Hon'ble LOHRA, J.—By the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought a direction for granting him regular pay scale of Conductor from the inception of his service career on the anvil of doctrine of `equal pay for equal work' with all consequential benefits. The petitioner has also prayed for direction against the respondents to regularize his services as Conductor from the date of his initial appointment. 2. For claiming the aforementioned reliefs, it is inter-alia alleged by the petitioner in the writ petition that at the threshold of his service career he was appointed as Conductor in the year 1987. While serving as Conductor, the services of the petitioner were dispensed with and being aggrieved from the said action of the respondents, an application was submitted by him under Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as `the Act of 1947') questioning his termination before the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur. During the pendency of the said petition before the Industrial Tribunal, rival parties resolved the dispute amicably and matter was compromised and as a consequence a compromise award was passed by the Tribunal. In adherence of the award, the petitioner was taken back on duty in the month of May 1990 and he was allowed daily wages @ Rs. 25 only. As per the version of the petitioner, since May 1990 he is continuing in the service of the Corporation without any interruption and the daily wages which were allowed to him were also enhanced to the tune of Rs. 40 per day w.e.f. June 1993. For invoking the doctrine of `equal pay for equal work', the petitioner has also averred in the petition that the duties undertaken by him as Conductor are almost akin to that of a regular employee of the Corporation and therefore he is entitled for the regular pay scale of Conductor. The petitioner has also averred in the writ petition that keeping in view longevity of his service, he is entitled for regularization of his services as Conductor. In his pleadings, the petitioner has also referred to a writ petition, bearing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2415 of 1993, which was preferred by him earlier before this Court. The petitioner has also averred in the writ petition that keeping in view longevity of his service, he is entitled for regularization of his services as Conductor. In his pleadings, the petitioner has also referred to a writ petition, bearing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2415 of 1993, which was preferred by him earlier before this Court. According to petitioner, while deciding the said writ petition, this Court vide order dated 7th of February 1995 passed thee following order: "On 10.5.93 this Court has pointed out to the petitioner that he has approached this Court without even making a representation to the employer about his claim for regularization. Sh. Chandak submits that a representation has been sent by the petitioner on 4.6.93 and there is no response. In these circumstances, without even issuing notice to the other side, it can be and is hereby directed that if the respondents have received the representation dated 4.6.93, they shall decide it within a period of three months from the date, a copy of this order is produced by the petitioner alongwith a copy of his representation before the Chief Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Abu Road, Distt. Sirohi. If the petitioner is still aggrieved, he may approach this Court again. With these directions, this petition is disposed of." 3. Pursuant to the decision (Annex. 3) of this Court, the petitioner submitted his representation (Annex. 4) on 11th April 1997 but the same has not yielded the desired result. The petitioner has also referred to an order dated 4th of June 2004 passed by the respondent Corporation, whereby his services as Conductor was regularized w.e.f. 23rd January 2004. As per the version of the petitioner in the petition, the order dated 4th June 2004 is in contravention of the compromise dated 20th April 1990. With these pleadings, the petitioner has craved for the reliefs mentioned to supra. 4. On behalf of the respondents, no formal reply to the writ petition has been filed. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material on record. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rajesh Joshi assisted by Mr. With these pleadings, the petitioner has craved for the reliefs mentioned to supra. 4. On behalf of the respondents, no formal reply to the writ petition has been filed. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material on record. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rajesh Joshi assisted by Mr. Vinit R. Dave, has urged that keeping in view the longevity of the satisfactory services of the petitioner and the compromise which was arrived between the rival parties, the petitioner is entitled for regular pay scale of Conductor from the inception of his service career and he is also entitled for regularization of his services. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed heavy reliance on an office order passed by the Chief Manager, Phalodi Depot of the Corporation dated 16th January 2006 pertaining to one Mr. Bharat Singh. According to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the services of Mr. Bharat Singh were regularized on completion of 240 days' employment. For strengthening his submissions for the twin reliefs, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on a judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation vs. Mohd.. Khursheed Anwar (2010) 7 SCC 739 ), and yet another judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of Prabhakar Joshi vs. Kendriya Vidhyalaya Sangathan ( 2002(2) ALD 320 ). 7. In case of Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation (supra), while analyzing the doctrine of `equal pay for equal work', Hon'ble Apex Court made following observations in Para 20 & 21 of the said verdict: 20. To say the least, the decision of the Corporation to effect economy by depriving the respondents' even minimum of the pay scale was totally arbitrary and unjustified. The very fact that the respondents were engaged on a consolidated salary of Rs. 2,000/- per month and the prescribed pay scale of the post of Assistant Engineer in other branches was Rs. 2200-4000/- and that of the Junior Engineer was Rs. 1,600-2,660/- gives a clear indication that they were engaged to do the work of Assistant Engineer. The appellants had neither pleaded before the High Court nor has it been shown to this Court that the respondents were not qualified for the post of Assistant Engineer. 2200-4000/- and that of the Junior Engineer was Rs. 1,600-2,660/- gives a clear indication that they were engaged to do the work of Assistant Engineer. The appellants had neither pleaded before the High Court nor has it been shown to this Court that the respondents were not qualified for the post of Assistant Engineer. It is also not the case of the appellants that the respondents suffered from any other disability which could impede their appointment on the post of Assistant Engineer. In the written statement filed before the High Court, the appellants did make a statement that the respondents were not discharging the duties of Assistant Engineer but no material was produced either before the High Court or before this Court to show any difference in the nature of duties being performed by the respondents and those which were required to be performed by an Assistant Engineer. It is, therefore, reasonable to take the view that the respondents had been arbitrarily deprived of their legitimate right to get minimum of the pay scale prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer. 21. In the result, the appeal is party allowed. The impugned order is set aside. However, the appellants are directed to pay to the respondents minimum of the pay scale prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer (as revised from time to time) from the date of their appointment till they continued in the employment of the Corporation. 8. The next decision, on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance. i.e. Prabhakar Joshi's case (supra), in Para 27 of the judgment, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has considered the longevity of the services of the incumbent, which was more than a decade, and therefore in that situation ordered regularization of his services as Music Teacher from the date of his initial appointment. 9. Per contra, Mr. V.K. Mathur with Mr. Anirudh Purohit, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has argued that the Corporation has already regularized the services of the petitioner by showing benevolence vide its order dated 4.6.2004 w.e.f. 23.1.2004 and therefore, nothing survives in this writ petition for adjudication. According to submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, the regularization order is a just order and the same is in consonance and in conformity with the ratio decidendi in case of State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi ( 2004(4) SCC 1 ). According to submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, the regularization order is a just order and the same is in consonance and in conformity with the ratio decidendi in case of State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi ( 2004(4) SCC 1 ). The learned counsel for the respondents has also submitted that for regularizing services of an individual, besides longevity of the services, it is paramount for the employer to verify the satisfactory services of an individual and no blanket direction for regularization of services of an individual can be issued. While repudiating the contention of the petitioner for grant of regular pay scale from thee inception of his service career, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner was engaged on daily wages at the threshold without following prescribed procedure for regular recruitment. Therefore, the petitio-ner is not entitled for regular pay scale from inception of his service career. 10. I have thrashed out the matter in its entirety and have also perused the award dated 20th of April 1990 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, as well as the compromise which was arrived at between the rival parties. From the terms of the compromise, it is explicitly clear that the petitioner has been taken back on duty with continuity of services in the same status. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents has not chosen to file reply to the writ petition and during the course of arguments also the learned counsel has not been able to controvert the factum of continuous employment of the petitioner since 1987. Moveover, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has not been able to persuade me that why in the case of other incumbent Bharat Singh, his services were regularized on completion of 240 days employment. True it is that the said order was issued by the Corporation by showing extra benevolence vis-a-vis an individual but the same cannot be construed as a ground for invoking the equality clause as enshrined under Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. It is a trite law that neither the Act of 1947, nor any other labour legislation envisages a condition that an incumbent who has served for 240 days in a calender year or more can stake his claim for regularization of his services. It is a trite law that neither the Act of 1947, nor any other labour legislation envisages a condition that an incumbent who has served for 240 days in a calender year or more can stake his claim for regularization of his services. Therefore, in my humble opinion, the example cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is obviously of no avail and consequence to him. Assuming it that the Corporation has shown some favour to an incumbent dehors the law, the same cannot be cited as a precedent or an example to countenance further wrong action or illegality in the another case. The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a positive concept and is not meant for perpetuating illegalities. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. 11. Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Union of India & Another vs. International Trading Corporation & Another ( 2003 (5) SCC 437 ) has observed in Para 13 of the verdict as infra: 13. What remains now to be considered, is the effect of permission granted to the 32 vessels. As highlighted by learned counsel for the appellants, even if it is accepted that there was any improper permission, that may render such permissions vulnerable so far as 32 vessels are concerned. But it cannot come to the aid of respondents. It is not necessary to deal with that aspect because two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case; direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short `the Constitution') cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs or par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that wrong has been committed on some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality respondents cannot strengthen their case. They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs or par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that wrong has been committed on some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality respondents cannot strengthen their case. They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality. The said view was further reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Union Bank of India vs. M.T. Latheesh ( 2006 (7) SCC 350 ) in Para 28 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as infra: 28. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the bank has made several compassionate appointments quite contrary to the Scheme and, therefore, the respondent should also be considered for such appointment on compassionate grounds. It is well settled that Articles 14 cannot be extended to legalise illegal orders though others had wrongly got the benefits of that order on some stray incidents earlier. 12. Therefore, in this view of the matter, the example of Bharat Singh cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot come to rescue of the petitioner for claiming the reliefts contained in the writ petition. Thus, in totality, the contention of the petitioner about violation of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution fails flat and consequently rejected. 13. Now, adverting to the legal precedents on which the petitioner has placed reliance, suffice it to state that the judgment rendered in Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation's case (supra) is not at all concerned with the regularization of the services of an individual. The principle propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in that case is confined to doctrine of `equal pay for equal work' as envisaged under Article 39(d) read with Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. The ratio decidendi of this pronouncement fully endorses the grievance of the petitioner for equal pay for equal work. In fact this judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court clearly clinches the issue in favour of the petitioner for granting him minimum pay scale of Conductor from an earlier date. In the other legal precedent of Andra High Court, i.e. Prabhakhar Joshi's case (supra), the Andhra Pradesh High Court while deciding the matter has considered legal precedents but has not cared to consider the Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Uma Devi's case (supra). 14. In the other legal precedent of Andra High Court, i.e. Prabhakhar Joshi's case (supra), the Andhra Pradesh High Court while deciding the matter has considered legal precedents but has not cared to consider the Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Uma Devi's case (supra). 14. In Uma Devi's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has deprecated the practice of allowing back-door entries and has put a word of caution for issuance of blanket directions of regularization of the employment which are made dehors the constitutional scheme. In Para 43 of the judgment in Uma Devi's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made following observations: 43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as `litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The Court must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. Emphasizing the need for adherence to the procedure established by law for public employment, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 45 of the said verdict has further made the under mentioned observations: 45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain-not at arms length - since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain-not at arms length - since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 15. The legal position which has emerged out from the Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Uma Devi's case (supra) now requires judicial scrutiny by this Court keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. 16. From the admitted facts, it is amply clear that the petitioner at the threshold of his service career was appointed as daily rated Conductor in the year 1987 but his services were dispensed with. He challenged the said termination order before the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur by invoking provisions of Section 33-A of the Act of 1947. The aforesaid petition of the petitioner was not contested by the respondents and parties have mutually agreed to settle their dispute. Thereupon, the Industrial Tribunal vide its award dated 20th April 1990 reinstated the petitioner in the services of the respondent Corporation without allowing any monetary benefits with the same status which he was enjoying at the time of termination of his services. In compliance of the compromise award dated 20th April 1990 (Annex. 6), the petitioner was taken back on duty in the month of May 1990. According to the version of the petitioner, since then he is continuously working and there is no interruption in his service. When confronted with this fact situation, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has also answered in affirmative that since May 1990 the petitioner is continuing in the employment of the Corporation. According to the version of the petitioner, since then he is continuously working and there is no interruption in his service. When confronted with this fact situation, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has also answered in affirmative that since May 1990 the petitioner is continuing in the employment of the Corporation. In fact, the learned counsel for the respondents has made an attempt to impress upon this Court that considering his longevity of services the order of regularization dated 4th of June 2004 (Annex. 5) was issued. 17. At this stage, this Court feels that the interregnum period of 1987 to May 1990 was of course considered by the Industrial Tribunal as a consequence of compromise to be a period of employment but for this period no wages were allowed to the petitioner and furthermore this period was treated to be a period of employment by legal fiction only. Thus, in my considered opinion, the period anterior to May 1990, when the petitioner was taken back on duty in compliance of compromise award, is not liable to be counted for considering his case for regularization. At the most, the period commencing from May 1990 can be reckoned for the purposes of considering his case for regularization. If the period commencing from May 1990 is counted then in that event obviously the petitioner has completed 10 years' uninterrupted services in May 2000 itself. The fact that the petitioner was possessing requisite qualification for the post in question can also be inferred from the fact that the parties have compromised before Industrial Tribunal. Thus, the services rendered by the petitioner from May 1990 deserve credence for the purpose of considering the relief of regularization and the ratio decidendi of Uma Devi's case (supra) can be pressed into service for consideration of his case for regularization on completion of 10 years' services. My this view is fully fortified from para 53 of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Uma Devi's case, and recital contains in Para 53 of the judgement are reproduced as infra: 53. One aspect needs to be clarified. My this view is fully fortified from para 53 of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Uma Devi's case, and recital contains in Para 53 of the judgement are reproduced as infra: 53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa (supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), and B.N. Nagarajan (supra), and referred to in para 15 above, of duty qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and the instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitution scheme. 18. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court are fully applicable and the case of the petitioner is liable to be considered for regularization of his services from a date which is anterior to 2004. The peculiar facts of this case and the umpteen material available on record further strengthens the affections of the petitioner for preponement of his date of regularization. The peculiar facts of this case and the umpteen material available on record further strengthens the affections of the petitioner for preponement of his date of regularization. As regards the other relief for grant of regular pay scale to the petitioner from the inception of his service career, I fully concur with the view of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of U.P. Land Development Corporation case (supra), that petitioner's entitlement for notional benefit of the minimum pay scale of Conductor at least from the date of filing of the writ petition is fully justified. 19. The upshot of the above discussion is that this writ petition is allowed in part and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioner notional benefits of pay scale of Conductor from the date of institution of this writ petition and to consider his case for regularization of his services from May 2000. In case the order Annex. 5 comes in the way of the petitioner for granting him the relief of regularization and other consequential benefits then the same may be ignored or treated as redundant. The respondents are further directed to undertake the exercise of consideration of the case of the petitioner for regularization and fixation of pay scale within a period of two months from the date of production of the certified copy of this order and to issue necessary orders to allow him fruits flowing from the said order uninfluenced by the regularization order Annex. 5 issued by them earlier. 20. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the costs are made easy.