the judgment reported in the case of Union of India vs. Bipad Bhanjan Gayen, reported at 2008 (11) SCC 314 , to submit that in such circumstances, no opportunity needed to be extended to the petitioner. In addition, he also seeks to rely upon the judgment reported in the case of Union of India vs. Bipad Bhanjan Gayen, reported at 2008 (11) SCC 314 , to submit that in such circumstances, no opportunity needed to be extended to the petitioner. He also seeks to rely upon the judgment in the case of KendriyaVidyalaya Sangathan vs. Ram Ratan Yadav, reported at (2003) 3 SCC 437 , to urge that the course adopted by the respondents is proper and no interference is warranted. The judgment in the case of SushilKumar Singhal vs. Punjab National Bank, reported at (2010) 8 SCC 573 , is also relied upon for the very same purpose. 5. The relevant provisions need to be briefly quoted before proceeding further. Section 10(1)(b)(i) of 1949 Act reads as under: “10. Prohibition of employment of managing agents and restrictions on certain forms of employment. – (1) No banking company - (b) shall employ or continue the employment of any person – (i) who is, or at any time has been, adjudicated insolvent, or has suspended payment or has compounded with his creditors, or who is, or has been, convicted by a criminal Court of an offence involving moral turpitude;” Similarly, Section 12 of 1958 Act reads as under: “12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction – Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law; Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4, is subsequently sentenced for the original offence.” 6. The perusal of judgment on which Shri Chandurkar, learned counsel, has placed reliance in the case of Divisional Personnel Officer vs. T.R. Chellappan, (supra) shows that there the provisions of Article 311(2) proviso (a) of the Constitution of India and Rule 14 of Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, are looked into. The employee convicted by criminal Court but released on probation had made the grievance and in the background of challenge as raised, the Hon'ble Apex Court noticed that ipso facto removal from the service cannot be upheld. The Hon'ble Apex Court then noticed that the words in Section 12 of 1958 Act, referred to two contingencies. The employee convicted by criminal Court but released on probation had made the grievance and in the background of challenge as raised, the Hon'ble Apex Court noticed that ipso facto removal from the service cannot be upheld. The Hon'ble Apex Court then noticed that the words in Section 12 of 1958 Act, referred to two contingencies. The first one is a disqualification resulting from conviction and that disqualification must be provided by some law other than Probation of Offenders Act. Section 12 does not contemplate automatic disqualification attaching to a conviction and obliteration of the criminal misconduct of the accused. The consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 12 shows that disqualification cannot be an automatic consequence of misconduct, unless the statue so requires. It is observed that proof of misconduct may or may not lead to disqualification as it rested on facts and circumstances of a particular case and the language of the statute. It is in this background that in para 15, the Hon'ble Apex Court has noted a Full Bench view of the Delhi High Court in the case of Director of Postal Services vs. Dayanand, reported at 1972 Lab. I.C. 736. The said Full Bench has observed that object of Section 12 of 1958 Act is to remove disqualification attached to conviction and “it does not go beyond it”. Important fact in this judgment is occupation of post by the respondent and his removal therefrom. 7. In Union of India vs. Bakshi Ram, (supra), High Court had relied upon provisions of Section 12 to set aside dismissal and to direct reinstatement with all consequential benefits. High Court had found that sole reason for dismissal of respondent was, his conviction under Section 10(n) of Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949, and in view of Section 12 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, there was no disqualification for him to continue in service. The Hon'ble Apex Court has allowed the appeal of Union of India and set aside the impugned order of High Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court has allowed the appeal of Union of India and set aside the impugned order of High Court. In para 13, it has observed that words “such law” are used in the context of other law providing for disqualification on account of conviction but then the Hon'ble Apex Court little later in the very same para has observed thus: “But that is not the same thing to state that the person who has been dismissed from service in view of his conviction is entitled to reinstatement upon getting the benefit of probation of good conduct. Apparently, such a view has no support by the terms of Section 12 and the order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained.” The facts show that the respondent Bakshi Ram was tried for an offence under Section 10(n) of Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949, and on 23.03.1971, he was sentenced to four months' rigorous imprisonment. Because of this conviction and sentence, he was proceeded departmentally and dismissed from service. This disciplinary proceeding was during the pendency of his appeal before the Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge upheld the conviction but released him under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. It is in this background that the Hon'ble Apex Court has looked into provisions of Section 12. Thus, conviction and disciplinary action are found to be distinct measures. The conviction under Section 10(n) leading to dismissal and protection from disqualification under Section 12 of 1958 Act are thus found to be independent of each other. This appears to be in consonance with the view expressed by the Hon'ble three judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Divisional Personnel Officer vs. T.R. Chellappan, (supra). 8. We may straightway go to recent judgment in the case of SushilKumar Singhal vs. Punjab National Bank, reported at (2010) 8 SCC 573 , where the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and Section 12 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, are looked into. The Hon'ble Apex Court has in para 22 extracted Section 10 (1)(b)(i) of the 1949 Act and then in para 28 applied the law. Conclusions reached by the Hon'ble Apex Court shows that once a criminal Court grants a delinquent employee benefit of the 1958 Act, its order does not have any bearing so far as the service of such employee is concerned. Conclusions reached by the Hon'ble Apex Court shows that once a criminal Court grants a delinquent employee benefit of the 1958 Act, its order does not have any bearing so far as the service of such employee is concerned. The word “disqualification” in Section 12 of 1958 Act is construed to mean that such a person does not stand disqualified for the purposes of other Acts like Representation of the People Act, 1950, etc. The conviction in a criminal case is independent of his release on probation. Grant of benefit under 1958 Act only enables the delinquent to avoid sentence on showing good conduct. In case of an employee who stands convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, it is his misconduct that leads to his dismissal. The Hon'ble Apex Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal of the employee. 9. Some arguments have been advanced before us about the use of word “such” in Section 12 of 1958 Act. Section 12 which opens with non-obstante clause also employees word “any other law”. It, therefore, stipulates that had a person been subjected to any disqualification because of conviction for committing an offence under law contemplated in Section 3 or 4 of 1958 Act, because of cognizance of such conviction in any other law, that disqualification stands removed. Here, the petitioner aspired to serve a Bank where the service warrants a confidence of the employer. The petitioner has been convicted of a theft. The provisions made in Banking Regulation Act, 1958, prohibits a Bank from employing such person. The petitioner's candidature for Clerk post has been cancelled. Thus, he was not issued and never issued any appointment order. He did not possess a right to post also. We, therefore, find that the matter is governed squarely by the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of SushilKumar Singhal vs. Punjab National Bank, (supra). 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Bipad Bhanjan Gayen, (supra) has noted that the respondent employee before it was only a probationer and was sent for training subject to verification of details given by him in his attestation form. The order of learned Single Judge of High Court and Division Bench of High Court setting aside his termination on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice were found unsustainable. The order of learned Single Judge of High Court and Division Bench of High Court setting aside his termination on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice were found unsustainable. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said judgment relied upon its earlier judgment in the case of Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission vs. Koneti Venkateswarulu, reported at (2005) 7 SCC 177 and found that a person who indulges in such suppression and obtains employment, does not deserve public employment. The termination for withholding relevant informations while filling in attestation form has been thus maintained by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Mere fact that the respondent was subsequently discharged from criminal case, is found not sufficient to absolve him of his liability to have filled in attestation form correctly and accurately. The petitioner before this Court was also under obligation to disclose all relevant informations and not to suppress material facts. The nature of employment which he desired to enter expected more transparency from him in this respect. His conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude needed to be disclosed. It is crystal clear that he did not disclose it and the respondents learnt about it only in exercise of verification undertaken routinely through police machinery. Support sought to be taken from the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MohinderSingh vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (supra) in this respect is misconceived. The petitioner had not stepped into employment and had no right to post. His vested right has not been taken away. On the contrary, for deliberate suppression of material fact by him, his candidature itself has been cancelled. Before issuing an appointment order, the employer has got more power and can control entry of any person in service. Use of that power by employer Bank in present facts is neither arbitrary nor perverse. 11. In this situation, no case is made out warranting interference. Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule discharged. However, there shall be no order as to costs.