As the issue raised in both the writ petitions is the same, WP(C) Nos. 2889/2004 and 2890/2004 were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. A brief dilation on facts is considered necessary. 3. Petitioner in WP(C) No. 2889/2004 was serving as Assistant (Accounts) in the Nagaon Paper Mill of Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. at the relevant point of time. On 5.7.1990, he was placed under suspension pending drawal of departmental proceeding. Thereafter, a departmental proceeding was instituted against the said petitioner on various charges. Departmental enquiry was conducted. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and imposed penalty of reduction to a lower grade vide the order dated 30.6.1995. On reduction to a lower grade, petitioner was designated as Junior Assistant (Accounts). It was further declared that petitioner's seniority would commence from the date he assumed duties as Junior Assistant (Accounts). Though the suspension order was revoked, it was ordered that the period of suspension would not be treated as on duty and he would not be entitled to draw any salary/wages, allowances, increments or any benefit for the said period except the subsistence allowance already drawn by him. Though he filed appeal, the order of the disciplinary authority was maintained. Petitioner then filed Civil Rule No. 4358/1995. 4. Petitioner in WP(C) No. 2890/2004 was serving in the rank of Executive in the Nagaon Paper Mill of Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. when he was placed under suspension on 5.7.1990 pending drawal of departmental proceeding. Thereafter, departmental proceeding was drawn up against the petitioner in the course of which, departmental enquiry was held. Report of the enquiry officer was accepted by the disciplinary authority and penalty order dated 30.6.1995 was passed imposing on him the penalty of reduction to a lower grade. On such reduction, petitioner was designated as Senior Accountant and it was declared that his seniority in the said grade would commence afresh on assumption of duties by him in the post of Senior Accountant. Though his suspension order was revoked, it was ordered that the period of suspension would not be treated as on duty and the petitioner would' not be entitled to draw any salary/wages, allowances, increments, etc., for the said period except the subsistence allowance already drawn by him. Though his suspension order was revoked, it was ordered that the period of suspension would not be treated as on duty and the petitioner would' not be entitled to draw any salary/wages, allowances, increments, etc., for the said period except the subsistence allowance already drawn by him. Though he had filed appeal before the appellate authority against the penalty order, he had to approach this court since no order was passed by the appellate authority. Following order of this court, appellate authority considered the appeal but rejected the same. Aggrieved, he filed a writ petition before this court which was registered as Civil Rule No. 350/1997. 5. Both the writ petitions were dismissed by a Single Bench of this court vide the common order dated 18.7.2001 Thereafter, both the petitioners filed writ appeals, which were registered as Writ Appeal Nos. 339/2001 and 340/2001. By a common judgment and order dated 26.6.2003, a Division Bench of this court did not find any error in the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer but interfered with the penalty imposed. The penalty of reduction to a lower grade was set aside and the respondents .were directed to pass fresh orders imposing on the petitioners the penalty of reduction to a lower stage in their own time scale. The two writ appeals were accordingly disposed of. 6. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority passed separate but identical orders dated 19.9.2003 imposing fresh penalty. In case of petitioner of WP(C) No. 2889/2004, he was restored to the post of Assistant (Accounts) in the pay scale of Rs. 1410-50-1910-60-2330/- (Pre-Revised) w.e.f. 30.6.1995 and was awarded the major penalty of reduction of his pay by three stages from Rs. 1,660 to Rs. 1,510 in the time scale of pay of Rs. 1410-50-1910-60-2330 for a period of 3 years w.e.f. 30.6.1995 to 29.6.1998. It was clarified that the petitioner will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and that on expiry of this period, the reduction will not have the effect of postponing future increments of pay. Likewise, in the case of petitioner of WP(C) No. 2890/2004, he was restored to the post of Executive (Accounts) in the pay scale of Rs. 2400-120-4320 (Pre-Revised) w.e.f. 30.6.1995 and awarded the major penalty of reduction of his pay by 3 stages from Rs. 3,840 to 3,480 in the time scale of pay of Rs. Likewise, in the case of petitioner of WP(C) No. 2890/2004, he was restored to the post of Executive (Accounts) in the pay scale of Rs. 2400-120-4320 (Pre-Revised) w.e.f. 30.6.1995 and awarded the major penalty of reduction of his pay by 3 stages from Rs. 3,840 to 3,480 in the time scale of pay of Rs. 2400-120-4320 for a period of 3 years w.e.f. 30.6.1995 to 29.6.1998. It was clarified that petitioner will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and that on expiry of this period, the reduction will not have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay. 7. Both the petitioners submitted representations and legal notices to the respondents with the grievance that during the period of suspension from 5.7.1990 to 30.6.1995, the petitioners were denied 6 annual increments. By the fresh penalty order, reduction of pay by 3 stages effective from 30.6.1995 to 29.6.1998 having been ordered, the petitioners would stand to lose 9 annual increments, which would be beyond the penalty imposed. Respondents informed the petitioners by separate letters dated 27.1.2004 that the prayer made by them could not be considered as they are not entitled to any salary/wages and allowances except subsistence allowance already drawn by them during the period of suspension. 8. Aggrieved, petitioners have preferred the present two writ petitions. 9. Petitioners have contended that the respondents have sought to impose a penalty on them which is beyond the penalty ordered by this court in the previous round of litigation. Court had directed reduction of pay by 3 stages in their own time scale of pay. But by the impugned penalty, the respondents have given effect to the penalty from 30.6.1995 while denying any such increment for the period from 5.7.1990 to 30.6.1995 when the petitioners were under suspension, thereby making the petitioners lose a total of 9 annual increments as against 3 directed by this court. 10. Petitioners have also filed additional affidavits to place on record that there was a revision of pay in their respective pay scales w.e.f. 1.1.1992 but the petitioners were paid subsistence allowance on the pre--revised pay scales. The subsistence allowance from 1.1.1992 to 30.6.1995 should have been paid as per the revised pay scale. 11. In both the writ petitions, respondents have filed identical affidavits. The subsistence allowance from 1.1.1992 to 30.6.1995 should have been paid as per the revised pay scale. 11. In both the writ petitions, respondents have filed identical affidavits. Stand taken is that the Division Bench of this court did not interfere with the findings arrived by the enquiry officer but interfered with the penalty imposed by modifying the original penalty of reduction to a lower grade to reduction to a lower stage in the same time scale. In terms of the order of this court, fresh penalty orders dated 19.9.2003 were passed. While justifying the order of penalty, it is contended that petitioners are not entitled to any salary/wages and other allowances during the period from 5.7.1990 to 30.6.1995 when they were under suspension. Contention of the petitioners that the period of suspension should be treated as on duty is untenable and, therefore, question of granting any increment or financial benefit during the period of suspension does not arise. 12. Heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. N. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mrs. M. Hazarika, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. J. Roy, learned counsel for the respondents. 13. Mr. Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners have referred to various provisions of the Standing Orders framed in terms of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 as well as the Hindustan Paper Corporation Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, to contend that the reckonable date for imposition of the penalty should be 5.7.1990 when the petitioners were placed under suspension and not 30.6.1995 which was the date of imposition of the previous penalty which was interfered with by the High Court. He submits that this court had directed imposition of penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the same time scale in terms of rule 23(e). The respondents had thereafter, imposed the penalty of reduction of pay by 3 stages in the same time scale giving effect to the said penalty from 30.6.1995 to 29.6.1998. Since the respondents had clarified that petitioners will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction, it is clear that the annual increments to pay which became due to the petitioners during the period of suspension cannot be denied to them. He submits that during the period of suspension, 6 annual increments became due to the petitioners. Since the respondents had clarified that petitioners will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction, it is clear that the annual increments to pay which became due to the petitioners during the period of suspension cannot be denied to them. He submits that during the period of suspension, 6 annual increments became due to the petitioners. Therefore, petitioners have been denied a total of 9 annual increments to pay, i.e., 6 during the suspension period and 3 during the period of reduction of pay, which is beyond the penalty imposed. He submits that while imposing penalty, the disciplinary authority has to strictly follow the rules and there can be no discretion while imposing penalty. Penalty should be strictly construed, he contends. In support of his submissions, Mr. Choudhury has placed reliance on the following decisions of the hon'ble Supreme Court: Dilip Kumar Sharma and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 1 SCC 560 Umesh Chandra Misra v. Union of India and Others, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 210 State Bank of India and Others v. T.J. Paul, (1999) 4 SCC 759 . 14. Opposing the submissions of Mr. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, Mrs. Hazarika, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has contended that since a major penalty was imposed, no salary is payable for the suspension period. Only entitlement of the petitioners during the period of suspension is the subsistence allowance which has already been paid. If there is no pay, then question of increment to pay does not arise. She, therefore, submits that there is no merit in the claim of the petitioners and the writ petitions should be dismissed. 15. In his brief reply, Mr. N. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that increments to pay earned by an employee is automatic. The same cannot be denied by the respondents on the plea of petitioners being under suspension. He submits that the impugned order goes beyond the punishment imposed. 16. Submissions made have been considered. 17. As can be seen from the above, there is no dispute regarding the penalty imposed. Only grievance agitated by the petitioners relates to the period when such penalty should be made effective and also the claim to higher subsistence allowance following revision of pay during the period when the petitioners were under suspension. 18. Submissions made have been considered. 17. As can be seen from the above, there is no dispute regarding the penalty imposed. Only grievance agitated by the petitioners relates to the period when such penalty should be made effective and also the claim to higher subsistence allowance following revision of pay during the period when the petitioners were under suspension. 18. Rule 29 of the Standing Orders provides for penalties for misconduct. Penalties have been categorized under two heads – minor penalties and major penalties. As per clause (c) of major penalties under rule 29, reduction to a lower grade or post or to a lower stage in a time scale shall constitute major penalty. As per rule 30(e) of the Standing Orders, if on conclusion of the enquiry, the workman has been found guilty of the charge(s) framed against him and punishment is awarded, the workman shall not be entitled to any remuneration for the period from the date when he was placed under suspension till the date of imposition of punishment except subsistence allowance already paid to him. It further provides that if a penalty other than dismissal or removal is imposed on him, the period of suspension shall be treated as on leave without pay. Rule 38 of the Standing Orders clearly provides that the workman shall normally be eligible for increment as a matter of course at the end of the prescribed period. 19. As per the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, reduction to a lower grade or post or to a lower stage in a time scale is a major penalty under rule 23(e). Rule 22 deals with treatment of the period of suspension. When the employee under suspension is re--instated, in a case other than exoneration or imposition of minor penalty, the competent authority may grant him such proportion of pay and allowances for the period of suspension as the competent authority may prescribe. 20. From a careful reading of the aforesaid provisions, it becomes evident that in a case of imposition of major penalty other than dismissal or removal, the period of suspension of an employee is to be treated as on leave without pay. It further transpires that ordinarily an employee is entitled to increment to pay as a matter of course. When an employee is on leave without pay, it means that he will not be actually paid his salary. It further transpires that ordinarily an employee is entitled to increment to pay as a matter of course. When an employee is on leave without pay, it means that he will not be actually paid his salary. It cannot be construed to mean that he would not get the benefit of any pay revision, increments to pay, etc., which may accrue in the interregnum. As and when the leave period ends, the employee's pay would accordingly be re--fixed. 21. Having noticed the position as discussed above, let us now examine the penalty orders dated 19.9.2003 passed following the order of this court. As per the orders of penalty, the pay of the petitioners would be reduced by 3 stages for a period of 3 years from 30.6.1995 to 29.6.1998 with the further direction that they will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction. It is thus clear that the penalty imposed on the petitioners is reduction of pay by 3 stages for a period of 3 years during which period they would not be entitled to increments to pay. As already discussed above, in the case of imposition of major penalty other than dismissal or removal, the period of suspension is to be treated as on leave without pay. Accordingly, the suspension period of the petitioners from 5.7.1990 to 30.6.1995 is required to be treated as on leave without pay. If that be the position, petitioners would be entitled to the benefit of pay revision, increments to pay, etc., for this period as otherwise the effect of the penalty would be more than what was imposed. 22. The decisions relied upon by Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioners re-emphasises the proposition that imposition of penalty should be strictly construed and should not be given effect to in a manner where the effect of penalty goes beyond what is intended. 23. Regarding revision of pay w.e.f. 1.1.1992 and payment of higher subsistence allowance as per revised pay scale, the averments made by the petitioners in their additional affidavits have not been controverted by the respondents. In view thereof, the court would proceed that there was pay revision w.e.f. 1.1.1992 and, therefore, the subsistence allowance paid to the petitioners would have to be worked out as per the revised pay scale. 24. In view thereof, the court would proceed that there was pay revision w.e.f. 1.1.1992 and, therefore, the subsistence allowance paid to the petitioners would have to be worked out as per the revised pay scale. 24. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed by directing the respondents to treat the period of suspension of the petitioners as on leave without pay. Petitioners would be entitled to increments to pay during the period from 5.7.1990 to 30.6.1995 when they were under suspension. Respondents shall work out the respective pay of the petitioners as on 30.6.1995 by taking into account the pay increments till then, on which date the orders of penalty dated 19.9.2003 would come into effect for 3 years. Respondents shall also work out the revised subsistence allowance to be paid to the petitioners for the period from 1.1.1992 to 30.6.1995 following revision of pay w.e.f. 1.1.1992 and pay the differential amounts. 25. The above directions shall be carried out within a period of four months from today. 26. No cost. ______________