JUDGMENT S.C. Sharma, J. 1. Mr. G.S. Patwardhan, learned counsel for the petitioner. Respondent No. 1 is present in person. Mr. C.S. Ujjainia, learned counsel for the respondent State. The petitioner before this Court an educational institution has filed this present petition being aggrieved by the order dated 30-3-2012 passed by the controlling authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1972'). The contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner is an educational institution and the respondent No. 1 is a retired teacher. It has been further stated that an application was preferred by the respondent No. 1 under section 10(1) of the Act of 1972 as the gratuity was not being paid to him and notices were issued in the matter. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before this Court that the institution is receiving grant-in-aid and as the grants towards gratuity was not paid by the State Government, they have not paid the gratuity to the respondent No. 1 and therefore an application was also preferred before the controlling authority for impleadment of the State of Madhya Pradesh as one of the respondents, however no orders were passed on the application preferred by the present petitioner and on the contrary, an ex parte order has been passed directing payment of gratuity to respondent No. 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 26-6-2012. 3. On the other, the respondent No. 1, who is present in person has argued before this Court that the gratuity is being paid to other employees of the same educational institution and for no rhyme and reason, the gratuity was not paid to him, hence he was forced to file an application under section 10(1) of the Act of 1972 before the controlling authority. It has also been stated that a notice was served to the present petitioner and the present petitioner opted not to appear before the controlling authority and later on the application claiming gratuity was not opposed by the employer and therefore after recording the evidence and after verifying the service record of the respondent No. 1, the controlling authority has rightly directed the payment of gratuity in the matter. He has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. He has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as respondent No. 1, who is present in person and also the learned counsel for the respondent/State and perused the record. The matter is being disposed of with the consent of the parties at motion hearing stage itself. 5. In the present case, the entitlement of the petitioner in respect of payment of gratuity has not been disputed by the employer. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that because the petitioner-institution has not received the grant-in-aid from the State Government, the gratuity was not paid to the respondent No. 1 and it is the State Government, who has to pay the gratuity to respondent No. 1. This Court has carefully gone through the order dated 26-6-2012. The order reflects that a proper notice was issued to the petitioner-school and the petitioner has not opposed the application submitted by the respondent No. 1 for payment of gratuity. In the present case, the State Government is certainly not the employer of the respondent No. 1, on the contrary, the present petitioner is the employer of the respondent No. 1. The word "employer" has been defined under section 2(f) of the Act of 1972, which reads as under:-- (f) "employer" means, in relation to any establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company or shop-- (i) belonging to, or under the control of, the Central Government or a State Government, a person or authority appointed by the appropriate Government for the supervision and control of employees, or where no person or authority has been so appointed, the head of the Ministry or the Department concerned, (ii) belonging to, or under the control of, any local authority, the person appointed by such authority for the supervision and control of employees or where no person has been so appointed, the chief executive office of the local authority, (iii) in any other case, the person, who, or the authority which, has the ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company or shop, and where the said affairs are entrusted to any other person, whether called a manager, managing director or by any other name, such person. 6. 6. Keeping in view the aforesaid definition of employer, it is the petitioner, who is the employer of respondent No. 1. Once, the petitioner is the employer of the respondent No. 1, the petitioner is liable to pay the gratuity to the respondent No. 1 not the State Government. The petitioner could certainly have taken the appropriate steps for claiming amount from the State Government, as the institution is receiving grant-in-aid from the State Government. 7. This Court has carefully gone through the impugned order and does not find any illegality committed by the controlling authority in passing the impugned order. Not only this, the petitioner has straightway approached this Court by filing this present writ petition in spite of the fact that under sub-section (7) of section 7 of the Act of 1972 an appeal is provided. Sub-section (7) of section 7 of the Act of 1972 read as under:-- (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the Appellate Authority such amount. 8. The aforesaid statutory provisions of law makes it very clear that an appeal has to be preferred within a period of 60 days against the order of the controlling authority and the period of limitation can be condoned further by a period of 60 days. Not only this, a certificate of the controlling authority has to be filed that the appellant has deposited the equal amount of the gratuity. 9. Not only this, a certificate of the controlling authority has to be filed that the appellant has deposited the equal amount of the gratuity. 9. This Court in W.P. No. 4106/09 decided on 12-2-2013 has held as under:-- The petitioner before this Court has filed this present petition being aggrieved by the order dated 12-4-2007 passed by the controlling authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (in short the "Act of 1972") in Gratuity Case No. 38/2006 and is also challenging the order dated 24-2-2009 passed by the Appellate Authority under the Act of 1972 in Gratuity Appeal Case No. 80/2008. The contention of the petitioner is that the respondent No. 3 was appointed as daily wager on 10-4-1972 and he was retrenched on 21-11-1976. It is further stated that the order of retrenchment was challenged before the appropriate forum and an ex parte order was passed reinstating the workman with backwages w.e.f. 13-7-1987. It is farther stated that the matter relating to his retrenchment and his reinstatement is still subjudice. The contention of the petitioner is that an application was preferred by the workman before the controlling authority under the Act of 1972 and the controlling authority has passed an order dated 12-4-2007 directing the payment of gratuity. The petitioner's contention is that an appeal was preferred and the Appellate Authority has dismissed the appeal for non-compliance of the statutory provisions as contained under sub-section (7) of section 7 of the Act of 1972. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued before this Court that the Company was prevented from filing of an appeal in time on account of illness of Managing Director and the appeal could not have been dismissed in the manner and method it has been done by the Appellate Authority as the company was able to demonstrate the sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. He has prayed for quashing of the order dated 24-2-2009. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the workman has argued before this Court that the appeal was preferred after expiry of 458 days and the statutory provisions do not provide for such condonation of delay in the matter of limitation. He has prayed for quashing of the order dated 24-2-2009. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the workman has argued before this Court that the appeal was preferred after expiry of 458 days and the statutory provisions do not provide for such condonation of delay in the matter of limitation. Learned counsel Shri Sumit Samvatsar has drawn the attention of this Court towards sub-section (7) of section 7 of the Act of 1972 and his contention is that this Court does not have the power to condone the delay in respect of limitation period in light of the statutory provisions governing the field. He has also placed reliance upon a judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Western Coalfield Ltd. vs. Controlling Authority and others, reported in 2000 (2) LLJ 965 , wherein it has been observed that the Appellate Authority has no authority to condone the delay beyond 120 days. He has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. The matter is being disposed of with the consent of the parties at motion hearing stage itself. In the present case, it is an undisputed fact that an application was preferred by the workman before the controlling authority under the Act of 1972. The application was decided by the controlling authority on 12-4-2007 after hearing the present petitioner-company and an exhaustive order has been passed directing payment of Rs. 1,29,461/- to the workman. It is not a case where an ex parte order was passed by the controlling authority under the Act of 1972, meaning thereby the company was well aware of the order passed by the controlling authority. The appeal was not preferred in time. It was preferred after expiry of 458 days. 1,29,461/- to the workman. It is not a case where an ex parte order was passed by the controlling authority under the Act of 1972, meaning thereby the company was well aware of the order passed by the controlling authority. The appeal was not preferred in time. It was preferred after expiry of 458 days. Sub-section (7) of section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 reads as under:-- 7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. [Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the Appellate Authority such amount.] The aforesaid statutory provision of law makes it very clear that the Appellate Authority has got no authority to condone the delay beyond 120 days. This Court in the case of Western Coalfield Ltd. (supra) in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 has held as under:-- 3. It is the admitted position that the impugned order was passed on January 25, 1995 in case No. CHA-48(46)/94. It is also admitted by Mr. Menon that the appeal was presented after 120 days. 4. The moot question that arises for consideration is whether the Appellate Authority has the jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond 120 days. It is the admitted position that the impugned order was passed on January 25, 1995 in case No. CHA-48(46)/94. It is also admitted by Mr. Menon that the appeal was presented after 120 days. 4. The moot question that arises for consideration is whether the Appellate Authority has the jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond 120 days. In this context it is apposite to refer to section 7(7) which reads as under:-- Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days: Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the Controlling Authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4) or deposits with the Appellate Authority such amount. 5. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it becomes luminously clear that the Appellate Authority has jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the period of sixty days if sufficient cause is shown, by extending the said period by a further period of sixty days. It is to be borne in mind that the Payment of Gratuity Act is a special statute and there is provision for condonation of delay. Once the limitation period has been provided and there is further provision conferring the power on authority to condone the delay of 60 days beyond the specified period if sufficient cause is shown, the authority cannot travel beyond it. It is well settled in law that in absence of conferment of jurisdiction to condone delay the statutory authority which is a quasi juridical authority cannot condone delay or extend the period of limitation. It is well settled in law that in absence of conferment of jurisdiction to condone delay the statutory authority which is a quasi juridical authority cannot condone delay or extend the period of limitation. In this regard, I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and another vs. Shah Manilal Chandulal, 1996 (2) JT 278 wherein the Apex Court while considering whether the Land Acquisition Officer under the Land Acquisition Act is Court or not and can condone the delay under section 18 of the said Act, has held as under:-- 17. It is to remember that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984) was enacted prescribing the limitation to exercise the power under sections 4, 6and 11 and also excluded the time occupied due to stay granted by the Courts. Taking cognizance of the limitation prescribed in proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 the provisions of the Limitation Act were not expressly extended. Though section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is available, and the limitation in proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 may be treated to be special law, in the absence of such an application by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984), the Act specifically maintains distinction between the Collector and the Court and the Collector/LAO performs only statutory duties under the Act, including one while making reference under section 18. It is difficult to construe that the Collector/LAO while making reference under section 18, as statutory authority still acts as a Court for the purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act. 18. Though hard it may be, in view of the specific limitation provided under proviso to section 18(2) of the Act, we are of the considered view that sub-section (2) of section 29 cannot be applied to the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18. The Collector/LAO, therefore, is not a Court when he acts as a statutory authority under section 18(1). Therefore, section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18... In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law and keeping in view the provisions contained in the Act I am of the considered view that the Appellate Authority has rightly rejected the appeal on the ground of limitation. 6. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law and keeping in view the provisions contained in the Act I am of the considered view that the Appellate Authority has rightly rejected the appeal on the ground of limitation. 6. In the result the writ petition sans merit and, accordingly, stands dismissed without any order as to costs. This Court has carefully gone through the statutory provisions as contained under sub-section (7) of section 7 of the Act of 1972 and keeping in the judgment delivered by this Court in an identical case, is of the considered opinion that the order dated 24-2-2009 has rightly been passed by the Appellate Authority. It is pertinent to note that the employer has also not deposited the gratuity amount as required under sub-section (7) of section 7 of the Act of 1972 while preferring an appeal before the Appellate Authority and therefore, no case for interference in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is made out in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 10. Keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and the order passed in W.P. No. 4106 of 2009 dated 12-2-2013 (supra) this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order dated 30-3-2012 passed by the controlling authority. However, the petitioner shall be at a liberty to take appropriate steps for claiming the amount from the State Government in accordance with law. Resultantly, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.