ORDER :- This civil revision petition (CRP) is filed against order dated 5.11.2012 passed in CMA No.21 of 2011 on the file of the Court of IV Additional District Judge, Kakinada (CMA) confirming order passed in EA No.177 of 2010 in EP No.249 of 2005 in OS No.242 of 1988 on the file of the Court of II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada (EA). 2. The petitioner herein is the appellant in the CMA, claim petitioner in the EA, third defendant in the suit and third judgment debtor (JDr No.3) in the E.P., the first respondent herein is the first respondent in the EA, plaintiff in the suit and decree holder in the E.P., the second respondent herein is the second respondent in the EA., first defendant in the suit and first Judgment Debtor (JDr No.1) in the E.P., the third and fourth respondents herein are also the third and fourth respondents in the E.A., whereas the fifth respondent is the fifth respondent in the EA, second defendant in the suit and second Judgment-Debtor in the E.P. For convenience sake, I refer the parties as arrayed in the E.A. 3. The E.P. was filed by virtue of decree dated 2.7.1993 passed in favour of the first respondent i.e., the plaintiff in OS No.242 of 1988 on the file of the Court of II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada and got the property scheduled therein sold on 28.10.1998 which was confirmed on 10.10.2004. The petitioner filed the E.A. under Order XXI Rule 90 read with Sections 47 and 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908' (CPC) to set aside the sale of the property and its confirmation in the E.P. proceedings on the ground of committing irregularities in conducting the sale. 4. The claim of the petitioner is as follows: The petitioner's father-in-law namely Amalakanti Sri Rama Chandra Murthy (deceased) acquired the property under an agreement of sale dated 11.5.1973. Accordingly the deceased was in possession and enjoyment of the property till his death on 3.4.1983. After his death, the husband of the petitioner i.e., the fifth respondent succeeded to the property as his sole legal heir. Subsequently the first respondent filed two suits i.e., OS Nos.242 of 1988 and 254 of 1988 one for money decree on the basis of mortgage and the other for simple money decree against the petitioner, second respondent and the fifth respondent. Subsequently the first respondent filed two suits i.e., OS Nos.242 of 1988 and 254 of 1988 one for money decree on the basis of mortgage and the other for simple money decree against the petitioner, second respondent and the fifth respondent. In that a compromise decree was passed on 2.7.1993. Subsequent to the compromise, the fifth respondent paid amount to the first respondent towards the discharge of the decretal amount on different dates to a tune of Rs.1,13,500/- in total. It is alleged that the first respondent suppressing the payment of the amount by the fifth respondent filed the E.P. and brought the property of the fifth respondent for sale. In fact the first respondent furnished very low price and managed to knock down the property accordingly in favour of the third respondent who is her co-sister's son though the property was worth Rs.4,00,000/- as on the date of sale by virtue of fraud played by the first respondent. No publicity was given for the sale of the property. There are two storied RCC buildings in the E.P. schedule property, but in the E.P. schedule it was described only as tiled house. Thereby the sale of the property is to be set aside. 5. The claim of the respondents 1, 3 and 4 is that whereas the sale of the property was held on 28.10.1998 and it was confirmed on 13.10.2004 hence the petition was barred by limitation. Further number of similar petitions were filed by the members of the family of the petitioner which were dismissed by the Courts below. They denied that any irregularities were committed in respect of the sale of the property. It is also claimed by them that the fifth respondent who is no other than the husband of the petitioner filed EA No.254 of 2007 under Order XXI Rule 90 and Section 47 CPC to set aside the sale dated 28.10.1 998 on the same grounds taken in the present claim petition for setting aside the sale whereas the petitioner was also one of the respondents therein which was dismissed on merits on 12.6.2007. Further aggrieved by the order in that claim petition, the fifth respondent preferred revision before the High Court in CRP No.2613 of 2007 which was• also dismissed. Further aggrieved by the order in that claim petition, the fifth respondent preferred revision before the High Court in CRP No.2613 of 2007 which was• also dismissed. Further subsequent to the dismissal of that CRP, the fifth respondent filed CMA No.44 of 2007 on the file of the Court of III Additional District Judge, Kakinada against the order passed in the claim petition (EA No.254 of 2007) which was dismissed confirming the order passed in that claim petition. Further the EA in question was filed to drag on the proceedings only. Therefore, they pleaded to dismiss the claim petition. 6. For the petitioner he got himself examined as PWI and got marked Exs. A1 to A4 whereas on behalf of the respondents no witness was examined and no documents were marked. 7. The Court below taking into consideration the material on record observed as follows: The petitioner as PWI pleaded ignorance with regards to the proceedings in EA No.687 of 2005 and EA No.254 of 2007. The contentions raised by the petitioner in the present petition are similar to the contentions raised by the fifth respondent in EA No.254 of 2007. As the, petitioner has been living along with her husband (5th respondent) and children and she is also a party to the previous claim petitions, it cannot be inferred that she got no knowledge about the previous claim petitions. Therefore, it is obvious that the petitioner, her husband and children are harping upon the same contention time and again in different claim petitions more or less on the same grounds. In both the earlier claim petitions it was held by the Court that the E.P. schedule property belonged to Amalakanti Ratnam. Accordingly, the trial Court dismissed the I.A. Against that order, the CMA was preferred which was dismissed making same observations aggrieved by which the present CRP has been filed. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that by virtue of Section 47 CPC all questions arising between the parties in the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit, by reason of which the petitioner has got every right to question the irregularities in conducting the sale. According to him while considering that aspect, the question of actual right of the petitioner in the property need not be gone into. On the other hand by virtue of Order XXI Rule 90 CPC, any person who has got some interest in the property can also question the sale on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale of the property. In support his contentions, he has relied upon the decisions in J. Malia Reddy v. I. Shanthamma and others, 2009 (5) ALD 379 (DB), Chirravuri Veerabhadra Rao v. State Bank of India, Rajahmundry and others, 2010 (1) ALD 545 = 2010 (1) LS 52, Harnandrai Badridas v. Debidutt Bhagwati Prasad, AIR 1973 SC 2423 , M/s. Mahakal Automobiles v. Kishan Swaroop Sharma, (2098) 13 SCC 113 = 2008 (8) SCJ 198, M Veera Raghavaiah v. P. Singa Rao, 1997 (2) ALT 699 (DB), Jaikisandas Balchand Pamnani v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay, AIR 1991 Born. 341, A C. Nagaraju v. N. Sreenivasa Reddy, 2004 (4) ALD 468 = DLR 2004 AP 586, Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala and another, 2006 SAR (Civil) 663, Reliance Granite Private Ltd., Hyd. v. Government of A.P., 2006 (2) ALD 237 , State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao, 2005 (5) ALD 118 (SC) = (2005) 6 SCC 149 , Dr. K.L Askari v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan, 2010 (4) ALD 244 (DB) = 2010 (5) ALT 597 , (DB), Mahakal Automobiles v. Kishan Swaroop Sharma (supra) and HP. Financial Corpn. v. M/s. Himachal Shoddy Mills Ltd., AIR 1999 HP 31 . 9. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents 1, 2 and 5 would contend that in order to question the sale of the property, the petitioner should have right in the property but as established she got no right in the property by reason of which she got no locus standi to file the claim petition. Further the Courts below properly examined the matter and there are no grounds to interfere with the order. 10. Importantly the petitioner is not claiming any interest in the property but still she has been questioning the sale on the ground of committing irregularities in that behalf. Therefore the following points are to be considered for the disposal of the EA: 1. 10. Importantly the petitioner is not claiming any interest in the property but still she has been questioning the sale on the ground of committing irregularities in that behalf. Therefore the following points are to be considered for the disposal of the EA: 1. Whether the petitioner can question the sale of the property on the said grounds without having any interest therein? 2. Whether it is maintainable under Order XXI Rule 90 and Sections 47 and 151 CPC? 3. Whether the provisions of Order XXI Rule 90 and Section 47 CPC are distinct 6r can be applied simultaneously ? 11. Section 47 CPC enjoins- "Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree.-(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their, representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be detennined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) .......... (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this Section, be determined by the Court." By virtue of Section 47 all questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree are to be adjudicated in the executing Court and not in a separate suit. But the executing Court cannot go beyond the decree or cannot question• the correctness of the validity of the decree except where the decree is a nullity or is without jurisdiction. A bare reading of the Section no doubt shows that its scope is very wide and comprehensive enough to include all questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. 12. In V. Subbarmma v. Koniki Chengama Naidu, 1998 (3) ALD 630 = 1998 (3) ALT 497 , considered as to whether Section 47 got no application when sale of a property was confirmed and corresponding sale certificate was issued in executing decree and the only recourse open was to file a petition under Order XXI Rule 91 CPC for setting aside the sale. The High Court placed reliance on the following decisions in that context: 13. While examining the distinction between Section 47 CPC and Order XXI Rule 90 CPC and relevant factors in Seshagiri Aiyar v. Valambal Ammal, AIR 1952 Mad. The High Court placed reliance on the following decisions in that context: 13. While examining the distinction between Section 47 CPC and Order XXI Rule 90 CPC and relevant factors in Seshagiri Aiyar v. Valambal Ammal, AIR 1952 Mad. 377 , it was held: "If a party impeaches a sale on grounds which attract the provisions of Order 21 Rule 90 he cannot escape from the period of limitation provided by Article 166, Limitation Act by framing his application as one under Section 47. The substance of the application must be considered in order to determine whether the application is one which fal1s under Section 47 or under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC. If the grounds alleged do not relate to matters in publishing or conducting the sale but are anterior or subsequent to the sale the application is outside the purview of Order 21, Rule 90." 14. In T. Venkata v. T. Ramachandra, AIR 1972 AP 223 , it was observed similarly: "When a person feeling aggrieved by a sale impugnes it on grounds stated in Rule 90 he is bound by the requirements and implications of that rule. For the purpose of finding out whether a particular application• comes under Rule 90 or Section 47 the substance of the application must be considered. If the substance is that there were irregularities or illegalities in publishing or conducting the sale then the application must be treated as one under Rule 90. If on the other hand the grounds alleged are either anterior or subsequent to the publishing or conducting the sale it is outside the purview of Rule 90 and win come within Section 47." 15. In Satyanarayanamurthy v. Bhavanarayana, AIR 1957 AP 185 , while considering the scope and ambit of Order XXI Rule 90, it was held: "Even if an attachment is a necessity preliminary to a sale the judgment-debtor if he receives a notice under Rule 66(2) has an opportunity of raising the question of absence of attachment If, on the other hand, there is no attachment and no notice under Rule 66, then he may very well complain of the absence of notice under Rule 66 and on proof of substantial injury, may get the relief provided by Rule 90. Therefore, the question of absence of attachment by itself is immaterial both under Section 47 because it does not make the sale void and under Rule 90 because it cannot in the contemplation of the Code, by itself occasion substantial injury. In the result, unless the matters alleged in an application for setting aside a sale are such that they would render the sale void (in which case no question of substantial injury could arise as the application falls under Section 47), it must come under Order XXI Rule 90 and can succeed only on proof of material violation of Rule 65 etc., followed by proof of consequential substantial injury to the applicant. Non-service of notice under Order 21 Rule 66(2) is an irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale." 16. In Shaukat Hussain alias Ali Akram v. Smt. Bhuneshwari Devi (dead) by L.Rs., (1972) 2 SCC 731 , the first plaintiff obtained money decree from a Small Causes Court. Consequently she initiated necessary execution petition against the J.Drs. They filed title suit in the Court of a Munsif for setting aside the decree passed by the Small Causes Court on the ground that it was illegal, fraudulent and without jurisdiction. Later they filed an application under Order XXI Rule 29 CPC for setting aside the decree passed by the Small Causes Court. Consequently the execution proceedings were stayed subject to certain conditions, but as the formalities were not complied with, the properties of the J.Drs were attached. Further one of the J.Drs filed objection under Section 47 CPC for setting aside the sale whereas the concerned Court allowed that application on the ground that the sale proclamation was issued while the stay was in force, against which the matter was taken to the first appellate Court which Court upheld the order following which the matter was taken in second appeal before the concerned High Court contending that the order of stay was granted without jurisdiction and the execution of sale was legal. The Supreme Court considered the scope of Order XXI Rule 90 and Section 47 CPC while considering various other aspects also and held in that context as follows: "A judgment-debtor can ask for setting aside a sale in execution of a decree under Section 47 CPC and, in special circumstances which attract the provisions of Order 21 Rule 90, he may also apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale provided he further proves to the satisfaction of the Court that he has sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregularity or fraud. The application made to the executing Court in the present case by the judgment-debtors was not one under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC. That is conceded by Mr. Chagla. Had it been the case that on account of fraud or material irregularity in conducting the sale, the sale required to be set aside, evidence would have been led on the point and there would have been a clear finding as to the substantial injury. The judgments of all the three Courts proceed entirely on the basis that the application was one under Section 47 CPC and not under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC. They do not deal with the question of material irregularity or fraud in the conduct of the sale, nor do they deal with the injury caused to the judgment-debtors." 17. The analogy laid down in the decisions cited above is quite applicable here. That makes it very clear that Section 47 CPC does not deal with the question of material irregularity or fraud in conducting the sale whereas that aspect is to be dealt with under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC only. On the other hand if the grounds alleged do not lead to matters in publishing or conducting the sale but are anterior to, or subsequent to sale the corresponding application is outside the purview of Order XXI Rule 90 CPC and comes within the purview of Section 47 CPC. For the purpose of finding out whether particular application comes under Order XXI Rule 90 or Section 47 CPC, the substance of the application must be taken into consideration. For the purpose of finding out whether particular application comes under Order XXI Rule 90 or Section 47 CPC, the substance of the application must be taken into consideration. What is important in the present context is that the petitioner is questioning the irregularity or illegality in publishing the notice of the sale of the property only by reason of which the matter comes only within the purview or Order XXI Rule 90 CPC. On the other hand when the petitioner is not having any saleable interest in the property, he or she cannot have any locus standi to question the sale of the property. 18. In fact in Macha Koundan v. Kottora Koundan, AIR 1936 Mad. 50, a Larger Bench of Madras High Court while considering sale of a property in respect of which concerned judgment debtor got no saleable interest in executing a decree, held "In our judgment, there is no scope for invoking the doctrine of money had and received since it could not be postulated that the executing creditor received money which he had no right to do and by a legal fiction the receipt by him was for the use of the plaintiff. If no one had guaranteed the title of the judgment-debtor to the property sold under a legal process and the purchaser had purchased only the judgment debtor's interest therein for what it was worth, it could not be predicted that there was any failure of consideration for the purchase of that or that the judgment-creditor either unjustly or inequitably had withdrawn the amount deposited by the purchaser. The question of failure of consideration would arise only if there was a covenant of title. In the absence of it, the principle of money had and received would be inapplicable and the suit for return of the money cannot be sustained on that ground." Considering those decisions this Court in V. Subbarmma’s case (supra) held: "The conspectus of the catena of decisions on the subject is that the scope and ambit of Section 47 CPC is very wide whereas the scope of Order XXI Rule 90 CPC is limited to the extent of any material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale. I, therefore, hold that the petition filed by the respondents/decree holders under Section 47 CPC is in order, inasmuch as the ground on which they are seeking remedy is not one of irregularity or fraud, in publishing or , conducting the sale. As regards Larger Bench decision cited supra, it is the exception carved out therein by the Larger Bench that is applicable to this case." 19. The same analogy is applicable herein in the context of a person not having any saleable interest in the property to question the corresponding sale. Emphatically Order XXI Rule 90(2) CPC clearly postulates that the question of sale of property can be raised by a person who got actual interest in the property. Hence the petition is not tenable. 20. Pertinently one way the petitioner herein is claiming shelter under Section 47 and the other way he is claiming shelter under Order XXI Rule 90. With regards to the issue raised the question of irregularity or illegality in publishing and conducting the sale of the property in question clearly comes within the purview of Order XXI Rule 90 whereas it does not come within the purview of the other provision. When Section 47 speaks of execution of a decree, certainly Order XXI Rule 90 deals with a different aspect as it deals with the question of setting aside sale of a property on the grounds of illegality or irregularity in conducting the sale. Therefore, the question on hand is to be decided only on the question of application of Order XXI Rule 90. 21. The decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are not applicable here. 22. It is very clear that the motto of the opposite parties is to see that they would not loose their property at any cost ignoring the plight of the first respondent. In order to achieve their object it seems that they got no feeling of sympathy towards the first respondent or a feeling of accepting justice. Such people should be dealt with sternly otherwise law abiding people would have to suffer. The circumstances of the case make it very clear that the auction purchaser suffered a lot to enjoy the fruits of sale held in 1998. Such people should be dealt with sternly otherwise law abiding people would have to suffer. The circumstances of the case make it very clear that the auction purchaser suffered a lot to enjoy the fruits of sale held in 1998. The family members of the petitioner and also the petitioner successfully thwarted his endeavour to achieve his object having filed various petitions referred and thereby placing necessary hurdles. 23. In the result, for the above reasons, the civil revision petition is dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) payable by the petitioner to the third respondent-auction purchaser in pursuing the frivolous litigation within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order failing which the third respondent-auction purchaser can realize it as per law. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.