Judgment K.J. Thaker, J.—The appellant-ori. Accused No. 3 has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 23.4.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Vadodara in Sessions Case No. 115/2006, whereby, the learned trial Judge has convicted the appellant-ori. Accused under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to undergo S/I for 30 days, which is impugned in this appeal. 2.1 The case of the prosecution is that the complainant Chandubhai has two sons namely Kanchan and Kanji, and one daughter Rekha. His elder son Kanchan was residing separately with his wife Ganga, mother Ujiben and his two sons in a house given by the complainant’s father Shantibhai Chhotabhai rathodiya. The complainant has three younger brothers namely, Karshan, Raman and Balu. The complainant Chandu and his two brothers karshan and raman are residing separately in Indira Colony, whereas, the youngest brother Balu is residing separately with his family in Old Colony adjacent to Kanchan’s house. The complainant’s son Kanchan, from the very beginning was residing with his grandfather shantibhai, and due to love and affection, Shantibhai decided to give the said house to Kanchan, treating him as his fifth son. However, comlainant’s three brothers and their family members were not happy with this decision, and they were, of and on, insisting upon Kanchan to vacate the said house and to give share to them. 2.2 On 25.4.2006, at about 8.00 p.m., Ganga w/o Kanchan had come to New Colony and told the complainant that “Balukaka is insisting to vacate the house, and, Balukaka by catching private part (Sunvalo) of Kanchan, pulled out him from the house.” After half an hour, Kanchan himself came to meet the complainant Chandubhai and told that Balukaka has beaten him for vacating the house. Upon the request made by Kanchan, the complainant himself accompanied with Kanchan went to meet Karshan and Raman for taking their help, but, instead of helping, both Karshan and Raman, as also Ripin s/o. Karshan started beating Kanchan. Thereafter, the complainant Chandubhai and his wife Baluben went to Old Colony with Kanchan, and they decided to meet Sarpanch of the village Haripura, and to request him to intervene for resolving the dispute about the ancestral house. Thereafter, the complainant Chandubhai and his wife Baluben went to Old Colony with Kanchan, and they decided to meet Sarpanch of the village Haripura, and to request him to intervene for resolving the dispute about the ancestral house. While complainant Chandu, his wife Baluben, his son Kanchan and Ganga w/o Kanchan were going to the house of Sarpanch, at about 10.30, when they reached near the house of Mahendra Jaysing Surve, all the four accused,namely Balu, Karshan, Raman and Ripin who were hidden in dark, suddenly attacked with sticks and knife on Kanchan. First of all, Karshan inflicted blow on back of Kanchan, due to which he fell down and when he was trying to get up, and escape, Balu caught Kanchan, and at that time, Raman caused injury to Kanchan by inflicting knife blow on the right side of stomach. When Kanchan fell down, Balu and Ripin inflicted blows on his back by lathies (sticks). The complainant Chandubhai, his wife Baluben, Ganga w/o Kanchan immediately shouted for help, and therefore, all the accused ran away from the place of incident. Due to injuries, there was severe bleeding,m and to restrain it, Kanji, younger son of the complainant taking a handkerchief from Vikram s/o. Balu tied that part of bleeding. Many persons came thee from nearby area. Immediately, Kanchan was shifted to Jarod Referral Hospital by Three Wheeler Tempo of Kamlesh K. Aye, but, unfortunately, the doctor after examining Kanchan, declared him as ‘dead’. Therefore, a complaint was lodged. 2.3 The appellant accused came to be arraigned for committing murder. The investigation being complete, the charge-sheet was laid against the present appellant. The case being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, which was given number as Sessions Case No. 115/2006. 2.4 Thereafter, the Sessions Court framed the charge below Exh. 3 against the appellant for commission of the offence under Section 302 of IPC. The appellant-accused has pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.5 To prove the case against the present appellant, the prosecution has examined the following witnesses whose evidence is read before this Court by the learned advocate for the appellant. 1. Chandubhai Shantilal Rathodiya Ex. 11 2. Gangaben Kanchanbhai Ex. 13 3. Mahendra Jaysingrao Surve Ex.14 4. Rameshbhai Dahyabhai Ex. 15 5. Ranchhodbhai Govindbhai Parmar Ex. 20 6. Kalpeshkumar Girvatsinh Chavda Ex. 25 7. 1. Chandubhai Shantilal Rathodiya Ex. 11 2. Gangaben Kanchanbhai Ex. 13 3. Mahendra Jaysingrao Surve Ex.14 4. Rameshbhai Dahyabhai Ex. 15 5. Ranchhodbhai Govindbhai Parmar Ex. 20 6. Kalpeshkumar Girvatsinh Chavda Ex. 25 7. Savajibhai Jerambhai Vaghasiya Ex. 27 8. Dr. Chetana Naginlal Panchal Ex. 32 2.6 The prosecution also relied upon the following documentary evidences so as to bring home the charges against the appellant-accused. 1. Complaint Ex. 12 2. Panchnama of place of incident Ex. 16 3. Inquest panchnama Ex. 18 4. Panchnama of clothes seized from the dead body of the deceased Ex. 19 5. Panchnama of body of accused No. 3 Ex. 21 6. Panchnama of recovery of knife Ex. 22 7. Panchnama of body of accused No. 1, 2 & 4 Ex.26 8. Letter to FSL Ex. 28 9. FSL Report Ex. 29 10. Panchnama of recovery of lathies Ex. 30 11. PM Note Ex. 33 3. Thereafter, after examining the witnesses, further statement of the appellant-accused under Section 313 of CrPC was recorded in which the appellant-accused has denied the case of the prosecution. 4. After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence and after hearing the parties, learned trial Judge vide impugned judgment and order dated 23.4.2007 held the present appellant-original accused guilty of the charge levelled against him under Section 302 of IPC, convicted and sentenced the appellant accused, as stated above. 5. We have heard at length learned advocate Ms Archana U. Amin learned advocate for appellant and Ms CM Shah learned APP for the respondent-State. 6. The learned advocate for the present appellant has contended that the trial court has committed an error in passing the impugned judgment and order, inasmuch as it failed to appreciate the material on record in its proper perspective, and hence, the present appellant deserves to be given the benefit of doubt and be acquitted. 7. On the other hand, learned APP has strongly opposed the contentions raised by the learned advocate for the present appellants and has submitted that the trial court has passed the impugned judgment and order after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the material, in the form of oral and documentary evidence, produced before it and hence, no interference is called for and the appeals deserve to be dismissed. 8. 8. The learned advocate for the appellant has taken us through the entire record. Having perused the entire record, more particularly, the medical evidence which shows that no injuries were found on the body of the deceased Kanchan at the time of postmortem except two injuries viz. one simple injury on upper part of left eyebrow and one grievous injury on right part of stomach. The appellant accused has inflicted injuries on the deceased which has caused his death. 9. Having considered the minutely the evidence on record, oral as well as documentary evidence, which we have appreciated, re-appreciated and reconsidered in light of the latest decision of the Apex Court. The finding of facts as far as the death being homicidal death cannot be found any fault with. The trial Court was justified in holding the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302, however, on re-appreciation of the facts, the provisions of Section 299(b) and Section 300(3) and degree of probability of death would be a determining factor. It cannot be said that the accused had any motive to do away with the deceased, however, he had a knowledge looking to the injuries, it cannot be said that he had no knowledge that the danger cause proximate to a practical certainty and such knowledge on the part of the accused was of the higher degree. The act having been committed by the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt. PW-5 Ranchhodbhai Parmar Ex. 20, panch witness has supported the case of the prosecution and there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW-5 who is resident of another village Moval and has no enmity with the accused. 10. The residual question which arise before us whether Section 302 of IPC has its application or it would be falling within Section 304 of IPC. 11. This bring us to the crucial question as to which was the appropriate provision to be applied. In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus and ‘murder’ its specie. All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable homicide’ but not viceversa. Speaking generally, ‘culpable homicide’ sans ‘special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognize three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, ‘culpable homicide of the first degree’. All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable homicide’ but not viceversa. Speaking generally, ‘culpable homicide’ sans ‘special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognize three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, ‘culpable homicide of the first degree’. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as ‘murder’. The second may be termed as ‘culpable homicide of the second degree’. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is ‘culpable homicide of the third degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. 12. The academic distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various Clauses of Section 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences. Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done-Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder is the act by which the death is caused is done. INTENTION (a) with the intention of causing death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; KNOWDLEGE (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. KNOWLEDGE (4) with the knowledge that the act is so immediately dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. 13. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300.The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under Clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the ‘intention to cause death’ is not an essential requirement of Clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender’s knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of Clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300. 14. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under Clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In Clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words ‘likely to cause death’ occurring in the corresponding Clause (b) of Section 299, the words ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature’ have been used. In Clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words ‘likely to cause death’ occurring in the corresponding Clause (b) of Section 299, the words ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature’ have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between Clause (b) of Section 299 and Clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word ‘likely’ in Clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words “bodily injury...” sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” mean that death will be the “most probable” result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature. 15. For cases to fall within Clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the internal bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 16. The ingredients which are required are that there should be no motive. We are of the opinion that the culpable homicide is there, but it would fall within the provisions of Section 304 Part-I and not part-II of IPC, as submitted by the learned advocate for the appellant. The factual scenario and the manner of assault, in our considered view, the appropriate conviction shall be under Section 304 Part-I of IPC, and to that extent, the appeal requires to be partly allowed. 17. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 23.4.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Vadodara in Sessions Case No. 115/2006 is modified to the extent that the conviction and sentence imposed upon Original Appellant-original accused No. 3 under Section 302 of IPC to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life, is altered and he is convicted under Section 304 Part-I of IPC and sentenced to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment. Fine as well as default sentence are unaltered. Fine as well as default sentence are unaltered. Rest of the judgment and order of the trial Court stands confirmed. R & P to be sent back to the trial Court, forthwith. A writ of this order be sent to the concerned jail authority, forthwith.