Judgment Bhaskar Bhattacharya, CJ.—This Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is at the instance of an employer and is directed against an order dated 15th January, 2013 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 12955 of 2004 whereby the learned Single Judge partly allowed the writ-application wherein the subject-matter of challenge was an award dated 26th February, 2004 passed by the Industrial Tribunal [Central], Ahmedabad, vide Ref (ITC) A. 139 of 2004 below Exh. 87 in Reference [LCB] No. 58 of 1989. 2. The Industrial Tribunal, by the award impugned, directed the employer to reinstate the respondent-workman in his original post with continuity of service without back wages. 3. Being dissatisfied, the employer preferred the writ-application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and, as indicated earlier, the learned Single Judge modified the award by upholding the order of reinstatement but setting aside the order of grant of continuity of service in the facts and circumstances of the case. 4. Being dissatisfied, the employer has come up with the present appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 5. After hearing Mr. Naik appearing on behalf of the appellant and after going through the materials on record, we find that the writ-application was described as one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and at the same time, the Industrial Tribunal was made a party. Mr. Naik tried to convince us that although the application was described as one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in reality the same was an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing of the award itself by way of a writ in the nature of certiorari and the learned Single Judge, instead of quashing the entire award, partly modified the same. Mr. Naik . therefore, contended that the decision of this Court in the case of Revaben Wd/O Ambalal Motibhai vs. Vinubhai Purshottambhai Patel reported in 2013 (1) GLH 440 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 6. In the case of REVABEN [Supra], we discussed in detail the question of maintainability of an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a combined application under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. In the case of REVABEN [Supra], we discussed in detail the question of maintainability of an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a combined application under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In that context, we held that in order to maintain an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order passed in a writ-application, it must be established that the proceeding before the learned Single Judge was an original proceeding, and if the order impugned is an order passed by a Tribunal or Labour Court or a Civil Court, the same can be an original proceedings only if it was a fit case for issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari otherwise, such order can be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution in exercise of power of superintendence. We also relied upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chandra Rai reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044 , where the Supreme Court highlighted the characteristic of the writ of certiorari and distinguished the same from the power of superintendence in the following way: “24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram and others vs. Smt. Radhikabai and another, (1986) Supp SCC 401. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary Court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary Court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the Court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior Court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior Court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior Court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well.” (Emphasis supplied). 7. In the case of REVABEN [Supra], we further held, by relying upon the decision of a four-judge-bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia, vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar And Another reported in AIR 1963 SC 786 that there is no scope of issue of a writ of certiorari where the Tribunal, whose order is sought to be quashed, is not made a party. 8. In the case before us, the application is described as one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the prayer was for issue of a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned award, and at the same time, the Tribunal was also made a party. 9. However, as indicated above, it appears from the order impugned that the learned Single Judge has not exercised the jurisdiction of certiorari, but, after examining the merits of the case, was of the view that it was a fit case for modifying the award by maintaining the order of reinstatement but setting aside the order of continuity of service. 10. Therefore, it is apparent that the learned Single Judge really exercised power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by modifying the award which is not possible while issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari. 11. It is now well settled that in order to decide whether an appeal lies or not against a particular order, the appellate Court is required to consider not the caption of the application in which the order was passed but what was the nature of the order actually passed by the order impugned. We have already pointed out that certiorari can be passed only in the manner and the circumstances mentioned in SURYA DEV RAI [Supra]. We have already pointed out that certiorari can be passed only in the manner and the circumstances mentioned in SURYA DEV RAI [Supra]. Here, the Court having modified the award by passing an order which according to the learned Single Judge should have been passed by the Tribunal, it is a plain exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies against such an order and the said order can be challenged only before the Supreme Court by way of an application under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 12. Mr. Naik tried to convince us that although it was a case for exercise of jurisdiction for issue of certiorari, the learned Single Judge not having passed such an order of certiorari, his client has the right to prefer appeal contending that it is a fit case for exercise of original jurisdiction of certiorari and not a case of the power of superintendence exercised by the learned Single Judge, and, therefore, the appeal should be heard on merits. 13. We are afraid, we are not impressed by such submission for the simple reason that once the learned Single Judge has modified the award in exercise of power under Article 227 and that order not having been challenged before the Supreme Court, the same has attained finality. In such circumstances, in this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, we cannot decide whether it was a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction of certiorari inasmuch as if we do so, and consequently, pass an order of certiorari and in the process, quash the award in its entirety, as suggested by Mr. Naik, our order will be in conflict with the order passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution which has attained finality. One of the cardinal principles of exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that the writ Court should not pass any order which will have the effect of upsetting an order passed in a concurrent jurisdiction by the same Court. One of the cardinal principles of exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that the writ Court should not pass any order which will have the effect of upsetting an order passed in a concurrent jurisdiction by the same Court. In other words, once the High Court, in exercise of a revisional jurisdiction affirms an order passed by a subordinate Court or Tribunal or modifies it instead of setting it aside in its entirety, the selfsame order of the Court or Tribunal which has been modified by the High Court in exercise of power of superintendence cannot itself be the subject-matter of a Letters Patent appeal in exercise of writ jurisdiction between the same parties. Moreover, we have pointed out that the power under Article 227 is more extensive than the one under Article 226. 14. On the above ground also, we are unable to entertain this appeal and pass an order which will be in conflict with the one passed in exercise of power by the learned Single Judge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. We, thus, hold that this appeal is not maintainable. In this case, there was no scope of exercising jurisdiction of certiorari once the learned Single Judge has modified the order in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which has not been challenged. Thus, the appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not at all maintainable and on this ground alone, the appeal is dismissed. 15.1 We, however, make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case and the dismissal of the appeal will not stand in the way of the appellant in seeking appropriate remedy before the appropriate forum in accordance with law. 15.2 In view of the above order passed in the appeal, the connected Civil Application has become infructuous and stands disposed of accordingly. 15.3 There will, however, be no order as to costs in both these matters.