JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri N.C. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri G.S. Bhatt, learned counsel appearing for respondent. 2. The plaintiff-respondent instituted Original Suit No. 139 of 1988 seeking permanent injunction against defendants-appellants from interfering in possession of plaintiff on Abadi Plot No. 262 situate at Mauja Sitapur, Tehsil Karvi, District Banda, boundary whereof is shown in the bottom of plaint. He also sought injunction restraining the defendants-appellants from raising any construction, temporary or permanent, or otherwise cause hindrance in peaceful possession of plaintiff. He further sought a direction to defendants-appellants that wall which has been illegally constructed by them during pendency of suit on Plot No. 262, should be removed taking away Malba from the aforesaid plot. 3. The defendants-appellants contested suit and besides other they raised a plea that property in dispute belong to Thakur Balaji Maharaj Virajman Akhada, Rambag, District Chitrakoot, a religious endowment and the said property could not have been transferred to anyone without seeking permission of Commissioner under Section 7 of U.P. Hindu Religious Institutions (Prevention of Dissipation of Properties) Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1962”) since the valuation of property is more than Rs. 50,000/- and its annual income is more than Rs. 1200/-. The defendants-appellants also pleaded that disputed property actually is Khasra No. 265 and not 262, in respect whereto there is already a decree of Court in their favour and no injunction, therefore, can be granted. Besides above, they also pleaded that they are in possession of property in dispute since several decades and, therefore, suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. The Trial Court formulated six issues as under: ^^1- D;k oknh fookfnr Hkwfe dk Lokeh vfèkiR; gS\ 2- D;k okn focU/ku ds fl)kUr ls ckf/kr gS\ 3- D;k okn esa vko’;d i{kksa ds i{kdkj u cuk;s tkus ,oa vuko’;d i{kksa dks i{kdkj cuk;s tkus dk nks"k gS\ 4- D;k okn /kkjk 34 ,oa 41 fof’k"V vuqrks"k vf/kfu;e ls ckf/kr gS\ 5- D;k okn dk ewY;kadu ,oa iznRr U;k; 'kqYd vi;kZIr gS\ 6- vuqrks"k ftldh izkfIr dk oknh vfèkdkjh gS\** “1. Whether the plaintiff is the landlord with possession over the disputed land? 2. Whether the suit is barred by the doctrine of estoppel? 3. Whether the suit suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties and joinder of unnecessary parties? 4. Whether the plaintiff is the landlord with possession over the disputed land? 2. Whether the suit is barred by the doctrine of estoppel? 3. Whether the suit suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties and joinder of unnecessary parties? 4. Whether the suit is barred by Sections 34 and 41 of Specific Relief Act? 5. Whether the valuation of suit as also the Court fees paid is insufficient? 6. Relief the plaintiff is entitled to?” (English translation by the Court) 5. It was held that disputed property is Plot No. 262 and owned by Thakur Balaji Maharaj Virajman, a regligious endowment. None of the parties raised any dispute that it is not a public trust and, therefore, Act, 1962 has no application to the said property. It is in these circumstances and looking to the fact that plaintiff did neither plead nor adduce any evidence to show that any prior permission of Commissioner under Section 7 of Act, 1962 was obtained, the Court held that property could not have been transferred to plaintiff-respondent without complying with Section 7 of Act, 1962 and lease claimed to have been executed in violation of aforesaid provision would confer no right upon plaintiff-respondent in respect to such property. With respect to allegation of construction on Plot No. 262, the Trial Court found that Court Commissioner’s report, i.e., Paper No. 70-C, shows that there was no construction made on Plot No. 262. The Court also found that plaintiff could not show that he had possession on the property in dispute and that being so, vide judgment dated 20.11.2000, the suit was dismissed. 6. Aggrieved thereto the plaintiff-respondent preferred Appeal No. 56 of 2000 which has been allowed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 3, Chitrakoot. With respect to identity of plot, as being 262, and its ownership belong to Thakur Balaji Maharaj Virajman, the Lower Appellate Court has confirmed findings of Trial Court. 6. Aggrieved thereto the plaintiff-respondent preferred Appeal No. 56 of 2000 which has been allowed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 3, Chitrakoot. With respect to identity of plot, as being 262, and its ownership belong to Thakur Balaji Maharaj Virajman, the Lower Appellate Court has confirmed findings of Trial Court. However, with reference to illegality in alleged transfer by not complying with the requirement of Section 7 of Act, 1962 the Appellate Court found that Act, 1962 stood repealed by U.P. Hindu Religious Institutions (Prevention of Dissipation of Properties) (Repeal) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 2000”), which was assented by Governor on 31.10.2000 and published in U.P. Gazette on 1.11.2000 and on the date the Trial Court decided matter, i.e., 20.11.2000, the Act, 1962 had already been repealed and, therefore, recourse to Section 7 thereof is wholly illegal. In the circumstances, transfer of disputed property in favour of plaintiff was held to be valid and not hit by Section 7 of Act, 1962. 7. This Court while entertaining this appeal on 22.9.2006 formulated following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the lease deed dated 4.6.1988 with regard to the suit property, as set up by the plaintiff respondent, would convey any right or title in his favour in the face of non-compliance to the provisions of Section 7 of U.P. Hindu Public Religious Institutions (Prevention of Dissipation of Properties) Act, 1962 (U.P. Act No. XXII of 1962)? 2. Whether the provisions of the aforesaid Act stood repealed with retrospective effect on coming into force of the (Repeal) Act No. 31 of 2000?” 8. Sri N.C. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there is no evidence to show that Section 7 of Act, 1962 was ever complied by plaintiff-respondent. With respect to issue No. 2, he submitted that repeal is effective prospectively but would not cause any effect upon the acts, omissions, happenings, rights, obligations, privileges etc. Sri N.C. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there is no evidence to show that Section 7 of Act, 1962 was ever complied by plaintiff-respondent. With respect to issue No. 2, he submitted that repeal is effective prospectively but would not cause any effect upon the acts, omissions, happenings, rights, obligations, privileges etc. already stood under Act, 1962, before its repeal, and for the said purpose placed reliance on Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1897”) and decisions of Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 ; M/s Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh and others, AIR 1992 SC 180 ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 257; State of Rajastha v. Mangilal Pindwal, AIR 1996 SC 2181 ; S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and another, 2006(2) SCC 740 ; Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector & ETIO and others, 2007(5) SCC 447 ; and, Sangam Spinners v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner I, 2008(1) SCC 391 . 9. Sri G.S. Bhatt, learned counsel appearing for plaintiff-respondent submitted that the trust is a private trust, therefore, Act, 1962 has no application. Further there is nothing to show that the value of property of trust is more than Rs. 50,000/- and its income is more than Rs,. 1200/- per annum, therefore, by virtue of Section 2 of Act, 1962 it was not applicable. He further submitted that subsequent pleadings being prohibited, therefore, plaintiff could not raise these questions before Trial Court but this Court can always look into these questions being pure question of law. He submitted that in injunction can be sought even by a trespasser and that the real question up for consideration in the case in hand is, whether plaintiff-respondent was in possession of property in dispute and if so, whether he was being illegally obstructed or interfered in peaceful enjoyment by defendants-appellants. He referred to Order VII Rule 9, Order X Rule 1, Order XII Rule 4 and Section 100(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the “CPC”). He referred to Order VII Rule 9, Order X Rule 1, Order XII Rule 4 and Section 100(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the “CPC”). He also placed reliance on decisions of Apex Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, 2004(3) SCC 137 (para 24) and Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another, 2012(8) SCC 148 (paras 27 and 28). 10. Sri Bhatt, learned counsel for respondent virtually did not address this Court on substantial questions of law formulated by this Court while admitting appeal and instead proceeded to make submissions on other aspects of the matter and argued that even if the two questions are decided against plaintiff-respondent still the same would not entitle the appellants to have the present appeal allow but this Court will have to consider the issues raised by him which are also according to him pure questions of law and need be addressed before interfering with judgment Lower Appellate Court. 11. Before considering the arguments advanced by plaintiff-respondent, it would be appropriate first to consider the two substantial questions of law formulated by this Court while admitting this appeal and since both are inter related, the same can be considered together. 12. Section 7 of Act, 1962 clearly bars transfer of property belonging to a Hindu Public Religious Institution unless prior written sanction of Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner, as the case may be, depending upon value of property as provided therein is obtained after showing that transfer is necessary or beneficial to institution. Section 7 of Act, 1962 initially enacted was substituted by U.P. Act VIII of 1965 w.e.f. 18.3.1965 and the amended provision application to the case in hand reads as under: “7. Previous approval necessary for transfer of property.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in any other law, for the time being inforce no transfer of property belonging to a Hindu Public Religious Institution shall be valid unless prior written sanction of the Commissioner or, where the value of the property sought to be transferred does not exceed rupees two hundred and fifty, of the Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction over the institution, on the ground of the transfer being necessary or beneficial to the institution has been obtained. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section transfer does not include the customary use or distribution of any movables as Bhog, prasad and the like. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section transfer does not include the customary use or distribution of any movables as Bhog, prasad and the like. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order of a Commissioner or an Assistant Commissioner may within thirty days from the date thereof appeal against that order to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the headquarter of the Hindu Public Religious Institution or the property concerned lies and the order passed by the District Judge in the appeal shall be final.” 13. Apparently it cannot be said that unless a written sanction of Commissioner is obtained a transfer of property of Hindu Religious Institution would be invalid since barred by aforesaid provision. The words “previous written sanction” make it very clear that before effecting transfer sanction and that too in writing must have been obtained otherwise any transfer of property governed by Section 7 would be illegal. When law requires something to be done in a particular manner, the things would have to be done in that particular manner alone otherwise it would be illegal. I need not to support the above two decisions by referring to a catena of law on the subject for the reason that, in my view, the above provisions are so well embedded in law that the same do not require clutches of citations to support. Now it is in this context this Court would have to examine, whether repeal of Act, 1962 by Act, 2000 would have made any difference or can validate the otherwise legal flaw crept in by executing lease deed dated 4.6.1988 transferring the property of Hindu Religious Institution in question without any prior sanction of Commissioner. 14. The defendants have pleaded in their written statement that value of property was more than Rs. 50,000/- and annual income was Rs. 12,00/-. To the aforesaid pleadings there is nothing on record to show any dispute raised to aforesaid facts or that the plaintiff-respondent raised any issue about applicability of Act, 1962 on the ground that value of property of religious institution was less than Rs. 50,000/- or that its annual income was less than Rs. 12,00/- and or that it was not a public trust. 50,000/- or that its annual income was less than Rs. 12,00/- and or that it was not a public trust. In absence of any dispute raised by plaintiff-respondent in regard to applicability of Act, 1962 the said issue cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time before this Court and that too by way of oral arguments when these issues which basically require investigation into facts, were not raised before Courts below. These are questions of facts and learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent could not show that any issue or dispute was raised before Courts below on aforesaid aspects. Since the application of Act, 1962 having not been agitated before Courts below giving no opportunity to Courts below to look into requisite facts constituting basic foundation to see whether Act, 1962 was applicable or not, this Court shall proceed holding that Act, 1962 is applicable to the institution in question and property in dispute except and to the extent Act, 2000 provides otherwise. 15. Before Trial Court the plaintiff-respondent attempted to wriggle out of the rigour of Section 7 of Act, 1962 on the ground that “a lease” is not a transfer, relying on Apex Court’s decision in Safali Roy Chaudhury and others v. Amrendra Kumar Dutta, AIR 1976 SC 1810 , but the plea did not find favour with Trial Court and it held that it is a transfer and without prior permission of Commissioner was impermissible by virtue of Section 7 of Act, 1962. Before Lower Appellate Court, applicability of Act, 1962 was not disputed but what was contended is that Act, 1962 having been repealed by Act, 2000, it ceased to be of any consequence to the validity of lease deed in question and could not have been relied by Trial Court since the judgment was delivered after repeal of Act, 1962. 16. In the light of discussions made above at the pain of repetition I reiterate that twin averments advanced by counsel for plaintiff-respondent with respect to applicability of Act deserved to be rejected and the reason therefor I may reiterate hereat as under. 17. 16. In the light of discussions made above at the pain of repetition I reiterate that twin averments advanced by counsel for plaintiff-respondent with respect to applicability of Act deserved to be rejected and the reason therefor I may reiterate hereat as under. 17. The question as to what is the value of property of trust or that its annual income is a pure question of fact and since specific pleadings in this regard taken by defendants-appellants, having not been controverted or disputed before Courts below by plaintiff, this Court is bound to proceed as if Act, 1962 was applicable subject to consideration on its continued applicability in the case in hand on account of Act, 2000. 18. The another question is that the trust in fact is a private trust and not public trust but here also no such issue was raised before Courts below and this question also involves investigation into facts and having not been raised before Courts below it cannot be raised for the first time before this Court. Since applicability of Act, 1962 has not been disputed, therefore, this Court will have to proceed with the fact that trust is a public trust governed by Act, 1962. 19. Now I straightway come to the question, whether Act, 2000 would result in making requirement of prior sanction under Section 7 of Act, 1962 nugatory, redundant and inconsequential, having retrospective effect, nullifying all the previous acts, etc. after repeal in 2000. 20. In this regard it would be appropriate to refer Section 6 of U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1904”). It reads as under: “6. after repeal in 2000. 20. In this regard it would be appropriate to refer Section 6 of U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1904”). It reads as under: “6. Effect of repeal.—Where any Uttar Pradesh Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any remedy, or any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be continued and concluded, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed.” (emphasis added) 21. Section 6 of Act, 1904 is pari material to Section 6 of Act, 1897 (Central). It is not in dispute that repeal Act, 2000 discloses no different intention. It simply repeals Act, 1962 and has been given effect to from 31.10.2000. 22. Section 6 of Act, 1897 came to be considered by Apex Court in Mohar Singh Pratap Singh (supra). The Court held, when there is a simple repeal, there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. The Court in para 8 further said: “The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. It is in the light of these principles that we now proceed to examine the facts of the present case.” 23. In T.S. Baliah v. ITO, AIR 1969 SC 701 , the Court said in para 5: “The principle of this section is that unless a different intention appears in the repealing Act, any legal proceeding can be instituted and continued in respect of any matter pending under the repealed Act as if that Act was in force at the time of repeal. In other words, whenever there is a repeal of an enactment the consequences laid down in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears in the repealing statute.” 24. Again in M/s Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh (supra) referring to Section 6 of Act, 1897, the Court said, that objectives of provision is to ensure protection of any right or privilege acquired under repeal Act. The only exception to it is legislative intention to the contrary. There the applications were filed for renewal of permit before repeal of provision. The Apex Court said that by virtue of Section 6(c) of Act, 1897 the right of appellant to get his application considered and decided in accordance with law was saved. 25. In Mangilal Pindwal (supra) the Court said: “This means that as a result of repeal of a statute the statute as repealed ceases to exist with effect from the date of such repeal but the repeal does not affect the previous operation of the law which has been repealed during the period it was operative prior to the date of such repeal.” 26. In S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills (supra) the Court said: “In terms of Clause (c) of Section 6 as quoted above, unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the enactment repeal. The effect of the amendment in the instant case is the same.” 27. In Southern Petrochemical Industries (supra) the effect of repeal Act was considered by Apex Court from para 83 onwards and in para 98 the Court said: “Section 6 of the General Clauses Act seeks to achieve the same purpose, subject of course, to the repealing Act having no provision inconsistent with the repealed Acts.” 28. In the present case nothing contained in repeal Act shows any contrary legislative intention so as to abate or frustrate the pending matters or may have resulted in divesting a right under repealed statute disentitling a person to initiate a proceeding thereunder to enforce such rights etc. Learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent could not refer to any provision in Act, 2000 to demonstrate or show that rights, obligations, proceedings etc. under Act, 1962 stood nullified or diluted in any manner by virtue of repeal of said Act by repeal Act, 2000 which has been given effect prospectively, i.e., w.e.f. 31.10.2000. 29. In view of above discussion, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Lower Appellate Court has completely misdirected itself that the mere factum that Act, 1962 was repealed by Act, 2000 which came into force on 31.10.2000, the Trial Court could not have relied on Section 7 of repeal Act, i.e., Act, 1962 since the judgment was delivered after repeal Act came into force. It has completely misdirected itself. The inference and conclusion drawn is patently illegal and in the ignorantia of Clause 6 of Act, 1897 or U.P. Act, 1904, therefore, question No. 2 will have to be answered in favour of appellants and the judgment of Lower Appellate Court in taking a view otherwise deserved to be reversed. 30. Now coming to first substantial question of law, since it is not disputed by learned counsel for the respondent that no prior permission was obtained as contemplated in Section 7 of Act, 1962 in the circumstances even this question has to be answered in favour of defendants-appellants. 31. 30. Now coming to first substantial question of law, since it is not disputed by learned counsel for the respondent that no prior permission was obtained as contemplated in Section 7 of Act, 1962 in the circumstances even this question has to be answered in favour of defendants-appellants. 31. The plaintiff-respondent though attempted to argue that there are some more questions involving substantial question of law which deserved to be formulated by this Court and be decided, i.e., regarding applicability of Act, 1962 on the ground of value of property; whether a trust is a public trust or private etc but having found that these questions involve investigation into facts and unless pleaded, evidence adduced by parties, and thereafter issues are decided by Courts below, there is no occasion to permit plaintiff to raise these pleas for the first time before this Court and that too when they involve investigation into facts, I reject his submission as above. 32. In the result the appeal is allowed. Both the questions are answered in favour of appellants. The impugned appellate judgment dated 25.7.2006 and decree dated 10.8.2006 are hereby set aside. The judgment and decree of Trial Court dated 20.11.2000 is restored and confirmed. 33. No costs. ——————