Judgment : Dr. A.K. Rath, J. The petitioner has called in question the legality and propriety of the order dated 09.12.2009 passed by the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneswar (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) in O.A. No.1238 of 2002 whereby and whereunder, the learned Tribunal dismissed the application and thereby upheld the punishment of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the short fact of the case of the petitioner is that he was working as a peon in Water Resources Department. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him in the year 1999 on the allegation that while he was discharging his duties as a Treasury peon during November and December, 1990, he manipulated Government records and presented two bills for non-refundable advance from G.P.F. Account of one Shri C.S. Patra, Ex-Asst. Executive Engineer (Mechanical) against a single sanction order, as a result of which Rs.65000/-was encashed twice on 20.11.1990 and 01.12.1990 and he misappropriated the said amount. He was charged with the misappropriation of money and mis-conduct contrary to the Rules 3 and 4 of the Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1959. An Enquiry Officer was appointed on 5.12.2000. He submitted an application before the Enquiry Officer for supply of the copy of the forged bill by which the alleged defalcation had been committed, but the same was not supplied to him. However, the Enquiry Officer submitted a report to the disciplinary authority holding, inter alia, that the charges had been proved. On the basis of the said enquiry report, the disciplinary authority dismissed the petitioner from services. Thereafter he filed O.A. No.1238 of 2002 before the learned Tribunal and by order dated 09.12.2009, the learned Tribunal dismissed the said application. 3. Pursuant to issuance of notice, counter affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties. The case of the opposite parties is that the petitioner was entrusted with Treasury work after decentralization of Accounts Section. Rs.65000/-was encashed twice and the same was noticed in the year 1998. After preliminary enquiry, a regular disciplinary proceeding was initiated and concluded against the petitioner, but no disciplinary proceeding could be conducted against the DDO and Cashier as they had retired from the service. Furthermore, the office copy of the forged duplicate bill was supplied to the petitioner. 4. Rs.65000/-was encashed twice and the same was noticed in the year 1998. After preliminary enquiry, a regular disciplinary proceeding was initiated and concluded against the petitioner, but no disciplinary proceeding could be conducted against the DDO and Cashier as they had retired from the service. Furthermore, the office copy of the forged duplicate bill was supplied to the petitioner. 4. In course of hearing, Shri R. Achary, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the finding of the Enquiry Officer is perverse and consequently the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority on the basis of the said report is not sustainable in the eye of law. Per contra, the learned Additional Govt. Advocate supported the order of the learned Tribunal. 5. We are shocked in the manner in which the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. It reveals from the enquiry report vide Annexure-5 that the Director of Treasuries and Inspection had made a thorough enquiry and concluded that the OSD-cum-Deputy Secretary being the DDO, who had drawn the second bill, was squarely responsible for the mis-appropriation. The Finance Department had recommended to initiate disciplinary action against the concerned officer, but then, the said DDO had retired from the service, for which no proceeding was initiated. The report further reveals that the involvement of the AG staff could not be ruled out. The Enquiry Officer further came to the conclusion that “most probably both the bills were signed by the DDO and placed for drawal. If the forged bill bears the genuine signature of the DDO, then it becomes easier for the delinquent to manipulate by cutting his own entries only and put the bill again for drawal. In any case, involvement of the treasury staff is definitely there, otherwise, it could not have happened. May be even the AG staff are involved, otherwise, why it was not reflected in the Annual Account slip of the same year. The most unfortunate part is that the victim of this nefarious mischief is not the Govt. but an Asst. Engineer.” 6. We are of the opinion that the findings are based on mere surmises and conjectures. May be even the AG staff are involved, otherwise, why it was not reflected in the Annual Account slip of the same year. The most unfortunate part is that the victim of this nefarious mischief is not the Govt. but an Asst. Engineer.” 6. We are of the opinion that the findings are based on mere surmises and conjectures. Having come to the conclusion that the OSD-cum-Deputy Secretary being the DDO, who had drawn the second bill, was squarely responsible for the mis-appropriation, and involvement of the treasury staff was definitely there, otherwise, it could not have happened, the Enquiry Officer ought to have exonerated the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer was appointed to enquire into the charges levelled against the delinquent employee. On the basis of the materials available on record, both oral and documentary, it is the bounden duty of the Enquiry Officer to come to a definite conclusion as to whether the charges are proved or not. The Enquiry Officer cannot submit a report on mere surmises and conjectures. The findings of the Enquiry Officer, which have been quoted above would, inter alia, show that the same is not only perverse, but no reasonable man can come to such conclusion on the basis of the materials available on record. 7. The scope of judicial review has been succinctly stated in B.C. Chaturvedi V. Union of India and others, AIR 1996 SC 484 . Their Lordships in paragraphs 13 and 14 held as follows:- “13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 718 : ( AIR 1964 SC 364 ), this Court held at page 728 (of SCR) : (at p.369 of AIR), that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. 14. 14. In Union of India v. S.L. Abbas (1993) 4 SCC 357 : (1993 AIR SCW 1753), when the order of transfer was interfered by the Tribunal, this Court held that the Tribunal was not an appellate authority which could substitute its own judgment to that bona fide order of transfer. The Tribunal could not, in such circumstances, interfere with orders of transfer of a Government servant. In Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. H.P. Vora (1993) Supp. I SCC 551 : (1992 AIR SCW 2830), it was held that the Administrative Tribunal was not an appellate authority and it could not substitute the role of authorities to clear the efficiency bar of a public servant, recently, in State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow (1994) I JT (SC) 217 : (1994 AIR SCW 1465), a Bench of this Court to which two of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy & B.L. Hansaria, JJ) were members, considered the order of the Tribunal, which quashed the charges as based on no evidence, went in detail into the question as to whether the Tribunal had power to appreciate the evidence while exercising power of judicial review and held that a Tribunal could not appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion to that of the disciplinary authority. It would, therefore, be clear that the Tribunal cannot embark upon appreciation of evidence to substitute its own findings of fact to that of a disciplinary/appellate authority.” 8. We are conscious that adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court. But then, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) that if the conclusion upon consideration of evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. The enquiry report must contain the reasons on which the conclusion is based. In the instant case, the same is based on mere surmises and conjectures. The order of the disciplinary authority basing on the report of the Enquiry Officer is bereft of reasons and a laconic one. The disciplinary authority has merely accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and imposed punishment of dismissal without assigning any reason. 9. In the instant case, the same is based on mere surmises and conjectures. The order of the disciplinary authority basing on the report of the Enquiry Officer is bereft of reasons and a laconic one. The disciplinary authority has merely accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and imposed punishment of dismissal without assigning any reason. 9. In view of the discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs, we quash the order dated 09.12.2009 passed by the learned Tribunal in O.A. No.1238 of 2002 under Annexure-1 as well as the order of punishment dated 5.1.2002 passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the petitioner from services. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to be re-instated in service. The opposite parties are directed to re-instate the petitioner in service within a period of eight weeks from today. But then, the petitioner will not be entitled to any salary for the entire period, since he was out of service. The said period shall be calculated towards his seniority and retiral benefits. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. M.M. Das, J. I agree. Petition allowed.