JUDGEMNT : MR. BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. 1. These two Letters Patent Appeals were taken up together as these appeals have been preferred against the selfsame order dated 17th April, 2013 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, which is the subject-matter of these appeals. 2. The appellant of the Letters Patent Appeal No. 731 of 2013 was the applicant of Special Civil Application No. 3347 of 2013 out of which this appeal lies, whereas the Letters Patent Appeal No. 733 of 2013 is filed by the original respondent Nos. 6 to 9 of the above Special Civil Application, who supported the applicant of the above Special Civil Application. 3. It may not be out of place to mention here that the selfsame order dated 4th April, 2013 passed by the Industrial Tribunal was challenged by one Shreenath Travels by filing Special Civil Application No. 6839 of 2013 and the learned Single Judge, by a common order dismissed both the aforesaid Special Civil Applications. However, in these two appeals, we are concerned only with the subject-matter of the Special Civil Application No. 3347 of 2013. 4. The grievance of the applicant of Special Civil Application No. 3347 of 2013, who is the appellant in one of the appeals, was twofold; first grievance was with regard to the action of the appropriate government in making a reference to the Industrial Tribunal on 20th July, 2012 in exercise of the power under Section 10[1] of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [hereafter to be referred to as “the Act”], giving rise to Reference [IT] No. 51 of 2012 with the Industrial Tribunal, Surat and the second one was with regard to ad interim protection granted by the Tribunal by order dated 8th March, 2013 in the said Reference, which was subsequently made absolute by the order dated 4th April, 2013 by giving interim protection to the workmen till the disposal of the Reference. The said second order dated 4th April, 2013 is also challenged by filing the other Special Civil Application no. 6839 of 2013. 5. The said second order dated 4th April, 2013 is also challenged by filing the other Special Civil Application no. 6839 of 2013. 5. By the order impugned herein, the learned Single Judge was of the view that there was ample material on record to uphold the action of the appropriate government in making reference to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10[1] of the Act and as such, the learned Single Judge did not find any infirmity in the said action of the appropriate government. 6. As regards the other part of the order by granting interim relief in favour of the workmen was concerned, the learned Single Judge, by giving detailed reasons refused to interfere with the same with specific observation that the observations made in the said order should not influence the Tribunal while finally adjudicating the Reference. 7. Being dissatisfied, these two appeals have been filed. 8. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record, we first propose to consider whether these two appeals are maintainable in the facts of the present case. 9. It appears that the Special Civil Application No. 3347 of 2013 has been described as one under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein, both the orders, being order dated 20th July, 2012 passed by the Labour Commissioner, Gandhinagar, making Reference and the order dated 8th March, 2013 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, were challenged. The said order dated 8th March, 2013 having been made absolute, by way of amendment, the subsequent order dated 4th April, 2013 was also challenged. 10. It appears that the applicant prayed for issue of appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the order of Reference and also by way of appropriate writ of certiorari for quashing the subsequent order of interim relief granted by the Tribunal. In the application, the Industrial Tribunal, Surat, whose order was sought to be quashed was also made party. 11. As held by this Court in the case of Revaben wd/o Ambalal Motibhai & ors. v. Vinubhai Purshottamdas Patel & Ors., reported in 2013 [1] GLH 440, an appeal under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent can be preferred against an order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court only if the order is passed in exercise of original jurisdiction. v. Vinubhai Purshottamdas Patel & Ors., reported in 2013 [1] GLH 440, an appeal under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent can be preferred against an order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court only if the order is passed in exercise of original jurisdiction. So far as the order passed by a Court or a Tribunal is concerned, in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, a High Court is also vested with the power of superintendence in respect of any order passed by a Court or a Tribunal and can pass such order as it thinks fit in the facts of such case. While the writ in the nature of certiorari is limited to the question of jurisdiction, the power of superintendence is wider in terms and the Supreme Court in the case of SURYA DEV RAI VS. RAM CHANDRA RAI reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044 , highlighted the characteristics of the writ of certiorari and distinguished the same from the power of superintendence in the following way: “24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram and others v. Smt. Radhikabai and another, (1986) Supp SCC 401. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 25. 25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well. (Emphasis supplied). 12. In the case before us, we find that the learned Single Judge, while affirming the order passed by the Tribunal, has taken into consideration the entire material on record and affirmed the same on merit. (Emphasis supplied). 12. In the case before us, we find that the learned Single Judge, while affirming the order passed by the Tribunal, has taken into consideration the entire material on record and affirmed the same on merit. Thus, the learned Single Judge did not exercise any jurisdiction of certiorari by limiting its scrutiny only to the question of jurisdiction. In other words, it appears from the tenor of the order impugned in the appeal as regards the affirmation of the interim order that the learned Single Judge really exercised the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Once we hold that the said part of the order was one exercised in supervisory jurisdiction, it is settled that such order can be challenged only by way of Special Leave Application under Article 136 of the Constitution of India unless the High Court grants leave to prefer an appeal against such order. It is also settled law that in order to decide the question of appealability of an order, the decisive factor is what is the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the order impugned and not the caption under which the application was described. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the application was described as one under Article 226 of the Constitution, the learned Single Judge not having considered the question of grant of certiorari, but having exercised the power of superintendence, that part of the impugned order was really passed not in original proceeding of certiorari but was passed in exercise of power of superintendence. 13. We, therefore, find that there is no scope of considering the merit of that part of the order affirming the interim order in this Letters Patent Appeal under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent. 14. As regards the first order impugned in the application, viz. the order of Reference, that was no doubt, challenged in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the learned Single Judge has also affirmed the order of Reference in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the order of Reference challenged in the Special Civil Application which has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge can be challenged by way of a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent. 15. Therefore, the order of Reference challenged in the Special Civil Application which has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge can be challenged by way of a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent. 15. We, therefore, propose to consider this Letters Patent Appeal only in respect of the order of Reference affirmed by the learned single Judge. 16. The entire order of Reference is quoted below: “ORDER Industrial Disputes Act 1947 No. K.H.A.H.M.C./ 39515/5/2/IDR/AJ/199/12 It is the opinion of the undersigned that the Industrial Dispute connected with the matters stated in the Schedule enclosed herewith, is between the [1] Manager, Delhi Public School, Dummas Road, Surat [2] Manager, Mahendra Travels, City Bus Depot, Near C.N.G. Pump, Kharvarnagar Udhna Road, Surat and their workers. Now, under Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vide Notification No. K.H.R/2001/173/IDA/102001/607/M[2] dated 18.08.2001 of Gujarat Government, Labour and Employment Department, the powers under Sub-Section [1] of Section 10 of the said Act and Sub-Section [4] and [5] of the Section 12, except item no.3 of Schedule-2 and item no. 9,10,11 of Schedule-3 of the said Act, to the extent of Industrial Units employing 100 or more labourers, for the entire state, is handed over to the Labour Commissioner, Gujarat State, Gandhinagar. Now, as stated herein above, by the [sic] virtue of power under Sub-Section 1 of Section-10 of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947, I, the Labour Commissioner, Gujarat State, Gandhinagar, hereby forward the said dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Surat for deciding the same. Schedule [As per Appendix enclosed] [Conci. Case No. 09/12] Appendix of Demand [1] All the Drivers and Conductors of Gaviur and Olpad Veluk appointed for the work of conveyance of the students in the buses owned by the Organization, shall be taken on the muster of Permanent Workers and whether the concerned worker shall be given from the date of his appointment, all the rights benefits applicable to the permanent workers in their category? [2] As the organization has appointed on service by making recruitment on the buses owned by the organization, if the organization has raised the illusive contractors then the same shall be cancelled and whether all the drivers conductors shall be given the identity cards along with their date of appointment and designation? [2] As the organization has appointed on service by making recruitment on the buses owned by the organization, if the organization has raised the illusive contractors then the same shall be cancelled and whether all the drivers conductors shall be given the identity cards along with their date of appointment and designation? [3] Whether the organization, by showing bogus and illusive contractors on paper in the Provident Fund Office or any other office, whether shall be continued or not? [4] Whether or not, every Driver, Conductor shall be given 4 School Uniforms per year? [5]. Whether or not, every driver, conductor shall be given 2 pairs of shoes of good company? [6] Whether or not, due to raising such demands any worker by keeping grievance, by undertaking unfair labour practice, shall be removed from the service directly or indirectly?” 17. A plain reading of the aforesaid order of Reference indicates that the appropriate government, on the basis of the materials on record, made the said Reference and in such circumstances, the learned Single Judge held that the sufficiency of the material taken note of by the appropriate government in making Reference cannot be gone into in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We find that the aforesaid view taken by the learned Single Judge is the correct view as held by a five-judge-bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy and Another, reported in 1953[4] S.C.R. 334, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under:- “This is, however, not to say that the Government will be justified in making a reference under S. 10 (1) without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended in relation to an establishment or a definite group of establishments engaged in a particular industry, and it is also desirable that the Government should, wherever possible, indicate the nature of the dispute in the order of reference. But, it must be remembered that in making a reference under S. 10 (1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the less administrative in character. But, it must be remembered that in making a reference under S. 10 (1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the less administrative in character. The Court cannot, therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. No doubt, it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But, if the dispute was an industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon, and it will not be competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those matters. The observations in some of the decisions in Madras do not appear to have kept this distinction in view. Moreover, it may not always be possible for the Government, on the material placed before it, to particularise the dispute in its order of reference, for situations might conceivably arise where public interest requires that a strike or a lock-out, either existing or imminent, should be ended or averted without delay, which, under the scheme of the Act, could be done only after the dispute giving rise to it has been referred to a Board or a Tribunal (vide Ss. 10 (3) and 23). In such cases the Government must have the power, in order to maintain industrial peace and production, to set in motion the machinery of settlement with its sanctions and prohibitions without stopping to enquire what specific points the contending parties are quarrelling about, and it would seriously detract from the usefulness of the statutory machinery to construe S. 10 (1) as denying such power to the Government. We find nothing in the language of that provision to compel such construction. xxx xxx” 18. Mr. M.R. Bhatt, the learned senior counsel appearing with Ms.Mauna M. Bhatt for the appellant in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 731 of 2013 tried to impress upon us that before making a reference, a conciliation in terms of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is mandatory and in this case admittedly there being no such proceeding, the order of Reference was illegal. In order to consider the aforesaid submission, we quote relevant part of Section 12 of the Act as under:- “12. Duties of conciliation officers. --[1] Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. xxx xxx xxx 19. There is no dispute that this is not a dispute of utility of service and such being the provision, application of Section 12 is merely directory and not mandatory and, therefore, even if there was no reconciliation in terms of Section 12, that will not invalidate the Reference in terms of Section 10. We, therefore, find no merit in the above contention of Mr. Bhatt. 20. On consideration of the entire materials on record, we, therefore, dismiss Letters Patent Appeal No. 731 of 2013 so far as the order of the learned Single Judge affirming the order of Reference is concerned and so far as the other part of the order impugned, viz. affirmation of the interim relief, we hold that this appeal is not maintainable and the appropriate remedy of the appellant lies by approaching the Supreme Court against that part of the order of the learned Single Judge affirming the order of the interim relief. As regards the other appeal preferred by the respondent Nos. 6 to 9, being Letters Patent Appeal No. 733 of 2013, they having challenged only the order of interim relief granted by the Tribunal, for the selfsame reason assigned by us above, we hold that their appeal is not at all maintainable and appropriate remedy of these appellants lie by moving the Supreme Court against the order of the learned Single Judge. 21. Thus, both the appeals are dismissed. 21. Thus, both the appeals are dismissed. 21.1 In view of the dismissal of both the appeals, the connected Civil Applications have become infructuous and the same are disposed of accordingly. Notice is discharged. 21.2 There will be, however, no order as to costs in all these matters. 21.3 We make it clear that it would be open to the aggrieved party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award as pointed out in the Supreme Court decision quoted above. We further also make it clear that we have not gone into the above aspect in this appeal. Appeals dismissed.