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2013 DIGILAW 447 (JHR)

Reman Devi v. Ranchi Kshetriya Gramin Bank

2013-04-04

APARESH KUMAR SINGH

body2013
JUDGMENT By Court.- Heard counsel for the parties. 2. The deceased-petitioner Bal Krishna Munda has died during the pendency of the writ application who is substituted by his wife Reman Devi. The deceased petitioner had preferred this application being aggrieved by the appellate order dated 17.7.2001 issued by the Chairman, Ranchi Kshetriya Gramin Bank vide Annexure-15 on behalf of the Board of Directors-cum-Appellate Authority, confirming the penalty imposed by the Chairman-cum-Disciplinary Authority upon the petitioner of removal, from service. The petitioner has also challenged the original order imposing penalty by the Chairman of the said Bank dated 17.2.2000, which is contained at Annexure-13 to the writ application. 3. The petitioner was working as Manager at the Hatinghore Branch of Ranchi Kshetriya Gramin Bank from 19.9.1994 to 4.1.1999. He was proceeded against departmentally on the basis of charge-sheet dated 18.3.1999, alleging serious misconduct for having disbursed loan on several occasions to the tune of Rs. 1,72,700/-, and Rs. 91,100/- respectively to Sri Ram Lakhan Sahu, Officer and Sri Binayak Damodar Singh, Clerk-cum-Cashier of the branch as detailed in Annexures A and B to the said charge-sheet. He had indulged in disbursal of several loans without obtaining National Savings Certificate (N.S.C.)/L.I.C./T.D.R.s and Keeping on record adequate securities as also not reported such disbursement to the competent authority. These charges amounted to serious misconduct within the meaning of Regulation No. 17 and 19 read with Regulation No. 30(i) of Ranchi Kshetriya Gramin Bank Staff Service Regulation, 1981. The petitioner is stated to have participated in the inquiry and confessed his guile The inquiry was proceeded after appointment of Presenting and Enquiry Officer and, after giving adequate opportunity to the petitioner, which is not in dispute, the impugned order of punishment was passed by the Chairman which is contained at Annexure-13 holding the petitioner guilty of the charges found to have been proved during the inquiry also on the basis of unambiguous categorical statement made by him. The defence of the petitioner, is that he had obtained the N.S.C.(L.I.C. policies as securities, which were verified by the Chairman and found to be incorrect as the concerned employee had also failed to furnish any evidence to that effect. The defence of the petitioner, is that he had obtained the N.S.C.(L.I.C. policies as securities, which were verified by the Chairman and found to be incorrect as the concerned employee had also failed to furnish any evidence to that effect. In the impugned order it is also recorded that the petitioner exceeded his delegated authority in allowing withdrawals of the Bank's money on numerous occasions to staff members without adequate/requisite securities as per Bank's norms and proved himself to be a security risk and unfit for the Bank's service. It was also held that the acts of the petitioner has resulted in loss to bank as petitioner had failed to perform his statutory duty with utmost honesty and integrity and has also acted negligently, thus has lost the confidence of the employer. In such circumstances, the major punishment of removal from service was passed and it was also directed that the amount in question be recovered from the employee concerned. 4. The petitioner preferred appeal vide Annexure-14 before the Board of Directors of the respondent-Bank and the appellate order has been communicated to the petitioner by the Chairman of the respondent-Bank on behalf of the Board of Directors-cum-Appellate Authority. The grounds for assailing the impugned order on behalf of the petitioner are : (a) that he innocently advanced the loan being guided by the fact that the lonee were employees of the bank itself and no stranger: (b) that the Bank has already recovered the amount from the concerned employees and no loss has resulted to the bank (c) that the appellate order has been passed by the same person i.e. the Chairman of the Bank and not by the Board of Directors of the Bank, who is the Appellate Authority, in such case. As such, there is violation of Principles of Natural Justice, so far as the maxim Nemo in propria causa judex, esse debet is concerned, which means that no man can be a judge in his own cause. Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the impugned order is wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found to be proved against the petitioner and leniency of the punishment is required to be passed. He also submitted that petitioner was posted for 20 years in the service and there is no charges of any misconduct against him. 5. Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the impugned order is wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found to be proved against the petitioner and leniency of the punishment is required to be passed. He also submitted that petitioner was posted for 20 years in the service and there is no charges of any misconduct against him. 5. Respondent-Bank has however supported the impugned order by submitting that the petitioner was working in the capacity of Branch Manager in the concerned branch and it was his responsibility to secure adequate security in the nature of N.S.C./L.I.C. Policies/other security before advancing any loan to anyone including the employee of the Bank. It is the contention of the counsel for the respondent that the petitioner had confessed his guilt of disbursal of the aforesaid money amounting to Rs.1.72.700/- which were actually disbursed on 50 occasions and Rs.91.000 on 39 occasions which were definitely abuse of official position because sanctions were beyond his delegated authority that too without taking any security. Petitioner also failed' to bring the aforesaid fact to the notice of the higher authority and when the same was detected he was proceeded against departmentally and upon establishment of guilt during the course of inquiry, also based upon his confession, the order of punishment has been passed, which is, neither disproportionate nor excessive to the charges established in serious misconduct of breach of trust. 6. I have heard counsel for the parties and gone through the relevant materials on record. The fact which has been borne on record and narrated herein above indicate that the petitioner had acted beyond his delegated authority in disbursal of loan of Rs. 1,72,700/- and Rs.91,100/- respectively to two persons who were incidentally employees of the Bank that too through several transactions, without securing the said loan on the basis of any pledge of N.S.C/L.I.C policy/T.D.R.s. The petitioner appears to have confessed his guilt before the Enquiry Officer and the charges against him have also been established. The Disciplinary Authority being the Chairman of the Bank considered the inquiry report, confession of the petitioner as also his defence and has came to a finding that the employer has lost confidence in the employee because of his failure to remain honest and with integrity in service which is primarily in the nature of fiduciary relationship between the Bank and the Manager of the Bank concerned. The impugned order, therefore, has been passed by imposing major punishment of removal from service. The grievance of the petitioner that the original authority has also passed the appellate order seems to be misplaced upon perusal of the impugned order contained at Annexure-15 itself .as it is apparent that the order has only been communicated by the Chairman of the respondent-Bank on the decision taken by the Board of Directors of the respondent-bank and not taken on his own. In support of his contention counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of this Court passed in the case of N. Roy Chowdhury v. The Steel Authority of India Ltd., reported in 2011 (1) JLJR 135 in order to submit that the Chairman, who was Disciplinary Authority has also presided over the meeting of the Board of Directors while considering the appeal of the petitioner which he cannot perform as it is contrary to rule against the bais. On perusal of the impugned appellate order it however does not appear that the Chairman, who is Disciplinary Authority has presided over the meeting of the Board of Directors. Such a plea has not been taken by the petitioner in the writ petition or even in the grounds at para 2 and such feeble argument has been advanced by the counsel for the petitioner during the course of argument. In that view of the matter, the judgment relied upon by the petitioner is also not applicable to the fact of the case. 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court on numerous occasion including in the case of Uttranchal Transport Corporation v. Sanjay Kumar Nautiyal, reported in 2008 (12) SCC 131 , in the case of Divisional Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Kamruddin, reported in 2009 (7) SCC 552 and also in the case of Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union of India, reported in 2012(6) SCC 369 has held that in a case of financial irregularities and loss to public exchequer by the delinquent employee holding a position of trust, no 1eniency should be granted to the delinquent if the charges are found to be established against him in the departmental inquiry. The relationship of trust between the employer and employee stands betrayed. The acts of the petitioner led to the loss of confidence of the employer and, therefore, the punishment no less than removal from service is warranted in such circumstances. The relationship of trust between the employer and employee stands betrayed. The acts of the petitioner led to the loss of confidence of the employer and, therefore, the punishment no less than removal from service is warranted in such circumstances. 8. In the facts and. circumstances of the case, this Court does not find it fit to interfere with the impugned order of punishment by the Disciplinary Authority and subsequently, confirmed by the Appellate Authority and the order of punishment also does not seems to be either excessive or disproportionate. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed. Petition dismissed.