JUDGMENT Arup Kumar Goswami, J. 1. This Writ Appeal is placed before this Bench of Three Judges in terms of the Order dated 02.04.2013 to decide as to whether the Division Bench Judgment of this Court dated 14.11.2006 in Writ Appeal No. 189/2004 (Assam State Electricity Board and Anr. Vs. Mokalbari Kanoi Tea Estate (P) Ltd.) is in conflict with the law laid down by the Apex Court in M/s. Hindustan Times Limited Vs. Union of India and Ors, reported in AIR 1998 SC 688 . For the present, this preface may suffice and we shall indicate the issues involved and the questions raised in this Appeal at an appropriate stage. 2. The writ petition was filed by the respondent, which is a company duly incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It carries on business, inter-alia, of plantation, manufacture and sale of black tea and owns two factories, namely, Mokalbari Tea Estate (new) and Mokalbari Tea Estate (old) in the district of Dibrugarh, Assam. The Appellant Board supplied power to the aforesaid tea estates. Up to March 1993, the total load released in favour of the New factory was 570 KW and for the Old factory, 540 KW. On writ petitioner's request for sanction of additional load, the Appellant Board provided additional load of 68 KW and 98 KW to the New and Old factories, respectively, with effect from 08.04.1993. Thus, the total load released towards both New and Old factory was 638 KW each. Bills raised by the Board were regularly paid and there was no default. 3. In the month of September 1998, when it was noticed that the Board was raising bills showing the load as 570 KW and 548 KW for the New and Old factory, respectively, instead of 638 KW, the same was brought to the notice of the appellant No. 4, the jurisdictional Assistant Executive Engineer with a request to show the correct load in the bills. The appellant No. 4 responded by raising two bills, both dated 08.12.1998, one for New factory and the other for the Old factory, raising demand of arrear amount to the tune of Rs. 2,53,428/- and Rs. 3,67,728/-, respectively. Both the bills also included current Charges as well. The arrear component comprised of Minimum Charge and Fixed Charge. While Minimum Charge amount in respect of New factory is Rs. 22,848/-, the Fixed Charge amount is Rs. 2,30,400/-. 2,53,428/- and Rs. 3,67,728/-, respectively. Both the bills also included current Charges as well. The arrear component comprised of Minimum Charge and Fixed Charge. While Minimum Charge amount in respect of New factory is Rs. 22,848/-, the Fixed Charge amount is Rs. 2,30,400/-. Corresponding figures for New factory are Rs. 32,928/- and Rs. 3,34,800/-, respectively. While the Fixed Charge in respect of both the factories was for the period October 1994 to September 1998, the Minimum Charge bill raised for New factory was from January, 1994 to April, 1994 and for the Old factory for the period December, 1993 to March, 1994. On clarifications being sought by the writ petitioner, by letter dated 11.01.1999, it was informed that there was under billing as while raising the bills during the interregnum, additional load supplied was not taken into consideration. 4. The writ petitioner appealed to the appellant No. 2 i.e. the Additional Chief Engineer (Com) to revise the bills towards the arrear demand for the period of three years preceding starting from 08.12.1995 up to 08.12.1998. The appeal was disposed of by an order dated 19.03.1999 directing the writ petitioner to clear the outstanding arrear bills in five equal installments with the first payment on or before 31.03.1999 and also levying a surcharge of 20% per annum and 24% per annum in respect of New factory and Old factory, respectively. 5. The writ petition was, thereafter, filed with the plea that the Board cannot enforce its claim beyond three years, which is the period of limitation for filing of a suit. It was also pleaded that the Board could not have levied surcharge. 6. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the appellants in the writ petition, amongst others, it is stated that till the bills dated 08.12.1998 were issued, bill for Minimum Charges and Fixed Charges were never raised for the enhanced additional load. Charges for electricity consumed become due within the meaning of Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, for short, the Act, when the liability is quantified and the bill is raised. In the appeal dated 27.01.1999 before the appellant No. 2, there was no prayer for any revision of the bills for a period of three years and the only prayer made was for grant of 12 installments for payment of the arrear. In the appeal dated 27.01.1999 before the appellant No. 2, there was no prayer for any revision of the bills for a period of three years and the only prayer made was for grant of 12 installments for payment of the arrear. It is further stated that surcharge is justified and the rate of interest is dependent on outstanding amount in terms of the Resolution No. 18 dated 05.06.1998 of the Board. 7. In the writ petition, an interim order was passed on 19.04.1999 directing the appellants not to insist on payment of arrear dues and also not to disconnect power supply. 8. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, applying the ratio of the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2006 passed in Writ Appeal No. 189/2004 to the effect that Assam State Electricity Board Authority cannot raise bill in respect of a period prior to three years preceding the date of issuance of the bill, the learned Single Judge held that bills dated 08.12.2998 are not legal and valid and therefore, directed the Board to raise bills for the period of three years from 08.12.1998. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants, before the Division Bench, raised the issue that period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit does not govern issuance of bills for consumption of electricity by the Electricity Board and had placed reliance on M/s. Hindustan Times Limited (Supra) for the said proposition. 10. It is in the background of the aforesaid facts, a Division Bench of this Court, as noted earlier, vide Order dated 02.04.2013 placed the matter before a Bench of Three Judges to decide the correctness or otherwise of the Division Bench Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2006 in Writ Appeal No. 189/2004. 11. In challenge in the writ petition, which gave rise to Writ Appeal No. 189/2004, was a bill dated 10.02.2000 raised by the Electricity Board for the period 08.06.1994 to 13.09.1994, calculated after rectification of a defective meter, on the ground that it was raised after a lapse of six years, much after the period of limitation had expired. 12. We have heard Mr. B.D. Das, learned Sr. counsel for the appellants and Mr. S.K. Kejriwal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. We have also perused the materials on record. 13. At the very outset, in the beginning of his submissions, Mr. 12. We have heard Mr. B.D. Das, learned Sr. counsel for the appellants and Mr. S.K. Kejriwal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. We have also perused the materials on record. 13. At the very outset, in the beginning of his submissions, Mr. Das submits that against the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2006 in Writ Appeal No. 189/2004, placing reliance on which the writ petition was allowed in the instant case by the learned Single Judge, the Electricity Board had preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court of India in S.L.P. No. 1315/2007 and by an Order dated 02.02.2007, the Apex Court had dismissed the Special Leave Petition, in short, SLP, only on the ground that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was not considered to be a fit case for exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. He contends that dismissal of the SLP on the aforesaid ground will not preclude the appellants from raising the same point of law and this Court can also entertain such a plea and adjudicate upon the same. It is submitted by him that the Act does not provide any period of limitation for raising of a bill. Period of limitation for filing a suit for realization of the amount of bill would commence from the date of service of the bill, irrespective of the period for which such bill is raised. Placing reliance of Section 24 of the Act, the learned Sr. counsel submits that the Board can issue disconnection notice in respect of amount payable by the consumer, irrespective of the fact whether realization of the said amount by filing a suit would be barred by time. Due to inadvertence, bills were not raised taking into account the enhanced load and therefore, bills dated 09.12.1998 were issued for the arrears and Clause-18(g)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Terms and Conditions of Supply, 1998, for short, T & C, 1998, provides for meeting such a situation. Accordingly to him, Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2006 in Writ Appeal No. 189/2004 is in conflict with the decision of the Apex Court in Hindustan Times Limited (Supra). In order to substantiate his arguments, the learned Sr. counsel has also placed reliance in the Judgments of the Apex Court in (i) L.S. Synthetics Limited Vs. Accordingly to him, Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2006 in Writ Appeal No. 189/2004 is in conflict with the decision of the Apex Court in Hindustan Times Limited (Supra). In order to substantiate his arguments, the learned Sr. counsel has also placed reliance in the Judgments of the Apex Court in (i) L.S. Synthetics Limited Vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Limited and Anr., reported in (2004) 11 SCC 456, (ii) Swastic Industries Vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Board, reported in (1997) 9 SCC 465 , (iii) Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Limited Vs. State of Bombay and Ors., reported in AIR 1958 SC 328 , (iv) Employees' State Insurance Corporation Vs. H.M.T. Limited and Anr., reported in (2008) 3 SCC 35 . Reliance is also placed in (i) M/s. Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Company Private Limited Vs. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Anr., reported in AIR 1978 Bom 369 , (ii) H.D. Shourie Vs. Municipal Corporation Delhi and Anr., reported in AIR 1987 Delhi 219, and (iii) a Division Bench Judgment dated 21.09.2001 of this Court in W.A. No. 162/99 in the case of ASEB and Ors. Vs. The Ahmed Tea Company (P) Limited. 14. Mr. S.K. Kejriwal, learned counsel of the respondent submits that in the SLP filed by the Electricity Board which was dismissed by Apex Court, the present respondent was the respondent before the Apex Court also and as such the Apex Court having dismissed the SLP, the Electricity Board cannot be permitted to raise the same issue in the present writ appeal and the writ appeal is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. In support of his submission, the learned counsel places reliance on (i) Gangadhara Palo Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer and Anr., reported in (2011) 4 SCC 602 and (ii) Satrucharla Vijaya Rama Raju Vs. Nimmaka Jaya Raju and Ors., reported in (2006) 1 SCC 212 . It is submitted by him that the earlier Division Bench judgment is not in conflict with Hindustan Times Limited (Supra) and both the judgments operated in different fields and no interference is called for with the earlier Division Bench judgment. Learned counsel submits the word 'due' in section 24 of the Act must be construed to be an amount which can be recovered by taking recourse to filing of a suit and cannot take within its fold time-barred and stale claims. Learned counsel submits the word 'due' in section 24 of the Act must be construed to be an amount which can be recovered by taking recourse to filing of a suit and cannot take within its fold time-barred and stale claims. He heavily relies on State of Kerala and Ors. Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty and Anr., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 657 . 15. We shall first consider the effect of dismissal of the SLP filed by the Board, not arising from this proceeding, but nonetheless, posing a similar question. 16. The order of the Apex Court dated 02.02.2007 dismissing the SLP reads as under: UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following. ORDER In the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find it a fit case for exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. 17. It is by now well settled that dismissal of SLP by the Supreme Court by a non-speaking order of dismissal where no reasons are given does not constitute res judicata. It cannot be also said that the mere rejection of SLP, by itself, could be construed as imprimatur of the Apex Court on the correctness of the decision sought to be appealed against. When leave is granted and an appeal is dismissed, order of the High Court gets merged with that of the Supreme Court but not when a SLP is dismissed, more so when it is by a non-speaking order. The doctrine of merger is a common law doctrine founded on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of justice delivery mechanism. When the Apex Court gives reasons while dismissing a SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the decision becomes law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. But when no reason is given and the SLP is summarily dismissed, the Court does not lay down any law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. In Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association Vs. But when no reason is given and the SLP is summarily dismissed, the Court does not lay down any law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. In Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association Vs. Union of India, reported in (1989) 4 SCC 187 , it was laid down that the effect of a non-speaking order of dismissal of a SLP without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons of its dismissal must, by necessary implication, be taken to be that the Supreme Court has decided only that it was not a fit case where SLP should be granted. By taking such view, the Apex Court reiterated the same view taken in Workmen Vs. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and Anr., reported in (1978) 3 SCC 119 and Indian Oil Corporation Limited Vs. State of Bihar and Ors., reported in (1986) 4 SCC 146 . 18. In Kunhayammed and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Anr., reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359 , the Supreme Court stated as follows: 27. A petition for leave to appeal to this Court may be dismissed by a non-speaking order or by a speaking order. Whatever be the phraseology employed in the order of dismissal, if it is a non-speaking order, i.e., it does not assign reasons for dismissing the special leave petition, it would neither attract the doctrine of merger so as to stand substituted in place of the order put in issue before it nor would it be a declaration of law by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution for there is no law which has been declared. If the order of dismissal be supported by reasons then also the doctrine of merger would not be attracted because the jurisdiction exercised was not an appellate jurisdiction but merely a discretionary jurisdiction refusing to grant leave to appeal. We have already dealt with this aspect earlier. Still the reasons stated by the Court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution if there is a law declared by the Supreme Court which obviously would be binding on al the courts and tribunals in India and certainly the parties thereto. We have already dealt with this aspect earlier. Still the reasons stated by the Court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution if there is a law declared by the Supreme Court which obviously would be binding on al the courts and tribunals in India and certainly the parties thereto. The statement contained in the order other than on points of law would be binding on the parties and the court or tribunal, whose order was under challenge on the principle of judicial discipline, this Court being the Apex Court of the country, no court or tribunal or parties would have the liberty of taking or canvassing any view contrary to the one expressed by this Court. The order of Supreme Court would mean that it has declared the law and in that light the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 but still, the case not being one where leave was granted, the doctrine of merger does not apply. The Court sometimes leaves the question of law open. Or it sometimes briefly lays down the principle, may be, contrary to the one laid down by the High Court and yet would dismiss the special leave petition. The reasons given are intended for purposes of Article 141. This is so done because in the event of merely dismissing the special leave petition, it is likely that an argument could be advanced in the High Court that the Supreme Court has to be understood as not to have differed in law with the High Court. 19. In Gangadhara (Supra), the Apex Court, amongst others, reiterated the view taken in Kunhayammed (Supra) and held that when a SLP is dismissed without giving any reasons, there is no merger of the judgment of the High Court with the Order of the Apex Court and hence the High Court could review the judgment since it continues to exists. On the other hand, if a SLP is dismissed with reasons, however meagre, may be just one sentence, there is a merger of the judgment of the High Court in the order of the Supreme Court and hence, High Court could not entertain a review application in such a situation. On the other hand, if a SLP is dismissed with reasons, however meagre, may be just one sentence, there is a merger of the judgment of the High Court in the order of the Supreme Court and hence, High Court could not entertain a review application in such a situation. In Satrucharla (Supra), at the instance of the appellant, the learned Trial Judge, dealing with an Election Petition, recorded a finding against the appellant against which he approached the Supreme Court by filing a SLP. The SLP came to be dismissed without any reasons, without granting liberty to the appellant to challenge the finding while challenging the final decision, if it became necessary. It is in the aforesaid context, the Apex Court stated that though there may not have been a merger, the same would be conclusive against the appellant disentitling him to raise the same issue. 20. The Order of dismissal dated 02.02.2007 of the Apex Court, extracted hereinabove, would go to show that the same was a non-speaking order, explicitly stating that the same was not a fit case for exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Thus, we are of the opinion that dismissal of the SLP would not be a bar for this Court to adjudicate the issue sought to be raised by the appellants. 21. Section 22 of the Act casts an obligation on a licensee to supply energy to every person within the area of supply who makes an application for such supply. Section 22A confers power on the State Government to give directions to a licensee in regard to supply of energy to certain class of consumers. Section 22B confers power to control distribution and consumption of energy. Section 23 prohibits the licensee from showing undue preference to any person in making any agreement for the supply of energy. Section 24(1) is very material for the purpose of this case and as such, the same is set out herein below: 24. Section 22B confers power to control distribution and consumption of energy. Section 23 prohibits the licensee from showing undue preference to any person in making any agreement for the supply of energy. Section 24(1) is very material for the purpose of this case and as such, the same is set out herein below: 24. Discontinuance of supply to consumer neglecting to pay charge-(1) where any person neglects to pay any charge for energy or any sum, other than a charge for energy, due from him to a licensee in respect of the supply of energy to him, the licensee may, after giving not less than seven clear days' notice in writing to such person and without prejudice to his right to recover such charge or other sum by suit, cut of the supply and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply-line or other works, being the property of the licensee, through which energy may be supplied, and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply, are paid, but no longer. 22. In Swastic Industries (Supra), on an analysis of Section 24(1) of the Act, the Supreme Court held that Section 24(1) comprises of two components: one is the right to recover the charges due by way of suit and the other the right to discontinue supply of electrical energy to the consumer who neglects to pay charges. It was further held that right to file a suit is a matter of option given to the licensee and the fact that there is a right given to the Board to file a suit and that period of limitation has been prescribed to file the suit, it does not take way the right conferred on the Board under Section 24(1) to make demand for payment of the charges and on neglecting to pay the same, it has the power to discontinue the supply or cut off the supply. 23. Thus, there can be no two opinions that the Board has two options available under Section 24(1) of the Act. 23. Thus, there can be no two opinions that the Board has two options available under Section 24(1) of the Act. It is to be noticed that the right to discontinue the supply of electricity is without prejudice to the right of the licensee to file a suit to recover the amounts, since by resorting to disconnection of supply, the licensee will not necessarily obtain the amounts due from the consumer. 24. Now the next question that falls for our consideration is as to whether it would be permissible for the Board to recover old and time-barred claims on the threat of cutting off supply to a consumer. According to the learned counsel of the respondent, recovery of which is barred by the law of limitation, could not be legally described as 'due' from the consumer. In M/s. Bharat Barrel (Supra), the Bombay High Court noted that the word 'due' is used in two different senses. While in some statutes, it had been held to mean all moneys owed or payable, even though their recovery may be barred by the law of limitation, in other statutes, a more restricted meaning has been given to this word meaning thereby moneys which are legally recoverable or those which can be recovered by action. In the context of the word 'due' as appearing in Section 24(1) of the Act, the Bombay High Court opined that wider meaning has to be given to the word 'due' rather than the narrower and restricted meaning thus holding that it would be immaterial if the claim or part thereof would be barred by the law of limitation. It was held that the provisions contained in Section 24(1) which enables the licensee to discontinue electric supply to a particular consumer if he neglects to pay the charges for electricity supplied, is mainly by way of reliving of the licensee of the obligation on him as found in Section 22, which provides for making supply of electricity on application to all consumers within the area of supply. It is to be noted that in challenge before the Bombay High Court was a notice dated 31.10.1972 issued by the B.E.S.T. Undertaking claiming that the consumer had been undercharged for the period 1961 to 1972. 25. The law of limitation rests on the foundation of public interest. It is to be noted that in challenge before the Bombay High Court was a notice dated 31.10.1972 issued by the B.E.S.T. Undertaking claiming that the consumer had been undercharged for the period 1961 to 1972. 25. The law of limitation rests on the foundation of public interest. It has been held by Courts that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them. It is also recognized that with passage of time, the defendant may lose evidence to disprove a stale claim. It is also expected that persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. In L.S. Synthetics (Supra), the Apex Court reiterated that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings before bodies other than Courts, such as a quasi-judicial tribunal or even an executing authority and that the Act primarily applies to civil proceedings or special criminal proceedings. The Apex Court also noted that even in relation to certain civil proceedings, the Limitation Act may not have any application. 26. In H.D. Shourie (Supra), the Delhi High Court, interpreted Section 24 of the Act by holding that the amount of charges would become due and payable only with the submission of the bill and that the word "due" in that context must mean due and payable after a valid bill has been sent to the consumer and that even though the liability to pay may arise when the electricity is consumed by the consumer, nevertheless it becomes due and payable only when the liability is quantified and a bill is raised. Also interpreting Section 455 of the Municipal Corporation Act which provided that no proceeding for recovery which is due shall be commenced after the expiry of three years on which the sum becomes due, it was held that electricity charges become due after the bill is sent and not earlier and the remedy available for recovery of the amount by filing a suit would come to an end after three years from the date electricity charges become due and payable or in other words, Section 455 would come into play after the submission of the bill for electricity charges and not earlier. Accordingly, it was held that the authorities are at liberty to send a bill for consumption of electricity even three years after the electricity have been consumed. 27. Accordingly, it was held that the authorities are at liberty to send a bill for consumption of electricity even three years after the electricity have been consumed. 27. The question that the Supreme Court was confronted with in Kalliyanikutty (Supra) was whether a debt which is barred by the Law of Limitation can be recovered by resorting to recovery proceedings under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act of 1968, for short, Act of 1968, which is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to recovery of arrears of public revenue in the State of Kerala. Section 5 of the Act of 1968 provided that whenever public revenue due on land is an arrear, such arrear, together with interest, if any, and cost of the process may be recovered by one or more of the modes set out in that section including by way of attachment and sale of the defaulters' movable or immovable properties. Section 71 provided for extending the provisions of the Act for recovery of amounts due from any person or class of persons to any specified institution or any class or classes of institutions. Noting that the Act of 1968 only provides a process for speedy recovery of moneys due and it did not create any new right, it was held that the person claiming recovery cannot claim recovery of amounts which are not legally recoverable nor can a defence of limitation available to a defendant in a suit or other legal proceedings be taken away under the provisions of the Act of 1968. Under the Act of 1968, only the process of recovery is different. Instead of bank or the financial institution filing a suit which is defended by the debtor, the creditor first recovers and then defends his recovery in a suit filed by the debtor. When right to file a suit is preserved under Section 70, there is necessary implication that the shield of limitation available with debtor in a suit is also preserved. If that be so, it is obvious that recovery could not have been made legally of a time-barred debt. 28. Amount due was interpreted in Kalliyanikutty (Supra) in the context of the provisions of the Act of 1968. If that be so, it is obvious that recovery could not have been made legally of a time-barred debt. 28. Amount due was interpreted in Kalliyanikutty (Supra) in the context of the provisions of the Act of 1968. Referring to the definition of "due" in Law Lexicon and Black's Law Dictionary, the Apex Court stated that the exact meaning of the word "due" will depend upon the context in which the word appears. There is no mistaking from the facts of Kalliyanikutty (Supra), amount due was in the context of recovery to be effected. 29. In Kalliyanikutty (Supra), the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 laid down as follows: 15. It has been submitted before us that the statute of limitation merely bars the remedy without touching the right. Therefore, the right to recover the loan would remain even though the remedy by way of a suit would be time-bared. Reliance was placed on Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir in this connection. The Court there observed that though a debt may be time barred, it would still be a debt due. The right remains untouched and if a creditor has any means of enforcing his right other than by sanction or set-off, he is not prevented from doing so. In Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha (SCC at pp. 503-504) this Court held that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. Section 3 of the Limitation Act only bars the remedy but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. Excepting cases which are specifically provided for, as for example, under Section 27 of the Limitation Act, the right to which the remedy relates subsists. Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process is barred, that right can be exercised in any manner other than by means of a suit. For example, a creditor's right to make adjustment against time-barred debts exists. 30. In Bombay Dyeing (Supra) also the Supreme Court had laid down that the statute of limitation only bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt. In Ahmed Tea Company (Supra), the order passed by the Court was on the compromise of the parties. For example, a creditor's right to make adjustment against time-barred debts exists. 30. In Bombay Dyeing (Supra) also the Supreme Court had laid down that the statute of limitation only bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt. In Ahmed Tea Company (Supra), the order passed by the Court was on the compromise of the parties. HMT Ltd. (Supra) is not relevant for the purpose of this case as the Apex Court was primarily considering the meaning of the words "may recover" in the context of Section 85-B of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. 31. In Hindustan Times (Supra), an order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner dated 07.05.1980 passed under the Section 14-B of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, for short, Act of 1952 levying damages for delay in remitting employees' Provident Fund contribution based on a notice issued on 23.02.1971 by the Department for varying periods in between July 1965 to November 1968 was the subject matter of dispute before the Apex Court. The power of computation and recovery are both vested in the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or other officer as provided in Section 14-B. As the recovery is to be effected not by way of suit, the Apex Court held that provisions of the Limitation Act are not attracted. The Act of 1952, as enacted, did not have any provision prescribing any period of limitation for computing and recovering the arrears and subsequent many amendments covering a period of more than 30 years also did not provide for any period of limitation, thus demonstrating the intention of the Legislature not to prescribe for any period of limitation for computing and recovering the arrears, which are for the ultimate benefit of the employees. The Supreme Court negatived the plea of limitation set up by the appellant. 32. The Supreme Court negatived the plea of limitation set up by the appellant. 32. The Division Bench in Mokalbari (Supra), in which bill dated 10.02.2000 for the period 08.06.1994 to 13.09.1994 was an issue, observed that as the demand raised was hit by the provisions of Limitation Act, it would have been appropriate for the Board to have availed the remedy for recovery of the amount by issuing disconnection notice, as would be apparent from the following paragraph of the judgment: It would appear from above that if any person neglects to pay any charge for energy, the licensee (in the instant case the appellant Board) may after giving not less than seven days clear notice cut off the supply or disconnect the electric supply line. This power is available to the licensee in addition to the power of the licensee to recover such charge or other sum due to the licensee by filing a suit. In the instant case, the Board has not filed any suit, but raised the bill dated 10.2.2000 demanding payment of Rs. 1,76,864.90. Apparently, the demand made is hit by the provisions of Limitation Act. Therefore, it would have been appropriate on the part of the Board to avail the remedy for recovery of the amount by issuing disconnection notice. The observation of the learned Single Judge that no notice of disconnection was issued having attained finality, we are of the considered view that there remains nothing left to be decided in this appeal. Mr. Das submitted that the notice of disconnection is available in the office file. But, curiously enough, this notice has not been annexed with the Memo of Appeal. No prayer has also been made before this Court for reversal of the observation of the learned Single Judge that no notice was issued. Therefore, we decline to review the finding of the learned Single Judge. 33. The learned Single Judge, in his order dated 21.05.2007 also observed as follows: It is needless to say that whether the ASEB has the power to issue disconnection notice as provided under Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, even in respect of time barred claim, being not in issue in the present writ petition, I have not decided such issue and it is left open to the ASEB to take such action as permissible under the law. 34. 34. The admitted position in the instant case is that no disconnection notice was issued by the Board and the writ petition was filed against the bills dated 08.12.1998 demanding arrear amount, details of which have already been noted in the earlier part of the judgment. There being an interim order not to disconnect power supply, obviously, disconnection notice could not have been issued. 35. The question of issuing any disconnection notice would, in the first place, arise only when the consumer neglects to pay any charge due from him. Disconnection notice can only follow after the consumer is notified about the dues, which according to the Board, is payable by him, by way of a bill and there is corresponding neglect to pay by the consumer. Both under the Terms and Conditions of Supply, 1988 and under Terms and Conditions of Supply, 1998, bills are to be presented every month or at such periodical interval of time, as the Board may fix, to the consumer giving time of 15 days for payment. However, there is no limitation in the Act or in the Terms and Conditions that a bill cannot be raised in respect of electricity consumed beyond a particular period of time. 36. On a consideration of the authorities cited and the scheme of the Act, we are inclined to hold that the word "due" in the context of Section 24 must mean due and payable after a valid bill had been sent to the consumer. The liability to pay may arise when the electricity was consumed by the consumer, but it becomes due and payable only when the liability is quantified and the bill is raised. In our opinion, the ratio laid down in Kalliyanikutty (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case inasmuch as period of limitation could be set up by the debtor under the provisions of the Act of 1968. We are also of the opinion that the ratio enunciated in Hindustan Times (supra) is applicable in absence of any period of limitation to compute and recover arrears by way of a bill. Though in the instant case, bills were raised for the period in question, the said bills did not correctly reflect the actual amount payable. We are also of the opinion that the ratio enunciated in Hindustan Times (supra) is applicable in absence of any period of limitation to compute and recover arrears by way of a bill. Though in the instant case, bills were raised for the period in question, the said bills did not correctly reflect the actual amount payable. If no suit is filed for recovery of the amount within a period of 3 years from issuance of the bills, any suit filed thereafter for recovery of the amount in question will be barred by limitation. Amount claimed in the bills dated 8.12.1998, no doubt, pertains to a period beyond 3 years from date of raising of the bills. But the Act having not set any limit on the right of the authority to assess, re-assess, compute or send a bill, it cannot be held that the authority loses its right to recover the money due for the reason of not having sent the bill within a period of 3 years from consumption of electricity. Therefore, we are of the view that the Board has a right to send a bill for consumption of electricity even after 3 years. Right to file a suit is an option given to the Board. It does not take away the right to make demand for payment of charges and on neglecting to pay the same, the Board has the power to dis-continue the supply or cut off the supply. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 22 and 24 of the Act, we are of the opinion that legislative intendment appears to be that there is obligation of both the Board and the consumer. The Board is to supply electrical energy and the consumer is under corresponding duty to pay the sum due towards electricity consumed. Though there is no period prescribed within which a bill is to be raised, it is not that the Board can raise a bill at any time according to its own wish. We cannot be unmindful of the fact that under the Terms and Conditions of Supply 1988 as well as 1998, ordinarily, bills were to be presented every month. What would be the reasonable time is again a question which has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. We cannot be unmindful of the fact that under the Terms and Conditions of Supply 1988 as well as 1998, ordinarily, bills were to be presented every month. What would be the reasonable time is again a question which has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The question of prejudice may also arise if there is any inordinate delay in raising the bills. Prejudice, needless to say, has to be pleaded and established by the consumer. In the instant case, no prejudice is pleaded. There is also no apparent dispute that amounts shown in the bills is wrong. 37. The orders passed in appeal by the Additional Chief Engineer (Com) are cyclostyled orders wherein some blanks relating to number of installments and amount of surcharge etc. were filled up by hand. There was no application of mind in disposing of the said appeals and in a routine manner surcharge was imposed. According to the Terms and Conditions of Supply, surcharge is leviable for delayed payment. The arrear amount of charges due accumulated because of the Board's failure to raise the correct bill earlier and not because of any fault on the part of the consumer. Considering the same, as it appears, five equal monthly installments were granted by the Additional Chief Engineer (Com). In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that it will not be just and equitable to permit the Board to levy surcharge as imposed by the orders dated 19.03.1999. 38. In the result, we hold that the Judgment of the Division Bench dated 14.11.2006 in Writ Appeal No. 189/2004 (Assam State Electricity Board and Anr. Vs. Mokalbari Kanoi Tea Estate (P) Ltd.) does not lay down correct law. We also hold that the Board committed no illegality in raising the bills dated 8.12.1998 for consumption of electricity though 3 years had elapsed in the meantime. The respondent/writ petitioner will now pay the unpaid amount of the bills dated 08.12.1998 in five equal monthly installments. The first installment shall be paid on or before 31.07.2013 and the last installment on or before 30.11.2013. If the respondent/writ petitioner neglects to pay the amount due in terms of the above schedule, the Board may take consequential steps as provided under Section 24 of the Act. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The first installment shall be paid on or before 31.07.2013 and the last installment on or before 30.11.2013. If the respondent/writ petitioner neglects to pay the amount due in terms of the above schedule, the Board may take consequential steps as provided under Section 24 of the Act. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The Writ Appeal is allowed as indicated above. No costs.