JUDGMENT : K.J. Thaker, J. Learned advocate Mr. N.K. Majmudar appearing for appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 310/2007 has stated that his client has taken away the papers from him on 17.3.2008. Since we are declined to adjourn the matter, and at our request, Mr. N.K. Majmudar learned advocate has assisted this Court on behalf of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 310/2007. So far as respondent no. 1 in Criminal Appeal No. 300/2008 is concerned, though bailable warrant is served upon him, he has not engaged any advocate, and therefore, at our request, learned advocate Mr. Y.M. Thakore has assisted this Court on behalf of respondent no. 1 in Criminal Appeal No. 300/2008. 2. The appellant-ori. Accused no. 5 has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 310/2007 and the appellant-ori. Accused no. 1 has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 647/2007 under section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 18.1.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Main Court, Gandhinagar in Sessions Case No. 13/2006, whereby, the learned trial Judge has convicted the appellants-ori. Accused no. 1 & 5 under section 364A of IPC and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- each, in default, to undergo further R/I for two months. The appellants-ori. Accused no. 1 and 5 are convicted under section 365 of IPC and sentenced them to undergo R/I for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- each, in default, to undergo further R/I for one month. The appellants-ori. Accused no. 1 and 5 also convicted under section 384 of IPC and sentenced them to undergo R/I for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default, to undergo further R/I for fifteen days. The appellants-ori. Accused no. 1 and 5 also convicted under section 342 of IPC and sentenced them to undergo R/I for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default, to undergo further R/I for ten days, and the appellants-ori. Accused no. 1 and 5 also convicted under section 506(2)of IPC and sentenced them to undergo R/I for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- each, in default, to undergo further R/I for two months, which is impugned in this appeal. 3. 500/- each, in default, to undergo further R/I for ten days, and the appellants-ori. Accused no. 1 and 5 also convicted under section 506(2)of IPC and sentenced them to undergo R/I for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- each, in default, to undergo further R/I for two months, which is impugned in this appeal. 3. Criminal Appeal No. 300/2008 has been preferred by the State under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the judgment and order dated 18.1.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Main Court, Gandhinagar in Sessions Case No. 13/2006, whereby, the learned trial Judge has acquitted the respondents-ori. Accused no. 2 & 4 of the charges levelled against them. Since all the three appeals arise from the judgment and order of the trial Court, they are heard and decided by this common judgment. 3.1 At the out set, before dealing with the facts, it was sought to be contended by the learned advocate for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 647/2007 Mr. Syed that on a resort being made by him and on the basis of the term ‘ejusden generis’, the private person cannot be charged under section 364A of IPC, and the charge itself is bad in view of the amendment to Section 364A of IPC. It is submitted that his client cannot be prosecuted under the said Act. While considering the same, he has submitted that there is a difference of opinion in the decisions of Punjab & Haryana High Court and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 73/2006 with Criminal Appeal No. 709/2006 (Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jayant Patel & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Paresh Upadhyay, JJ). We are afraid that the interpretation of statutes on the term ‘ejusden generis’ that the general word are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified, and he has relied on Article by Shaily and has submitted that a common person will not be included in the said provision after its amendment in the IPC. The said amendment was brought into the statute book in the year 1995. The amendment was with a view to widen the scope of section 364A so as to avoid terrorism rampant on global scale. The said amendment was brought into the statute book in the year 1995. The amendment was with a view to widen the scope of section 364A so as to avoid terrorism rampant on global scale. It was not with a view to narrow the scope of provision but with a view to widen the scope of the section. The recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Akram Khan v. State of West Bengal, reported in (2012) SCC 406, is the answer to the submissions made by learned advocate Mr. Syed that it will not be possible for this Court to give such restricted meaning to the term ‘any other person’ as it appears in section 364A of IPC. It has to be read as per the interpretation of statutes. It has interpreted so as to give the meaning and object that the framers of the section have thought by the said legislation after the rampant global threat, and therefore, the said contention that the accused in this case cannot be said to be representative of any Government nor can it be said that the accused have tried to threaten the Government machinery. Therefore, this would not fall within the meaning of the said section, is devoid of merits. We are afraid that the said meaning will frustrate the purpose of legislation itself, and cannot be, therefore, given the meaning which the learned advocate Mr. Syed wants this Court to interpret Section 364A of IPC, which reads as under: "Section 364A. Therefore, this would not fall within the meaning of the said section, is devoid of merits. We are afraid that the said meaning will frustrate the purpose of legislation itself, and cannot be, therefore, given the meaning which the learned advocate Mr. Syed wants this Court to interpret Section 364A of IPC, which reads as under: "Section 364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.- Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or [any foreign State or international intergovernmental organisation or any other person] to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine." 3.2 The said contention of learned advocate for the appellant-accused cannot be countenanced in even light of the latest decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 73/2006 with Criminal Appeal No. 709/2006 (Coram: Jayant Patel & Paresh Upadhyay, JJ) in the case of Shaukat Hussen Hajibhai Shaikh v. State of Gujarat. Para-22 of the said decision is the answer to the submission made by the learned advocate for the appellant. The Article by Shailly has been heavily relied on and read by the learned advocate, but however, the term even if it is applied, the decision of the Apex Court has to be read and will weigh against the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court, had the interpretation as submitted by the learned advocate for the appellant been accepted, the object and purpose of section 364A would have been frustrated, and therefore, the court cannot give meaning to the legislative intent in such a way which would frustrate the very object of the section, and thus, the rule of ejusdem cannot be made applicable in the facts of this case, as recently the Apex Court in the case of Sunder alias Sundararajan v. State by Inspector of Police, reported in AIR 2013 SC 777 , upheld the conviction of the appellant therein, and thus, without further discussion, this contention is negatived. 3.3 The case of the prosecution is that the complainant is residing at Ahmedabad and is doing the business of construction. That the complainant was residing with his sons, namely Hitesh and Bhavik and their wives in a joint family. That at the relevant point of time, the complainant had floated a scheme of Navkar Bungalows at village Kudasan and construction work was going on at the site of Kudasan village. That the complainant and his two sons used to go to the site and used to take care of the construction work. That the complainant’s son, namely, Bhavik used to pay more attention to the construction work which was going on at village Kudasan. That the son of the complainant, namely, Bhavik used to go to the site by Swift Maruti Car. That the accused no. 1 namely Mahadevbhai Harjibhai Rabari was dealing in the business of land brokerage. That the accused no. 1 came into contact with the complainant as the complainant was in the business of construction. That the accused no. 1 used to visit the complainant’s house frequently and he was known to every member of the complainant’s family. Thus, so far as accused no. 3, namely Ratnabhai Rabari is concerned, he was serving as a driver of the complainant. That the accused no. 1, namely Mahadevbhai used to go to Nandasan every Sunday for Darshan at Meladi Mata temple. That since the accused no. 5 also used to come at Meladi Mata temple on every Sunday, they came into contact with each other. That the accused no. 5 was in need of money, and therefore, he had a talk with accused no. 1 that he needed money. Thereafter, the accused no. 1 asked accused no. 5 that for getting money, the accused no. 5 should kidnap the son of complainant. Thereafter, accused no. 1 and accused no. 5 had hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the son of the complainant with the help of other accused persons. That while on 21.11.2005, the son of the complainant, namely Bhavik was returning back home from Navkar Bungalows’ construction site for having lunch, nearby Kudasan road, accused no. 1 namely Mahadevbhai Rabari raised his hand and son of the complainant was stopped. That two unidentified persons were standing with Mahadevbhai. That while on 21.11.2005, the son of the complainant, namely Bhavik was returning back home from Navkar Bungalows’ construction site for having lunch, nearby Kudasan road, accused no. 1 namely Mahadevbhai Rabari raised his hand and son of the complainant was stopped. That two unidentified persons were standing with Mahadevbhai. Thereafter, they immediately took possession of car and tied a cloth piece on the eyes of Bhavik and mobile phone of Bhavik was snatched away by accused persons. Thereafter, nearby Karan nagar, the car was stopped and the son of the complainant Bhavik was made to sit in Max jeep an thereafter he was taken to one room and he was confined there by accused persons. That the accused no. 5 had snatched away golden chain, cash of Rs. 1000/- and mobile phone from Bhavik at the point of knife. Thereafter, the accused persons had demanded Rs. 75 lacs from the complainant on telephone. That lastly, on 23.11.2005, at 8.00 a.m., the accused persons had released Bhavik on Kalol Highway in rickshaw. Thereafter, Bhavik went to the house of his relative at Ambikanagar, Kalol and from there, he called the complainant to take him from there on phone. Thus, with the aforesaid allegations, the complaint was filed. 3.4 The appellants accused came to be arraigned for committing murder. The investigation being complete, the charge-sheet was laid against the present appellants. The case being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, which was given number as Sessions Case No. 13/2006. 3.5 Thereafter, the Sessions Court framed the charge below Exh. 3 against the appellants for commission of the offence under section 364A, 365, 384, 342, 504, 506(2) read with section 120B of IPC. The appellants-accused have pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3.6 To prove the case against the present appellants, the prosecution has examined the following witnesses: 1. Mahendrabhai Chandulal Shah Exh. 23 2. Bhavik Manhendrabhai Shah Exh. 25 3. Jayendrabhai Manubhai Soni Exh. 27 4. Dhruvesh Jagdishbhai Shah Exh. 28 5. Malek Shakilahmed Noormahmad Exh. 29 6. Pareshkumar Ramanlal Thakor Exh. 30 7. Vanuben Ishwarbhai Desai Exh. 32 8. Vinodkumar Krishnakumar Dixit Exh. 33 9. Jaswantsinh Shivsinh Rathod Exh. 36 10. Mrugeshbhai Arunbhai Raval Exh. 38 11. Lilaben Ramanji Ranchhodji Thakor Exh. 40 12. Pinakin Shankarlal Parmar Exh. 49 13. Kaushik Arunbhai Shikari Exh. 54 14. 28 5. Malek Shakilahmed Noormahmad Exh. 29 6. Pareshkumar Ramanlal Thakor Exh. 30 7. Vanuben Ishwarbhai Desai Exh. 32 8. Vinodkumar Krishnakumar Dixit Exh. 33 9. Jaswantsinh Shivsinh Rathod Exh. 36 10. Mrugeshbhai Arunbhai Raval Exh. 38 11. Lilaben Ramanji Ranchhodji Thakor Exh. 40 12. Pinakin Shankarlal Parmar Exh. 49 13. Kaushik Arunbhai Shikari Exh. 54 14. Dhiren Jayantilal Lariya Exh. 61 15. Amit Chandrakant Bhatt Exh. 65 16. Pranavbhai Vasantbhai Sodha Exh. 68 17. Dashrathsinh Joravarsinh Vaghela Exh. 85 18. Digvijaysinh Pathubha Chudasama Exh. 87 3.7 The prosecution also relied upon the following documentary evidences so as to bring home the charges against the appellant-accused. 1. Complaint Exh. 24 2. Report u/s. 157 Exh. 86 3. Application for offence Exh. 71 4. Panchnama of scene of offence Exh. 72 5. Panchnama of scene where Bhavik was kept Exh. 41 6. Panchnama of person of accused Mahadevbhai Exh. 42 7. Discovery panchnama Exh. 73 8. Panchnama of person of accused Dinesh Exh. 43 9. Panchnama of place from where Bhavik was kidnapped Exh. 44 10. Panchnama of mobile Exh. 37 11. Panchnama Exh. 74 12. Panchnama of TI Parade Exh. 56 13. Panchnama of person of accused Ratnabhai Exh. 45 14. Panchnama of person of accused Abhuji Exh. 46 15. Panchnama of person of accused Baldevbhai Exh. 75 16. Panchnama of golden chain recovered from the shop of Jayendrabhai Soni Exh. 47 17. Panchnama of place where conspiracy was hatched Exh. 76 18. Panchnama of motor-cycle Exh. 95 19. Panchnama of TI parade of accused Abhuji and Baldevbhai Exh. 58 20. Panchnama of chain identified by Bhavik Exh. 77 21. Discovery panchnama Exh. 39 22. Panchnama of knife identified by Bhavik Exh. 78 23. Panchnama of seizure of knife & key Exh. 79 4. Thereafter, after examining the witnesses, further statement of the appellants-accused under section 313 of CrPC was recorded in which the appellants-accused have denied the case of the prosecution. 5. After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence and after hearing the parties, learned trial Judge vide impugned judgment and order dated 18.1.2007 held the present appellants-original accused guilty of the charge levelled against them under section 364A, 365, 384, 342 and 506(2) of IPC, convicted and sentenced the appellants-accused, as stated above. 6. We have heard learned advocate Mr. N.K. Majmudar learned advocate for appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 310/2007, Mr. 6. We have heard learned advocate Mr. N.K. Majmudar learned advocate for appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 310/2007, Mr. I.H. Syed learned advocate for appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 647/2007. Mr. Y.M. Thakore learned advocate for respondent no. 1 in Criminal Appeal No. 300/2008 and Ms. CM Shah learned APP for the State in all the appeals. 7. Learned advocate Mr. Syed has made an alternative submission that accused Mahadev cannot be held guilty under section 364A of IPC on the basis of the aforesaid interpretation of section 364A of IPC, and as far as section 365 of IPC and other provisions of IPC are concerned, he has already undergone the maximum punishment as he was under trial prisoner till he was convicted and till date he is not enlarged on bail. We are unable to accept the said submission for the reasons discussed hereinafter and the factual scenario as it emerges from the record of this case. Section 364A cannot be read so as to leave out the general public as a class of offenders. 8. PW-1 and 2 have categorically mentioned that ransom was asked for after kidnapping PW-2, except PW-11 Lilaben, all the witness have supported the prosecution case. Prosecution witnesses before whom the knife was produced by accused Baldev, the said panchnama has been proved, and therefore, recovery of weapon from Baldev is also proved. The ocular version of PW-2 inspires full confidence. The submission of learned advocate for accused no. 1 and 5 is that no ransom is paid. The victim says that there were certain things which he has not disclosed to anyone and there is no mentioning of amount of Rs. 75 lacs. The son, nowhere says that the ransam was demanded from father. The police is not informed by PW-2 Bhavik about his kidnapping on 21.11.2005 to 24.11.2005 and very strangely on 24.11.2005, the police had recorded the statement of PW-2 Bhavik at length, and the complainant‘s version is corroborated by the vivid description of the trauma which Bhavik faced during his kidnapping. 9. Learned advocate for the appellants further submitted that the charge is not proved beyond reasonable doubt and the dates, i.e. 21st and 25th morning were the crucial dates and there is a huge delay in recording the FIR. 9. Learned advocate for the appellants further submitted that the charge is not proved beyond reasonable doubt and the dates, i.e. 21st and 25th morning were the crucial dates and there is a huge delay in recording the FIR. Learned advocate Shri. Majmudar contended that there is no demand made by accused Baldev and there are certain contradictions in the evidence of PW-1 and 2. 10. We have gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence produced on the record. We have read the oral evidence of prosecution witness-complainant and also perused the charge framed against the appellants. The learned trial Judge has raised points which have been answered by the learned trial Judge against the accused and in favour of the prosecution. 11. While considering the genesis, the first aspect that PW-2 Bhavik was made to sit in a car and was taken from place to p[lace. The provisions of section 364A of IPC would mean kidnapping for ransom and the demand for ransom. A demand of ransom of whatever amount was already demanded, the witnesses have clearly deposed, and in unequivocal terms that money was asked for release of Bhavik from PW-1 (father), and therefore, commission of offence would be completed moment the ransom is demanded, and to attract section 364A, the prosecution has to prove that the accused must have kidnapped or abducted. In this case, it is proved that the accused no. 1 and 5 abducted, detained and kidnapped PW-2 Bhavik. The said person (PW-2 Bhavik) must be kept under detention or custody. He (PW-2 Bhavik) was under the custody of accused no. 5, who had shown him knife, and the aforesaid two persons must have kidnapped or abducted him for ransom. PW-1 & 2 in their evidence came out with a specific case that Accused no. 1 and 5 had demanded ransom for the release of PW-2 and PW-1 had even conveyed telephonically that he was not able to give the said amount, as it was a very huge amount, and therefore, the term ransom have not been defined, it would mean a sum of money for releasing a person. The definition of kidnapping will also have to be looked into. In the recent decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2013 SC 1484 in the case of Bakshish Ram and anr. The definition of kidnapping will also have to be looked into. In the recent decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2013 SC 1484 in the case of Bakshish Ram and anr. v. State of Punjab, wherein, the Apex Court has held that the High Court should apply its independent mind and record its own finding by making independent assessment of evidence. 12. If, PW-1 complainant, had not received any phone call being made when PW-2 was confined illegally, can be no ground not to attract ingredients of Section 364-A, where not only abduction of PW-2 forcibly and his illegal confinement get proved, but his having been put to fear of death and his apprehension of either death or hurt writs large in his oral evidence and also in the complaint. There is no enmity at all between the parties to allege such serious allegations against the accused. 13. In this case, PW-2 in his evidence, says that he has conveyed to his father to give the amount asked for by the accused. The other clinching factor is the recovery of knife at the behest of accused no. 5. The decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 73/2006 (Coram: Jayant Patel & Paresh Upadhyay,JJ) and the Apex Court in the cases of Sunder alias Sundararajan v. State by Inspector of Police, reported in AIR 2013 SC 777 and in the case of Shyam Babu & Ors. v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 2009 SC 577 would apply in full force to this case and the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Akram Khan v. State of West Bengal, reported in (2012)1 SCC 406 , is a complete answer to the submissions made by the learned advocates appearing for the accused. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and resultant order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court and we are of the view that no other conclusion except the one reached by the trial Court is possible in the instant case as the evidence on record stands. Therefore, there is no valid reason or justifiable ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence. Hence, Criminal Appeal No. 310/2007 and Criminal Appeal No. 647/2007 require to be dismissed. 14. Therefore, there is no valid reason or justifiable ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence. Hence, Criminal Appeal No. 310/2007 and Criminal Appeal No. 647/2007 require to be dismissed. 14. The view taken by the learned trial Judge, is based on sound appreciation of facts. The TI parade is proved, and therefore, the submission of the learned advocates that the appellants are not identified is not proved beyond reasonable doubt and the inducement is also given. There is a demand. The finding of facts cannot be said to be in any way such which would give benefit of doubt to the accused represented by the learned advocates. We are in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and resultant order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court and we are of the view that no other conclusion except the one reached by the trial Court is possible in the instant case as the evidence on record stands. Therefore, there is no valid reason or justifiable ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence. 15. So far as the acquittal appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 300/2008 is concerned, it is to be noted that the State has preferred this appeal against the original accused no. 2 and 4, however, the State has not preferred any appeal against the acquittal of original accused no. 3. Since the original accused no. 4 - respondent no. 2 herein, has expired on 1.11.2007, the appeal qua respondent no. 2 - original accused no. 4 stands abated. 16. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: “54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: “54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the court below.” 17. Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 the Apex Court laid down the following principles: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 18. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 18. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 19. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. Reported in (2007) 3 SCC 75, the Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision the Court has observed as under: “16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with.” 20. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. state of MP, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5589. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. state of MP, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5589. Thus, the powers which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 21. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 , wherein, it is held as under: “… This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi v. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary ( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.” 22. In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh and Ors, reported in (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in para 10 and 11 has held as under: “10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so-called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his anke was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 23. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookiah and Anr. v. State, rep. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 23. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookiah and Anr. v. State, rep. By the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para-4 has held as under: “4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges levelled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasised that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyse the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the Court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against the acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ] 24. Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. 25. We have gone through the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ] 24. Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. 25. We have gone through the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. We have also perused the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the trial court and also considered the submissions made by learned APP for the appellant-State. The trial court while considering the oral as well as documentary evidence has clearly observed that there is no any evidence to convict the respondents. The prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. Even in the present appeal, nothing is produced or pointed out to rebut the conclusion of the trial Court. Thus, from the evidence itself it is established that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 26. Ms. C.M. Shah learned APP is not in a position to show any evidence to take a contrary view of the matter or that the approach of the trial court is vitiated by some manifest illegality or that the decision is perverse or that the trial court has ignored the material evidence on record. 27. In the above view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the trial court was completely justified in acquitting the respondents of the charges levelled against them. We find that the findings recorded by the trial court are absolutely just and proper and in recording the said findings, no illegality or infirmity has been committed by it. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the court below and hence find no reasons to interfere with the same. Hence, the appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 300/2008 requires to be dismissed. 28. In the result, Criminal Appeal Nos. 310/2007 & Criminal Appeal No. 647/2007 preferred by the appellants-ori. Accused No. 5 and ori. Accused no. 1 against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 18.1.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Main Court, Gandhinagar in Sessions Case No. 13/2006, are dismissed, 29. 28. In the result, Criminal Appeal Nos. 310/2007 & Criminal Appeal No. 647/2007 preferred by the appellants-ori. Accused No. 5 and ori. Accused no. 1 against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 18.1.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Main Court, Gandhinagar in Sessions Case No. 13/2006, are dismissed, 29. The acquittal appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 300/2008 preferred by the appellant-State against the judgment and order dated 18.1.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar in Sessions Case No. 13/2006 acquitting the respondents, is also dismissed. 30. So far as ori. Accused no. 4 is concerned, the acquittal appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 300/2008 preferred by the State, stands abated qua him as he has expired on 1.11.2007. 31. R & P to be sent back to the trial Court, forthwith. However, life would not be till last breath and his case may be considered by the appropriate authority. Appeals dismissed.