JUDGMENT J.P. DEVADHAR, J. This appeal is filed against the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 15th October, 2012, whereby Chamber Summons No. 1114 of 2012 taken out by the respondent No. 1 has been allowed and the attachment levied by the appellant (original plaintiff) on 14th July 2011 on the immovable property belonging to the respondent No. 2 in execution of a consent decree passed on 6th April, 2011 in Suit No. 1201 of 2011 has been raised. 2. The relevant facts are that from 2006 onwards the respondent No. 2 had availed various credit facilities from the Bank of India ('Bank' for short) for an aggregate amount of Rs. 23 crores by creating various securities in favour of the said bank including a mortgage and charge on the immovable property belonging to the respondent No. 2 viz. Land and building situated at Andheri-Kurla Road, Safed Pool, Village Mohili, Andheri (E), Mumbai - 400072 ('suit property' for short). 3. As the respondent No. 2 failed to pay the instalments, the Bank classified the account of the respondent No. 2 as non performing asset with effect from 31st December, 2010 as per the guidelines framed by the Reserve bank of India. Thereafter, the Bank issued notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization & Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 ('2002 Act' for short) on 31st January 2011 requiring the respondent No. 2 to discharge the liabilities in full within sixty days, failing which the mortgaged property (suit property) belonging to the respondent No. 2 would be sold in auction. As the respondent No. 2 failed to repay the amounts due, the bank took symbolic possession of the suit property on 20th April, 2011 under Section 13(4) of the 2002 Act. 4. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1, by a Deed of Assignment dated 12th March, 2012 obtained assignment of all the loans disbursed by the Bank of India to the respondent No. 2. As a result, the respondent No. 1 became a secured creditor, entitled to recover the outstandings to the tune of more than Rs. 4. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1, by a Deed of Assignment dated 12th March, 2012 obtained assignment of all the loans disbursed by the Bank of India to the respondent No. 2. As a result, the respondent No. 1 became a secured creditor, entitled to recover the outstandings to the tune of more than Rs. 20 crores by selling the suit property belonging to the respondent No. 2 under the 2002 Act, which stood attached on issuance of notice dated 31st January, 2011 under Section 13(2) of the 2002 Act and symbolic possession of which was taken by the bank on 20th April, 2011 under Section 13(4) of the 2002 Act. 5. In the meantime, the respondent No. 2 by a sale agreement dated 10th January 2008 had agreed to sell certain premises to the appellant in the building constructed by the respondent No. 2 on the suit property for valuable consideration. As the respondent No. 2 failed to execute sale deed in respect of the premises agreed to be sold under the agreement for sale dated 10th January, 2008, the appellant filed a suit in this Court bearing No. 1201 of 2011 seeking specific performance of the sale agreement dated 10th January, 2008 or alternatively claimed refund of Rs. 8.55 crores paid by the appellant under the sale agreement dated 10th January, 2008 with interest. 6. On 6th April, 2011 consent terms were filed in suit No. 1201 of 2011, wherein the respondent No. 2 submitted to a decree for Rs. 7.60 crores and agreed to pay the same to the appellant with interest @ 18% within the date specified therein and it was further provided in the consent terms that till the entire amount under the consent decree was paid, the appellant would continue to have right, title and interest in respect of the premises agreed to be purchased by the appellant under the agreement for sale dated 10th January, 2008. 7. Since the respondent No. 2 failed to pay the decretal amount to the appellant within the period set out in the consent decree, the appellant filed Execution Application No. 410 of 2011 in this Court seeking execution of the consent decree dated 6th April, 2011, by attaching and selling the suit property of the respondent No. 2. 7. Since the respondent No. 2 failed to pay the decretal amount to the appellant within the period set out in the consent decree, the appellant filed Execution Application No. 410 of 2011 in this Court seeking execution of the consent decree dated 6th April, 2011, by attaching and selling the suit property of the respondent No. 2. Accordingly, Warrant of Attachment was issued on 14th June, 2011 and the suit property was attached on 15th June, 2011. Thereafter, pursuant to the warrant of sale dated 15th June 2012 a public notice was issued on 20th June, 2012 calling for objections, if any, for sale of the suit property in execution of the consent decree obtained by the appellant on 6th April, 2011. 8. The respondent No. 1 who had stepped into the shoes of the bank, on noticing the attachment levied by the appellant on the suit property, filed its objections before the Commissioner for Taking Accounts, on 8th August 2012 stating therein that the respondent No. 1 is a secured creditor and since the suit property stands attached on issuance of the notice dated 31st January, 2011 under Section 13(2) of the 2002 Act and since symbolic possession of the suit property being taken by the respondent No. 1 on 20th April 2011, it was not open to the appellant to attach the very same property in execution of a money decree. It was further stated in the objections filed before the Commissioner that the respondent No. 2 had challenged the measures taken by the respondent No. 1 in respect of the suit property under the 2002 Act by filing an application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the same was withdrawn by the respondent No. 2 on 22nd May 2012 and, therefore, when the suit property was attached under the 2002 Act, the appellant could not have attached and purported to sell the suit property by initiating execution proceeding under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Since no steps were taken on the objections filed, the respondent No. 1 took out Chamber Summons No. 1114 of 2002 under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking an order for raising the warrant of attachment dated 14th June 2011 levied upon the suit property by the appellant. 9. Since no steps were taken on the objections filed, the respondent No. 1 took out Chamber Summons No. 1114 of 2002 under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking an order for raising the warrant of attachment dated 14th June 2011 levied upon the suit property by the appellant. 9. By the impugned order dated 15th October, 2012 the learned Single Judge allowed the Chamber Summons taken out by the respondent No. 1 thereby raising the warrant of attachment dated 14th June 2011 levied upon the suit property by the appellant. Challenging the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge dated 15th October, 2012 the appellant has filed the present appeal. 10. We have heard Mr. Shailesh Shah, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Chetan Kapadia, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 and Mr. Rohan Cama, learned counsel for respondent No. 2. We have also heard Mr. Arif Bookwala, learned Senior Advocate and Ms. Mamta Sadh, learned Advocate as intervenors since they are appearing as counsel for the appellant in Appeal No. 22 of 2013 and Appeal No. 23 of 2013 respectively and have common grievance in respect of certain observations made by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated 15th October, 2012. 11. The first question to be considered herein is, whether the appellant in execution of a money decree obtained in a suit filed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 could execute the said decree by attaching the right, title and interest of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property when the said property has already been attached by the respondent No. 1 under the 2002 Act. There is no dispute that as per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Transcore V/s. union of India reported in [2008] 1 SCC 125 : [2007 ALL SCR 824], once a notice is issued under Section 13(2) of the 2002 Act, the said notice constitutes attachment of the secured asset. In the present case, notice under Section 13(2) of the 2002 Act was issued On 31st January 2011 and symbolic possession was taken by the respondent No. 1 on 20th April 2011 and hence the right, title and interest in the suit property stood attached by the respondent No. 1 under the 2002 Act. In the present case, notice under Section 13(2) of the 2002 Act was issued On 31st January 2011 and symbolic possession was taken by the respondent No. 1 on 20th April 2011 and hence the right, title and interest in the suit property stood attached by the respondent No. 1 under the 2002 Act. The question, therefore, to be considered is, once the right, title and interest in the suit property is attached by the respondent No. 1 under the 2002 Act and even the symbolic possession of the suit property is taken over by the respondent No. 1 under the 2002 Act, whether the appellant in execution of a money decree obtained in a Suit, could attach the right, title and interest of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property by initiating execution proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ? 12. The argument of Mr. Shailesh Shah, learned counsel for the appellant is that although the schedule to the warrant of attachment and the warrant of sale refers to attachment of the right, title and interest of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property, what is in fact attached is the 'equity of redemption' right of the respondent No. 2 in respect of the suit property and not the mortgage right of the respondent No. 1. According to Mr. Shah, when a property is mortgaged, the equity of redemption continues to remain with the mortgagor and when a mortgagee attaches the mortgaged property, what is attached by the mortgagee is the right, title and interest of the mortgagor in the mortgaged property excluding the equity of redemption which remains with the mortgagor. It is further contended that the right of equity of redemption continues with the mortgagor till it is extinguished by the act of parties or by a decree of a Court. In the present case, on the date of attachment levied by the appellant on 15th June 2011, the equity of redemption right was not extinguished by sale of the mortgaged property or otherwise and, therefore, according to Mr. Shah, the appellant was entitled to attach the equity redemption right which had remained with the mortgagor. In support of the above contention, Mr. Shah strongly relied upon a decision of the Apex court in the case of Kabidi Venku Sah V/s. Syed Abdul Hai reported in AIR 1984 S.C. 117 . 13. Shah, the appellant was entitled to attach the equity redemption right which had remained with the mortgagor. In support of the above contention, Mr. Shah strongly relied upon a decision of the Apex court in the case of Kabidi Venku Sah V/s. Syed Abdul Hai reported in AIR 1984 S.C. 117 . 13. We see no merit in the above argument, because, neither in the execution application and consequently, nor in the warrant of attachment dated 14th June 2011 there is any reference to the appellant attaching the 'equity of redemption right of the respondent No. 2 in the mortgaged property. In fact, the warrant of attachment dated 14th June 2011 issued under Order XXI Rule 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 specifically records that the appellant has applied for execution of the decree dated 6th April 2011 by attachment of the immovable property belonging to the respondent No. 2 as more particularly set out in the schedule annexed thereto and the schedule to the said warrant of attachment refers to the attachment of the right, title and interest of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property. Therefore, the argument that the appellant has attached only the 'equity of redemption' right of the respondent No. 2 in respect of the suit property cannot be accepted. 14. Reliance placed by the counsel for the appellant on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kabidi Venku Sah (supra) is misplaced, because, as held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, it may be open to a decree-holder to attach the equity redemption right of a mortgagor (if existing) in respect of the mortgaged property, but in the present case what is attached by the appellant is the right, title and interest of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property and not the equity redemption right of the respondent No. 2 in respect of the suit property. Even the warrant of sale dated 15th June 2012 refers to sale of all the right title and interest of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property by public auction and the sale is not restricted to the sale of equity of redemption. 15. Even the warrant of sale dated 15th June 2012 refers to sale of all the right title and interest of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property by public auction and the sale is not restricted to the sale of equity of redemption. 15. Moreover, neither in the affidavit in reply to the Chamber Summons No. 1114 of 2012 affirmed by the appellant on 8th October 2012 nor before the learned Single Judge it was contended by the appellant that only the equity of redemption has been attached and that the sale is restricted to the equity of redemption right vested in the respondent No. 2 in the suit property. Even the public notice issued on 20th June 2012 refers to sale of all the right, title and interest of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property and thus the sale is not restricted only to the extent of equity of redemption. Therefore, the argument raised for the first time in this appeal to the effect that the appellant has attached only equity redemption right of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property is contrary to the facts on record and, hence, cannot be accepted. 16. To overcome the above difficulty, Mr. Shah submitted that the appellant be permitted to amend the execution application so that the warrant of attachment/warrant of sale are also consequently amended, thereby making it clear that the attachment/sale is restricted only to equity of redemption right of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property. However, counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 opposed the above course of action, on the ground that once notice under Section 13(2) of the 2002 Act is issued, all right, title and interest of the respondent No. 2 in the mortgaged property including the equity redemption right stand extinguished. In support of the above contention, reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in the case of UCO Bank V/s. Kanji Manji Kothari reported in 2008 (2) ALL M.R. 512. It is further contended on behalf of the respondent Nos. In support of the above contention, reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in the case of UCO Bank V/s. Kanji Manji Kothari reported in 2008 (2) ALL M.R. 512. It is further contended on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that once the mortgaged property is attached and possession is taken under the 2002 Act, then, any claim including attachment of equity of redemption if any, in execution of a decree of a civil Court obtained by any debtor has to be agitated by initiating proceedings under Section 17 of the 2002 Act. It is further contended on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that in view of the bar created under Section 34/35 of the 2002 Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding in respect of any matter which the Debt Recovery Tribunal is empowered to determine under the 2002 Act and that the provisions of the 2002 Act override other laws. 17. Although, the appellant intended to attach and sell the 'equity of redemption' right of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property, in fact, the warrant of attachment dated 14th June 2011, warrant of sale dated 15th June 2012 and the public notice issued on 20th June 2012 refer to attaching and selling all right, title and interest of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property. Even the learned Single Judge had no occasion to consider the jurisdictional issue relating to the attachment and sale of equity of redemption right of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property when the said property is already attached and the possession of which is taken over by the respondent No. 1 under the 2002 Act. In these circumstances, in our opinion, it would be just and proper to set aside the warrant of attachment dated 14th June 2011, warrant of sale dated 15th June 2012 as also the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 15th October 2012 and permit the appellant to amend the execution application so that, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 could file their objections to the amended execution application and thereafter appropriate order could be passed on the amended execution application. 18. 1 and 2 could file their objections to the amended execution application and thereafter appropriate order could be passed on the amended execution application. 18. Accordingly, we pass the following order : a) The warrant of attachment dated 14th June 2011, warrant of sale dated 15th June 2012 as also the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 15th October 2012 are set aside. b) The appellant may within two weeks from today amend the execution application so as to seek attachment and sale of 'equity of redemption' right of the respondent No. 2 in the suit property. c) If the appellant amends the execution application within two weeks from today, then, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 may file their objections to the amended execution application within a period of two weeks thereafter. d) If the execution application is amended and the objections are filed within the time stipulated herein above, then the learned Single Judge, may after hearing the parties pass such order as deemed fit inter alia on the question regarding the jurisdiction of this Court to attach the suit property in execution of a money decree, when the said property is already attached and is in possession of the secured creditor under the provisions of the 2002 Act. 19. During the period when this Court is considering the jurisdictional issue under the amended execution application of the appellant, if the respondent No. 1 sells the suit property under the provisions of the 2002 Act, then the surplus remaining after adjusting the claim of the respondent No. 1 shall be deposited by the respondent No. 1 in this Court. 20. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.