JUDGMENT : The unsuccessful plaintiff has taken redressal of this Court under section 100, Civil Procedure Code by challenging the judgment and decree passed by two Courts below dismissing his suit for declaration of Bhumi-swami right and injunction. 2. No exhaustive statements of fact are required to be narrated for the purpose of disposal of this second appeal looking to the sole substantial question of law which has been framed and which is in respect of decree for injunction in respect of plaintiff. Suffice it to say that plaintiff has specifically pleaded that he is the Bhumiswami and is having possession over the suit property and, therefore, the suit be decreed. The defendants No. 1 and 2 by filing the written-statement denied the plaint averments and specifically pleaded that they are the Bhumiswami of the land in question and are also possessing the same. 3. The learned trial Court framed necessary issues and after recording the evidence of the parties dismissed the suit. The first appeal which was filed by the plaintiff has also been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 4. In this manner, this second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff which was admitted on 24-1-2001 on the following substantial question of law :- "Whether the lower Appellate Court erred in law in not granting a decree for permanent injunction on the basis of long possession of the appellant?" 4A. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that learned First Appellate Court in para 14 has recorded a finding that the name of plaintiff has been entered in column No. 12 of the khasra which is a column of possession and, therefore, the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and if that would be the position, learned two Courts below have erred in substantial error of law in dismissing the suit at-least for injunction. Learned counsel has also invited my attention to para 5 of the additional plea of the written-statement filed by the defendants and argued that defendants themselves have pleaded that plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. By putting a deep dent on the case of defendants, learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the statement of defendant Bherulal (DW-1) and has submitted that he himself has admitted the possession of plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of injunction. 5. By putting a deep dent on the case of defendants, learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the statement of defendant Bherulal (DW-1) and has submitted that he himself has admitted the possession of plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of injunction. 5. On the other hand, Shri Himanshu Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents argued in support of the impugned judgment and submitted that cogent reasons have been assigned by learned two Courts below holding that plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property and, therefore, this appeal be dismissed. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. Regarding Substantial Question of Law framed: 7. There is specific averments of plaintiff that the suit property is in his Bhumiswami right and he is possessing it. However, these averments have been emphatically denied by first and second defendants by filing written-statement and they have specifically pleaded that plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property. I do not find merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that defendants themselves have admitted in the written-statement that plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. The argument so advanced by learned counsel for the appellant at the first blush appears to be quite attractive but on the deeper scrutiny it is found to be devoid of any substance. True, in additional pleas para 5, at one place it has been pleaded by defendants that plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and he is the Bhumiswami but this position has been clarified in later lines of the same para wherein it has been specifically pleaded that defendants are possessing the land as owner of the suit property. In the first line of para 5 there appears to be a clear typographical error which has been clarified by defendants in later lines of the same para. That apart, the sole plaintiff is Yashraj and the word 'plaintiffs' is plural and this word is written in the first line of additional plea para 5 of the written-statement and, therefore, it can be inferred that the word 'vadigan' (plaintiff) indeed is 'prativadigan' (defendant). Further, I do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that in para 5, the defendant Bherulal (DW-1) has admitted the plaintiffs possession. Further, I do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that in para 5, the defendant Bherulal (DW-1) has admitted the plaintiffs possession. By paying heed to para 5 of his deposition sheets, only this much is gathered that he has stated that name of plaintiff has been entered in possession column and the same has been wrongly written by Patwari. Nowhere it is admitted by him in his cross-examination that indeed plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. If the Patwari has written the name of plaintiff in column No. 12, it would not confer any right upon the plaintiff. 8. The Division Bench of this Court Churamani and another vs. Shri Ramadhar and others, 1991 MPLJ 311 = 1991 RN 61 has categorically held that the entry made by Patwari in the remark column or any other column of a khasra or field book, no presumption of correctness can be attached. The Division Bench further held that Patwari is not required to make any kind of entry in a khasra or field book under Chapter IX of M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. In this view of the matter, even if any entry in column No. 12 has been made by Patwari in the khasra, it would not mean that plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. Learned counsel has placed heavy reliance upon the Single Bench decision of this Court State of M. P. and another vs. Uttam Chand and others, 2000(2) JLJ 143 and submitted that if a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to retain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by due course of law. In this regard, learned counsel has also placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, 1989 MPLJ (S.C.) 767 = AIR 1989 SC 2097 . There is no dispute in this proposition but the question still rest upon the pivot as to whether plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. Shobha Venkat Rao, 1989 MPLJ (S.C.) 767 = AIR 1989 SC 2097 . There is no dispute in this proposition but the question still rest upon the pivot as to whether plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. There is a pure finding of fact in this regard by learned two Courts below holding that plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property and this is a pure finding of fact based upon correct appreciation of the pleadings and evidence, both oral and documentary. 9. The substantial question of law is thus answered against the appellant and it is hereby held that because plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property, therefore, he is not entitled for a decree of injunction. 10. Resultantly, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.