Arup Kumar Goswami, J. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.11.1998 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Darrang, Mangaldoi, in T.A. No. 23/97 modifying the judgment dated 26.09.1997 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Darrang, Mangaldoi in T.S. No. 4/94. The respondent/Defendant No. 1 has filed a cross objection. The case set up in the plaint is that in Periodic Patta No. 42/42 of village- Narikali under Lokrai Mouza, there were two dags: Dag No. 90, which is now numbered as Dag No. 114 and Dag No. 62, which is now numbered as 107. In Dag No. 62 (107), there were 3K 3L of land and in Dag No. 90 (114), there was 7B 4K 6L of land. Land in both these dags were owned by one Tanu. His mother, Puni, survived him and on the death of Tanu, name of Puni was mutated in the patta. Puni sold IB of land to Hari Prasad and 2B to Kerkon Nath. The said land formed part of Dag No. 90 (114). Puni also gifted 4B 4K 6L of land to one Rupnath Saharia. The land belonging to Kerkon Nath was purchased by Diparu Nath and accordingly, his name was also mutated in respect of 2B of land. Father of the plaintiff, Kalaram Koch, purchased 3K 3L of land of Dag No. 62 (107) from Puni by oral agreement and 4B 4K 6L from Rupnath Saharia in Dag No. 90 (114) and accordingly, his name was mutated in the patta in the year 1950. On 02.07.1991, the Defendant No. 1 forcibly occupied 2K 17L of land covered by Dag No. 62 (107) (Schedule-A of the plaint), which prompted him to file a proceeding under section 145 Cr.P.C. and in such proceeding, the learned Magistrate illegally declared possession in favour of the Defendant No. 1. The Defendant No. 1 also, in collusion with Revenue Authorities obtained mutation in respect of 1B 2K 5L only of Schedule-B land measuring 2B 2K 17L in Dag No. 90 (114). In the plaint originally filed, the schedule of the land was shown as 1B out of 2B 2K 17L and mutation was stated to be granted in respect of IB land. The plaint was amended and Schedule-B was changed to 2B 2K 17L. In the plaint originally filed, the schedule of the land was shown as 1B out of 2B 2K 17L and mutation was stated to be granted in respect of IB land. The plaint was amended and Schedule-B was changed to 2B 2K 17L. Plaint was also amended stating that mutation was granted in respect of 1B 2K 5L of land. 2. In the suit, the following prayers were made: (a) That the suit of the plaintiff be decreed with cost. (b) That a declaratory decree be passed that the plaintiff has got right, title and interest of the schedule 'A' and 'B' land. (c) That the main defendant be ejected from the suit land (Schedule 'A' + 'B') land be demolishing his houses, structures, fences whatsoever existing and the vacant possession thereof be delivered to the plaintiff. (d) That a permanent injunction be issued restraining the defendant, his agents, relatives, servants and workmen from entering and or dispossessing the plaintiff from the schedule land. (e) That a declaratory decree be passed that the mutation in the name of the defendant No. 1 in schedule 'B' land is illegal, void, inoperative in law and thus liable to be set aside. (f) That no relief is sought against the pro-forma defendant but if they file written statement against the plaintiff they may be treated as main defendant. (g) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to? SCHEDULE-A Land measuring 2K-17Ls covered by Dag No. 107 of periodic patta No. 155 of village-Narikalt, Mouza-Lokrai, bounded by:-- East:- (Nonoi) Mathauri, West:- Nonoi river, North:- Tapeswar Barua, South:- Ambika Nath. SCHEDULE-B Land measuring 2B-2K-17Ls covered by Dag No. 114 of periodic patta No. 155 of village-Narikali, Mouza-Lokrai, bounded by North:-Tapeswar Barua, South:-Tapeswar, Haricharan Nath East:-Tapeswar, West:-Mathauri. Thus, the plaintiff prayed for right, title and interest in land measuring 2K 17L covered by Dag No. 62 (107) and 2B 2K 17L in Dag No. 90 (114). 3. In the written statement, defendant No. 1 stated that Schedule-A is not a periodic patta land but is Government land, which is in occupation of the defendant for last 15 years or so. The boundary of Schedule-A land is not correct and the said boundary covers land of Hari Prasad and Diparu as well. 3. In the written statement, defendant No. 1 stated that Schedule-A is not a periodic patta land but is Government land, which is in occupation of the defendant for last 15 years or so. The boundary of Schedule-A land is not correct and the said boundary covers land of Hari Prasad and Diparu as well. It is stated that Schedule-B land belonged to father of the plaintiff, Kalaram Baruah and IB of the Schedule-B land was sold by the father of the plaintiff to one Sanibor Nath on 11.04.1977 by a registered deed and on 31.08.1978, Sanibor Nath, by registered deed, sold the said plot of land to the Defendant No. 1 and delivered possession thereof. There was a slight discrepancy in the Schedule of the land sold to Sanibor Nath in that in the south, instead of Diparu, it should have been mentioned as Hariprasad. Sanibor Nath had transferred the land which was purchased by him from the father of the plaintiff but there was some mistake in number of the Dag. Defendant No. 1 had lent Rs. 1,500/- to the father of the plaintiff in the year 1978 and being unable to repay the amount, the father of plaintiff sold the Schedule-B land to Defendant No. 1 by making endorsement in the concerning Chitha, instead of a sale deed, though requested by the Defendant No. 1. 1B 2K 5L of Dag No. 90 (114) which is transferred by the plaintiff is to the east of the land purchased by Defendant No. 1 from Sanibor Nath and thus the Defendant No. 1 became the owner and possessor of 2B 2K 5L of land. Mutation order was passed on 13.03.1987, though he was in possession from 1978. The Defendant No. 1 had raised many constructions in the said plot of land-a full wall pucca house in 1978/1979 in the northern side, another pucca house on the western side of Schedule-B land, a tin-roofed house in the southern side, etc. by spending about 2 (two) lakhs. In the additional written statement filed, it was stated that plaintiff had endorsed his note with signature in the concerned Chitha which was duly recorded and the mutation order was passed with the consent of the plaintiff himself. It is further stated that the plaintiff had not challenged a memorandum with regard to Scheduled-B land, ordered at the instance of the learned trial Court. 4. It is further stated that the plaintiff had not challenged a memorandum with regard to Scheduled-B land, ordered at the instance of the learned trial Court. 4. On the basis of the pleadings, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court: 1) Whether there is cause of action to instigate the suit? 2) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? 3) Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 4) Whether schedule 'A' land is a Sarkari land or periodic patta land? 5) Whether plaintiffs father Kolaram Baruah sold IB of land to Sanibar Nath and whether Sanibar Nath sold the land so purchased to defendant Khasnur Ali as alleged in para 12(11) of the W/S? 6) Whether plaintiff sold 1B 2K 5Ls land from Dag No. 114 as alleged in para 12(VI) of the W/S and whether the defendants name was mutated on 13.3.87. 7) Whether the defendant has been possessing the schedule 'B' land since 1978-79 continuously against the interest of the plaintiff and whether he constructed pacca house, bathroom etc. As alleged in para 12(VIII) IX and X of the W/S and whether he spent about Rs. 2 Lakhs in constructing these houses and other structure etc. On the suit land? 8) Whether the plaintiff has got right, title and interest over the suit land? 9) To what relief, if any, are parties entitled? 5. Subsequently one more additional issue was framed, which is as under: Additional issue 1. Whether the Defendant No. 1 without knowledge of the plaintiff collusively with revenue authority got his name mutated in respect of 1B-2K-5 Lessas of land out of schedule land? 6. During trial, plaintiff examined 4 (four) witnesses and the Defendant No. 1 also examined 7 (seven) witnesses. Both the parties had also exhibited a number of documents. 7. The learned Trial Court, in issue No. 4, recorded the finding that preponderance of evidence goes to show that Schedule-A land is a periodic patta land. While deciding issue No. 5, the learned Court held that Ext. Both the parties had also exhibited a number of documents. 7. The learned Trial Court, in issue No. 4, recorded the finding that preponderance of evidence goes to show that Schedule-A land is a periodic patta land. While deciding issue No. 5, the learned Court held that Ext. 'Unga' having not been proved in accordance with law as laid down under Section 67of the Indian Evidence Act, no right, title and ownership could have been conferred on the basis thereof upon Sanibor Nath by sale deed No. 2543 dated 04.02.1978 in respect of 1B of land out of Schedule-B land and consequently, defendant No. 1 also acquired no right over the said plot of land by virtue of Ext. 'Gha'. While dealing with issue No. 6, the learned Trial Court took note of the fact that Defendant No. 1 had admitted that no registered sale deed was made by the plaintiff in respect of 1B 2K 5L of land under Dag No. 90 (114), forming part of Schedule-B land. The learned Trial Court held that though Chitha mutation Ext. 'Ka' was executed by the plaintiff, the same cannot transfer a valid title upon the Defendant No. 1. The plea of adverse possession was negatived in issue No. 7 by holding that on the face of plea of the Defendant No. 1 that he had been possessing the suit land by virtue of purchase, he cannot set up a plea of adverse possession. The learned trial Court decided issue No. 8 regarding plaintiffs right, title and interest over the suit land on the premise that it was an admitted position that plaintiffs father was the owner of the suit land and as Defendant No. 1 failed to prove that he purchased land from the father of the plaintiff, therefore, plaintiff has got right, title and interest over the suit land. The learned trial Court was wrong in opining that it was an admitted fact that the father of the plaintiff was the owner of the suit land. The suit land comprises of two schedules: Schedule-A and Schedule-B. So far as Schedule- B is concerned, in paragraph 22(ii), the defendant admitted that Schedule-B land belonged to father of the plaintiff. But there was no such admission with regard to Schedule-A land. The suit land comprises of two schedules: Schedule-A and Schedule-B. So far as Schedule- B is concerned, in paragraph 22(ii), the defendant admitted that Schedule-B land belonged to father of the plaintiff. But there was no such admission with regard to Schedule-A land. The Additional Issue No. 1 was also decided in favour of the plaintiff and thus the trial Court decreed the suit, declaring right, title and interest over the suit land with a direction to the Defendant No. 1 to vacate possession over the suit land in favour of the plaintiff within 6 (six) months from the date of delivery of judgment failing which decree could be executed in accordance with law. 8. The learned lower Appellate Court recorded a finding that there is no evidence on record that Schedule-A land is a Sarkari land and on the contrary, the evidence on record shows that both Schedule-A and Schedule-B are periodic patta land since the days of late Tanu Koch. The Appellate Court had discounted the purported purchase by the father of the plaintiff Kalaram Baruah alias Kalaram Koch as the purchase was made by Chitha entry and not by execution of sale deed in his favour. Having held so, the learned Appellate Court opined that "such void transfer of ownership of land and delivery possession puts the transferee in possession with clear animus on distinct understanding that from that time onwards the transferor has no right or title to the property and the transferee adversely possesses the property from the date of such illegal transfer", and as Kalaram was in possession for more than 12 (twelve) years by way of adverse possession, he acquired title of ownership in respect of the suit land by way of adverse possession and plaintiff, by right of inheritance, except an area of 1B of land in Schedule-B sold to Sanibor Nath by his father Kalaram. 9. The learned lower Appellate Court also held that the Defendant No. 1 failed to prove sale of land by the father of the plaintiff to Sanibor Nath by Ext. 'Unga' and correspondingly by Sanibor Nath to the Defendant No. 1 vide Ext. 'Gha'. However, as Ext. 9. The learned lower Appellate Court also held that the Defendant No. 1 failed to prove sale of land by the father of the plaintiff to Sanibor Nath by Ext. 'Unga' and correspondingly by Sanibor Nath to the Defendant No. 1 vide Ext. 'Gha'. However, as Ext. 'Ka' (1) in the Chitha showed that name of the Defendant No. 1 was mutated in respect of 1B of land out of Schedule-B land on the strength of purchase from Sanibor Nath and as Defendant No. 1 was possessing the land comprised in Dag No. 90 (114) for more than 15 (fifteen) years from 31.08.1978, Defendant No. 1 had acquired title by way of adverse possession. It is further held that in respect of IB 2K 5L of land in Dag No. 90 (114), Ext 'Kha', a certified copy of Jamabandi, showed that name of Defendant No. 1 was mutated on 13.03.1997 and the period being only 7 (seven) years till the date of institution of the suit, Defendant No. 1 did not acquire any title by way of adverse possession in respect of the said plot of land. 10. Accordingly, the decree of the learned title Court was modified to the extent that the Defendant No. 1 had title in respect of land measuring 1B bounded by Topeswar Nath in" the north, Ram Avatar in the south, plaintiff in the east and mathauri in the west. 11. This second appeal was admitted to be heard on 28.09.1999 on the substantial question of law as to whether the Lower Appellate Court erred in law in coming to a finding without any pleading and issue as regards adverse possession. 12. Heard Mr. S. Chouhan, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. T Islam, learned counsel for the respondent. I have also perused the materials on record. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that in view of the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in issue No. 7, which is not interfered with by the learned lower Appellate Court, the modification of the impugned appellate judgment to the extent of grant of decree of 1B in favour of the Defendant No. 1, is not sustainable in law. 14. 14. He also submits that the learned Court below had recorded concurrent finding of fact that Schedule-A land is periodic patta land and that the Defendant No. 1 could not prove purchase of land measuring 1B from Sanibor Nath and land measuring 1B 2K 5L from the father of the plaintiff. It is argued by him that when the specific case of the Defendant No. 1 was based on transfer of land from Sanibor Nath and the father of the plaintiff, the learned lower Appellate Court committed grave error of law in passing the judgment holding that Defendant No. 1 acquired title in respect of 1B land by way of adverse possession. It is also pleaded by him that in addition to that, there is also no pleading by Defendant No. 1 claiming adverse possession and no issues were also framed. It is also submitted by him that in his written statement Defendant No. 1 had admitted that the father of the plaintiff had right, title and interest in the Schedule-B land and therefore, no further proof was required. 15. The learned counsel, in respect of his submissions, places reliance on the following judgments: (i) Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam @ Brijram & Ors., reported in AIR 1974 SC 471 (ii) RSA 138 2002 decided on 01.02.2013 (Mumtaz Begum & Ors. v. Md. Mazaharul Hoque @ Mukul) (iii) Manindra Kumar Dey & Ors. v. Mahendra Suklabaidya & Ors., reported in 1999 (1) GLT 30 and (iv) Narendra Kumar v. Vishnu Kumar Nayyar, reported in : AIR 1994 Delhi 209. 16. Mr. T Islam, learned counsel for the respondent/Defendant No. 1 submits that though there was an admission by the Defendant No. 1 in the written statement to the effect that Schedule-B land originally belonged to the father of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the same, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that he was still the owner of Scheduled-B land in view of the averments made in the written statement that there had been transfers of land comprised in Schedule-B land and this burden the plaintiff failed to discharge. It is submitted by him that the plaintiff had only brought into evidence documents pertaining to record of rights, which cannot be the only basis for establishing right, title and interest. It is submitted by him that the plaintiff had only brought into evidence documents pertaining to record of rights, which cannot be the only basis for establishing right, title and interest. As the plaintiff is to prove his case and as the plaintiff had failed to prove his right, title and interest in the suit property, judgment of the learned courts below cannot be sustained in law. It is further submitted by him that plaintiff was also granted decree by the learned lower appellate court below on the basis of adverse possession, though not pleaded and therefore, the substantial question of law formulated at the instance of the appellant is also squarely applicable to him. According to him, if it is held that the judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate court is bad inasmuch as title of ownership was declared in favour of Defendant No. 1 by adverse possession, the cross-objection is also liable to be allowed as the decree of the learned lower appellate court below was also on the basis of adverse possession, which was not pleaded by the plaintiff. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places reliances on the following judgments: (i) Ambika Prasad Thakur & Ors. v. Ram Ekbal Rail (dead) by his legal representatives & Ors., reported in AIR 1966 SC 605 , (ii) Balwant Singh & Anr. v. Daulat Singh (dead) by his legal representatives & Ors., reported in AIR 1997 SC 2719 , (iii) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Keshav Ram & Ors., reported in AIR 1997 SC 2181 (iv) Hindustan Steel Limited Rourkela v. Smti Kalyani Banerjee & Ors., reported in : AIR 1973 SC 408 and (v) Punjab Urban Planning & Development Authority v. Shiv Saraswati Iron and Steel Re-Rolling Mills, reported in: (1998) 4 SCC 539 . 17. In Nagindas (supra) the Apex Court had said that admission, if true and clear, is by far the best proof of the facts admitted and they by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. It has also been held that admission in pleadings stands on a higher footing than evidentiary admission and the former class of admission is fully binding on the parties that make them and constitute a waiver of proof. It has also been held that admission in pleadings stands on a higher footing than evidentiary admission and the former class of admission is fully binding on the parties that make them and constitute a waiver of proof. The admission by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties and on the other hand, evidentiary admission can be shown to be wrong. In Narendra Kumar (supra) the Delhi High Court reiterated the proposition that facts which are admitted need not be proved. It is no doubt true as held in Shiv Saraswati (supra) that the plaintiff must succeed or fail on his own case and cannot take advantage or weakness in the defendant's case to get a decree. Admission and weakness are two different things and operate at different fields. I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Islam that inspite of aforesaid admission in the written statement, it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove his right, title and interest by tendering into evidence documents of title. In Ambika Prasad (supra) on which Mr. Islam, in the context of admission, relies, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case as the Apex Court had said that admission in that case was made under some suspicious circumstances at the end of the trial of the case when the argument had begun, by way of a petition and without amending the written statement, and thus such admission had weak evidentiary value. The specific case of the Defendant No. 1 was transfer by way of sale from the Schedule-B land by the father of the plaintiff as well by the plaintiff him-self. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that Defendant No. 1 had failed to prove the sale of land in accordance with law. It was a burden which the defendant had to discharge. 18. In Hindustan Steel Ltd., (supra) the Apex Court has laid down that proceedings for mutation of names are not judicial proceedings and they are in the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the interest of the State and that mutation proceedings cannot be treated as a conclusive evidence of propriety right. It has also been held that an entry in the revenue extract may, prima facie, be good evidence of possession and even of the right to hold the land but in law it is not conclusive. It has also been held that an entry in the revenue extract may, prima facie, be good evidence of possession and even of the right to hold the land but in law it is not conclusive. In Keshav Ram (supra), the Apex Court had reiterated that an entry in the revenue papers by no stress of imagination can form the basis for declaration of title. Similar view has been taken in Balwant Singh (supra) and it has been held that mutation in the revenue record neither creates nor extinguishes title nor has it any presumptive value on title and that it only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. 19. In respect of Schedule-A land the plaintiff had relied on Ext. 5, a certified copy of Jamabandi. Similarly, in respect of 1B 2K 5L of land, Defendant No. 1 relied on Ext. Kha, which is also a certified copy of Jamabandi. In view of the law laid down by Apex Court, no title can flow on the basis of such revenue record. In Mumtaz Begum (supra), this court had held that plea of title on the basis of a un-registered sale deed and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent. Neither the plaintiff nor the Defendant No. 1 had pleaded adverse possession. However, the learned appellate court decreed the suit on the basis of adverse possession except 1B of land in Schedule-B land, on which also title was conferred on Defendant No. 1 on the basis of adverse possession. In Mumtaz Begum (supra), this court stated as follows: 17. It is settled law that mere possession, even if it is true, for any number of years will not clothe a person in enjoyment of the property with the title by adverse possession. Adverse possession, in a sense, is based on the presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law, but a blended one of fact and law. Adverse possession, in a sense, is based on the presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law, but a blended one of fact and law. A person who claims adverse possession must show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long has his possession continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. In order to succeed a person pleading adverse possession must clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. In terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse. Therefore, there must be intention to dispossess. Animus pos-sidendi is one of the ingredients of adverse possession. A peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nee vi, nee clam, nee precario is necessary to constitute adverse possession. 20. The reliance placed by the learned appellate Court in Achat Reddi v. Ramakrishna Raddiar & Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 553 , on the basis of which the learned lower appellate court passed the impugned judgment applying the law of adverse possession is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. In Achal Reddi (supra) the Apex Court had laid down that in case of agreement of sale, the party who obtained possession acknowledges title of the vendor even though agreement of sale may be invalid. It is an acknowledgement and recognition of the title of the vendor which excludes the theory of adverse possession. It was also held that position is different in a case where in pursuance of an oral transfer or a transfer not registered, the owner of the property transfers the property and puts the transferee in possession with the clear animus on the distinct understanding that from that time onwards he shall have no right or title to the property. It was also held that position is different in a case where in pursuance of an oral transfer or a transfer not registered, the owner of the property transfers the property and puts the transferee in possession with the clear animus on the distinct understanding that from that time onwards he shall have no right or title to the property. The Apex Court also laid down that such proposition is to be applied where there is a clear manifestation of the intention of the owner to divest himself of the right over the property. In the instant, case neither the plaint nor the written statement was structured so as to warrant invocation of the principle laid down in Achal Reddi (supra). To reiterate, there is no pleading whatsoever regarding adverse possession, both by the plaintiff and by the Defendant No. 1. 21. The reliance placed by Mr. Chouhan in Manindra Kumar (supra) has no application to the facts of the case as the ratio laid down in the said case is that objection to mode of proof put forward must be taken at trial before the document is marked as an Exhibit and admitted into record. 22. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India & Ors., reported in : (2004) 10 SCC 779 , the Apex Court stated as follows:-- 12. A plaintiff, filing a title suit should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it. In P. Periasami v. P. Periathambi this Court ruled that: Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property. The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Dealing with Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar that is similar to the case in hand, this Court held: 4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Dealing with Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar that is similar to the case in hand, this Court held: 4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years i.e. up to completing the period his title by prescription nee vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant. 23. As was indicated earlier, while the learned trial Court had granted a decree on the suit land on the basis of admission, the appellate Court had granted a decree on the basis of adverse possession. In view of the discussions above, this Court holds that the plaintiff will be entitled to a declaration of right, title and interest in respect of Schedule-B land and the Defendant No. 1 shall be liable to be ejected from Schedule-B land. The mutation order in favour of Defendant No. 1 in Schedule-B land is also declared to be illegal and void. It is also held that the plaintiff has failed to prove right, title and interest in Schedule-A land. 24. The second appeal and the cross objection are accordingly disposed of modifying the decree of the learned appellate court in terms of the above. No costs. Send back the lower Court records. __