Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 46 (GAU)

Rina Datta v. State of Tripura

2013-01-28

SWAPAN CHANDRA DAS

body2013
JUDGMENT Swapan Chandra Das, J. 1. By this revisional application, filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C., the petitioner challenged order, dated 25.04.2008, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Belonia, South Tripura, in Case No. S.T. 49(ST/B)/2007, whereby learned Addl. Sessions Judge rejected the petition filed by the petitioner-seeking further investigation in connection with the Sessions Trial case. Heard learned counsel, Mr. Alik Das for the petitioner and learned P.P., Mr. D. Sarkar for the respondent No. 1 and learned counsel, Miss R. Guha for respondent Nos. 2 to 14. Also heard learned counsel, Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, who was appointed as Amicus Curiae to conduct the case. 2. Facts, necessary for disposal of the present revisional application, in short, noted thus: 2.1 Krishna Keshab Datta, a constable of Tripura Police, attached with S.B. Wing, husband of the petitioner, was found at Manpathar market under Santirbazar PS on 05.12.1998 at about 1630 hrs. So far the records reveals, the said Krishna Keshab Datta at the relevant time was posted as PSO of one MLA Sri Gouri Sankar Reang. The said Krishna Keshab Datta was picked up by the personnel of Tripura State Rifles (for short, TSR) posted at Manpathar TSR camp and was beaten up in the market and, thereafter, he was taken to the nearby TSR camp. Accordingto the FIR lodged by Sajal Sharma, SI of Police of Manpathar Out Post, the said Krishna Keshab Datta was found creating nuisance in the Manpathar market under influence of liquor and was unable to take care of himself and that his service revolver was also falling down repeatedly from his waist and at that time the TSR constables picked him up and took him to the TSR camp. Subsequently, he was handed over by the TS R personnel to the Manpathar police Out Post, headed by SI Sajal Sharma and on such production SI Sajal Sharma arrested him under Section 151 of Cr.P.C., since he found him under influence of liquor and, thereafter, he took him to Santirbazar hospital for his medical examination. He was admitted in Santirbazar hospital and, on the following day, i.e., on 06.12.1998, SI Sajal Sharma released Krishna Keshab Datta on bail to his younger brother, Napor Datta. He was admitted in Santirbazar hospital and, on the following day, i.e., on 06.12.1998, SI Sajal Sharma released Krishna Keshab Datta on bail to his younger brother, Napor Datta. Since the health condition of Krishna Keshab Datta was deteriorating gradually, on 06.12.1998, he was referred to T.S. District Hospital, Udaipur, and accordingly, he was taken to the T.S. District Hospital, wherefrom he was referred to G.B. Hospital and on way to GB. Hospital, at Bagma, he died and, therefore, his relatives brought the dead body back to T.S. District Hospital, where postmortem examination over the dead body was done. On the basis of a report from the T.S. District Hospital, Udaipur, U.D. Case No. 1(12)/98 under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. was registered on 08.12.1998 and SI Sajal Sarma started investigation. He collected the postmortem report conducted at T.S. District Hospital, Udaipur and it was found that Krishna Keshab Datta died because of severe head and chest injuries and the death was homicidal in nature. In the postmortem report, the autopsy surgeon found the following injuries-- (i) Haematoma (2 cm diameter) over the occipital region. (ii) Multiple abscurious and swelling on the backside of chest. (iii) Blood inside nostrils, ears. The autopsy surgeon opined that the cause of death of the deceased was head injury as well as chest injury. 2.2 After having investigation under Section 174 of Cr.P.C., SI Sajal Sharma filed a suo-motu FIR on 10.12.1998 before the O/C Santirbazar PS alleging, inter alia, the facts, as stated above, and accordingly, Santirbazar PS Case No. 82/98 under Section 302 of IPC was registered and an investigation was taken up. O/C of the PS entrusted the charge of investigation with SI Nitya Nanda Sarkar and, subsequently, investigation was entrusted to CID. 2.3 On conclusion of investigation, I.O. filed charge sheet against 13 (thirteen) TSR personnel, i.e., the respondent Nos. 2 to 14 of the present revisional application and considering the police report, cognizance was taken by learned SDJM, Belonia, South Tripura, on 26.06.2000 for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and the case was committed to the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge for trial. 2.4 As I find on record, learned Addl. Sessions Judge framed charge against the accused persons (respondent Nos. Sessions Judge for trial. 2.4 As I find on record, learned Addl. Sessions Judge framed charge against the accused persons (respondent Nos. 2 to 14) on 08.02.2008 and 27.03.2008 for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.5 While the trial was on progress, on 25.04.2008, a petition was filed before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. seeking further investigation of the case on the ground that police did not properly investigate the case since during investigation, no Test Identification Parade (TIP) was arranged for identification of the TSR constables, who were involved in the incident and some material witnesses were also not examined and that the accused persons were not arrested during the course of investigation. 2.6 By impugned order, dated 25.4.2008, learned Addl. Sessions Judge rejected the prayer of further investigation observing as follows: In the instant case, the investigation opened in the year 1998. chargesheet submitted on 14.6.2000. The case was investigated by C.I.D. Now the wife of the victim prayed for further reinvestigation by C.I.D. and endorsing the same to D.S.P. Such matter of further re-investigation only can be done by the investigating agency if considered necessary. I.O. of the case not yet examined and any foul play by I.O. in the investigation, not yet detected. How the complainant came to such conclusion, not yet explained at all. There is no provision in the Cr.P.C. to stay the proceeding and order the further investigation as prayed for. In the light of the decision of our Apex Court and other Courts and for aforesaid reason, I consider that the petition has no merit and, therefore, stands rejected. The present two witnesses are examined and discharged. To date fixed (26.4.08) for P.Ws. Challenging the above order the present revisional application is filed. 3. Learned counsel, Mr. Das, appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the deceased Krishna Keshab Datta was taking tea in the market on 05.12.1998 at about 4.30 pm, sitting in a tea-stall, wherefrom he was picked up by the TSR constables and was beaten up with butt of guns and kicks in the market itself in presence of many people and, thereafter, he was dragged inside the TSR camp and was beaten up there. He fell unconscious in the TSR camp and in such unconscious condition he was handed over to SI Sajal Sharma, the In-charge of Manpathar Out Post, who casually dealt with the case and arrested Krishna Keshab Datta but did not take any action against the TSR constables. SI Sajal Sharma took Krishna Keshab to Santirbazar Hospital in unconscious condition and there is nothing on record that Krishna Keshab regained consciousness thereafter. In his unconscious state, Krishna Keshab was released on bail to his younger brother on 06.12.1998 and the petitioner with the help of other relatives took Krishna Keshab to T.S. District Hospital wherefrom, while on way to GB. hospital Krishna Keshab died. After postmortem it was found that Krishna Keshab was having with head and chest injury because of which he died. On 08.12.1998, petitioner lodged an FIR in writing with the O/C of the P.S. alleging that her husband has been murdered by TSR personnel but no cognizance was taken by the police on that FIR and no case was registered. 3.1 Learned counsel, Mr. Das has further argued that S.I. Sajal Sharma lodged the FIR on 10.12.1998 after investigation of U.D. case. But in the FIR he did not mention the name of TSR personnel, who handed over Krishna Keshab to him in injured condition on 05.12.1998, which shows that from the very beginning police acted in a hush-hush manner to save the culprits, i.e., the TSR personnel, who deliberately committed the murder During the course of investigation, no Test Identification Parade (TIP) was arranged to facilitate identification of the involved TSR constables by the eyewitnesses, who found the incident in the market. The Asstt. Commandant of TSR, who was In-charge of the TSR constables of Manpathar TSR camp, was also not examined. Though the investigation was taken up by the CID, but subsequently, no serious step was taken to collect the relevant materials for identification of the involved constables in the murder of Krishna Keshab Datta, It is also argued by learned counsel, Mr. Das that it is a clear case of atrocity by security forces, namely, the TSR, but unfortunately, investigation was done as a matter of eye wash without taking any effective step to book the offenders and mechanically a charge sheet was submitted against the TSR constables, who were posted in the camp at the relevant time. Das that it is a clear case of atrocity by security forces, namely, the TSR, but unfortunately, investigation was done as a matter of eye wash without taking any effective step to book the offenders and mechanically a charge sheet was submitted against the TSR constables, who were posted in the camp at the relevant time. Learned counsel, therefore, has submitted that it is a fit case where for fair ends of justice further investigation of the offence is necessary, but learned Addl. Sessions Judge failed to construe the necessity of such further investigation and casually rejected the prayer. He, therefore, prayed for allowing the petition for further investigation. Learned counsel, Mr. Das, has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Rana Sinha @ Sujit Sinha Vs. State of Tripura & Ors. reported in (2011) 5 GLR 388. 4. Learned P.P., Mr. Sarkar, appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1, has submitted that the deceased was found creating nuisance in the market under influence of liquor and that fact has been proved in the statement of doctor of Santirbazar Hospital, who examined him on 05.12.1998. He was picked up from the market by the TSR constables of Manpathar TSR camp and, thereafter, he was handed over to the Manpathar Out Post, wherefrom he was taken to the hospital and he died on 06.12.1998. Postmortem examination report shows that he had head injury and chest injury as a result of which he died and, therefore, an FIR was lodged by SI Sajal Sharma, who conducted investigation under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. Investigation was done by the CID and charge sheet was filed against all the TSR constables posted at Manpathar TSR camp at the relevant time according to the record, which has been seized during investigation. All the eyewitnesses, who alleged to have found the TSR constables assaulting the deceased, have been examined and their statements were recorded by the police. All records including the GD. Book of the TSR camp and the police outpost were seized and brought on record on the basis of which 13 (thirteen) accused persons were booked for trial. There was no foul play on the part of the police in the matter of investigation since the deceased was also a constable of police working in the police department itself. Book of the TSR camp and the police outpost were seized and brought on record on the basis of which 13 (thirteen) accused persons were booked for trial. There was no foul play on the part of the police in the matter of investigation since the deceased was also a constable of police working in the police department itself. There is nothing for further investigation of the case on the ground as alleged by the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel, Miss R. Guha appearing for respondent Nos. 2 to 14 (accused persons), has submitted that the incident occurred in the year 1998. Investigation of the case was conducted by the CID of police and charge sheet was filed in the year 2000. Cognizance was taken by learned SDJM, Belonia and, thereafter, the case was committed for trial. No objection was raised by the petitioner even on the date of her examination as a witness. Referring to the records learned counsel, Miss Guha has submitted that the petitioner was examined as PW4 on 27.03.2008, and on that day she raised no question about the veracity of the investigation. All the eyewitnesses have also been examined as witness by the Court. Under such circumstances, at this stage, nothing remains to direct for further investigation. While the trial of the case is in progress, direction for further investigation at the whims of the petitioner will not only stall the smooth trial of the case but also frustrate the purpose of fair trial. 5.1 She also argued that learned Addl. Sessions Judge rightly passed the order since the Sessions Court has no power to direct further investigation and this Court also in exercise of power under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C. cannot set aside the order passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge and direct further investigation of the case. 5.2 Learned counsel, Miss Guha relied on the following case laws: (i) Union of India Vs. Tulsiram Patel: (1985) 3 SCC 398 (ii) Virender Prasad Singh Vs. Rajesh Bhardwaj & Ors.: (2010) 9 SCC 171 (iii) K. Chandrasekhar Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1998 SC 2001 (iv) Ramachandran Vs. R. Udayakumar & Ors.: AIR 2008 SC 3102 . 6. Learned amicus curiae, Mr. Tulsiram Patel: (1985) 3 SCC 398 (ii) Virender Prasad Singh Vs. Rajesh Bhardwaj & Ors.: (2010) 9 SCC 171 (iii) K. Chandrasekhar Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1998 SC 2001 (iv) Ramachandran Vs. R. Udayakumar & Ors.: AIR 2008 SC 3102 . 6. Learned amicus curiae, Mr. Bhattacharjee has contended that the materials, which have been collected by the police during investigation, prima facie, indicate that Krishna Keshab Datta died a homicidal death because of custodial torture by the TSR constables, who picked him up from the market and taken him to the TSR camp. He has further submitted that all the eyewitnesses of the occurrence, who found the incident of assault on Krishna Keshab in the market, have been examined by the police and listed as witnesses and they have also been examined during trial but they could not identify the particular accused in the dock. At this stage of trial a direction for further investigation to hold TIP will serve no purpose and this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C. cannot direct further investigation. However, according to learned counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee, such a direction may be given by the Court in exercise of the inherent power under Section 482 and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution as has been clearly held by this Court in the case of Rana Sinha (supra). 6.1 Learned amicus curiae, Mr. Bhattacharjee has further contended that in cases of custodial torture police personnel normally does not come forward to say against their colleague and under such circumstances the Court has to take into consideration the surrounding circumstances and the materials on records and arrive at a right decision in the particular facts and circumstances of the case. 6.2 Mr. Bhattacharjee has also contended that non-examination of the Asstt. Commandant of TSR, who was the I/C of Manpathar TSR camp, is of no consequence since he was not an eyewitness of the occurrence but only a witness of records so as to ascertain who were the TSR personnel, posted in the camp at the relevant point of time and that fact has already been brought on record and, therefore, such non-examination of the Asstt Commandant of TSR cannot be a ground for pushing the case for further investigation. He has, however, contended that it was the duty of the investigating agency at the very inception to arrange TIP of the TSR constables working in the Manpathar TSR camp, by the eyewitnesses of the occurrence. But since that has not been done at the stage of investigation such holding of TIP at the time of trial after examination of all the witnesses will serve no practical purpose. 6.3 Learned amicus curiae has finally contended that from the very beginning investigation was started with a halfhearted approach. FIR lodged by the petitioner on 08.12.1998 could have been registered by police since postmortem report was available in the hand of police by that time. Further, when FIR was lodged by SI Sajal Sharma, after investigation of U.D. case, he would mention the name of TSR personnel, who handed over the deceased to him in the Manpathar Out Post During investigation, T.I. Parade could have been easily arranged for identification of involved TSR personnel by the eyewitnesses, but that was not done. Those material defects of the investigation cannot be corrected now by further investigation. The case has to be decided on the basis of the materials already on record which is clearly indicative of custodial torture. In support of his argument, learned amicus curiae, Mr. Bhattacharjee, has referred the following case laws: (i) Munshi Singh Gautam & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (2005) 9 SCC 631 (para 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). (ii) Haricharan & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.: (2011) 4 SCC 159 (para 27, 28, 39). (iii) CBI Vs. Kishore Singh & Ors.: (2011) 6 SCC 369 (para 14, 24). (iv) Mehboob Batcha & Ors. Vs. State: (2011) 7 SCC 45 (para 15, 16 and 17). (v) Prithipal Singh Vs. State of Punjab: (2012) 1 SCC 10 (page 25, 28, 29, 74, 75). 7. Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. prescribes the provision of further investigation. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rana Sinha (supra) has considered elaborately the purpose and scope of further investigation as well as reinvestigation. At the very inception of the judgment of Rana Sinha (supra) My Lord, Hon'ble Justice I.A. Ansari in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the judgment observed-- 1. Article 21 guarantees fair trial. A fair trial is impossible if there is no fair investigation. At the very inception of the judgment of Rana Sinha (supra) My Lord, Hon'ble Justice I.A. Ansari in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the judgment observed-- 1. Article 21 guarantees fair trial. A fair trial is impossible if there is no fair investigation. In order to be a fair investigation, the investigation must be conducted thoroughly, without bias or prejudice, without any ulterior motive and every fact, surfacing during the course of investigation, which may have a bearing on the outcome of the investigation and, eventually, on the trial, must be recorded contemporaneously by the Investigating Officer at the time of investigation. A manipulated investigation or an investigation, which is motivated, cannot lead to a fair trial. Necessary, therefore, it is that the courts are vigilant, for, it is as much the duty of the court commencing from the level of the Judicial Magistrate to ensure that an investigation conducted is proper and fair as it is the duty of the Investigating Officer to ensure that an investigation conducted is proper and fair. A fair investigation would include a complete investigation. A complete investigation would mean an investigation, which looks into all aspects of an accusation, be it in favour of the accused or against him. 2. Article 21, undoubtedly, vests in every accused the right to demand a fair trial. This right, which is fundamental in nature, casts a corresponding duty, on the part of the State, to ensure a fair trial. If the State is to ensure a fair trial, it must ensure a fair investigation. Logically extended, this would mean that every victim of offence has the right to demand a fair trial meaning thereby that he or she has the right to demand that the State discharges its Constitutional obligation to conduct a fair investigation so that the investigation culminates into fair trial. The State has, therefore, the duty to ensure that every investigation, conducted by its chosen agency, is not motivated, reckless and that the Investigating Officer acts in due obedience to law. It is only when the State ensures that the investigation is fair, can it (the State) be able to say, when questioned, that the trial conducted was a fair trial. It is only when the State ensures that the investigation is fair, can it (the State) be able to say, when questioned, that the trial conducted was a fair trial. Article 21, therefore, does not vest in only an accused the right to demand fair trial, but it also vests an equally important right, fundamental in nature, in the victim, to demand a fair trial. Article 21 does not, thus, confer fundamental right on the accused alone, but it also confers, on the victim of an offence, the right, fundamental in nature, to demand fair trial. 7.1 In that reported case the parents of the appellant were killed in the presence of grandmother of the appellant and some other eyewitnesses. FIR was lodged by the uncle of the appellant and investigation was taken up but, even the eyewitnesses, who witnessed the occurrence, were not examined by the police and, subsequently, they appeared before the Superintendent of Police of the district and their statements were recorded in presence of the Superintendent of Police but they were not cited as witnesses. Charge sheet was filed in a casual manner against one accused though in the statements of the eyewitnesses other names also transpired. In the given facts and circumstances of that case, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court allowed the prayer of further investigation of the case. 7.2 The concept of 'further investigation' as well as 'reinvestigation' has been elaborately discussed in the case of Rana Sinha (supra) and the context of the observation in the case of Rana Sinha (supra) thus-- Summary on the concept of further investigation 159. 7.2 The concept of 'further investigation' as well as 'reinvestigation' has been elaborately discussed in the case of Rana Sinha (supra) and the context of the observation in the case of Rana Sinha (supra) thus-- Summary on the concept of further investigation 159. The position of law may, in the light of the discussions held above, be summarized thus: Under the Code 'investigation' consists, generally, of the following steps: (1) Proceeding to the spot, (2) Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case, (3) Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, (4) Collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence, which may consist of (a) the examination of various persons (including the accused) and the reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit, (b) the search of places or seizure of things considered necessary for the 'investigation' and to be produced at the trial, and (5) information of the opinion as to whether, on the material collected, there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so, taking the necessary steps for the same by the- filing of charge sheet under Section 173 (See H. N. Rishbad (supra)]. 160. 'Further investigation' is nothing, but continuation of an earlier investigation. In 'further investigation', thus, the investigation, which might have been conducted in the past, would be resumed and conducted further. 161. As against 'further investigation', a 'reinvestigation' is an investigation, which is a new and fresh investigation wiping out the earlier investigation and 're-investigation' is conducted by an agency, which is not only different from the earlier investigating agency, but also must be one, which falls under the control, supervision or jurisdiction of an authority not only different from, but also independent of, the authority, which had the control, supervision or jurisdiction over the earlier investigating agency. In this sense, an investigation conducted by an investigating agency, such as, Criminal Investigation Department of a State, is not different from the ordinary police machinery of the State concerned, because both of them are under the jurisdiction of the same State; whereas Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I) is an authority, which is different from the normal police investigation of the State or its Criminal Investigation Department. As has been pointed out in clear terms, in A.S. Peter (supra), what Section 173(8) permits is a 'further investigation' and not a 're-investigation'. As has been pointed out in clear terms, in A.S. Peter (supra), what Section 173(8) permits is a 'further investigation' and not a 're-investigation'. What is, however, extremely important to bear in mind is that a reinvestigation being prohibited by law, it would not, ordinarily, be ordered by a superior court. It, thus, becomes clear that a 'reinvestigation' would be ordered in the situations, which are extra-ordinary, rare and cannot be met by a 'further investigation'. [See Kishan Lal (supra)]. 162. Section 173(8) can give rise to, broadly speaking, four distinct situations, where the question of 'further investigation' may arise. The police report, which does not suggest prosecution of an accused and which is, ordinarily, called 'final report', may not be accepted by the court on its own examination or, if, upon notice received, the informant, or de facto complainant, or the aggrieved person, or the victim, raises objection, or points out some omission, deliberate or otherwise, defect or deficiency in the investigation. In a case, therefore, either of his own, on noticing a defect or deficiency in an investigation, or when such a defect or deficiency is brought to the notice of the Magistrate by the informant, de facto complainant, aggrieved person or victim, the Magistrate can direct further investigation if he has not already taken cognizance and if the defect, deficiency or omission warrants 'further investigation'. One must, of course, bear in mind, that in both the cases aforementioned, a direction for 'further investigation' is given without really taking cognizance of any offence. 7.3 The scope of power of this Court to direct to such further investigation has also been elaborately discussed in Rana Sinha (supra) in paragraphs 203, 207, 216, 217, 218, 221, 227 and 228 thus-- Scope of High Court's power to direct 'further investigation' under Articles 226, 227 and Section 482 of the Code. 203. What is, now, extremely important to note is that Article 227 vests in the High Court the power of supervisory jurisdiction so as to keep the courts and tribunals within the bounds of law. When a court's order is correct and in accordance with law, the question of reversing such an order in exercise of power under Article 227 does not arise. Same is the situation at hand. When a court's order is correct and in accordance with law, the question of reversing such an order in exercise of power under Article 227 does not arise. Same is the situation at hand. Since the learned trial Court, in the present case, could not have directed 'further investigation' (as already held above) on the request of the de facto complainant or the victim, such as, the present Appellant, the impugned order, declining to direct further investigation, cannot be said to amount to refusal to exercise jurisdiction. If the case at hand warranted 'further investigation', then, the remedy of the informant, de facto complainant or the victim, such as, the present Appellant, lied in approaching the High Court either by making an application under Section 482 of the Code or by making an application under Article 226 inasmuch as the High Court has, in appropriate cases, the power to direct "further investigation' in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code as well as in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the facts of a given case so warrant. 207. While considering the above aspect of this appeal, one has to also bear in mind that the prayer made by a party, in any criminal or civil trial, shall not be the sole determining factor as to whether a person is or is not entitled to the relief, which he has sought for. If the law, on the basis of the facts brought on record, requires a relief to be given to a party, such a relief ought not to be disallowed merely because the party has not specifically sought for such a relief unless, of course, the party concerned himself refuses to receive such a relief. 216. Inasmuch as the learned trial Court did not have, as we have already mentioned above, the power to direct further investigation on the basis of the present Appellant's application, the learned trial Court's order was within the bounds of law. When the learned trial Court's order declining to direct further investigation was correct in law, the question of the High Court interfering with the said order, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, did not arise. When the learned trial Court's order declining to direct further investigation was correct in law, the question of the High Court interfering with the said order, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, did not arise. Did this dis-empower or disable the High Court from either exercising its inherent power, which has been saved by Section 482, or from invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 if passing such a direction for further investigation or re investigation could have prevented miscarriage of justice and ensured a fair trial. While considering this aspect, we must remind ourselves that a fair trial cannot be founded on an unfair, manipulated, biased and motivated investigation. 217. Strictly speaking, therefore, while the learned Single Judge could not have exercised the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, in the present case, as against that part of the learned trial Court's order, whereby the learned trial Court had declined to direct further investigation at the instance of the Appellant, there was no impediment in directing a further investigation or re-investigation by taking resort to Section 482 or Article 226 if the facts and circumstances, placed before the High Court, had so warranted. Whether a direction for further investigation would have met the ends of law or there ought to have been a direction for re-investigation is a question, which has to be, now, answered. 218. While considering the above aspect of the present case, it needs to be borne in mind that it is the Public Prosecutor, as we have already discussed above, who is the appropriate authority to seek direction/permission for 'further investigation'. In the present case, therefore, what the learned Additional Public Prosecutor had noticed, if true, required or called for 'further investigation'. While considering the above aspect of the present case, it needs to be borne in mind that it is the Public Prosecutor, as we have already discussed above, who is the appropriate authority to seek direction/permission for 'further investigation'. In the present case, therefore, what the learned Additional Public Prosecutor had noticed, if true, required or called for 'further investigation'. Since the State had not come in revision or by way of any application, under Article 227 of the Constitution, to the High Court and the present Appellant also had not challenged that part of the impugned order, whereby the learned trial Court had declined to accept the request of the Additional Public Prosecutor to direct the police to conduct 'further investigation', it was open to the High Court to exercise, suo motu, its revisional jurisdiction under the Code or its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 as against that part of the order, whereby the learned trial Court had declined to direct 'further investigation' on the learned additional Public Prosecutor's application by holding that the power to conduct further investigation belongs to the police, whereas the application, seeking direction for further investigation had been made by the Additional Public Prosecutor and not the police. 221. While considering the above aspect of the case, one has to bear in mind that a fair investigation is concomitant of a fair trial. Without fair investigation, there can be no fair trial. It is, therefore, necessary for this Court to determine if the application, which the writ Appellant had made in the learned Trial Court, deserved a direction for 'further investigation' or re-investigation and, similarly, this Court is also required to determine whether the application, which the Additional Public Prosecutor, had made was an application, which ought to have been allowed by the Court. Ordinarily, when a power can be exercised under Article 227, the court would not take resort to Article 226, because Article 226 would, generally, be invoked, when there is no other alternative efficacious remedy. On this principle, where a remedy can be provided under Article 227, the question of taking resort to Article 226 does not legitimately arise. 227. Ordinarily, when a power can be exercised under Article 227, the court would not take resort to Article 226, because Article 226 would, generally, be invoked, when there is no other alternative efficacious remedy. On this principle, where a remedy can be provided under Article 227, the question of taking resort to Article 226 does not legitimately arise. 227. Though there is no formal challenge by the State to the order passed by the learned trial Court refusing to grant, in terms of the prayer made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, permission or direction to the police to conduct 'further investigation', the fact remains that this aspect of the matter having been brought to the notice of this Court by the present Appellant, in the writ application, which had been made under Article 226 as well as Article 227, the learned Single Judge could have, and, in our opinion, ought to have, taken the matter suo motu and directed, in exercise of the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, the police to conduct 'further investigation' expeditiously. This, however, was not done by the learned Single Judge. This Court, in this Letter Patent Appeal, may issue such a direction, though this appeal has been preferred by the son of the deceased couple and not by the State. 228. Coupled with the above, since the present Appellant's application was made under Article 226 and also 227, and, as we have already indicated above, Article 227 was not attracted, as against that part of the order, whereby the learned trial Court had declined to direct further investigation at the instance of the present Appellant, there was no impediment, on the part of the learned Single Judge, to exercise the High Court's extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India even on the writ application made by the present Appellant. What we would like to clarify is that the learned trial Court having no power to direct further investigation, at the instance of the present Appellant, could not have directed the police to direct further investigation on the prayer made by the present Appellant. This did not, however, in any manner disable or disempower the High Court from invoking its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and direct further investigation inasmuch as the materials surfacing on record did call for exercise of such jurisdiction. 8. This did not, however, in any manner disable or disempower the High Court from invoking its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and direct further investigation inasmuch as the materials surfacing on record did call for exercise of such jurisdiction. 8. In the present case, the petitioner being the wife of the deceased, in course of trial of the case, filed an application before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. seeking further investigation of the case on grounds set forth in the petition. In view of the law discussed by the Division Bench of this Court in Rana Sinha (supra), the trial Court rightly rejected the prayer since it has no jurisdiction to direct further investigation at the stage of trial. The petitioner challenged that order by filing the present revisional application under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C. A revisional court has a very limited jurisdiction to interfere in an order passed by an inferior court. So far the law has been discussed in Rana Sinha (supra), even in exercise of power under Article 227, the High Court cannot, in the given circumstances, direct further investigation in a case. This revisional application, filed simply under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C., is meant for looking into correctness, legality and propriety of the order impugned, passed by the trial Court and the order, while does not suffer from any of the infirmity as contemplated in Section 197 of Cr.P.C., this Court is not required to interfere in the order in exercise of its power under Section 401 of Cr.P.C. The ratio of the decision of Rana Sinha (supra), therefore, cannot be applied in the present revisional case. 9. The case is, however, examined on merit. Krishna Keshab Datta, husband of the petitioner, was handed over to SI Sajal Sharma, the In-charge of Manpathar Police Out Post on 05.12.1998 at 1630 hrs. and from the said outpost itself he was taken to Santirbazar Hospital and the Medical Officer of Santirbazar Hospital examined him. The Emergency Register of the hospital has been seized, which has been proved in the case as Exbt.MO.2 and the bed-head ticket of the deceased maintained in the hospital has also been proved as Exbt.P.3 series during trial. Postmortem report conducted at T.S. District Hospital, Udaipur has also been proved and the doctor has been examined during trial. 10. The Emergency Register of the hospital has been seized, which has been proved in the case as Exbt.MO.2 and the bed-head ticket of the deceased maintained in the hospital has also been proved as Exbt.P.3 series during trial. Postmortem report conducted at T.S. District Hospital, Udaipur has also been proved and the doctor has been examined during trial. 10. In the revisional application the petitioner stated that Najera Khatoon, Hanif Miah, Bharat Debnath, Ratan Shil and Jhutan Dhar were the eyewitnesses of the occurrence of assault and in her deposition recorded by learned Add. Sessions Judge on 28.03.2008 she stated that she came to know about the occurrence from Hanif Miah and Chandra Chasa. On going through the records, it appears that some eyewitnesses, namely Amar Sarkar, Chandra Chasa and Hanif Miah, etc., have already been examined as witnesses. SI Sajal Sharma, who was the O/C of Manpathar Police Out Post, has also been examined. While the eyewitnesses have already been examined by the Court in course of trial in presence of the accused persons in the doc, at this stage of trial of the case, I find no justification at all to direct further investigation of the case on the ground that TIP of the accused persons were not made by the eyewitnesses. There is nothing in law that unless a TIP is held, an accused cannot be identified by an eyewitness in the course of trial. The object of TIP is to enable the witness to identify the persons concerned in the offence, who were not personally known to them. This serves to satisfy the I.O. of the bona fide of the witnesses and to furnish further evidence to corroborate their testimony and the whole object behind such proceeding is to find out whether the suspect is the real offender or not. The eyewitnesses, since already been examined during trial in presence of the accused persons, the Court is to appreciate their evidence in right perspective and on that ground of non-holding of TIP of the accused persons by the eyewitnesses a direction for further investigation will serve no practical purpose. The eyewitnesses, since already been examined during trial in presence of the accused persons, the Court is to appreciate their evidence in right perspective and on that ground of non-holding of TIP of the accused persons by the eyewitnesses a direction for further investigation will serve no practical purpose. I find no justification at all to direct further investigation on this ground since at the stage of trial if any witness is found to be material the Court may summon that witness and examine him though he was not examined by the IO during the course of investigation and no statement was recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. 11. Learned counsel, Mr. Das in course of his argument pointed out that on 08.12.1998 the petitioner submitted a complaint before O/C Santirbazar PS alleging murder of her husband but on that day no specific case was registered and, thereafter, SI Sajal Sharma lodged the FIR on 10.12.1998 and investigation was taken up. It shows callousness of the police in the matter of investigation, therefore, further investigation is necessary by a superior officer of CID. It is evident on record that on 08.12.1998, a U.D. case was registered and investigation was taken up. It was the duty of the police to register the case in the event of FIR was lodged by the wife of the deceased, i.e. the present petitioner, but for not doing so at that stage, the defect, if any in the investigation, cannot be cured now by way of further investigation. The petitioner was not an eyewitness of the occurrence of actual assault or picking up of the deceased from the market by the TSR personnel. Whatever she reported it was based on the statement of other local people, who have been examined during the course of investigation by police. So, on that ground also I find no justification at all to direct a further investigation. The petitioner further contended that the accused persons were not arrested during the course of investigation. Learned amicus curiae has fairly contended that non-arrest of the accused persons during investigation cannot be perfected by directing further investigation at this stage when trial is going on. I find force in the submission made by learned amicus curiae. 12. On perusal of the L.C. records, it appears that witnesses upto Sl. No. 20 have been examined by prosecution during trial. I find force in the submission made by learned amicus curiae. 12. On perusal of the L.C. records, it appears that witnesses upto Sl. No. 20 have been examined by prosecution during trial. If any other material witnesses left out, definitely, they may be examined by the Court in exercise of the power vested on the trial Court under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. So, there remains nothing to have a further investigation of the case at this stage. 13. In the case of Rana Sinha (supra), the Division Bench of this Court very elaborately discussed the law regarding the scope and purpose of further investigation relying on the relevant Supreme Court's decisions. The case laws referred by learned amicus curiae, Mr. Bhattacharjee, mostly relates to custodial death and appreciation of evidence in such cases. While dealing with an application for further investigation, I find no justification to refer the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in those decisions referred by learned amicus curiae. 14. Since the impugned order passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge does not suffer from any illegality, impropriety or incorrectness, in view of the discussions made above, I find no merit in the revisional application to direct further investigation of the case at this stage. Accordingly, the revisional application stands rejected. Send back the LC records along with a copy of this judgment. Application dismissed.