1. Criminal Appeal No. 12/2012 has been filed by one Shri Moti Singh, one of the two convicts, against the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar, in criminal challan No. 55 arising out of FIR No. 3A/99 CBI for offences punishable under Sections 420, 468 and 471 RPC read with Section 120-B, and, decided on 30.10.2012. The State, too, has filed Criminal Acquittal Appeal bearing No. 07/2013 against the aforesaid judgment and order to the extent the learned trial court has acquitted the convicts under Section 467 RPC and ordered them to be released on probation. 2. It appears that case RC 3(A)99-Jammu was registered on 15.3.1999 on the basis of reliable information, that one Balbir Singh, Assistant of National Insurance Company, Srinagar, (for short NIC) had entered into criminal conspiracy with S/Shri Farooq Nazir Naqauishbandi and Farooq Ahmad Dar, accused No. 1, in furtherance whereof one bogus insurance policy No. 421001/3/104382/5/94-95 was drawn in favour of accused Farooq Ahmad Dar for a three storied residential house situated at Kawdara, Srinagar, which, in fact, did not exist, and a bogus fire claim for Rs. 2,49,616 was fraudulently prepared. 3. During the course of investigation, it was disclosed that Shri Balbir Singh, Shri Zahoor Ahmad, both posted as Assistants and Shri Shaukat Ahmad, posted as Branch Incharge in NIC in the Divisional Office, Srinagar, in the year 1995; and Farooq Nazir Naqashbandi, a private surveyor; Moti Singh an agent, working for the NIC, entered into a criminal conspiracy with one Farooq Ahmad Dar, a private person, in entertaining false/fake fire insurance claim for Rs. 2,49,616 for the house shown situated at Plot number 1135/748 at Kawdara and the said amount of Rs. 2,49,616 was fraudulently and dishonestly paid to convict Farooq Ahmad Dar thereby causing pecuniary advantage to the accused Farooq Ahmad Dar and wrongful loss to the NIC. 4. The prosecution story further was that in furtherance of criminal conspiracy, Farooq Ahmad Dar had submitted a fake fire accident claim supported by fake report from Fire Services, a fake report from Police and a fake land ownership certificate of the house in question. The claim was processed on the strength of fake documents. It was also alleged that claim intimation letter in duplicate was written by Moti Singh in his hand and he had forged and signed it as Farooq Ahmad Dar. The claim was processed on the strength of fake documents. It was also alleged that claim intimation letter in duplicate was written by Moti Singh in his hand and he had forged and signed it as Farooq Ahmad Dar. It was alleged that Zahoor Ahmad Mir, Assistant NIC had facilitated the processing of fake fire claim in connivance with Shaukat Ahmad, Branch Incharge, NIC; Balbir Singh, Assistant NIC, Srinagar; Farooq Ahmad Dar, alleged insured and Moti Singh, agent of NIC. It was further the case of the prosecution that in the divisional office fake ownership certificate was processed and the note sheet at serial number 29 and 30 of the claim file of Farooq Ahmad Dar was prepared while, in fact, the building did not exist at all. The policy number was shown as a naval policy number 421001/310115/92 with overwriting 93; whereas the number of eligible policy for 21001/310115/92/93 was not in the name of Farooq Ahmad Dar. 5. During investigation all relevant documents were collected and statements of witnesses were recorded. The specimen signatures and writings of the accused were taken and forwarded to GE QD Simla for handwriting expert opinion. Sanction to prosecute was obtained against accused Balbir Singh, Shaukat Ahmad, Zahoor Ahmad from the competent authority and challan against the accused was produced before Special Judge, Anticorruption, Srinagar. 6. The Special Judge, Anticorruption, Srinagar, finding no involvement of the NIC Officials in commission of the offences set out in the charge sheet, discharged accused Balbir Singh, Shaukat Ahmad and Zahoor Ahmad Mir. The other two accused being private persons and not coming within the purview of the definition of public servants, the Special Judge, Anticorruption sent the case file to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, for proceeding therein under law. The learned CJM committed the case to the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Srinagar, wherefrom it was transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar. 7. The learned CJM committed the case to the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Srinagar, wherefrom it was transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar. 7. The accused were charge sheeted on 26.7.2001 for the commission of offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 120-B, read with Section 471 RPC and in order to bring home the guilt to the accused, prosecution examined PW Zahoor Ahmad Khan, Patwari, Patwar Halqa S. R. Gunj; PW Mohammad Ashraf Khan, Girdawar; PW Khazir Muhammad Tehsildar, Budgam; PW Wali Mohammad Malik, Assistant Director, Fire Services; PW Muzaffar Hussain, Senior Divisional Manager, NIC; PW Gurmukh Singh; PW Ghulam Rasool Bhatt, Clerk NIC; PW Param Chand Mangotra; PW Ghulam Mohammad Najjar; PW Dr. A. B. Vaid, Handwriting Expert; PW Mohammad Muzaffar Hussain; PWS. H. Shetty; PW R. K. Motu, Senior Manager PNB; PW Dileep Kaul; PW Gh. Rasool Bhat; PW Farooq Naqashbandi and PW, IO, Ajay Khajuria. The accused have not adduced any evidence in defence. 8. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court held the accused 1 and 2 guilty for the commission of offences under Sections 420, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B RPC and convicted them for the commission of the said offences and sentenced them to undergo two years' imprisonment in each of the offences under Sections 420, 468, 471 read with Section 120- B RPC, besides imposing a fine of Rs. 20,000/- on each of them ordered to go into the accounts of NIC. However, the convicts were ordered to be released on probation for a period of two years on furnishing a bond of good behaviour and surety bonds of Rs. 25,000/- on the condition of fulfillment of which the sentence of imprisonment was ordered to remain under suspension. It was ordered that in case of breach, they shall be called to suffer the punishment by way of imprisonment. 9. Against the aforesaid conviction and order of sentencing, one of the two convicts, namely, Moti Singh, has filed the present Criminal Appeal No. 12/2012; whereas the State has come in Cr. Acquittal Appeal No. 07/2013. The other convict has not chosen to file any appeal. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and considered the matter. 11. Acquittal Appeal No. 07/2013. The other convict has not chosen to file any appeal. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and considered the matter. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant-convict submitted that the prosecution has in all examined 16 witnesses at the trial and none of them has deposed anything incriminating against the appellant. He submitted that except the handwriting expert's opinion, there is not an iota of evidence against the appellant. He further submitted that the whole prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence and that there is no direct evidence. Referring to the impugned judgment, learned counsel submitted that the impugned judgment is cryptic, inasmuch as the individual offences too are not proved by the prosecution. 12. Having gone through the record, I am of the considered view that there is much force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant for the following reasons. 13. The prosecution story was that the three discharged accused alongwith the convict-appellant Moti Singh, had entered into conspiracy with the first accused-convict, Farooq Ahmad Dar. Once the very basic premise of the prosecution story had come to an end with the discharge of the three alleged conspirators, the prosecution story had been demolished and the important links as to hatching of criminal conspiracy, entertaining and processing of bogus claim, showing the papers as duplicate on the ground of originals having been burnt in the fire incident of the NIC office; mention of wrong policy number; passing of the claim and despatch of the cheque etc, etc. had been lost. In other words, the chain of events had been broken and thus a yawning gap was created in the prosecution case. The trial court has noticed this fact, though, saying that it would have its own implications, yet has proceeded to hold the appellant and the accused No. 1 guilty of criminal conspiracy. 14. In order to bring home the guilt to the accused, prosecution was essentially required to establish the following facts/ links: i) that the accused 1 and 2 had entered into a criminal conspiracy to file a false and bogus insurance claim for Rs. 14. In order to bring home the guilt to the accused, prosecution was essentially required to establish the following facts/ links: i) that the accused 1 and 2 had entered into a criminal conspiracy to file a false and bogus insurance claim for Rs. 2,49,616 for the house purportedly situated at Kawdara; ii) that in pursuit of the above conspiracy, the accused had prepared fake documents, such as Patwari record, fire report of the Fire services Department, police report, fake insurance certificate, claim intimation letter; iii) that the claim intimation letter in duplicate was written by Moti Singh forging the signature of accused no. 1; iv) that the accused had access to the NIC office to ensure that the fake fire insurance claim was processed and got passed by the Company. 15. After scanning the evidence of witnesses and the record, the trial court has recorded definite and clear findings to the following effect: i) that it is not proved that the accused forged the fire accidental report and copies of girdawari or the police report; ii) that there is no supporting material from which it could be inferred that accused number 2 (i.e. the appellant herein) has forged the signatures of the accused no. 1; iii) that it was not proved as to who had prepared the fake insurance certificate; iv) that it was not proved how and in what circumstances the claim was prepared on the basis of the bogus documents. 16. It be seen that the very foundation of the case was built on the allegations that all the five accused (3 discharged accused) and convicts had entered into a criminal conspiracy. The object of criminal conspiracy had fallen to ground enroute when three official accused were discharged by the Court of Special Judge, Anticorruption, Srinagar, and that order has attained finality. Thus the question of hatching criminal conspiracy and to commit crime in furtherance of said conspiracy has lost its very basis and effect. The prosecution case, as put forth before the trial Court, was not that it were the accused-convicts who had hatched the alleged conspiracy. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the convicts have committed any act in furtherance of such alleged criminal conspiracy. 17. The prosecution case, as put forth before the trial Court, was not that it were the accused-convicts who had hatched the alleged conspiracy. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the convicts have committed any act in furtherance of such alleged criminal conspiracy. 17. The trial court, while recording the findings, has categorically held that the prosecution has failed to prove that the signatures of Farooq Ahmad, accused, were made by appellant, Moti Singh. There is also no evidence, as held by the trial court, to suggest as to who prepared the fake insurance certificate and which documents were bogus. All these links are missing. Thus, the finding of the trial court, that the appellant and Farooq Ahmad, accused, were involved in criminal conspiracy, is not based on any evidence. In order to connect the accused with the commission of the alleged crime, it was required of the prosecution to prove each and every chain of events alleged by it. The prosecution having failed to do so, it was not legally permissible for the trial court to hold that the accused-convicts were guilty of the offence of conspiracy. In this connection reference may be made to the Apex Court judgment in Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC 4427 , wherein it has categorically been laid down that prosecution has to prove all links and, if any link is incomplete, the case is to be thrown out. It would be fruitful to reproduce paragraph 14 of the judgment, which reads hereunder: "14. As noted above, the essential ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy is the agreement to commit an offence. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a situation, criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a situation, criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. Where the conspiracy alleged is with regard to commission of a serious crime of the nature as contemplated in Section 120B read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 120A, then in that event mere proof of an agreement between the accused for commission of such a crime alone is enough to bring about a conviction under Section 120B and the proof of any overt act by the accused or by any one of them would not be necessary. The provisions, in such a situation, do not require that each and every person who is a party to the conspiracy must do some overt act towards the fulfillment of the object of conspiracy, the essential ingredient being an agreement between the conspirators to commit the crime and if these requirements and ingredients are established, the act would fall within the trapping of the provisions contained in section 120B [See: S.C. Bahri v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1994 SC 2420 )]". 18. Further, this is a case where three of the accused, who as per the prosecution story had allegedly hatched the conspiracy and who had allegedly prepared and processed the claim case in question, had been discharged by the court of competent jurisdiction. Once three of the five principal accused were discharged, law is no more res Integra, the other two accused could not be held liable for the alleged criminal conspiracy. Reference in this behalf may be made to the apex Court judgment in State of Goa v. Pandurang Mohite, AIR 2009 SC 1066 , wherein it has been held that if some of the accused are discharged, the other accused cannot be convicted for the commission of criminal conspiracy. Paragraphs 7 and 14 are reproduced hereunder: "7. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. Paragraphs 7 and 14 are reproduced hereunder: "7. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR (1977 SC 1063); Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad ( AIR 1956 SC 316 ); Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka ( AIR 1983 SC 446 ); State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. ( AIR 1985 SC 1224 ); Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1987 SC 350 ); Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1989 SC 1890 ). The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1954 SC 621 ), it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt. 14. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1984 SC 1622 ). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned `must' or `should' and not `may be' established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 19. Apart from the above, the law regarding circumstantial evidence is well settled. When a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy three tests, namely, (i) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; (ii) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency, unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (iii) the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. The circumstantial evidence, in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. The circumstantial evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused, but should be inconsistent with his innocence. Reference in this behalf may be made to the Apex Court judgments in Gambir v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 1157 ; Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A. P., AIR 1990 SC 79 . 20. In 2012 AIR SCW 4784, the apex Court had laid down the test how an accused can be said to have committed criminal conspiracy. It will be profitable to reproduce paragraph 52 of the judgment hereunder: "52. 20. In 2012 AIR SCW 4784, the apex Court had laid down the test how an accused can be said to have committed criminal conspiracy. It will be profitable to reproduce paragraph 52 of the judgment hereunder: "52. Criminal conspiracy cannot be inferred on the mere fact that there were official discussions between the officers of the MoF and that of DoT and between two Ministers, which are all recorded. Suspicion, however, strong, cannot take the place of legal proof and the meeting between Shri P. Chidambaram and Shri A. Raja would not by itself be sufficient to infer the existence of a criminal conspiracy so as to indict Shri P. Chidambaram. Petitioners submit that had the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister intervened, this situation could have been avoided, might be or might not be. A wrong judgment or an inaccurate or incorrect approach or poor management by itself, even after due deliberations between Ministers or even with Prime Minister, by itself cannot be said to be a product of criminal conspiracy." 21. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh @ Raju @ Batya v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal Nos. 931-932 of 2009, decided on 06.05.2013, the Apex Court, while reiterating the law, has laid down as under: "In a case of circumstantial evidence, the judgment remains essentially inferential. The inference is drawn from the established facts as the circumstances lead to particular inferences. The Court has to draw an inference with respect to whether the chain of circumstances is complete, and when the circumstances therein are collectively considered, the same must lead only to the irresistible conclusion, that the accused alone is the perpetrator of the crime in question. All the circumstances so established must be of a conclusive nature, and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused." 22. Having said so, I am of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of criminal conspiracy as alleged and put forth in the charge. The trial court has also not marshaled out how the accused, i.e., the convict appellant and Farooq Ahmad hatched the alleged conspiracy. Apart from that, the prosecution has also failed to prove the individual offences alleged against the convicts. 23. The trial court has also not marshaled out how the accused, i.e., the convict appellant and Farooq Ahmad hatched the alleged conspiracy. Apart from that, the prosecution has also failed to prove the individual offences alleged against the convicts. 23. Now, I deem it proper to give brief resume of ingredients which are required for proving the other charges framed against the accused convicts. In this connection, it would be advantageous to reproduce paragraphs 366 to 376 of the Apex Court judgment reported in Ram Narain Poply v. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2003 SC 2748 . "366. Section 420 deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. The offence of cheating is made of two ingredients. Deception of any person and fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property. To put it differently, the ingredients of the offence are that the person deceived delivers to someone a valuable security or property, that the person so deceived was induced to do so, that such person acted on such inducement in consequence of his having been deceived by the accused and that the accused acted fraudulently or dishonestly when so inducing the person. To constitute the offence of cheating, it is not necessary that the deception should be by express words, but it may be by conduct or implied in the nature of the transaction itself. 367. Section 467 relates to forgery of such documents as valuable securities and of other documents mentioned. 368. Section 468 deals with forgery for the purpose of cheating. The offence is complete as soon as there was forgery with a particular intent. 369. Section 471 deals with using as genuine a forged document. For the purpose of convicting an accused under Section 467 read with Section 471 IPC, it has to be shown that an accused either knew or has reason to believe that the document was forged. 370. Section 463 defines forgery and Section 464 deals with making a false statement. Section 463 reads as follows: `463. For the purpose of convicting an accused under Section 467 read with Section 471 IPC, it has to be shown that an accused either knew or has reason to believe that the document was forged. 370. Section 463 defines forgery and Section 464 deals with making a false statement. Section 463 reads as follows: `463. Forgery-[Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.' 371. In order to constitute forgery, the first essential is that the accused should have made a false document. The false document must be made with an intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any class of public or to any community. 372. The expression `intent to defraud' implies conduct coupled with intention to deceive or thereby to cause injury. In other words, defraud involves two conceptions namely, the deceit and injury to the person deceived, that is infringement of some legal right possessed by him but not necessarily deprivation of property. The term `forgery' as used in the statute is used in its ordinary and popular acceptation. 373. The definition of the offence of forgery declares the offence to be completed when a false document or false part of a document is made with specified intention. The questions are (i) is the document false (ii) is it made by the accused and (iii) is it made with intent to defraud. If at all the questions are answered in the affirmative, the accused is guilty. 374. In order to constitute an offence of forgery the documents must be made dishonestly or fraudulently. But dishonest or fraudulent are not tautological. Fraudulent does not imply the deprivation of property or an element of injury. In order to be fraudulent, there must be some advantage on the one side with a corresponding loss on the other. Every forgery postulates a false document either in whole or in part, however, small. 375. The intent to commit forgery involves an intent to cause injury. Fraudulent does not imply the deprivation of property or an element of injury. In order to be fraudulent, there must be some advantage on the one side with a corresponding loss on the other. Every forgery postulates a false document either in whole or in part, however, small. 375. The intent to commit forgery involves an intent to cause injury. A person makes a false document who dishonestly or fraudulently signs with an intent or cause to believe that the document was signed by a person whom he knows it was not signed. 376. A false description makes a document of forgery when it is found that the accused by giving such false description intended to make out or wanted it to believe that it was not he that was executing the document but another person." 24. Besides, it is settled law that guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. The dishonest intention and mens rea on the part of the accused has to be established. My said view is fortified by mere reading of provision of Section 420 RPC. The Apex Court in Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 11 , held what are the ingredients which prosecution has to prove in order to bring home the guilt provided under Section 420 RPC. It will be beneficial to reproduce paragraphs 16 and 17, which reads thus: 16. A guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In other words `mens rea' on the part of the accused must be established before he can be convicted of an offence of cheating. (See Jeswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. The State of Bombay AIR 1956 SC 575 ). In Mahadeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal AIR 1954 SC 724 , it was held as follows Where the charge against the accused is under S.420 in that he induced the complainant to part with his goods, on the understanding that the accused would pay for the same on delivery but did not pay, if the accused had at the time he promised to pay cash against delivery an intention to do so, the fact that he did not pay would not convert the transaction into one of cheating. But if on the other hand he had no intention whatsoever to pay but merely said that he would do so in order to induce the complainant to part with the goods then a case of cheating would be established. 17. In Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha & Ors. AIR 1974 SC 301 it was held that unless the complaint showed that the accused had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the complainant parted with the money it would not amount to an offence under Section 420 IPC and it may only amount to breach of contract. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors. 2000 (3) SCC 693 , it was reiterated that guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating and, therefore, to secure conviction `mens rea' on the part of the accused must be established. It has been further held that in order to constitute the offence of cheating the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered." 25. Keeping in view the final police report read with the fact that main three accused have been discharged and the fact that prosecution has failed that accused (convicts) have forged the documents, in which manner fake insurance certificate was prepared and how claim has been prepared. In the given circumstances while applying the test laid down by the Apex Court, it can be safely said that prosecution has failed to bring home the guilt to the accused. Thus prosecution has failed to prove charge under Section 420 RPC. 26. Now coming to charge under Section 468 RPC, as discussed hereinabove, the trial Court has held that there is no evidence to prove that the documents are forged and even trial court has specifically recorded that prosecution has failed to prove that accused No. 2, appellant, has forged the signatures of the accused Farooq Ahmad. That being the unambiguous finding recorded by the trial court, it is incomprehensible, rather enigmatic, how then the trial Court has convicted them for the commission of offence under Section 468 RPC. This only demonstrates that the trial court is oblivious of the basic principles of criminal law. 27. With regard to charge under Section 471 RPC, this penal provision can be pressed into service when the charge under Section 468 RPC is established and proved. This only demonstrates that the trial court is oblivious of the basic principles of criminal law. 27. With regard to charge under Section 471 RPC, this penal provision can be pressed into service when the charge under Section 468 RPC is established and proved. As discussed above, prosecution having failed to prove the charge under Section 468 RPC, consequently, this charge also fails. 28. In light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, as cited and quoted hereinabove, the conviction recorded by the trial court against the convicts is grossly illegal. 29. In view of the above, I am of the considered view that the order of conviction recorded by the trial court is not sustainable, especially so because the prosecution has failed to establish an unbroken chain of events. In fact, the prosecution, in my view, has not been able to connect the accused-appellant with the alleged crime in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the accused could not have been sentenced. 30. The accused No. 1 in the case has not filed any appeal against the impugned judgment and order of the trial Judge. The appeal has been filed only by the 2nd accused. Since I have come to a conclusion that the impugned conviction and sentence are not sustainable, the question is whether the benefit of this judgment can be extended to the non-appealing convict? Law is not res Integra; The High Court of Calcutta in Parbati Devi v. The State, AIR 1952 Cal 835, has held that benefit is to be given. It is advantageous to reproduce paragraph 15 of the judgment, which reads hereunder: "15. When we were considering the appeal by Parvati Devi who came to the definite conclusion that there was no evidence on the record which would justify a conviction for conspiracy as between Parvati Devi and Shew Nath. It is not only in the exercise of the inherent power, but we consider it to be the duty of the Court to exercise jurisdiction in such a manner that manifest injustice may not be continued to be perpetrated. It does not matter that Shew Nath has not appealed. This matter having come to the notice of the Court, we think that we have got sufficient jurisdiction under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 561-A, Criminal P. C. to pass appropriate orders in the case of Shew Nath also." 31. It does not matter that Shew Nath has not appealed. This matter having come to the notice of the Court, we think that we have got sufficient jurisdiction under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 561-A, Criminal P. C. to pass appropriate orders in the case of Shew Nath also." 31. The Apex Court in Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2012 AIR SCW 3206, has also held that in such circumstances the benefit of judgment can be extended to the non-appealing convict as well. In the same manner, in Madhu v. State of Kerala, AIR 2012 SC 665, the Apex Court, relying on an earlier decision in Gurucharan Kumar & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 2 SCC 698 , observed that to do complete justice, it would be just and appropriate to extend the same benefit as has been executed to the appellant-accused (Madhu), also to Sibi, accused No. 2 therein. On the same analogy, the benefit of the instant judgment shall extend to the accused No. 1, i.e., the non-appellant convict, namely, Farooq Ahmad Dar, in the instant case as well. 32. It may be observed here that the State has also come in appeal before this Court against the order of the trial court insofar as the convicts had been acquitted under section 467 RPC and ordered to be released on probation. Since I have recorded a definite finding as to the impugned judgment and order of sentencing, holding the same to be not sustainable, the acquittal appeal filed by the State shall abide the aforesaid decision. 33. Accordingly, while allowing Cr. Appeal No. 12/2012, the impugned judgment and order of sentencing dated 30.10.2012, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar, in Criminal Challan No. 55, is set aside. Consequently, the Cr. Acquittal Appeal No. 07/2013 filed by the State is dismissed. 34. The convicts shall stand discharged of the surety and bail bonds. 35. The Registry to remit the record to the trial court alongwith a copy of this judgment.