Kotwal, J.:- This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Massodi-J) dated 04.02.2013 whereby the writ petition in SWP No. 2521/2011 filed by the appellant has been dis­missed as without merit. 2. Heard. We have perused the record. 3. Facts of the case have been stated in detail in the writ Court judgment. However, the background facts, which need to be noticed for the purpose of this appeal, briefly, are these: 3.1. Appellant, Dr. Beldev Singh Wazir, is M.S. (Surgery) from PGI, Chandigarh. He was appointed as Lec­ture, General Surgery, in Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences, Soura, Srinagar (for short hereinafter the Institute) vide order No. 23 - IMS of 1989 dated 01.07.1989. After working on this post for four years, he vide or­der No. 14 - IMS of 1993 dated 16.08.1993 was appointed as Assistant Professor, General Surgey and later vide No. 13-IMS of 1997 dated 11.08.1997 he was appointed as Associate Professor, Gen­eral Surgery, in the same Institute. All through his carrer in the Institute, the appellant, however, had been deputed and worked in the Department of Urol­ogy due to shortage of qualified doctors in the said department. In terms of the "the Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medi­cal Sciences Faculty Members (Revised Pay) Rules, 2000" notified vide SRO No. 378 dated 18.10.2000, which came into force with effect from 01.01.1996, inter alia the post of Associate Professor was re-designated as Additional Professor. Vide order No. SKIMS 21 (P) of 2004 dated 11.03.2004 issued by the Direc­tor of the Institute, appellant was or­dered "to act as in charge Head of the Department of Urology till such Senior Faculty is appointed for Urology." 3.2. Pursuant to Advertisement No­tice No. 01 of 2004 dated 03.12.2004, the appellant vide order No. 45 - SKIMS of 2005 dated 17.10.2005 was appointed as Professor of Urology in the Institute. His appointment, however, came to be challenged before this Court by one Dr. Mohd. Saleem Wani (here respondent No. 5) in a writ petition being SWP No. 1122/2005 on the ground that appel­lant did not possess requisite qualifi­cation and experience and was not eli­gible for the post of Professor of Urol­ogy. Learned Writ Court disposed of that writ petition vide judgment and order dated 25.05.2007 directing the re­spondent - Institute to appoint duly quali­fied committee to assess the eligibil­ity of the appellant (Dr. Learned Writ Court disposed of that writ petition vide judgment and order dated 25.05.2007 directing the re­spondent - Institute to appoint duly quali­fied committee to assess the eligibil­ity of the appellant (Dr. Baldev Singh Wazir) 'to Head of Urology Department in accordance with rules and circum­stances of case and make suitable rec­ommendations within a reasonable period of time for having a fully eligible person in place'. To avoid vacuum in the Department, learned Court, how­ever, allowed the arrangement as ex­isting on that date, that is, the date of judgment, to continue till then. 3.3. In compliance to the judgment and order of the Writ Court dated 25.05.2007, the respondent/Institute constituted a committee to look into the matter. The committee made its rec­ommendations, which were approved by the Chief Minister (Chairman govern­ing body of the Institute). Respondent No. 3 (Director of the Institute), there­fore, issued Government Order No. 64 - SKIMS of 2011 dated 19.11.2011. This order provides for designating the appellant (Dr. Baldev Singh Wazir) as 'Professor of General Surgery', his post­ing in the Department of Urology and that he shall draw salary against the post of Professor, Medical Oncology (Pediatric Oncology Unit). The order fur­ther provides that 'Director, SKIMS shall function as Head of the Depart­ment of Urology till such time post of Professor Urology is filled by eligible/qualified person'. Appellant, feeling ag­grieved, challenged this order in a writ petition being SWP No. 2521/2011, which, however, has been dismissed by the learned Writ Court vide the impugned judgment and order dated 04.02.2013. 4. Before taking up the grounds on which the appellant has assailed the judgment and order dated 04.02.2013 passed by the learned Writ Court, few facts, which are admitted or indisput­able, need to be paraphrased to under­line the rook cause of the litigation leading to this appeal. Underlining the root cause in needed because same has to remain central line of discussion hereafter. 5. The appellant, Dr. Baldev Singh Wazir, is M. S. (Surgery). He admittedly does not possess M. Ch. Degree (Mas­ter of Cherology) in any discipline. To say precisely, he is not M. Ch in Urol­ogy, which undisputedly is a Surgical Super Specialty. Underlining the root cause in needed because same has to remain central line of discussion hereafter. 5. The appellant, Dr. Baldev Singh Wazir, is M. S. (Surgery). He admittedly does not possess M. Ch. Degree (Mas­ter of Cherology) in any discipline. To say precisely, he is not M. Ch in Urol­ogy, which undisputedly is a Surgical Super Specialty. All through his carrer spreading over a period of 16 years in the Institute from the date of his ap­pointment as Lecturer in 1989 up till his appointment as Professor of Urol­ogy vide order No. 45 - SKIMS of 2005 dated 17.10.2005, the appellant, though appointed as a faculty member in Gen­eral Surgery, however, remained de­puted to and rendered his services in the Department of Urology of the said Institute. Appellant's appointment as Professor of Urology vide Government Order dated 17.10.2005 (supra) was challenged by respondent - 5, Dr. Mohd. Saleem Wani, who by that time was appointed and holding the post of As­sistant Professor, Urology in the Insti­tute, in SWP No. 1122/2005 on the ground that the appellant lacks eligbility for the post of Professor of Urol­ogy as he does not possess the requi­site qualification of M. Ch (Urology).This lack of M. Ch. Degree by the appellant is the root cause of disute leading to this appeal. 6. Besides underlining the root cause of dispute, we may restate that SWP No 1122/2005 (supra), in which respon­dent-5 had challenged the appellant's appointment as Professor of Urology, was disposed of by the learned Writ Court vide judgment dated 25.05.2007 with directions/observations which read: "a. respondent/Institute shall appoint a duly qualified committee to assess the eligibility of fifth respondent to head of Urology department in accor­dance with rules and circumstances of the case and make suitable recom­mendations within a reasonable pe­riod of time for having a fully eligible person in place. To avoid vacuum in the department, the present arrange­ment may continue till then. b. Since respondent/Institute admit­tedly suffered exodus of a number of Specialists during years of turmoil due to which many positions in many de­partments/faculties happened to be manned by ineligible persons, which position reportedly still persists with­out any serious effort underway to redeem the situation dispite changed situations. To avoid vacuum in the department, the present arrange­ment may continue till then. b. Since respondent/Institute admit­tedly suffered exodus of a number of Specialists during years of turmoil due to which many positions in many de­partments/faculties happened to be manned by ineligible persons, which position reportedly still persists with­out any serious effort underway to redeem the situation dispite changed situations. The aforesaid committee or one that may separately be appointed may also be asked to act as above in case of all other persons/depart­ments to recommend suitable action for having eligible persons in all places and positions as aforesaid with due dispatch, without creating any avoidable vacuum anywhere." 7. Government Order No. 64 - SKIMS of 2011 dated 19.11.2011 came to be issued by responden - 3 on the basis of the recommendations of the commit­tee constituted pursuant to the direc­tions issued by the learned Writ Court in SWP No. 1122/2005. The recom­mendations of the committee, which are incorporated in the order, read: "Committee felt that Dr. Baldev Singh is not eligible to hold that position of Professor and Head of Urology. Com­mittee debated a number of scenarious which SKIMS can follow to resolve this issue. It was unani­mously recommended that Dr. Baldev Singh should continue to stay and work in Urology keeping in view his past records in the specialty. How­ever, he should hold official title of Professor of General Surgery. Post of Professor of Urology should be re-ad­vertised with defined criteria to ap­point a suitable candidate". The operative part of order 19.11.2011 reads thus: "Now therefore, it is hereby ordered that Dr. Baldev Singh, Professor Urol­ogy is designated as Professor of Gen­eral Surgery and posted in the Depart­ment of Urology. Dr. Baldev Singh shall draw salary against the post of Professor, Medical Oncology (Pediatric Oncolgy Unit)." The order, however, provides further that, 'Director, SKIMS shall function as Head of the Department of Urol­ogy till such time post of Professor Urology is filled by eligible/qualified person'. 8. Dr. Baldev Singh shall draw salary against the post of Professor, Medical Oncology (Pediatric Oncolgy Unit)." The order, however, provides further that, 'Director, SKIMS shall function as Head of the Department of Urol­ogy till such time post of Professor Urology is filled by eligible/qualified person'. 8. A perusal of the impugned judg­ment and order dated 04.02.2013 passed by the learned Writ Court in SWP No. 2521/2011 would show that the learned Writ Court, while taking up the ques­tion as regards appellant's eligibility for the post of Professor of Urology, has taken the view that in terms of Schedule - II to "the Minimum Qualification for Teachers in Medical Institutions Regulations, 1998" (for short MCI Regulations of 1998) issued by the Medical Counsil of India, the qualifica­tion for the post of Professor of Urology is M. Ch. (Urology), the MCI Regulations have overriding effect on any Law, Rules, Regulations or Government in­structions made by the State Govern­ment on the subject and, therefore, the appellant does not have the qualifica­tion prescribeed under the MCI Regulations for the post of Professor of Urology as he admittedly was not having M. Ch. (Urology) degree to his credit. Not only that, learned Writ Court also observed that the appellant was appointed as Assistant Professor/Asso­ciate Professor in General Surgery so he in these circumstances did not pos­sess the requisite experience too for the post of Professor of Urology. 9. Appellant assails the impugned judgment and order, firstly, on the ground that the learned Writ Court by holding that the appellant did not pos­sess requisite qualification and was not eligible for the post of Professor (Urol­ogy) in terms of MCI Regulations, has committed an error of jurisdiction, which renders the judgment liable to be set aside. 10. It is urged on behalf of the appel­lant that under the "Sher-i- Kashmir Institute of Sciences Faculty Members (Revised Pay) Rules, 2000", notified vide SRO 378 dated 18.10.2000 (for short Rules of 2000), which were brought into force with effect from 01.01.1996, the revised hierarchy of the faculty of the Institute has been subject to such recruitment, promotion and selection process as is and shall be applicable in All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIMS), New Delhi in relation to vari­ous faculty positions. It is contended that the Registrar of the AIMS vide his letter dated 16.05.2005 had clarified that in the AIMS the D.M/M. Ch. It is contended that the Registrar of the AIMS vide his letter dated 16.05.2005 had clarified that in the AIMS the D.M/M. Ch. de­gree is not yet essential qualification for the post of Professor of Urology, therefore, the appellant being a post graduate in Surgery and having 14 years of teaching and research experi­ence after obtaining qualifying M.S. degree was eligible to apply for and be appointed as Professor of Urology. Re­spondent No. 5 in SWP No. 1122/2005 having not challenged the Advertise­ment Notice dated 31.12.2004, pursu­ant where to appellant had applied and was appointed as Professor of Urology, it was nobody's case that the appellant was not eligible to apply for the post of Professor of Urology. 11. Dlating appellant's contention in this behalf, Mr. M. A. Qayoo, learned counsel for the appellant, sought to demonstrate that for the purpose of ap­pointment to various faculty posts in the Institute, it is the Rules of 2000 which hold the ground and not the MCI Regulations of 1998 and that conditions for appointment of faculty in the Insti­tute were the same as were applicable to AIMS. As per the information pro­vided by Registrar, AIMS, New Delhi, M.Ch. degree is not essential qualifi­cation for the post of Professor in Urol­ogy in AIMS so, likewise, in the Insti­tute too M.Ch. degree is not essential qualification for the post of Professor of Urology and the appellant on the strength of his post graudate degree (M.S) in Surgery and 14 years experi­ence in the faculty was eligible for the said post. 12. Per contra, Mr. Shah Aamir, learned GA appearing for respondents 1-4 and Mr. A. Haqani, learned counsel appearing for respondent-5 supported the impugned judgment saying that the learned Writ Court, has given cogent reasons in taking the view that MCI Regulations of 1998 prevail upon Rules of 2000 and M. Ch. degree is essential qualification for the post of Professor of Urology, which is a Super Specialty Department of the Institute and the said qualification was clearly men­tioned in the advertisement notifica­tion too. 13. We have given our thought full consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant vis-a-vis the view taken by the learned Writ Court. degree is essential qualification for the post of Professor of Urology, which is a Super Specialty Department of the Institute and the said qualification was clearly men­tioned in the advertisement notifica­tion too. 13. We have given our thought full consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant vis-a-vis the view taken by the learned Writ Court. We, however, feel that the issue as re­gards eligibility of appellant for the post of Professor of Urology did not deserve any consideration or discussion by the learned Writ Court because this issue had been raised by respondent No. 5 in SWP No. 1122/2005 and was suffi­ciently clinched by the learned Writ Court vide the judgment and order dated 25.05.2007 rendered in that writ, whereby directions for constitution of the qualified committee were issued, which ultimately led to passing of or­der No. 64 - SKIMS of 2011 dated 19.11.2011 impugned in SWP No. 2521/2011. 14. Contextually, it is though impor­tant to note that neither in the memo of SWP No. 2521/2011 nor in the memo of this appeal the appellant has referred to or disclosed the grounds on which respondent No. 5 had assailed his ap­pointment as Professor of Urology in SWP No. 1122/2005. But the judgment and order dated 25.05.2007 passed by the learned Writ Court in the said Writ would make it clear that the appoint­ment of the appellant, who was respon­dent No. 5 in that Writ Petition, had been assailed on the ground that he was not eligible for the said post be­cause he was not credited with M. Ch. degree. The learned Writ Court in paragraph - 5 of the judgment dated 25.05.2007, after hearing the learned counsel and considering the matter, had observed: ".....Admitted position of the case is that for want of requisite eligibil­ity, the petitioner admittedly is not eligible to seek his appointment on the post of Professor in Urology depart­ment, and respondent No. 5 is pres­ently working as such even while not having the M. Ch. degree and lacks in eligibility on that count, particu­larly because he originally belongs to the department of General Surgery even while admittedly working in Urol­ogy department right since 1989....." 15. degree and lacks in eligibility on that count, particu­larly because he originally belongs to the department of General Surgery even while admittedly working in Urol­ogy department right since 1989....." 15. It was in the backdrop of this finding recorded by the learned Writ Court that the learned Court had re­jected respondent/Institute's strong recommendation for continuation of the appellant (respondent - 5 therein) as Pro­fessor of Urology going by the record of his acknowledged performance, term­ing it as no substitute for requisite eli­gibility and had, though avoiding his immediate exist without bringing a suitable arrangement in place, directed constitution of the duly qualified com­mittee. 16. Be that as it may, the learned Writ Court in SWP No. 2521/2011 seems to have felt necessity of discuss­ing the eligibility question too because the issue was racked up by the appel­lant in paragraphs - 15 and 16 of the writ petition as also by respondent No. 5, (Dr. Mohd. Saleem Wani), who was impleaded at a later stage, in his reply. 17. It is important to note that the appellant, while pleading in SWP No. 2521/2011 and in this appeal that the appointment to the post of Professor of Urology in the Institute was governed by Rules of 2000 and the M. Ch. degree was not requisite qualification as par with the eligibility criteria for this post in AIMS, has not thrown any challenge to well considered finding of the learned Writ Court that the MCI Regulations of 1998, which provide for M. Ch. degree as essential qualification for Professor of Urology, has overriding effect over any Law, Rules, Regulations or Govern­ment Instructions made by the State Government and the Rules of 2000, have to pave way for MCI Regulations, 1998 and are stripped of their force to the extent they are in conflict with the aforementioned Regulations. 18. We have gone through the im­pugned judgment and could not per­suade ourselves to disagree with the finding recorded by the learned Writ Court as regards supremacy of the MCI Regulation, 1998 over the Rules of 2000 relied upon by the appellant. Having viewed so, we are equally not persuaded to disagree with the view taken by the learned Writ Court that appellant, as he is not M. Ch. in Urology, does not possess the qualification prescribed under MCI Regulations for the post of Professor of Urology. 19. Having viewed so, we are equally not persuaded to disagree with the view taken by the learned Writ Court that appellant, as he is not M. Ch. in Urology, does not possess the qualification prescribed under MCI Regulations for the post of Professor of Urology. 19. Above apart, we, having exam­ined the record carefully, have found that even the Advertisement Notifica­tion No. 01/2004 dated 31.12.2004, pur­suant where to appellant had applied for and was appointed as Professor of Urology, provided for M. Ch. as an es­sential qualification for applying for the post of Professor of Urology and there­fore, appellant neither could have ap­plied for nor should have been selected and appointed for this post merely on the basis of his Post Graduate/M.S. (General Surgery) degree and experi­ence whatsoever. The relevant portion of the Advertisement Notification No. 01 of 2004 dated 31.12.2004 dealing with the essential qualification for the post of Professor reads: "PROFESSOR Qualification - essential for Medical candidates: (1) A medical qualification in­cluded in the Schedule I or II or Part - II of the Third - Schedule to the Indian Medical Council Act of 1956 [persons possessing qualifications included in Part-II or Third Sched­ule should also fulfill the condi­tions specified in Section 13 (3) of the Act] (2) A Postgraduate qualification e.g. MD/MS, or a recognized quali­fication equivalent thereto in the respective discipline/subject. AND/OR (3) M. Ch. for surgical super - specialties and DM for medical su­per - specialties (two years or three years or five years recognized course) or qualification recognized equivalent thereto. Experience: Essential for Medical candidates: 14 years' teaching and/or research experience in a recognized Institu­tion in the subject of specialty af­ter obtaining the qualifying degree of MD/MS or a qualification recog­nized equivalent thereto. …………………. …………………..” (Emphasis supplied) Item (3) above provides for the quali­fication prescribed for the post of Pro­fessor in Surgical - Specialties and Medical Super - Specialties. Unequivo­cally, the essential qualification for surgical super specialties is M. Ch. and that for medical super specialties is D.M. As said above, Urology is a Surgi­cal Super Specialty department so it would admit of no doubt that essential qualification for the post of Professor of Urology given in the advertisement notification was M. Ch in Urology and nothing short of that, besides experi­ence. Experience, however, will come into play only if essential qualification is there. 20. Experience, however, will come into play only if essential qualification is there. 20. Impugned judgment and order have further, been assailed on the ground that the committee constituted in compliance to Writ Court order dated 25.05.2007 passed in SWP No. 1122/2005 has traveled beyond its jurisdic­tion because the Court had directed constitution of the committee to assess the eligibility of appellant to head the Department of Urology and not his eli­gibility as Professor of Urology so the recommendations of the committee that appellant was not eligible for ap­pointment as Professor of Urology was contrary to the direction of the Court and the finding of the Writ Court in this regard is 'manifestly erroneous' and li­able to be set aside. 21. Dealing with this aspect, the learned Writ Court, after examining the directions of the Court issued vide judgment and order dated 25.05.2007 passed in SWP No. 1122/2005 in the context in which they were issued and referring to important aspects of the said judgment and order took the view that the matter, substantially and di­rectly, in issue before the, Writ Court was whether the appellant (petitioner) was eligible for the post of Professor of Urology. The finding recorded by the learned Writ Court reads verbatim: "The above facts abundantly make it clear that the matter, substan­tially and directly in issue before the Writ Court, was whether the petitioner was eligible for the post of Professor Urology, and the Court, in unambiguous and unequivocal terms, held petitioner not eligible for the post. The Writ Court direc­tion, therefore, is to be read in con­text of the case set up and the is­sue before the Court and not to be read in isolation. The Court not only put a question mark on petitioner's eligibility for the post of Professor Urology, but declared him not eligible for the post. This apart, headship of the department is closely linked with professorship in a particular discipline. It would be highly preposterous, even to as­sume that a person not eligible to be Professor in a particular depart­ment or hold senior faculty position would be eligible to head that de­partment. The argument advanced by learned counsel for petitioner in the circumstances is specious and far from convincing. So viewed, the committee cannot be held to have traveled beyond its jurisdiction while assessing/examining petitioner's eligibility for the post of Professor Urology". 22., Mr. The argument advanced by learned counsel for petitioner in the circumstances is specious and far from convincing. So viewed, the committee cannot be held to have traveled beyond its jurisdiction while assessing/examining petitioner's eligibility for the post of Professor Urology". 22., Mr. M. A. Qayoom, learned coun­sel for the appellant, reiterated the challenge in the course of his argu­ments. He would say that task assigned to the committee was limited to assess appellant's eligibility to hold the post of the Head of the Department of Urology. 23. Having perused the judgment and order dated 02.05.2007 rendered by this Court in SWP No. 1122/2005 in its entirety, we have found ourselves un­able to accept the contention of the ap­pellant and disagree with the view taken by the learned Writ Court. To say in brief in this regard, the petitioner in SWP No. 1122/2005 had assailed the eligibility of appellant for his appoint­ment as Professor of Urology and not his appointment as Head of the Depart­ment of Urology. The headship of the Department of Urology was not an is­sue in the said writ petition. The pur­pose of constituting the committee is to be looked in the same context and the purpose was to assess the eligibil­ity of appellant for his appointment to the post Professor Urology and thereby Head of the Department Urology. Con - textually, we are reminded on perusal of record, in particular the Rules of 2000, that there is no post of the Head of the Department in the hierarchy of a faculty of the Institute and we can understand that in every department normally the senior most professor per­forms as Head of the Department. To be eligible as Head of the Department, therefore, cannot be disassociated from eligibility to be a Professor in that de­partment. Challenge to the impugned judgment and order on this count, therefore, does not sustain. 24. The next question raised by the appellant is that order No. 64 dated 19.11.2011 (supra) was passed by re­spondent - Institute in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the appellant was not associated with the proceedings before the com­mittee, a copy of the recommendations of the committee was not provided to him and show cause notice, providing an opportunity of hearing to project his case against the recommendations and action proposed against him by the committee, was not issued to him. This as a matter of fact, seems to be the main plank of appellant's case before the learned Writ Court as also before us. 25. On perusal of the impugned judg­ment and order, we, however, have found that the contention of appellant in this behalf had received adequate considerati6n of the learned Writ Court. The learned Writ Court disagreed nei­ther that the principles of natural jus­tice are to be adhered even while pass­ing an administrative order having civil consequences nor with the contention of appellant that respondent - Institute has accepted the recommendations of the Committee and passed order dated 19.11.2011 without notice to and pro­viding opportunity of hearing to the ap­pellant. Learned Writ Court, however, while weighing the contention in the factual backdrop that the appellant lacked prescribed qualification and ex­perience for the post of Professor of Urol­ogy and could not have been considered much less appointed as Professor of Urology, took the view "that the right of hearing to the petitioner in the cir­cumstances would have been nothing except empty or idle formality for the reason that petitioner admittedly did not have M. Ch, Urology to his credit nor had four years' experience as Reader/Associate Professor." 26. Learned Writ Court also took the view that setting aside of order dated 19.11.2011 on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, was bound to revive Government Order No. 45-SKIMS of 2005 dated 17.10.2005 whereby the petitioner was appointed as Professor, Urology, which was ille­gal and de hors the Rules because the appellant was appointed without possess­ing requisite eligibility for the Post of Professor, Urology. In refusing interfer­ence with order dated 19.11.2011, the learned Writ Court drew support from M. C. Mehta Vs. Union of India & Ors, (1999) 6 SCC 237 . In this case, their Lordships, referring to law laid down in Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Govern­ment of Andhra Pradesh & Ors AIR 1996 SC (828), have observed: "The above case is a clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. Govern­ment of Andhra Pradesh & Ors AIR 1996 SC (828), have observed: "The above case is a clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such strik­ing down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the op­posite party in violation of the prin­ciples of natural justice or it otherwise not in accordance with law." 27. Learned Writ Court also observed that the principle was reiterated in Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo Vs. State of Bihar & Ors, (1999) 8 SCC 16 , where Supreme Court declined to set - aside an order, observing that "...in the event it is set aside it would amount to reviving an in­valid order." 28. It has been urgued by the appel­lant that the principles of natural jus­tice are not an empty formality. The purpose of natural justice is aimed at to check arbitrary exercise of power and prevent miscarriage of justice. An or­der passed without providing opportu­nity of hearing to a person against whom it is passed, is legally non est and is liable to be set - aside. The respon­dent - Institute before passing order 19.11.2011, was bound to issue show cause notice to the appellant, af­ford him opportunity of hearing and to hear him and that having not been done the same is liable to be set aside. 29. Mr. M. A. Qayoom, learned coun­sel for the appellant, while painstak­ingly demonstrating the importance of notice and opportunity of being heard, would say that the committee should have heard the appellant and more importantly the respondent - Institute before accepting the recommendations of the committee and passing the or­der Against the appellant, should have supplied him copy of the recommenda­tions and provided opportunity of hear­ing to put forth his case as adverse or­der was going to be passed against him. Mr. Qayoom argued empathetically that denial of right of hearing and passing of adverse order against the appellant without hearing him has caused preju­dice and the order is liable to be set aside. Mr. Qayoom argued empathetically that denial of right of hearing and passing of adverse order against the appellant without hearing him has caused preju­dice and the order is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel sought to em­phasize that the violation of the prin­ciples of natural justice admits of no exception so learned Writ Court had no option than to set aside Order dated 19.11.2011 impugned in the Writ. Learned counsel thus concluded that the order supra having been passed in breach of the principles of natural jus­tice should be set aside though a fresh order after hearing the appellant may be passed. Mr. Qayoom relied upon: Uma Nath Pandey Vs. State of U.P, AIR 2009 SC 2375 , Hiralal Vs. State of UP, AIR 2009 SC 2380 , Gajanan L. Pernekar Vs. State of Go, (1999) 8 SCC 378 , Kesar Enterprises Ltd. Vs. State of UP, AIR 2011 SC 2709 , Manohar Manikrao Anchule Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2013 SC 681 , State of Maharashtra Vs. Pub­lic Concern for Governance Trust & Ors, (2007) 3 SCC 587 , M. C. Mehta Vs. Union of India & Ors, (1999) 6 SCC 237 , D. K. Yadav Vs. J. M. A Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259 . 30. In reply, Mr. Shah Aamir, learned Government Advocate appearing for respondents 1 to 4 and Mr. A. Haqani, learned counsel appearing for respon­dent No. 5 supported the impugned judg­ment contending that learned Writ Court having come to the conclusion that the appellant did not possess req­uisite eligibility qualification as well as experience for the post of Professor Urol­ogy, was right in concluding that right of hearing to the appellant would have been nothing except as empty formal­ity. 31. We may state that we cannot rather entertain any confusion or dis­agreement about the importance of ob­servance of the principles of natural justice, in particular the principle of audi alteram partem, while passing ad­ministrative orders having civil or criminal consequences like that in the judicial and quasi judicial proceedings. Principle of audi alteram partem envis­ages that no one should be condemned unheard. No adverse order against a person should be passed without notice and providing him opportunity of being heard. Principle of audi alteram partem envis­ages that no one should be condemned unheard. No adverse order against a person should be passed without notice and providing him opportunity of being heard. Passing adverse order without notice and opportunity of being heard may cause prejudice to the person against whom it is passed because he would not be in position to put forth his case. An authority before passing ad­verse order against a person is required to issue show cause notice to the said person and to provide him reasonable opportunity of being heard to put forth his case. 32. Question for consideration thus arising would be whether the learned Writ Court should have set aside Order No. 64-SKIMS of 2011 dated 19.11.2011 on the ground that the same has been issued without notice to the appellant and providing him opportunity of being heard and put forth his version. 33. Mr. Qayoom, learned counsel for the appellant would say that an order passed in breach of the principles of natural justice is void and non est and should be set aside. Breach of the prin­ciples of natural justice admits of no exception so the order should have been set aside and the respondents - Institute should have been ordered to pass fresh order after notice to and hearing the appellant. In support he relied upon Haridayal and anr. Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1977 SC 1 . 34. Having regard to the legal posi­tion in retrospect and as it by now has by virtue of various judicial pronounce­ments developed, we cannot subscribe to a view that High Court in exercise of Writ jurisdiction should set aside an order once it is shown that the same has been passed in breach of the prin­ciple of audi alteram partem without re­quiring the petitioner to show that the prejudice has been caused and the po­sition would have been different had he been issued notice and heard. In R. S. Dass Vs. Union of India & Ors., 1986 Supp. SCC 617, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed; “it is well established that Rules of natural justice are not rigid rules, they are flex­ible and their application depends upon the setting and the back - ground of statutory revisions, nature of the right and which may be affected and the con­sequences which may entail, in the facts and circumstances of each case". 35. What is required to be deter­mined is whether and to what extent the prejudice has been caused by not following the principles of audi alterem partem and can the situation change or improve if the order is set aside and opportunity in terms of the principle is provided. It may be stated that if an adverse order is passed in breach of the principle of audi alteram partem the af­fected person may approach the Court to say that the prejudice has been caused by not hearing him. But if no substantial or de facto prejudice is caused question of breach of the prin­ciple would not arise. If it can be said that the situation would not have been different had the person been heard, no prejudice can be said to have been caused. 36. If the facts are admitted or in­disputable and there is no possibility of change or improvement in situation even after hearing the person against whom the order is passed 'useless for­mality theory' can be brought into ser­vice. This theory has now got recogni­tion and can be applied in the cases where the facts are admitted or indisputable. The 'useless formality theory' has received consideration of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta Vs. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 ( AIR 1999 SC 2583 ) (supra), relied upon by the learned Writ Court as also by the learned counsel for the appellant. Their Lordships in para 15 in M. C. Mehta have declared that, "Whenever there is a clear violation of the principles of natural justice, the Courts can be approached for a decla­ration that the order is void or for set­ting aside the same" but have posed a question, whether the Court in exer­cise of its discretion under Article 32 or Article 226 can refuse to exercise dis­cretion on facts or on grounds that no de facto prejudice is established'. In para 16 of the judgment Their Lord­ships, however, have pointed out that "Courts are not infrequently faced with a dilemma between breach of the rules of natural justice and the Court's dis­cretion to refuse relief even though the rules of justice have been breached, on the ground that no real prejudice is caused to the affected party". In para 17, Their Lordships relying upon Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs. In para 17, Their Lordships relying upon Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of A. P, AIR 1966 SC 828 reiterated that "it is not always necessary for the Courts to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to ex­ercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will re­sult in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the peti­tioner and against the opposite party, in violation of the principles of natural justice or it otherwise not in accor­dance with law". 37. Having observed as above, Their Lordships have taken into consider­ation the contention that "once natu­ral justice was violated, the Court was bound to strike down the order and their was no discretion to refuse re­lief and no other prejudice need be proved." Their Lordships have referred to Ridge Vs. Baldwin, 1964, AC 40, where it has been held that "breach of principles of natural justice is in itself sufficient to grant relief and that no further de facto prejudice need to be shown". But Their Lordships have moved along to point out that the Su­preme Court has not laid down any ab­solute rule. In this regard Their Lord­ships have referred with approval to S. L. Kapoor Vs. But Their Lordships have moved along to point out that the Su­preme Court has not laid down any ab­solute rule. In this regard Their Lord­ships have referred with approval to S. L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan, 1(1980) 4 SCC 378, where Their Lordhips after stat­ing that "principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any dif­ference if natural justice had been ob­served" and that "non - observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice indepen­dently of proof of denial of natural jus­tice is unnecessary" have also laid down an important qualification, which reads: "As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one venality is permis­sible, the Courts may not issue its writs to compel the observance of natu­ral justice, not because it is not nec­essary to observe natural justice but because Courts to not issue futile writs." Their Lordships (in M. C. Mehta) have thus concluded in 21 that: "It is therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual po­sition, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural jus­tice." 38. In Haryana Financial Corpora­tion and anr. Vs. Kailash Chandera Ahuja, 2008 AIR SCW 6055, factual po­sition was that the Disciplinary Author­ity had accepted the finding of guilt against the delinquent recorded by the Inquiry Officer in his inquiry report without furnishing copy of the inquiry report to the delinquent and it was urged on behalf of the delinquent that principles of natural justice were vio­lated. The only question raised before Their Lordships in this factual scenario was "whether the High Court was right in setting aside the order of punish­ment merely on the ground of non - sup­ply of report of Inquiry Officer to the delinquent". 39. Their Lordships after referring to various case law on the point have observed in para - 25: "It is settled law that principles of natural justice have to be complied with. One of the principles of natural justice is audi alteram partem ("Hear the other side"). But it is equally well settled that the concept 'natural justice' is not a fixed one. It has meant may things to many writ­ers, lawyers, jurists and systems of law. One of the principles of natural justice is audi alteram partem ("Hear the other side"). But it is equally well settled that the concept 'natural justice' is not a fixed one. It has meant may things to many writ­ers, lawyers, jurists and systems of law. It has many colors, shades, shapes and forms. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules and they cannot be imprisoned within the strait - jacked of the rigid formula". 40. In para - 37 Their Lordships pointed out that: "The recent trend, however, is of 'prejudice'. Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlaw­ful or void unless it is shown that non - observance had prejudicially affected the applicant." 40.A. Their Lordships have concluded in para 47: "From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that though supply of report of Inquiry Officer is part and parcel of natural justice and must be furnished to the delinquent - employee, failure to do so would not automatically result in quashing or setting aside of the order or the order being declared null and void. For that, the delinquent - employee has to show 'prejudice'. Unless he is able to show that non-supply of report of the Inquiry Officer has resulted in prejudice or miscar­riage of justice, an order punishment cannot be held to be vitiated. And whether prejudice had been caused to the delinquent employee depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down". 41. In Umanath Reddy, AIR 2009 SC 2375 (supra), Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in para - 5 as under: "The crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whether principles of natural justice have been violated; and if so, to what extent any prejudice has been cause. It may be noted at this juncture that in some cases it has been observed that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice do not improve the situation, "useless formality theory" can be pressed into service". 42. In this case, it is admitted posi­tion that the appellant does not possess M. Ch. degree in any discipline. He pos­sesses Master's degree in Generay Surgery (M. S. Surgery). 42. In this case, it is admitted posi­tion that the appellant does not possess M. Ch. degree in any discipline. He pos­sesses Master's degree in Generay Surgery (M. S. Surgery). It is indisput­able that he is not eligible for the post of Professor of Urology for which M. Ch. in Urology is essential qualification. In SWP No. 1122/2005 the learned Writ Court has found him lacking eligibility for the post of Professor of Urology for not having M. Ch. degree but, while constituting the committee, had al­lowed him to continue till a fully eli­gible person comes in place. For the same reason the learned Writ Court in SWP No. 2521/2011 found him not eli­gible for the post of Professor of Urology and we too have arrived at a conclu­sion that the appellant is not eligible for the said post for the same reason. 43. In the above factual scenario, the committee or the Institute cannot be said to have taken adverse or disad­vantageous view against the appellant even behind his back. In spite of not being eligible for the post of Professor of Urology, the appellant had applied for and was appointed to the said post. Even then, the committee recommended that he should hold official title of Pro­fessor of General Surgery and keeping in view his past record, continue to work in Urology and the Institute vide order No. 64 supra ordered to designate him as Professor of General Surgery and posted him in the Department of Urology. Here it may be worthwhile to state that in response to the advertise­ment notification No. 01 dated 31.12.2004 (supra), which inter alia clearly provided M. Ch. as essential qualification for the post of surgical super specialties like the Department of Urology, the appellant, knowing well that he was not having M. Ch. to his credit in any discipline, had ventured to apply for the post of Professor of Urol­ogy and opted not to offer himself for consideration for the post of Professor of General Surgery under Assessment Merit Promotion Scheme. The appel­lant can be said to have willfully taken a calculated chance and when pointed out could not have expected treatment better than the one provided to him by the committee and the Institute by des­ignating him as Professor of General Surgery and continuing him in Urol­ogy even without hearing him. The appel­lant can be said to have willfully taken a calculated chance and when pointed out could not have expected treatment better than the one provided to him by the committee and the Institute by des­ignating him as Professor of General Surgery and continuing him in Urol­ogy even without hearing him. In back­drop of such self - created circumstance, appellant cannot be heard saying that the passing of order dated No. 640SKIMS of 2011 dated 19.11.2011 behind his back has been passed without hearing the appellant so he has a reason to ap­proach the court for breach of natural justice but it is not a case of de facto or substantial prejudice having been caused to him and therefore, the order need not to be set aside on that count. 44. Can the situation change or improve if the order is set aside and opportunity in terms of the principle of audi alterem partem is provided to the appellant? This is the other important question arising in this behalf. Reply, however, would be 'no'. There is no pos­sibility rather question does not arise that the appellant would be in a position to show that his appointment as Professor of Urology was valid even though M. Ch. is essential qualifica­tion and the Advertisement Notifica­tion provided M. Ch. as essential quali­fication for the said post or that he could have been allowed to hold the post of Professor or Head of the Department of Urology regardless of the admitted po­sition that he does not have M. Ch. de­gree to his credit and the finding of the learned Writ Court in SWP No. 2211/2005 that being not M. Ch. he was not qualified and eligible for the said post. Order No. 64 need not be set aside on that score too because Court should not perform a useless formality. 45. We are not unmindful of the judgment of this Court in Hardayal's case (supra), which the strong reliance has been placed upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. he was not qualified and eligible for the said post. Order No. 64 need not be set aside on that score too because Court should not perform a useless formality. 45. We are not unmindful of the judgment of this Court in Hardayal's case (supra), which the strong reliance has been placed upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. Learned Single Judge in this case has stated that "I am unable to agree with the other submission that of the learned counsel of the respondents that no usefull purpose would have been served by issuing a show cause notice to the petitioner in the facts and circum­stances of the case, since the action was taken by the respondents after tak­ing into consideration all the material that was available on the record and which material could not have been rebutted by the petitioner. Whether or not the petitioner had a defence is for them to see and is not a matter of speculation by the authorities." We, however, are not persuaded to follow the view taken by the learned Judge in iso­lation of and ignoring the concept of 'prejudice' and 'possibility of improve­ment or change in situation' because both these concepts, as discussed above, have attained recognition over the years after Hardayal's case. Hav­ing regard to the admitted and indis­putable facts as discussed above, set­ting aside order No. 64 (supra) by the learned Writ Court would have been performing a useless formality, which the learned Writ Court should not have done nor should we. 46. To say at the cost of repetition, material on the record would show and it is not disputed that the appellant all through his career in the respondent - Institute has rendered valuable contri­bution in the Department of Urology, while being a member of the faculty of the General Surgery. This had been the stand taken by the Institute in its re­ply to SWP No. 1122/2005. But the con­tribution, howsoever timely and valu­able, cannot be a substitute for eligible for appointment to a post. 47. The impugned judgment and order have also been assailed on the ground that vide order No. 64 dated 19.11.2011 (supra) respondent No. 3 has arbitrarily appointed himself as Head of the Department (HOD) of Urology which in itself is sufficient for setting aside the order. 47. The impugned judgment and order have also been assailed on the ground that vide order No. 64 dated 19.11.2011 (supra) respondent No. 3 has arbitrarily appointed himself as Head of the Department (HOD) of Urology which in itself is sufficient for setting aside the order. Learned counsel for the appellant would say that the learned Writ Court in SWP No. 1122/2005 had directed that present arrangement shall continue till a fully eligible person is brought in place as HOD of Urology and even the committee had not recom­mended that respondent No. 3 shall function as the HOD till the said post is so filled up by eligible person. 48. This aspect of the matter had been explicitly taken into consideration by the learned Writ Court and the view taken reads: "The petitioner cannot have grouse as regards Director of the re­spondent Institute being asked to func­tion as Head of Department of Urol­ogy till the post is filled up by eligible/suitable faculty as the petitioner hav­ing no right to hold the post of Profes­sor Urology, and Head of Department, Urology, has nothing to do with the day - today administration of the De­partment. The Director of the respon­dent Institute, otherwise exercise over­all administrative control of the respon­dent Institute and discharge duties connected therewith, is equally com­petent to run the affairs of the Depart­ment Urology for the brief interval or transitory period till such function are taken over by a duly selected candi­date". 49. On a plain look at the reasoning recorded by the learned Writ Court, we are afraid we cannot agree with the same because it is in conflict with the mandate of the judgment and order dated 25.05.2007 (supra) rendered by the learned Writ Court in SWP No. 1122/2005. The learned Writ Court in SWP No. 1122/2005 has clearly pro­vided that the present arrangement, that is, the arrangement existing at the time of order dated 25.05.2007 may con­tinue till a fully eligible person is brought in place as HOD of the Depart­ment of Urology. This direction of learned Writ Court in SWP No. 1122/2005 has not been challenged by either of the parties on any aspect whatso­ever. Even the committee has not made any suggestion contrary to the direc­tion of the learned Writ Court. This direction of learned Writ Court in SWP No. 1122/2005 has not been challenged by either of the parties on any aspect whatso­ever. Even the committee has not made any suggestion contrary to the direc­tion of the learned Writ Court. The decision to appoint respondent No. 3 as the HOD of the Department of Urology seems a personal decision of respon­dent No. 3 because order No. 64 (supra) would show that the same was passed after approval of committee's recom­mendations by the Chairman of Gov­erning Body of the Institute, whereas functioning of respondent No. 3 as HOD as stop gap arrangement was not con­tained in the committee's recommen­dation. Order No. 64 (supra) to this ex­tent, cannot sustain and appeal to this extent has merit. 50. It has also been urged on behalf of the appellant that while designating the appellant as Professor of General Surgery the committee as well as re­spondent - Institute should have deter­mined his seniority in the Department of General Surgery and given him the position on the basis of such seniority in the said Department. This conten­tion, in our opinion, is beyond the scope of this appeal and premature too. Hav­ing designated the appellant as Profes­sor of General Surgery, it is for the In­stitute to fix his seniority and no com­ment from this Court at this stage in this appeal would be proper or is pos­sible. 51. For the aforementioned, we find no merit in this appeal in so far as it relates to designation of the appel­lant as Professor of General Surgery, his posting in the Department of Urol­ogy and other stipulations in this re­gard. Appeal to this extent is, there­fore, dismissed. However, the appeal in so faw as the order No. 64 (supra) provides for respondent No. 3 to func­tion as Head of the Department of Urology as stop gap arrangement is accepted and order No. 64 to this ex­tent is set aside. Direction in this re­gard issued by the learned Writ Court in SWP No. 1122/2005 shall hold ground, that is, appellant shall con­tinue functioning as Head of the De­partment of Urology as Head of the Department of Urology only till an eligible person is brought in place. 52. Appeal is disposed of accordingly along with connected CMP(s). Interim direction issued vide order dated 14.05.2013 stand vacated.