Judgment : Kemal Pasha, J. 1. Without alleging any breach of policy conditions within the meaning of Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Insurance Company has admitted the accident, with contention to get their liability limited to the statutory limit. In such a case, can it be said that the insurer has to produce the insurance policy to claim the benefit of the statutory limit? Can a contention for the benefit of the statutory limit of coverage be equated with any breach of policy conditions? 2. M/s United India Insurance Company Ltd. As plaintiff has filed this suit for recovery of money through its Divisional Manager. The first defendant was the registered owner of bus bearing Reg.No.KLM 438 and the second defendant was its duly appointed driver as on 15.8.1984. The said vehicle met with an accident on 15.8.1984 whereby the rider and pillion rider of a motorbike became injured. The said injured persons preferred claims for compensation before the Motor Accident Claim's Tribunal, Manjeri (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') as O.P.(MV) No.508 of 1984 and O.P.(MV) No.509 of 1984 wherein the first defendant was the second respondent, the second defendant was the first respondent, and the plaintiff was the third respondent. The plaintiff filed written statements in both the claim petitions, admitting the coverage of the vehicle with a third party (public risk) policy with a maximum limit of Rs.50,000/-arising out of any one accident. It was also contended that as per Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the liability of the plaintiff under the said policy was limited to a maximum of Rs.50,000/- for any one accident. The Tribunal passed Ext.A2 award dated 18.12.1985 for an amount of Rs.54,000/- in O.P.(MV)508 of 1984 and Rs.70,150/-in O.P.(MV) 509 of 1984 in favour of the petitioners and directed the plaintiff to satisfy the entire award, by overlooking and bypassing the limit of the contractual liability as well as statutory liability, by projecting a ground that the plaintiff's counsel had not produced the insurance policy. 3. 3. The plaintiff filed review petitions as I.A.No.1328 of 1986 and I.A.No.1329 of 1980 in O.P. (MV)No. 508 of 1984 and O.P.(MV) No.509 of 1984 respectively, against the said award before the Tribunal by holding that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the excess amount to be paid to the petitioners than the statutory limit, from the first defendant herein, the I.As. were dismissed as not maintainable. On the strength of the assurance provided in Exts.A3 and A4 orders on I.A.No.1328 of 1986 and I.A.No.1329 of 1986 respectively, the plaintiff satisfied the awards to the tune of Rs.75,697/- in O.P.(MV) No.508 of 1984 and Rs.98,103/-in O.P.(MV)No.509 of 1984 vide cheques dated 23.11.1988 deposited with the Tribunal on 2.12.1988. 4. According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the excess amounts of Rs.25,697/- paid in O.P.(MV)508 of 1984 and Rs.40,103/-paid in O.P.(MV)No.509 of 1984 from the first defendant. Ext.A6 demand notice caused to be issued by the plaintiff through their lawyer, could invite Ext.A7 reply in which some untenable contentions were resorted to. 5. The defendants have filed separate written statements thereby admitting the accident and the insurance policy. It was contended that tenable and favourable contentions were raised before the Tribunal, and if at all the plaintiff is aggrieved, the remedy open to the plaintiff is to file an appeal on the award. The nature of the insurance policy as well as its limit have not been challenged. It has been contended that the dispute in question has to be dealt with by the Tribunal, and that the court below has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 6. The court below held that the suit is not maintainable and further that, the court below has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and consequently dismissed the suit through the impugned judgment and decree. 7. Ext.A1 is the copy of the insurance policy which shows that the third party premium of Rs.240/- was received. For passengers' coverage an amount of Rs.2,550/-and for coverage of driver and conductor an amount of Rs.16/-were also received. Admittedly, it is not an unlimited policy. The third party risk coverage was limited to a maximum amount of Rs.50,000/- for any one accident, is not disputed or challenged by the first defendant/insured. For passengers' coverage an amount of Rs.2,550/-and for coverage of driver and conductor an amount of Rs.16/-were also received. Admittedly, it is not an unlimited policy. The third party risk coverage was limited to a maximum amount of Rs.50,000/- for any one accident, is not disputed or challenged by the first defendant/insured. Ext.A2 is the copy of the award dated 18.12.1985 passed by the Tribunal, which clearly shows that the plaintiff as third defendant had filed a written statement contending that the liability of the plaintiff was limited to Rs.50,000/-. In paragraph 9 of Ext.A2 award, it has been stated that the insurer, in the written statement, contended that the liability of the insurance company was limited to Rs.50,000/-. 8. According to the Tribunal, apart from filing a written statement, nothing else was done by the plaintiff to substantiate the contentions raised in the written statement. It was further held that no request was made to the Tribunal to issue directions to the first defendant to produce the insurance policy. It seems that the Tribunal has found fault with the plaintiff in not producing the insurance policy to prove that the liability of the company was limited to Rs.50,000/-. It was only on that ground, that the Tribunal held that the plaintiff was liable to satisfy the entire award. Ext.A3 is the copy of order dated 2.1.1987 passed by the Tribunal, in I.A.No.1328 of 1986 in O.P(MV) No.508 of 1984, by holding that the order passed by the Tribunal is a considered order and the policy was not produced at the time of final hearing, and therefore, the said I.A. is not maintainable. It was also held that the plaintiff, the insurance company, would be entitled to recover the excess amount paid by them, from the owner of the vehicle. The I.A. was dismissed. Ext.A4 is the order dated 2.1.1987 passed by the said Tribunal in I.A.No.1329 of 1986 in O.P.No.509 of 1984 by holding that the plaintiff, insurance company is entitled to recover from the owner of the vehicle, the excess amount, if any, to be paid by the company. The I.A. was dismissed with a further finding that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the balance amount from the owner of the vehicle, after discharging the decree debt. It seems that Exts.A3 and A4 order have not been incorporated in Ext.A2 award. 9. The I.A. was dismissed with a further finding that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the balance amount from the owner of the vehicle, after discharging the decree debt. It seems that Exts.A3 and A4 order have not been incorporated in Ext.A2 award. 9. The argument forwarded by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant insurance company had discharged the entire award amount on the assurance of the Tribunal that the appellant would be entitled to recover the balance amount from the owner of the vehicle after discharging the decree amount, seems to be correct in view of the contents of Ext.A4. It has to be noted that the Tribunal has not adjudicated upon the claim of the appellant in the review applications apart from stating that the appellant is entitled to recover the excess amount that would be paid towards the discharge of the decree amount by the appellant, from the owner of the vehicle. The Tribunal has not calculated and arrived at the amount that could be recovered by the appellant, from the 1st defendant. 10. In fact, the Tribunal could not have found fault with the appellant/insured in not producing the policy at all, as Section 95(2)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 itself clearly reveals that the liability of the insured in a case of this kind, in any one accident in respect of the persons other than the passengers carried for hire or reward, is limited to Rs.50,000/-. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C.M. Jaya[ 2002 (1) KLT 596 (SC)] held, "The said decision cannot be read as laying down that even though the liability of the insurance company is limited to the statutory requirement, an unlimited or higher liability can be imposed on it. The liability could be statutory or contractual. A statutory liability cannot be more than what is required under the statute itself. However, there is nothing in S.95 of the Act prohibiting the parties from contracting to create unlimited or higher liability to cover wider risk. In such an event, the insurer is bound by the terms of the contract as specified in the policy in regard to unlimited or higher liability as the case may be. However, there is nothing in S.95 of the Act prohibiting the parties from contracting to create unlimited or higher liability to cover wider risk. In such an event, the insurer is bound by the terms of the contract as specified in the policy in regard to unlimited or higher liability as the case may be. In the absence of such a term or clause in the policy, pursuant to the contract of insurance, a limited statutory liability cannot be expanded to make it unlimited or higher. If it is so done, it amounts to rewriting the statute or the contract of insurance which is not permissible." 11. In this particular case, the first defendant has no case that he had paid any excess premium. When the insurance coverage was admitted by the plaintiff by specifically contending that the coverage was limited to a maximum of Rs.50,000/- for any one accident, it was the duty of the first defendant to produce the insurance policy to contend in case he had a contention that he was entitled to the insurance coverage for any higher amount. When the first defendant has no case that there was any contract creating unlimited or higher liability to wider risk, the Tribunal ought to have held that the appellant/insurance company had only statutory liability as contemplated under Section 95(2) (b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 12. The learned counsel for the first respondent relies on the decision of the three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Swaran Singh[2004 (1) KLT 781(SC)] and argued that the party alleging breach must he held to have succeeded in establishing the breach of conditions of contract of insurance on the part of the insured by discharging its burden of proof. According to the learned counsel for the first respondent, the appellant ought to have produced the insurance policy in this case. We are unable to accept the said argument as this is not an instance wherein any breach is alleged by the appellant/insurance company, whereas, this is a case wherein the appellant/insurance company is claiming the protection of the statutory liability. When a statutory liability cannot be more than what is required under the statute itself, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, the limited statutory liability cannot be extended in order to make it unlimited or higher. When a statutory liability cannot be more than what is required under the statute itself, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, the limited statutory liability cannot be extended in order to make it unlimited or higher. The first defendant has no case that there was any other contract enabling coverage of any unlimited or higher liability. Even when the insured has any contention regarding a contract to vary the terms of the statutory liability, it is for the party who is alleging such contract to prove the same. The appellant/insurance company has not alleged any breach within the meaning of S.96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 13. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sony Cheriyan [1999 CCJ 1333(SC)], it was held: "The insurance policy between the insurer and the insured represents a contract between the parties. Since the insurer undertakes to compensate the loss suffered by the insured on account of risks covered by the insurance policy, the terms of the agreement have to be strictly construed to determine the extent of liability of the insurer. The insured cannot claim anything more than what is covered by the insurance policy. That being so, the insured has also to act strictly in accordance with the statutory limitations or terms of the policy expressly set out therein." 14. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Swaran Singh[2004(1) KLT 781(SC)(supra), it was held in paragraph 54 as follows: "The insurer's liability arises both from contract as well as statute. It will therefore, may not be proper to apply the rules for interpretation of a contract for interpreting a statute." 15. The court below has held that in view of S.175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in entertaining any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal. In fact, the law applicable in this case is the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 and not the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Of course, Section 110F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is pari materia to Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. By analyzing the provisions contained in Sections 149, 165, 168 and 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Of course, Section 110F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is pari materia to Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. By analyzing the provisions contained in Sections 149, 165, 168 and 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Swaran Singh (supra) has held that the Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or bodily injury or damage to property of third parties arising from the use of motor vehicle and that the said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims, inter se between the claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. It was held that in the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and deciding the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. It was further held that the decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of a claim for compensation by the claimants, and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in S.174 of the Act. The law laid down by the Apex Court after construing the aforesaid provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be extended to the provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as the old Act does not contain the provisions pari materia to all the aforesaid provisions in the new Act. 16. In Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another[ AIR 1969 SC 78 ] it was held: "Where the statute gives a finality to the orders if the special tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not." 17. In fact, the jurisdiction of the civil court in a peculiar situation like the present one does not seem to be expressly excluded under Section 110F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Apart from it, the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure in order to determine the liability of the first defendant towards the plaintiff to refund the excess amount that had to be paid by the plaintiff towards the discharge of the decree debt in excess of their statutory liability. Matters being so, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the civil court, is barred in the present case. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant relies on the decision in Antony v. Thandiyode Plantations (Pvt) Ltd.[ 1995 (2) KLT 512 (FB)] wherein it was held; "The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain a civil cause cannot be assumed unless a particular statute contains an express provision to that effect or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. Merely because the Companies Act provides for certain remedies it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of civil courts to deal with a case brought before it in respect of some of the matters covered by the Act is barred. Merely because the Companies Act provides for certain remedies it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of civil courts to deal with a case brought before it in respect of some of the matters covered by the Act is barred. The validity of the decision in M.F.A. cannot be challenged when it is sought to be enforced on the ground of lack of jurisdiction especially when it cannot be said thatthe court lacked jurisdiction in dealing with the dispute. In Firm I.S. Chetty & Sons v. State of A. P. ( AIR 1964 SC 322 ) Supreme Court held that the mere fact that a special statute provides for certain remedies may not by itself necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of the civil courts to deal with a case brought before it in respect of some of the matters covered by the said statute." 19. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nafeessu [ 2001(1) KLT 498 (SC)], it was held that contract between the insured and the company may not provide for all the liabilities which the company has to undertake vis-a-vis the third parties, in view of the provisions of the Act, and when once the company had undertaken the liability to third parties incorporated by the persons specified in the policy, the third parties' right to recover any amount by virtue of the provisions of the Act is not affected by any condition in the policy. 20. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Swaran Singh[2004(1) KLT 781(SC)(supra) it was held in paragraph 99 as follows: "We may, however, hasten to add that the Tribunal and the court must, however, exercise their jurisdiction to issue such a direction upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case and in the event such a direction has been issued despite arriving at a finding of fact to the effect that the insurer has been able to establish that the insured has committed a breach of contract of insurance as envisaged under sub-cl. (ii) of Cl.(a) of sub-s.(2) of S.149 of the Act, the insurance company shall be entitled to realise the awarded amount from the owner or driver of the vehicle, as the ase may be, in execution of the same award having regard to the provisions of Ss.165 and 168 of the Act. (ii) of Cl.(a) of sub-s.(2) of S.149 of the Act, the insurance company shall be entitled to realise the awarded amount from the owner or driver of the vehicle, as the ase may be, in execution of the same award having regard to the provisions of Ss.165 and 168 of the Act. However, in the event, having regard to the limited scope of inquiry in the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal it had not been able to do so, the insurance company may initiate a separate action therefor against the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both, as the case may be. Those exceptional cases may arise when the evidence becomes available to or comes to the notice of the insurer at a subsequent stage or for one reason or the other, the insurer was not given opportunity to defend at all." 21. In the present case we could note that what all things possible from their part, were done by the appellant/insurance company to see their liability is limited to the statutory liability. No excess contractual liability was created in this case over and above the statutory liability. Being a public sector undertaking, in view of the public interest also, the appellant insurance company has to see that its liability is limited to the statutory liability. It is true that the appellant/ insurance company had not raised any grounds of breach within the meaning of Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In a fair manner, without raising any breach, the Company wanted to get their liability limited to the statutory liability, by admitting the accident. 22. It seems that the Tribunal had thrust unnecessary liability upon the appellant/insurance company through the award by directing them to pay the entire award amount, without passing an order in the award for the recovery of the excess amount which the appellant had to pay than the statutory liability. On coming to know about it, the appellant/Company filed I.As. in both the O.P.(MV) cases for getting their liability limited to the statutory liability. Even though Exts.A3 and A4 orders were passed by the Tribunal with a finding that the appellant/ insurance company is entitled to recover the excess amount than the statutory liability, from the owner of the vehicle, such orders do not form part of Ext.A2 as both the I.As. Even though Exts.A3 and A4 orders were passed by the Tribunal with a finding that the appellant/ insurance company is entitled to recover the excess amount than the statutory liability, from the owner of the vehicle, such orders do not form part of Ext.A2 as both the I.As. were dismissed even after entering a specific findings as noted above. Through Ext.A4, the Tribunal had directed the appellant/insurance company to discharge the decree debt as a whole and to recover the excess amount from the owner of the vehicle. 23. As held in National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Swaran Singh (supra), having regard to the limited scope of inquiry in the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, the appellant/insurance company in this case also is entitled to bring a separate action against the owner of the vehicle for the recovery of the excess amount paid by the appellant/insurance company in discharge of the decree debt. As the excess amount was not quantified, the same to be quantified through evidence in a separate proceedings and therefore, the present suit was necessitated. This is especially because, the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 does not contemplate an independent adjudication of any such claim of the insurer as against the insured, through any independent proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. When a right has been created and the entitlement of the relief is also declared, in the absence of any special forum for enforcing such a remedy, the civil courts do have jurisdiction to entertain such a suit to obtain such a relief. 24. We conclude that the suit is maintainable and the court below has jurisdiction to entertain the said suit. Even though a vague contention of limitation was also raised by the defendants, there is absolutely nothing to find that the suit is barred by limitation. The defendants have no case that excess amounts as claimed were not paid by the appellant. The appellant is entitled to get the suit decreed, for the amounts claimed in the plaint. At the same time, regarding the quantum of interest, we are of the view that the rate of interest can be limited to 12% per annum. In the result, (i) This appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and decree are set aside. The appellant is entitled to get the suit decreed, for the amounts claimed in the plaint. At the same time, regarding the quantum of interest, we are of the view that the rate of interest can be limited to 12% per annum. In the result, (i) This appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and decree are set aside. (ii) The suit is decreed in terms of the plaint by limiting the interest to 12% per annum from the date of suit till the date of realization, with the costs of the suit. The appellant is allowed to recover the said amount with interest and costs as aforesaid, from the first defendant and all his immovable and movable assets. (iii) In the nature of this appeal, the parties are ordered to bear their respective costs.