JUDGMENT 1. - The accused-petitioner, Pushp Ratan, is aggrieved by the order dated 31.07.2012 passed by the Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge (J.D.), Mundawar, District Alwar, whereby the learned Magistrate has refused to send the petitioner's application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the Police Station Mundawar for investigation, and has instead decided to record the statement of the complainant, and of his witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. respectively. 2. The brief facts of the case are that one Veer Singh had lodged a report on 19.10.2008 at Police Station Mundawar wherein he claimed that on 18.10.2008 at 4.00 P.M. while he was sitting at home, accused persons Pushp Ratan (the present petitioner), Ratan, Udai Singh, Prasoon, Rituraj, Vimla, Ramesh, came to his fields. They cut away a Rohidi tree and assaulted him with lathies, Kulhadi (axe) and Farsi (a big axe). He further claimed that he has sustained injury on his jaw and lost one finger of his left hand. Lastly he claimed that his brother Rajesh was also injured. On the basis of this report, a formal FIR, FIR No.279/08 was registered. During the course of investigation, on 19.10.2008, Veer Singh was medically examined and the medical report was taken by the Head Constable, Staish Kumar. However, on 08.11.2008, Veer Singh submitted an application wherein he claimed that he was assaulted only by Udai Singh. The other persons named by him in the FIR were not present at the scene of crime. He had named them under pressure by others. Moreover, he does not wish his medical examination to be done. Although, Veer Singh knew very well that his medical examination was carried out on 19.10.2008, still in his application he mentioned that he does not wish to be medically examined. Moreover, since Satish Kumar had already received the injury report, it was also well within his knowledge that Veer Singh has been medically examined. Knowing fully about these facts, still Veer Singh and Pop Singh submitted the above mentioned application. The Investigating Officer knowing fully well that the medical examination had been done, still included the said application in the record. On the basis of the application filed by Veer Singh, eventually the police submitted a charge-sheet only against Udai Singh and that too for offences under Sections 323, 341 IPC. Surprisingly, in the charge-sheet, the Investigating Officer did not submit Veer Singh's injury report. 3. On the basis of the application filed by Veer Singh, eventually the police submitted a charge-sheet only against Udai Singh and that too for offences under Sections 323, 341 IPC. Surprisingly, in the charge-sheet, the Investigating Officer did not submit Veer Singh's injury report. 3. Although, the petitioner was named as an accused in the FIR lodged by Veer Singh, he is aggrieved by the fact that he was falsely implicated by Veer Singh in the said FIR. Moreover, he is aggrieved by the fact that the Investigating Officer, in collusion with Veer Singh, has presented the wrong facts of the case. Thus, according to the petitioner, the respondents have committed offences under Sections 466, 468, 182, 193, 196, 218, 120B IPC. Therefore, the petitioner submitted an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate praying that his application should be sent to the police for further investigation. However, by order dated 31.07.2012, the learned Magistrate declined to send the application for further investigation under. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Instead, the learned Magistrate thought it proper to record the statement of the complainant, and of his witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. respectively. Since the petitioner is aggrieved by the said order, he has filed the present petition before this court. 4. Relying upon the case of Babulal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2009 (3) WLC (Raj.) 199 , the learned counsel has contended that this court has opined that once an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is filed, the Magistrate has no other option, but to, ipso facto, send the application for further investigation by the police. Therefore, the learned Magistrate does not have an option to record the statement of the complainant, and of his witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. respectively. Hence, the learned Magistrate has Illegally exercised his discretion. Thus, the order deserves to be set aside, 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, perused the Impugned order and considered the case law cited at the Bar.Section 156 Cr.P.C. reads as under: "156. Police Officer's power to investigate cognizable case. - (1) Any Officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Police Officer's power to investigate cognizable case. - (1) Any Officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned." 6. A bare perusal of the Section clearly reveals that Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. uses the word "may order", The word "may" in this provision has granted a discretionary power upon the Magistrate to send the application for further investigation. After all, the word "may" is a discretionary word and not a mandatory word like the word "shall". 7. In the case of Babulal (supra), in Para-23, this court had observed as under:- "In a case, where an aggrieved person files an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. then it is to be proceeded in accordance to the prayer made therein and within the relevant provisions of law, which have been mentioned above. The Magistrate is not to go beyond the scope of the afore-referred Section, on his own. As a matter of fact, a Magistrate cannot transform an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. into a one under Section 2(d) Cr.P.C., as a complaint. It is not for the Magistrate concerned to start the Us in his own way but it is the aggrieved person who has to do it in the form and forum, which he deems fit and proper. In the recent past, it has been noted by this court that where cognizable offence is disclosed in the application, the Magistrate do not pass orders to the police for registration and investigation, as prayed for. In some cases, they even refuse to do so. In my considered opinion, if a cognizable offence is disclosed in an application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. the Magistrate concerned has no option but to direct the police to register and investigate the case. 8. In some cases, they even refuse to do so. In my considered opinion, if a cognizable offence is disclosed in an application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. the Magistrate concerned has no option but to direct the police to register and investigate the case. 8. However, since the State of Rajasthan was aggrieved by the opinion expressed by this court in last three lines of the above quoted para, it filed a SLP before the Apex Court, namely Special Leave to Petition (Criminal) No. 10534 of 2010, State of Rajasthan v. Babu Lal & Ors. By order dated 11.05.2010 , the Apex Court stayed the observation made in Para-23 quoted above. Therefore, the learned counsel is unjustified in relying upon the case of Babulal. For, the very ratio of the case has been stayed by the Apex Court. 9. The extent and ambit of the power contained in Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is no longer res integra. In the case of Mona Pan war v. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad through its Registrar & Ors., 2011 (1) Lawdigital.in 368 (SC) : 2011(3) SSC 496 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has opined as under: "18. When the complaint was presented before the appellant, the appellant had mainly two options available to her. One was to pass an order as contemplated by Section 156(3) of the Code and second one was to direct examination of the complainant upon oath and the witnesses present, if any, as mentioned in Section 200 and proceed further with the matter as provided by Section 202 of the Code. An order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with the final report either under Section 169 or submission of charge sheet under Section 173 of the Code. A Magistrate can under Section 190 of the Code before taking cognizance ask for investigation by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code. The Magistrate can also issue warrant for production, before taking cognizance. If after cognizance has been taken and the Magistrate wants any investigation, it will be under Section 202 of the Code. 23. A Magistrate can under Section 190 of the Code before taking cognizance ask for investigation by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code. The Magistrate can also issue warrant for production, before taking cognizance. If after cognizance has been taken and the Magistrate wants any investigation, it will be under Section 202 of the Code. 23. Normally, an order under Section 200 of the Code for examination of the passed because if consumes the valuable time of the Magistrate being vested in inquiring into the matter which primarily is the duty of the police to investigate. However, the practice which has developed over the years is that examination of the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200 of the Code would be directed by the Magistrate only when a case is found to be a serious one and not as a matter of routine course. If on a reading of -a complaint the Magistrate finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code will not be conducive to justice, he will be justified in adopting the course suggested in Section 200 of the Code. (Emphasis added)" 10. Thus, the settled position of law is that a discretion has been bestowed upon the learned Magistrate either to send an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for investigation by the police, or to record the statement of the complainant and of his witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. Since in the present case the learned Magistrate has decided to choose the second option before him, the impugned order cannot be faulted. 11. Thus, this court does not find any merit in the present petition. It is, hereby, dismissed. The stay application is also dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******