Judgment: There are deposits of considerable volume of iron ore, in an area of about 1,50,000 acres spread over different villages of Bayyaram, Garla and Nelakondapally Mandals of Khammam District and the neighbouring Mandal of Gudur in Warangal District. The land is part of scheduled area. According to Section 11(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short ‘the Act’), a) prospecting licence or mining lease to exploit any minerals, within the scheduled area can be granted only in favour of a) Scheduled Tribes; b) societies formed for scheduled tribes, or c) the State-owned Corporations; undertaking such activity. Approval of the Central Government is necessary for this. In the year 2006, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the 2nd respondent herein, submitted a proposal to the Government of India, the 1st respondent, to accord approval for reserving the area in favour of the A.P. Mineral Development Corporation Limited, the 4th respondent. The same was pending. The 2nd respondent issued memo dated 03-01-2009, according permission to the A.P. Mineral Development Corporation Limited (for short ‘the 4th respondent’), a State-owned entity, to invite ‘Expression of Interest’ from eligible applicants for setting up of Integrated Steel Plant, including beneficiation, to process the deposits of iron ore, available in the four Mandals, referred to above, under a joint venture. Accordingly, the 4th respondent published a notification on 17-01-2009, inviting the applications. M/s Rakshana Steels Limited, the petitioner in W.P.Nos.21956, 31370 of 2010 and 22525 of 2012 came forward with a proposal. Another applicant was M/s Pioneer Torsteels Mills Private Limited. The 2nd respondent issued G.O.Ms.No.28, Industrial and Commerce (M.III) Department dated 31-01-2009, constituting a Committee, comprising of Secretary to Government, Industries and Commerce Department; Finance Secretary; Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC); Director of Mines and Geology, and Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of the 4th respondent to process the applications. It appears that the committee examined the matter and submitted a report, recommending the acceptance of the application of M/s Rakshana Steels Limited, (for short ‘the petitioner’). The 2nd respondent examined that report and issued G.O.Ms.No.69, Industries and Commerce Department dated 24-02-2009, notifying its acceptance and approval for the proposal. The relevant conditions were incorporated. The 4th respondent entered into “Iron Ore Supply agreement” on 25-02-2009 with the petitioner, undertaking to supply iron ore, that would be extracted from the area mentioned above. The 2nd respondent examined that report and issued G.O.Ms.No.69, Industries and Commerce Department dated 24-02-2009, notifying its acceptance and approval for the proposal. The relevant conditions were incorporated. The 4th respondent entered into “Iron Ore Supply agreement” on 25-02-2009 with the petitioner, undertaking to supply iron ore, that would be extracted from the area mentioned above. However, the arrangement under the agreement was subject to the grant of approval by the 1st respondent, and grant of mining lease by the 2nd respondent. The 1st respondent accorded its approval under Section 17A(2) of the Act, for reserving the iron ore bearing areas in the three Mandals in Khammam District in favour of the 4th respondent for a period of ten years, vide proceedings dated 25-09-2009. Based upon this approval, the 2nd respondent issued G.O.Rt.No.64, dated 30-06-2010, reserving the said area in favour of the 4th respondent. About four months thereafter, the 2nd respondent addressed a letter dated 23-07-2010 to the 1st respondent, stating that 30 to 40% of the area, as regards which, approval was accorded under Section 17-A(2) of the Act, comprises of villages, towns Mandal headquarters, houses, buildings, inhabitations, etc, apart from railway lines, roads, rivers etc. It was mentioned that a detailed exercise needs to be undertaken to segregate and exclude such areas, before the activity of mining is undertaken. It ultimately requested the 1st respondent to keep the proceedings dated 25-09-2009 in abeyance. Acting on that, the 1st respondent issued proceedings dated 17-08-2010, revoking its approval accorded by it. W.P.No.21956 of 2012 is filed challenging the said proceedings. As a sequel to the revocation of approval by the 1st respondent, the 2nd respondent issued G.O.Ms.No.126, dated 09-12-2010, cancelling its orders in G.O.Ms.No.64, dated 30-06-2010, whereunder the area was reserved in favour of the 4th respondent. W.P.No.31370 of 2010 is filed challenging the same. As a fall out of these developments, the 2nd respondent has issued G.O.Ms.No.106, dated 07-07-02012, cancelling the G.O.Ms.No.69, dated 24-02-2009, whereunder the approval was accorded to the 4th respondent to enter into an agreement with the petitioner. Writ Petition No.22525 of 2012 is filed challenging the G.O.Ms.No.106 dated 07-07-2012. The Visakhapatnam Steel Plant Employees Union filed W.P.No.25114 of 2012 with a prayer to direct the 1st and 2nd respondents to allot the land referred to above in favour of the Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited for captive mining. Writ Petition No.22525 of 2012 is filed challenging the G.O.Ms.No.106 dated 07-07-2012. The Visakhapatnam Steel Plant Employees Union filed W.P.No.25114 of 2012 with a prayer to direct the 1st and 2nd respondents to allot the land referred to above in favour of the Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited for captive mining. The petitioner contends that the action of the respondents 1 and 2 in cancelling the proceedings accorded by them at various stages is illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional. It is pleaded that the approval was accorded by the respondents 1 and 2 under the relevant provisions of law, after following the due procedure and on being satisfied about the compliance with the directions. According to them, the respondents 1 and 2 do not have any power to revoke the statutory orders once issued, and such an exercise is untenable in law. Another contention of the petitioner is that the reasons furnished by the respondents, while revoking the approvals are not germane to the subject-matter and that the impugned orders were passed on extraneous considerations. The petitioner further contends that valuable rights have accrued to it on the basis of the agreement executed in its favour, and that the impugned orders are violative of principles of natural justice, apart from having the effect of defeating its legitimate expectations. The 1st respondent filed a detailed counter-affidavit. It is stated that though approval was accorded for reserving vast extent of mineral bearing area in favour of the 4th respondent, it ultimately emerged that no exercise was undertaken to segregate the area covered by Villages, houses, railway lines, roads, rivers, etc., and in that view of the matter, the revocation was effected. It is stated that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge any orders, since it is not a party to the proceedings. On behalf of the respondents 2 and 3, counter-affidavit is filed, justifying their actions. It is stated that except that an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the 4th respondent, in anticipation of lease being granted, no rights whatever were conferred upon the petitioner and that it has no standing to challenge the orders, particularly when the 4th respondent itself did not feel aggrieved by the cancellation. It is stated that except that an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the 4th respondent, in anticipation of lease being granted, no rights whatever were conferred upon the petitioner and that it has no standing to challenge the orders, particularly when the 4th respondent itself did not feel aggrieved by the cancellation. It is also stated that large scale mining, which may be undertaken in such a vast extent, would certainly have its impact upon several villages, railway lines, roads, rivers, etc., and in that view of the matter, a request was made to the 1st respondent to keep the order of approval in abeyance, so that further steps can be taken after thorough verification is done. The 2nd respondent contends that once the 1st respondent has chosen to revoke the order of approval, it becomes impermissible for them, i.e., respondents 2 to 4 to take up any steps for grant of mining lease. It is pleaded that an authority, which has passed an order, has inherent and implied power to revoke the same, and the petitioner has no right to challenge the impugned orders. The petitioners in W.P.No.25114 of 2012 tried to make an endeavour to get the land allotted in favour of the Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, for captive mining. Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner responded to a notification, inviting ‘expression of interest’ issued by the 4th respondent with the approval of the 2nd respondent, and once the proposal was accepted and an agreement was entered into, it is not at all open to the 1st respondent to revoke the approval, accorded by it, in exercise of statutory power. He submits that respondents 1 to 4 passed orders granting approval etc., strictly in accordance with law, and there was absolutely no basis for them in issuing the impugned orders. He contends that the 1st respondent is not conferred with the power to review or revoke its orders, nor Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 confers such powers. The second contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that the reasons furnished by the respondents 1 and 2 in revoking the various orders of approval passed by them are not at all relevant and they have been pressed into service, to sustain the otherwise untenable orders. The second contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that the reasons furnished by the respondents 1 and 2 in revoking the various orders of approval passed by them are not at all relevant and they have been pressed into service, to sustain the otherwise untenable orders. He submits that the respondents were very much aware of the fact that the vast extent of area is naturally dotted with villages and towns and the mining activity could certainly have been restricted to such of the areas, which are not covered by houses, inhabitations, railway lines, roads, etc. Thirdly learned Senior Counsel submits that though the request of the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent was to keep the approval in abeyance, the 1st respondent proceeded a step further and revoked it altogether. According to him, the act of the 2nd respondent in requiring the 1st respondent to keep the proceedings of the 1st respondent in abeyance amounts to interference with the statutory power of the 1st respondent and by acceding to that request, the 1st respondent has surrendered its powers. He placed reliance upon several judgments rendered by the Supreme Court. Learned Advocate-General appeared for the respondents 2 to 4. He submits that in G.O.Ms.No.69, dated 24-02-2009 itself, it was clearly mentioned that the various steps contemplated in it are subject to reservation of the iron ore bearing areas in favour of the 4th respondent, by the 1st respondent and knowing fully well, the uncertainty in the matter, the petitioner has come forward, to express its interest, and has become a party to the agreement. He submits that if at all anything, it is only an inchoate right, that has accrued to the petitioner, that too against the 4th respondent and that it has no right to challenge the orders passed by the respondents 1 and 2. He contends that the purport of the agreement between the petitioner and the 4th respondent is speculative in nature. It is urged that the Bank guarantee furnished under the agreement had expired and that the clauses in the contract cannot be enforced even in a civil suit. Mention is made of clause 26 of the agreement. According to the learned Advocate-General, the only remedy available for the petitioner is to claim damages, if otherwise permissible in law. He too relied upon certain decisions. Mention is made of clause 26 of the agreement. According to the learned Advocate-General, the only remedy available for the petitioner is to claim damages, if otherwise permissible in law. He too relied upon certain decisions. Sri Ponnam Ashok Gound, learned Assistant Solicitor General submits that the 1st respondent had revoked the approval accorded by it, in view of the representation made to the 2nd respondent. He contends that when such a large extent is involved, the exercise of segregating the area covered by houses, inhabitations, railway lines etc., ought to have been undertaken much in advance. He submits that the 1st respondent has inherent powers to cancel the orders passed by it, and that no illegality has taken place in the matter. Sri B. Tarakam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the persons, who got themselves impleaded in the writ petitions submits that the applications submitted by the impleaded parties for grant of mining lease were not considered on account of the reservation of the area in favour of the 4th respondent. He submits that since impleaded parties are tribals, there is no prohibition in law for grant of leases in their favour and that the orders impugned in the writ petition do not warrant interference. Sri S. Satya Prasad, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.25114 of 2012 submits that the petitioner, i.e. M/s Rakshana Steels Limited, has undertaken a speculative activity and though respondents 1 and 2 took various steps to the advantage of the petitioner, corrective steps were taken on realising that serious illegality has crept in. He submits that the respondents 1 and 2 i.e. State and Central Government were indifferent to the genuine necessity of a major public sector undertaking for captive mining and now that the impediments do not exist, necessary directions may be issued for grant of captive mining lease, in favour of the Visakhapatnam Steel Plant. The Act and the Rules made thereunder prescribe the procedure, to be followed for grant of mining leases to quarry different minerals and metals. Iron ore is classified as major mineral. Deposits thereof were noticed in about 1.5 lakhs of acres in three Mandals of Khammam District and one Mandal of Warangal District, mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. These Mandals, however, are in the scheduled area. Iron ore is classified as major mineral. Deposits thereof were noticed in about 1.5 lakhs of acres in three Mandals of Khammam District and one Mandal of Warangal District, mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. These Mandals, however, are in the scheduled area. Section 11 (5) of the Act places restrictions, on grant of mining leases in respect of lands, which are in the scheduled area. The prospecting licence or mining lease in respect of such lands can be granted only in favour of the persons, who are scheduled tribes, or societies, that have the scheduled tribes as its members, or any State-owned Corporations. While licence or lease can be granted to first two categories straightaway, approval of the 1st respondent is necessary, to reserve the mineral bearing lands in scheduled areas, in favour of a State-owned Corporation. Section 17-A of the Act provides for this. It reads, “Sec.17-A: Reservation of area for purposes of conservation:- (1) The Central Government, with a view to conserving any mineral and after consultation with the State Government may reserve any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease and, where it proposes to do so, it shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the boundaries of such area and the mineral or minerals in respect of which such area will be reserved. (1A) The Central Government may, in consultation with the State Government, reserve any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease, for undertaking prospecting or mining operations through a Government company or corporation owned or controlled by it, and where it proposes to do so, it shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the boundaries of such area and the mineral or minerals in respect of which such area will be reserved. (2) The State Government may, with the approval of the Central Government, reserve any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease, for undertaking prospecting or mining operations through a Government company or Corporation owned or controlled by and where it proposes to do so, it shall by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the boundaries of such area and the mineral or minerals in respect of which such areas will be reserved. (3) Where in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1A) or sub-section (2) the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be undertakes prospecting or mining operations in any area in which the minerals vest in a private person, it shall be liable to pay prospecting fee, royalty, surface rent or dead rent, as the case may be, from time to time at the same rate at which it would have been payable under this Act if such prospecting or mining operations had been undertaken by a private person under prospecting licence or mining lease”. In case the 4th respondent intended to carry out mining of iron ore in the area, referred to above, and the 2nd respondent was convinced with the ability and potential of the 4th respondent in this behalf, steps could have been initiated to seek approval of the 1st respondent under Section 17-A of the Act. As a matter of fact, such proposals were submitted in the year 2006 itself. However, even before any positive response came from the 1st respondent, respondents 2 and 4 became hyperactive in the year 2009. The 4th respondent approached the 2nd respondent to accord permission for inviting expression of interest from the interested agencies. The 2nd respondent acceded to the request and issued G.O.Ms.No.69, dated 24-02-2009, according its permission. Based upon that, the 4th respondent invited applications, which, in turn, were scrutinised by the committee, constituted by the 2nd respondent. Ultimately, the petitioner came to be selected. After obtaining permission from the 2nd respondent, the 4th respondent proceeded to execute “iron ore supply agreement” with the petitioner, on 25-02-2009. For all practical purposes, the 4th respondent wanted to become or act as a conduit to enable the petitioner to overcome the rigor of Sections 11(5) and 17-A of the Act. Everything went on smoothly, till the 1st respondent accorded its approval through its letter dated 25-09-2009 for reserving the area in favour of the 4th respondent and the 2nd respondent issued G.O.Ms.No.64, dated 30-06-2010, implementing the reservation. Thereafter, the events took a different turn. The 2nd respondent came forward with the plea that about 30 to 40% area of the land mentioned in the proceedings is covered by houses, habitations, railway lines, roads, rivers etc., and unless proper segregation takes place, further activity may not be advisable. Thereafter, the events took a different turn. The 2nd respondent came forward with the plea that about 30 to 40% area of the land mentioned in the proceedings is covered by houses, habitations, railway lines, roads, rivers etc., and unless proper segregation takes place, further activity may not be advisable. On reasons, it wanted the 1st respondent to keep the letter dated 25-09-2009 in abeyance. The latter took the view that there is no provision to keep the proceedings in abeyance, and that even on facts, it is not advisable to permit the state of affairs to remain the same. It accordingly issued proceedings dated 17-08-2005 revoking its earlier approval. This was followed by the cancellation of the G.O.Ms.No.69, dated 24-02-2009 and G.O.Ms.No.64 dated 30-06-2010. The root cause for the various steps mentioned above is the revocation of approval by the 1st respondent. The first contention advanced by the petitioners is that the 1st respondent is not conferred with the power to revoke an otherwise legal and valid order passed by it. It is true that there is no provision in the Act, which empowers the 1st respondent to review or revoke the orders passed by it under Section 17-A. However, if one takes into account, the purport of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, it becomes clear that an authority that is conferred with the power to pass any orders or to make Regulations possesses the inherent power to modify, change or even to revoke such orders of Regulations. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act reads, “Sec.21: Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued”. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the power under this provision cannot be utilized to withdraw an order, which is otherwise passed in accordance with law. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the power under this provision cannot be utilized to withdraw an order, which is otherwise passed in accordance with law. He has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in KAMLA PRASAD KHETAN AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1957 SC 676 ); STATE OF BIHAR v. D.N. GANGULY AND OTHERS ( AIR 1958 SC 1018 ), and GOPI CHAND v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION ( AIR 1959 SC 609 )and that of this Court in GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ANOTHER v. Y.S. VIVEKANANDA REDDY AND OTHERS ( AIR 1995 AP 1 (FB)). In the first of the citations, referred to above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of the fact that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act contains an inbuilt protection, namely, that even where that provision is invoked, an order amending, varying or rescinding the earlier one can be made only by following the procedure, that is prescribed for making the original order. The expression “in the like manner” employed in the section was highlighted. If, for instance, the making of an order or issuance of a notification by an authority acting under a provision of law needs the prior approval of a superior authority, an order amending, varying or rescinding the same can be passed only by following the same procedure, namely, obtaining prior approval. Similarly, if a valid order can be made only by publishing in a gazette, the one, which is passed rescinding or amending it can be passed, in the like manner. The second restriction placed upon exercise of power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is that, it cannot be utilized to widen the scope of the provision under which, the original order is passed. Similar view, but with emphasis on different aspects, was taken in other two judgments of the Supreme Court. In the judgment rendered in GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ANOTHER v. Y.S. VIVEKANANDA REDDY AND OTHERS (4 Supra), a Full Bench of this Court was dealing with a case, where the approval accorded by the Government, enabling the A.P. Mineral Development Corporation Limited was rescinded after the lease deeds were executed and the work under the leases has commenced. This Court found fault with the same. This Court found fault with the same. In the instant case, the series of the orders, be it, those, passed in exercise of powers under the relevant provisions, or rescinding or withdrawing them came into existence under peculiar circumstances. The 1st respondent accorded its approval under Section 17-A(2) of the Act, for reserving the area in favour of the 4th respondent on a request made by the 2nd respondent. However, the 2nd respondent itself wanted the order of approval to be kept in abeyance, by citing certain reasons, which have already been elaborated in the preceding paragraphs. Since there is no provision for keeping an order passed under Section 17-A(2) of the Act in abeyance, the 1st respondent thought it fit to withdraw the same. It is only the 2nd respondent, or at best the 4th respondent that can felt aggrieved by revocation. None of them have expressed any grievance about that orders, obviously because the revocation was almost invited. Hence, the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner, in this regard, cannot be accepted. The agreement entered into between the petitioner and the 4th respondent was almost in the form of a promise, contingent upon accrual of rights in favour of the 4th respondent. No valid legal or absolute rights have accrued to the petitioner. Even if the agreement is in force, it could not have been implemented, unless the land was made over to the 4th respondent. The contract between the 4th respondent and the petitioner can at the most be said to have given rise to certain contingent rights. An important fact that needs to be taken into account is that there is no privity of contract between the petitioner, on the one hand, and the respondent No. 1 or 2, on the other hand. The petitioner has to depend upon the existence of absolute right in the 4th respondent, to carry out mining operations; to enforce its rights under the agreement. Even this would be purely in the realm of common law. The clauses in the contract provide for adjudication of dispute in a Civil Court. It is strongly urged that the letter dated 17-08-2010 issued by the 1st respondent would amount to review of its earlier letter dated 25-02-2009, and unless power of review is specifically conferred, it cannot be exercised by an authority. The clauses in the contract provide for adjudication of dispute in a Civil Court. It is strongly urged that the letter dated 17-08-2010 issued by the 1st respondent would amount to review of its earlier letter dated 25-02-2009, and unless power of review is specifically conferred, it cannot be exercised by an authority. As part of the same contention, it is pleaded that even where Section 21 of the General Clauses Act gets attracted, it would not clothe the authority to exercise power of review. In this regard, a distinction between exercise of power of review, on the one hand, and the power to revoke an order, on the other; is to be maintained. Review is reexamination of the matter on merits, and arriving at a different conclusion. This may result in either a complete modification, or a slight change, of the order passed by an authority. Revocation, on the other hand, is a total obliteration of an order passed earlier. The order dated 17-08-2010 is clear in its purport and it does nothing short of revoking and wiping away the order dated 25-09-2009. Therefore, it is difficult to treat the exercise undertaken by the 1st respondent as the one of review. The second point of distinction is in relation to the parties to the proceedings. Even within the category of quasi judicial proceedings, there are some, which partake the adversarial character, in which, two competing parties are pitted against each other. Other proceedings are purely administrative and hierarchiral in nature. The exercise of review or modification of the orders by an authority would certainly affect the rights of the parties, in case the proceedings are adversarial in nature. The rights that have accrued to a party, cannot be taken away except by following the procedure prescribed by law. It would be so, even where one of the parties to the proceedings is the State itself. In the instant case, the proceedings before the 1st respondent are not adversarial in nature. They fall into the second category. The State Government alone was the party before the Central Government, without there being any adversary. If at all anyone, it is only the State Government that can feel aggrieved by the revocation of approval. The petitioner does not figure anywhere in that set of proceedings. Therefore, it cannot be said that the 1st respondent lacks jurisdiction to issue proceedings dated 17-08-2010. If at all anyone, it is only the State Government that can feel aggrieved by the revocation of approval. The petitioner does not figure anywhere in that set of proceedings. Therefore, it cannot be said that the 1st respondent lacks jurisdiction to issue proceedings dated 17-08-2010. The second contention urged by the petitioner is that the reasons mentioned by the respondents 1 and 2 in various proceedings are not germane to the issued involved. To be precise, the plea is that, in case 30 to 40% of the area is covered by habitations and common facilities, the mining could have been undertaken in such a way, that no harm is caused to them. Here again, the petitioner has no say in the matter. It cannot compel the respondents 1 and 2 to take steps, that are pleaded to sustain an otherwise speculative agreement, which it has entered into with the 4th respondent. The enforcement of the agreement by the petitioner is totally dependent upon the prospecting licence or mining lease being granted in favour of the 4th respondent. That having been not taken place and the 4th respondent not making any grievance of the orders passed by the respondents 1 and 2, the petitioner cannot be said to have suffered any detriment, that can be redressed in law. By the same reasoning, it cannot convince about the legality or otherwise of the reasons, that are stated by respondents 1 and 2, in respect of the various orders passed by it. The plea as to legitimate expectation is equally unacceptable. The relationship between the petitioner and the respondents is such that, hardly there can be any expectation, much less legitimate expectation. Further, at no point of time, the respondents 1 and 2 have held out any promise to the petitioner. When the 4th respondent itself is not in a position to undertake any activity by itself, the question of its passing on the benefits of such activity to the petitioner does not arise. It may be true that the petitioner has an expectation of high order on the assumption that its agreement with the 4th respondent would work out smoothly. However, the agreement itself was contingent in nature and there is vast element of speculation in it. It may be true that the petitioner has an expectation of high order on the assumption that its agreement with the 4th respondent would work out smoothly. However, the agreement itself was contingent in nature and there is vast element of speculation in it. An expectation can be treated as legitimate, if only the rights have straightaway accrued to a citizen on the basis of the acts, that emanated from the State, in exercise of statutory power. Howsoever attractive the expectation may be, it cannot be treated as legitimate, if it is shadowed and clouded by several imponderables. Added to that, the only agency against which the petitioner can have legitimate expectation is the 4th respondent. In case the 4th respondent had a valid lease in its favour, the petitioner had an agreement with it, and the latter had resiled from it, the petitioner could have maintained a writ petition against the 4th respondent by pressing the ground of legitimate expectation. It has already been mentioned that at no point of time, the 4th respondent had any rights to its credit and the slight progress that was recorded in the direction of granting lease has been retarded with the same speed, that too, at the instance of the State Government i.e. the 2nd respondent. Being what it is, the 4th respondent cannot have any qualms with its creator, the 2nd respondent, much less can it find fault with the impugned orders. The petitioner has to sail or sink with the 4th respondent. As a matter of fact, the element of uncertainty was brightly apparent and looming in the agreement itself from the inception. If at all anyone, the petitioner had to blame itself for entering into such a speculative enterprise. The steps taken by the respondents 2 to 4 that inspired the petitioner and other agencies to express their interest in a non-existent project are far from satisfactory, apart from being unwarranted. Such steps would certainly tell upon the credibility of the State as such. A workable contract or project of such a gigantic size ought to have been undertaken with utmost precaution and after thorough study and examination of every stage. This Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned proceedings, and even if there is scope for interference, it cannot be at the instance of the petitioner. A workable contract or project of such a gigantic size ought to have been undertaken with utmost precaution and after thorough study and examination of every stage. This Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned proceedings, and even if there is scope for interference, it cannot be at the instance of the petitioner. W.P.Nos.21956 of 2010; 31370 of 2010 and 22525 of 2012 are accordingly dismissed. W.P.No.25114 of 2012 is disposed of, directing that in case the Visakhapatnam Steel Plant makes, or has already made an application for captive mining, it shall be considered by the respondents, on its own merits. The miscellaneous petitions filed in the writ petitions shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.