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2013 DIGILAW 48 (MEG)

Matap Mark v. State of Meghalaya & Ors.

2013-11-15

PRAFULLA C.PANT, T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2013
Judgment T. Nandakumar Singh, J.:-- 1. By this writ petition, the petitioner is praying for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay compensation for the land measuring about 59 bighas purported to have been taken over by the Fisheries Department, Govt. of Meghalaya, Shillong more than 20 years ago by drawing up land acquisition proceeding. There is a considerable delay of more than one decade in approaching the court by the writ petitioner for the relief sought for in the present writ petition. 2. Heard Mr. H.R. Nath, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. H. Kharmih, learned GA appearing for the State respondents. 3. The succinct fact sufficient for deciding the matter in issue in the present writ petition is recapitulated that the petitioner is the recognized Akhing Nokma of Jamge Akhing and as an Akhing Nokma, he is the owner and manager of the Akhing land including the land in question said to have been taken over by the Govt. of Meghalaya, Fisheries Department. The pleaded case of the petitioner in para 3 of the writ petition is that the respondents had taken possession of 104 bighas of land in Jamge Akhing in the year 1989. Out of the said 104 bighas, 45.12 bighas were acquired with due process under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Save and except the said pleadings in the writ petition, there is no material pleadings supported by the documents that in the year 1989 the Akhing land measuring about 104 bighas had been taken over by the Govt. for the Fisheries Department. It is the further case of the petitioner that the Deputy Commissioner handed over the land measuring 45 bighas 12 lessa to the Fishery Department on 19.05.1989 and certificate for taking over of the said land by the Department was also issued i.e. certificate No. EGH/REV 132/83/75 dated Williamnagar 19.05.1989 (Annexure-I to the writ petition). The respondents along with the said 45 bighas 12 lessa of land had possessed the remaining area measuring about 59 bighas i.e. whole 104 bighas without following the due acquisition process and also the respondents did not pay the compensation or rent to the petitioner for the said 59 bighas since they had taken the possession of the whole 104 bighas of land. 4. 4. The petitioner further states that the Deputy Commissioner, East Garo Hills, Meghalaya (respondent No. 4) on 08.10.2007 wrote a letter to the Director of Fisheries, Meghalaya, Shillong (respondent No. 3) mentioning that after careful examination of the map and original sketch map, the excess land claimed by the petitioner comes to 59 bighas and requested the respondent No. 3 to sanction a total amount of Rs. 59,35,164.00/- and to pay it to the petitioner. For claiming that after acquiring 45 bighas and 12 lessa out of 104 bighas, the Fisheries Department had possessed the remaining 59 bighas without paying any compensation, the petitioner placed heavy reliance on the said letter of the Deputy Commissioner dated 08.10.2007. Since the petitioner had placed heavy reliance on the said letter of the Deputy Commissioner dated 08.10.2007 for the relief sought for in the present writ petition, it would be more profitable and convenience to reproduce the letter hereunder:- “GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, EAST GARO HILLS DISTRICT ::: WILLIAMNAGAR. No. EGH/REV. 132/83/145, dated Williamnagar, the 8th October, 2007. From: The Deputy Commissioner, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar. To, The Director of Fisheries, Meghalaya, Shillong. Sub: Acquisition of land by Fishery Department, Govt. of Meghalaya at Songsak (Jamge). Ref: Letter No. MEG/PISC/3102/86-87/98 dt.2.8.2007. Madam, In continuation of this office letter No. EHG/REV. 132/83/142 dated 5.9.2007, I have the honour to state that the joint verification of the acquired area of land could not be conducted on 18.9.2007. As the G.D.C. representative did not turn up without any information to the undersigned. However, basing on the area of map traced out by the G.D.C. itself (copy enclosed) following probable facts are being intimated herewith for your information and necessary action. 1. That as per availability of office records, it is a fact that the physical possession of land of 45.12 bighas only has been done on 19.5.1989 vide letter No. EGH/REV. 132/83/75, dated 19.5.1989 (copy enclosed). Accordingly, the payment of land compensation amounting to Rs. 2,82,576/- as sanctioned vide Fishery Department letter No. MEG/PISC/3419/88-89/18 dated 25.4.1989 has also been made for 45.12 bighas. 2. That on careful examination of above mentioned map and the original sketch map, it can be found that the excess quantum of land as claimed by the Nokma comes to 59 bighas (i.e. 104-45.12-59). Both copy of sketch map enclosed for your ready reference. 3. 2. That on careful examination of above mentioned map and the original sketch map, it can be found that the excess quantum of land as claimed by the Nokma comes to 59 bighas (i.e. 104-45.12-59). Both copy of sketch map enclosed for your ready reference. 3. Based on the above clarifications, the balance amount of land compensation for the excess quantum of land i.e. for 59 bighas come to Rs. 59,35,164/- as per latest enhanced rate notified vide G.D.C’s Letter No. GDCREV/1107/06/2448-60, dated 26.5.2006. The calculation of the above estimated amount has included all the mandatory provisions under L.A. Act as below:- (a) Cost of land - 35,40,000.00 (b) 30% Solatium - 10,62,000.00 (c) 12% Interest for three years - 12,74,400.00 (d) 10% Contingency & - 58.764.00 Establishment Charge Total - Rs. 59,35,164.00 In view of this, I would therefore, request you to kindly examine the matter and sanction the balance amount of compensation for Rs. 59,35,164.00 which is supposed to be paid to the petitioner so as to settle the problem at the earliest possible. This is for your information and necessary action. Sd/- Deputy Commissioner, East Garo Hills District, Williamnagar.” 5. On bare perusal of the said letter of the Deputy Commissioner dated 08.10.2007, it is clear that the Deputy Commissioner mentioned only the claim of the petitioner that the Fisheries Department, Govt. of Meghalaya possessed 59 bighas (i.e. 104 -45.12 - 59) of land and the amount of compensation for the said excess land i.e. 59 bighas. In nowhere of the letter dated 18.10.2007, the Deputy Commissioner made his finding that the said 59 bighas of land had been taken over and possessed by the Fisheries Department. 6. The writ petitioner also annexed the parawise comments of the Director of Fisheries, Govt. of Meghalaya to the claim for the payment of balance amount/compensation by the petitioner to the Govt. of Meghalaya. In that comments, the Director of Fisheries i.e. the Fisheries Department very clearly stated that only 45.12 bighas (15 acres) was duly acquired by the Fisheries Department and the Fisheries Department does not require the excess land of 59 bighas as only 45.12 bighas (15 acres) was actually acquired and the Fisheries Department did not take possession of the said 59 bighas as claimed by the writ petitioner Shri. Matap Marak. That comments of the Director of Fisheries was also forwarded to the Govt. That comments of the Director of Fisheries was also forwarded to the Govt. of Meghalaya under his letter being No. MEG/PISC/3102/86-87/160 dated 26.03.2010. The said comments of the Director of Fisheries is also quoted hereunder:- “PARAWISE COMMENTS ON THE PAYMENT OF BALANCE AMOUNT OF LAND COMPENSATION FOR ACQUISITION OF LAND BY THE FISHERIES DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA AT JAMGE AKHING, EAST GARO HILLS. 1. It is to be clarified here that the Departmental had actually taken possession of the plot of land at Jamge on 19.5.1989 for 45.12 bighas (15 acres) and not 59 bighas as claimed by Shri. Matap Marak, Nokma (Photostat copy enclosed). Further, it is to be mentioned here that the land acquisition for 45.12 bighas (15 acres) was done by the then Deputy Commissioner, Williamnagar after observing due process of land like Notification during July, 1987 (Photostat copy enclosed). 2. As explained in para 1. 3. As explained in para 1. 4. No comments. 5. It is to be clarified here that as per point No. 2 indicated by the Deputy Commissioner, Williamnagar vide letter No. EGH/REV.132/83/145 dated 8.10.2007, addressed to the Director of Fisheries, Shillong, it clearly states that only 45.12 bighas (15 acres) was duly acquired by the Fisheries Department as explained in Para 1. 6. As explained in Para 5. 7. It is to be clarified that the Department has actually acquired 45.12 bighas and not 104 bighas as indicated by the Deputy Commissioner. Williamnagar vide his letter No. EGH/REV-132/74 dated 9.5.1989 and Rs. 2,82,756/- was also paid as compensation for 45.12 bighas vide Bank Draft No. MLT/A/2 dt.28.3.1989 (Photostat copy enclosed) 8. It is to be clarified here that the Department does not require excess land of 59 bighas as only 45.12 bighas (15 acres) was actually acquired and compensation paid as explained in Para 7. In this connection, a copy of letter No. EGH/REV/132/83/163 dated 27.3.2009, being conduct joint survey and re-demarcation of land for Regional Fishseed Farm, Jamge is enclosed for your ready reference. 9. As explained in Para 8. 10. As explained in Para 1. 11. As explained in Para 1. 12. As explained in Para 1. Sd/ (N.D. Sangma) Director of Fisheries, Meghalaya, Shillong.” 7. 9. As explained in Para 8. 10. As explained in Para 1. 11. As explained in Para 1. 12. As explained in Para 1. Sd/ (N.D. Sangma) Director of Fisheries, Meghalaya, Shillong.” 7. The respondent filed joint affidavit-in-opposition stating that initially there was a proposal for taking over of 104 bighas of land for the Fisheries Department but later on finally decided to acquire only 45.12 bighas (15 acres) out of the said 104 bighas of land. Accordingly, only 45.12 bighas of land (15 acres) was taken possession by the Fisheries Department and the amount of Rs. 2,82,756.00/- had been paid as compensation for the said land vide letter of the Deputy Commissioner, Williamnagar being No. EGH/REV/132/83/75 dated 19.05.1989. The Fisheries Department does not require the excess land i.e. 59 bighas out of the said 109 bighas of land and accordingly, the Fisheries Department neither took possession of it nor acquisition proceeding was taken up. 8. As the petitioner claims that the Fisheries Department is in possession of the land in excess of 45.12 bighas (15 acres) and claimed for compensation for the excess land, there was re-demarcation and resurvey of the land occupied and possessed by the Fisheries Department in presence of the writ petitioner, his Maharis, Farm Superintendent and Patta Holder of the land already acquired by the Fisheries Department on 22.06.2010. After such re-demarcation and resurvey, the Extra Assistant Commissioner, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar submitted the report dated 08.07.2010, clearly that the Fisheries Department is in possession only 45 bighas and 12 lessa and the actual possession of the land by the Fisheries Department is not 104 bighas as claimed by the petitioner. The Extra Assistant Commissioner, East Garo Hills also obtained the signatures of all the persons in whose presence re-demarcation and resurvey of the land actually occupied by the Fisheries Department was conducted on 23.06.2010. The said report on the redemarcation and resurvey is reproduced below:- “REPORT ON THE REDEMARCATION AND RESURVEY OF REGIONAL FISH SEED FARM, JAMGE. As per the Deputy Commissioner’ order No. EGH/REV.132/83/172, dated 22nd June 2010, redemarcation and resurvey of the Regional Fish Farm, Jamge was conducted jointly by the survey team of GHADC, Tura under my supervision on 23/6/2010 and in the presence of the following parties:- (attendance recorded at Annexure-A) viz 1. Shri. Matap Marak, Nokma of Jamge and some of his maharis. 2. Shri. Matap Marak, Nokma of Jamge and some of his maharis. 2. Shri. Ronithson Marak, the patta holder of the acquired land to whom compensation of land was paid. 3. Shri. George W. Momin, Farm Superintendent, Fish seed Farm, Jamge (representing Fishery Deptt.). During verification of land, the earlier land acquisition papers and map was referred. Since, three plots under Mouza No. IV, P.P. viz Dag Nos. 1, 2 and 3 with the areas of B31-k2-L1: Bill-K1-L17: B2-K1-L14 respectively and had been the acquired land for the Fishery Deptt., physical verification of the said land along with the actual possession under the Fishery Farm was made. As per the land acquisition papers, the total area of B-45-K-O-L12 or 6.03 hactares was acquired payment made and land taken over by the Fishery Deptt on 19/5/1989. Re-demarcation and re-surveying of the above said plots was done one plot after another. The plots in question was taken measurements again by means of chain survey from all corners. Identification of the boundaries could clearly be made out as posts and pillars can still be seen. Measurements of the resurvey of the actual land in possession of Fishery Deptt. At Jamge gives the following end result. 1. Plot No. 1 - total area - B31-K2-L10 2. Plot No. 2 - total area - B11-K1-L17 3. Plot No. 3 - total area - B2-K1-L1 Total - B 45-K1-L01 It is seen that after a survey, the land in actual possession by the Fishery Deptt. is almost the same (only a negligible increase is seen). It is, therefore be concluded that the actual land in possession by the Fishery Deptt. is not 104 bighas as claimed by the nokma but 45 bighas-01K and 01L. Hence, the question of payment for another 59 bighas does not arise. To this effect, the map has also been plotted by the GHADC, Tura after resurvey of the said land and countersigned by the Senior Assistant Settlement Officer, GHADC, Tura who was also present during the whole survey. (His Written Statement and Map also enclosed for ready reference at Annexure B & C respectively). Map as prepared has also shown the other plots with their total area (Plots of the adjoining areas which were included when initially 104 bighas was proposed to be acquired i.e. Plot No. 4, 5, 6 & 7). (His Written Statement and Map also enclosed for ready reference at Annexure B & C respectively). Map as prepared has also shown the other plots with their total area (Plots of the adjoining areas which were included when initially 104 bighas was proposed to be acquired i.e. Plot No. 4, 5, 6 & 7). Sd/- S.B. Marak, MCS, Extra Assistant Commissioner, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar.” 9. The clear pleaded case of the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition is that the Fisheries Department had taken possession of only 45.12 bighas (15 acres) and for that compensation amounting to Rs. 2,82,576.00 had already been paid by the Fisheries Department and never took possession of the excess land i.e. 59 bighas (i.e. 104-42.12-59) and therefore, question of payment does not arise. The Govt. of Meghalaya under letter of the O.S.D. to the Govt. of Meghalaya being No. PISC(G)8/89/208 dated 24.08.2010, had already informed the writ petitioner that the land occupied by the Fisheries Department is only 45.12 bighas and the award made by the Collector for compensation of the land possessed by the Fisheries Department is final. The question of reopening after 21 years does not arise. The said letter for convenience is also quoted hereunder:- “GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA FISHERIES DEPARTMENT. No. PISC(G)8/89/208 Dated Shillong, the 24th August, 2010. From : Shri. N.D. Sangma, MCS, Officer on Special Duty to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Fisheries Department. To: Shri. Matap Marak, Nokma of Jamge Akhing East Garo Hills. Subject: Land under the Fisheries Department at Regional Fishseed Farm, Jamge. Reference: Your letter dated 8th June, 2010. Sir, With reference to your letter cited above, I am directed to inform you that we have received a report from the Deputy Commissioner, East Garo Hills District, Williamnagar, regarding the joint re-survey and redemarcation of the land under the Regional Fishseed Farm at Jamge carried out on the 23-6-2010 by the officers deputed by the Deputy Commissioner and the GHADC. It has been indicated that you, too, were present during the said exercise. According to this report, the land in actual possession of the Fisheries Department at Jamge, measures 45 bighas 1 Katha and 1 lessa in 3(three) plots, the details of which are indicated below:- 1. Plot No. 1 - total area - B31-K2-L10 2. Plot No. 2 - total area - B11-K1-L17 3. According to this report, the land in actual possession of the Fisheries Department at Jamge, measures 45 bighas 1 Katha and 1 lessa in 3(three) plots, the details of which are indicated below:- 1. Plot No. 1 - total area - B31-K2-L10 2. Plot No. 2 - total area - B11-K1-L17 3. Plot No. 3 - total area - B2-K1-L1 Total - B 45-K1-L01 As such, the controversy regarding the area of land at Jamge in the possession of the Fisheries Department is now finally settled as per the position indicated above. Moreover, legally, the award of the Collector is the final conclusive evidence as per Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and as such the question of reopening this case after 21 years does not arise. You are, therefore, requested to treat this matter as closed and resolved, once for all. This has the approval of the competent authority. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (N. D. Sangma) Officer on Special Duty to the Govt. of Meghalaya Fisheries : Shillong.” 10. It is now well settled law that a party has to plead its case and produce sufficient evidence to substantiate the averments made in the writ petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. There is a clear distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or counter-affidavit. While in a pleading i.e. a plaint or written statement, the facts and not the evidence are required to be pleaded. But in a writ petition or in a counter-affidavit not only the facts but also evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. The Apex Court held in the Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011) 7 SCC 639 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1989 ), (para 9 of the SCC) that: “9. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, (1988) 4 SCC 534 : AIR 1988 SC 2181 , this Court has observed as under (SCC p.543, para 13) “13. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011) 7 SCC 639 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1989 ), (para 9 of the SCC) that: “9. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, (1988) 4 SCC 534 : AIR 1988 SC 2181 , this Court has observed as under (SCC p.543, para 13) “13. ........In our opinion, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the court will not entertain the point.....there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, that is, a plaint or written statement, the facts and not [the] evidence are required to be pleaded in a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it.” (Emphasis added) A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387 : AIR 1998 SC 1608 ; Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh (2001) 5 SCC 133 : AIR 2001 SC 1684 and Rajasthan Pradesh Vaidya Samiti v. Union of India (2010) 12 SCC 609 : AIR 2010 SC 2221 .” 11. The Apex Court further held that in the absence of proper pleadings before the High Court on the basis of which the writ petition could be entertained/decided, the writ petition is liable to be rejected at the threshold for the reasons that the writ petition suffered for want of proper pleadings and material to substantiate the averments or allegations contained therein. Paras 10 & 16 of the SCC in State of Madhya Pradesh case ( AIR 2011 SC 1989 Paras 9 and 13) (supra) read as follows:- “10. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Paras 10 & 16 of the SCC in State of Madhya Pradesh case ( AIR 2011 SC 1989 Paras 9 and 13) (supra) read as follows:- “10. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question(s) in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is settled legal proposition that “as a rule, relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted”. Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. 16. In view of the above, it is evident that there were no pleadings before the High Court on the basis of which the writ petition could be entertained/decided. Thus, it was liable to be rejected at the threshold for the reason that the writ petition suffered for want of proper pleadings and material to substantiate the averments/allegations contained therein. Even in the case of a PIL, such a course could not be available to the writ petitioners.” 12. The present writ petition is liable to be rejected at the threshold for the reasons that there is no proper and material pleadings to substantiate the averments that the Fisheries Department is in possession of the said excess land i.e. 59 bighas and also there is no documents or evidence to prove of their allegation that the Fisheries Department is in possession of the excess land. From the pleadings of the parties, it is clear that there is serious disputed question of facts, if the Fisheries Department is in possession of the excess land i.e. 59 bighas. The writ proceeding is not the proper proceeding or forum for deciding the disputed questions of facts for which examination of the witnesses and documents are required. The Apex Court in a catena of cases held that where the disputed questions of facts are involved in the writ petition and for deciding that disputed facts, evidence are required, writ court is not the proper forum for seeking relief. The Apex Court in a catena of cases held that where the disputed questions of facts are involved in the writ petition and for deciding that disputed facts, evidence are required, writ court is not the proper forum for seeking relief. For this settled law, it may not be required to refer to several decisions of the Apex Court, it would be sufficed to refer to the decisions of the Apex Court in (i) D.L.F. Housing Construction (P) Ltd. v. Delhi Municipal Corpn. & Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 160 : ( AIR 1976 SC 386 ); (ii) Daljit Singh Dalal (Dead) through LRs v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 62 : ( AIR 1997 SC 1367 ); and (iii) Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) & Ors. v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) & Anr. (1999) 7 SCC 298 : ( AIR 1999 SC 3412 ). Para 20 of the SCC in D.L.F. Housing Construction (P) Ltd. case ( AIR 1976 SC 386 , Para 18) (supra) reads as follows: “20. In our opinion, in a case where the basic facts are disputed, and complicated questions of law and fact depending on evidence are involved the writ court is not the proper forum for seeking relief. The right course for the High Court to follow was to dismiss the writ petition on this preliminary ground, without entering upon the merits of the case. In the absence of firm and adequate factual foundation, it was hazardous to embark upon a determination of the points involved. On this short ground while setting aside the findings of the High Court, we would dismiss both the writ petition and the appeal with costs. The appellants may, if so advised, seek their remedy by a regular suit.” Para 8 of the SCC in Daljit Singh Dalal case ( AIR 1997 SC 1367 ) (supra) reads as follows: “8. There are thus several disputed questions of fact. We also fail to see any public interest involved in this petition. The disputes raised by the petitioner being factual disputes, cannot be examined in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petition is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.” Para 6 of the SCC in Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) case ( AIR 1999 SC 3412 ) (supra) held as follows: “6. The disputes raised by the petitioner being factual disputes, cannot be examined in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petition is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.” Para 6 of the SCC in Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) case ( AIR 1999 SC 3412 ) (supra) held as follows: “6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that “admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants”. The High Court failed to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to Appellant 1 had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the deceased and come in contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorized intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. Those questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995.” 13. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995.” 13. It is a fact that there is a considerable delay of more than a decade in filing the present writ petition. It is also clear that no reason or any sort of explanations are mentioned in the writ petition as to why the writ petitioner had been waiting about two decades for filing the present writ petition. In para 18 of the writ petition, instead of mentioning the reason for delay in approaching this Court by filing the present writ petition, the petitioner pleaded that the respondents are causing unreasonable delay to settle the compensation in favour of the petitioner. It is a trite law that there is no prescribed limitation for filing the writ petition. But it is equally settled law that there should be explanations or reasons for the delay in filing the writ petition. However, the writ court has the discretion to accept the writ petition filed after a considerable delay. For exercising this discretion jurisdiction there shall be some materials make out by the petitioner for accepting the writ petition which was filed with a considerable delay. The Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors v. Jyotish Chandra Biswas, AIR 2000 SCC 3666 held that the writ petition filed with a considerable delay about six years for which there was no reasonable explanation should be rejected at the threshold. Para 7 of the AIR in Life Insurance Corporation of India case (supra) reads as follows: “7. The order terminating the services of the respondent was passed on 28-1-1969. The writ petition was filed challenging the said order on 25-3-1975, almost after a period of six years. There was no explanation in the writ petition whatsoever for this inordinate delay. The respondent sought for his reemployment in the Corporation by his letter dated 9-1-1974 almost after a period of five years from the date of termination of his services. It only indicated that he accepted the order of termination of his services, if not expressly but impliedly. There was no explanation in the writ petition whatsoever for this inordinate delay. The respondent sought for his reemployment in the Corporation by his letter dated 9-1-1974 almost after a period of five years from the date of termination of his services. It only indicated that he accepted the order of termination of his services, if not expressly but impliedly. In the writ petition no ground was raised as to deprivation of right of appeal to the respondent against the order of the termination of his service. It is not the case of the respondent that he was denied any opportunity offending principles of natural justice. Inquiry was held pursuant to the charge-sheet; witnesses were examined; and even the respondent examined three witnesses on his behalf. The Inquiry Officer looking to the evidence brought on record found the respondent guilty of the charges. It was also not shown that any prejudice was caused to him in the inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority concurring with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, after giving further opportunity to the respondent, passed the order terminating the services of the respondent. These being the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion the learned single Judge was right in dismissing the writ petition. We find that the order of the learned single Judge is a detailed and considered one. We find it difficult to accept the observations made by the Division Bench of the High Court extracted above that the order passed by the learned single Judge was laconic. When there was no explanation whatsoever given by the respondent in the writ petition for delay of about six years, the learned single Judge was right in saying so and dismissing it. When the ground that the respondent was deprived of a right to appeal was not taken before the learned single Judge either in the writ petition or in arguments, the Division Bench was not right and justified in saying that the learned single Judge did not assign any reason whatsoever in support of his judgment in the regard. We fail to understand how such a non-existing ground could be considered by the learned single Judge.” 14. The Apex Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors. We fail to understand how such a non-existing ground could be considered by the learned single Judge.” 14. The Apex Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353 : ( AIR 2013 SC 565 ) had elaborately discussed the maintainability of the writ petition filed with delay and laches and held (Para 13 of the SCC in Tukaram Kana Joshi case ( AIR 2013 SC 565 , Para 11) (supra): “13. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party’s defence must be tried upon principle ‘substantially equitable. (Vide Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22 : AIR 1974 SC 2271 State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 and Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. (2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 824)). 15. At the last Mr. H.R. Nath, learned counsel for the petitioner made a faint attempt to substantiate the case of the petitioner by praying that the concerned authority of the Revenue Department of the State of Meghalaya be directed to see if the Fisheries Department is in possession of the said land i.e. 59 bighas or who is in possession of the said excess land. The Court can grant his prayer only when there are sufficient materials for satisfying prima facie for directing such enquiry. The Court can grant his prayer only when there are sufficient materials for satisfying prima facie for directing such enquiry. As stated above, there are no materials or material pleadings substantiated by the documents for satisfying prima facie that the Fisheries Department has been/is in possession of the said excess land i.e. 59 bighas. The Apex Court in a catena of cases held that the writ petition cannot be filed for the purpose of roving enquiry. It would be sufficed to refer to the decisions of the Apex Court in (i) Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority v. S. Vasudeva & Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 439 : ( AIR 2000 SC 767 ); (ii) Secretary, Minor Irrigation & Rural Engineering Services, U.P. & Ors. v. Sahngoo Ram Arya & Anr. (2002) 5 SCC 521 : ( AIR 2002 SC 2225 ); and (iii) Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee & Anr. v. C.K. Rajan & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 546 : ( AIR 2004 SC 561 ). Para 65 of the SCC in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee case (supra) reads as follows: “65. Where access to justice poses a fundamental problem facing the third world today, its importance in India has increased. Laws are designed to improve the socio-economic conditions of the poor but making the law is not enough, it must be implemented. The core issues which have been highlighted by the learned counsel of the parties must be considered from that angel. Administration of a temple by entertaining complaints does not lead to a happy state of affairs. Roving enquiry is not contemplated. Principles of natural justice and fair play ought to be followed even in the pro bono publico proceedings. The courts, undoubtedly, would be a parens patriae in relation to idols, but when the statute governs the field and the State takes over the management, ordinarily the courts would not step in.” 16. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered view that the present writ petition is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.