ORDER Heard Mr. Dhananjay Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Prabhu Narayan Sharma, A.C. to A.G. for the State. 2. In the present writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the FIR of Patori P.S.Case No. 249 of 2011 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 25(1-b)A/35 of the Arms Act. 3. On the basis of a written report dated 15.3.2010 submitted by the petitioner to the Officer-in-charge of Patori police station, Patori P.S. Case no. 42 of 2010 was registered against Sudhir Kumar Mahto and Manish Kumar Mahto for the offence under sections 365, 366A read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and 25 (I-B)A/ 35 of the Arms Act. 4. It has been stated in the aforesaid written report by the petitioner that his daughter Priyam Kumari, aged about 15 years, went out on the pretext of bringing medicine on 14th March, 2012 at 5.00 p.m. When she did not return to her house till 7.30 in the evening, the petitioner suspected foul. He went out to search for his daughter but could not trace her. He came back to his house and then went towards the maize field to defecate. On the way, he heard voice of four persons talking on mobile in the darkness of night. He could gather from their conversation that they were talking with his missing daughter. The petitioner came back to his house and informed his neighbours, namely, Ram Deyal Mahto, Shiv Deyal Mahto, Ratnesh Kumar and Raushan Kumar in this regard and proceeded with them towards the field where the four suspected persons were found talking with the petitioner’s missing daughter. 5. It has been further stated that the petitioner and others could apprehend two accused persons, namely, Sudhir Kumar Mahto and Manish Kumar Mahto but, the two others managed to escape. The petitioner alleged that when Sudhir Kumar Mahto was being over powered, a pistol fell on the ground from his waist. An information was sent to Patori Police Station in this regard. When the police came, the written report, the pistol and the two apprehended accused were hand over to them for necessary action. 6. The petitioner suspected that the accused persons were actively involved in abducting his daughter. The police instituted an FIR and took up investigation of the case. An information was sent to Patori Police Station in this regard. When the police came, the written report, the pistol and the two apprehended accused were hand over to them for necessary action. 6. The petitioner suspected that the accused persons were actively involved in abducting his daughter. The police instituted an FIR and took up investigation of the case. The petitioner was not satisfied with the manner in which the investigation was going on and, as such, he filed a protest petition in the court while the case was still under investigation. 7. On conclusion of investigation in Patori P.S. Case No.42 of 2010, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet under Sections 494, 366A and 376 of the Indian Penal Code on 30th June, 2011, against one Supendra Kumar son of Bipin Singh. However, the accused persons named in the FIR were found to be innocent and, as such, they were not sent up for trial. 8. It also transpired in course of investigation and supervision of Patori P.S. Case No. 42 of 2010 that the petitioner had planted pistol in question in order to frame the accused persons in a false case under Section 25(1-B) A read with 35 of the Arms Act. 9. It appears from perusal of the contents of the charge sheet no. 93 of 2011 dated 30th June, 2011, submitted in connection with the aforesaid Patori P.S. Case No. 42 of 2010 that the supervising officer directed the investigating officer of the case to institute a separate FIR against the petitioner and investigate the same. 10. Accordingly, on the basis of written report of the Investigating Officer of Patori P.S.Case No. 42 of 2010, namely, Surendra Prasad Ram, Sub Inspector of Police, Patori P.S.Case No. 249 of 2011 dated 6.12.2011, was registered under Section 25(1-b)A and 35 of the Arms Act against the petitioner and investigation was taken up. 11. The police investigated Patori P.S. Case No. 249 of 2011 and on conclusion of investigation submitted chargesheet vide chargesheet No. 114 of 2012 dated 30.4.2012 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Samastipur. 12. In the present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the second FIR i.e., Patori P.S. Case No. 249 of 2011 instituted against him by the police. 13. Mr. 12. In the present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the second FIR i.e., Patori P.S. Case No. 249 of 2011 instituted against him by the police. 13. Mr. Dhananjay Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the second FIR for the same incident is impermissible in law. He submitted that the Investigating Agency has no determinative right. They have only “right to investigate” the case in accordance with law. 14. He submitted that on conclusion of investigation, if the police submitted their report under Section 173 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Code’) before the court, the matter attains finality as far as the police is concerned, subject to right of further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code. According to him, if the investigation has been completed and the informant of the case is found to be guilty of committing an offence, reinvestigation by the Investigating Agency on its own cannot be permitted by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. 15. He further submitted that under the Code, reinvestigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the Investigating Agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. 16. Per contra, Mr. Prabhu Narayan Sharma, learned counsel for the State, submitted that sufficient materials were collected in course of investigation of the first case i.e., Patori P.S. Case No. 42 of 2010 that it was the petitioner, who had planted the pistol in question to frame the accused persons in an out and out false and concocted case under the Arms Act. The supervising authorities also found the allegations true as against the petitioner and, as such, directed the Investigating Officer of the first case to institute FIR against the petitioner separately and investigate the same. Upon investigation, the second case was found true against the petitioner and after obtaining sanction from the District Magistrate, charge sheet has already been submitted against the petitioner in the court. 17. Mr. Sharma submitted that the Magistrate concerned has already taken cognizance of the offence. According to him, in the second FIR the allegations are quite different from the first FIR and, as such, there is no procedural irregularity in instituting Patori P.S.Case No. 249 of 2011 and/or investigating the same. 18. 17. Mr. Sharma submitted that the Magistrate concerned has already taken cognizance of the offence. According to him, in the second FIR the allegations are quite different from the first FIR and, as such, there is no procedural irregularity in instituting Patori P.S.Case No. 249 of 2011 and/or investigating the same. 18. In order to examine the legal issue raised in the case, I would like to consider the relevant provisions of the Code first. 19. Chapter XII of the Code deals with the manner in which information in respect of cognizable offence can be given to the police and their powers to investigate. Section 154(1) of the Code requires that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, whether given orally or otherwise to the officer-in-charge of a police station has to be reduced in writing by or under the direction of such officer and shall be signed by the person giving such information and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. 20. Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer-in-charge of a police station to record the information referred to in Section 154(1) of the Code may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer-in-charge of the police station in relation to that offence. 21. The “First information report” is not defined in the Code. However, the information given to a police officer and reduced to writing as required by section 154 of the Code is known as “first information report”. The principal object of the first information report from the point of view of the informant is to set the criminal law in motion and from the point of view of the investigating authorities is to obtain information about the alleged criminal activity so as to be able to take suitable steps to trace and bring to book the guilty. 22. 22. Section 156 of the Code falling within the Chapter XII, deals with powers of a police officer to investigate a cognizable offence. The various steps to be adopted for investigation under Section 156 of the Code have been reiterated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer-in-charge of a police station. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. 23. Section 157 falling within the Chapter XII of the Code requires that immediate intimation of every complaint or information preferred to an officer-in-charge of a police station of commission of a cognizable offence shall be sent to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. The commencement of investigation in a cognizable offence by a police officer is subject to two conditions, firstly, the police officer should have reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence as required by Section 157(1) of the Code and secondly, the police officer should subjectively satisfy himself as to whether there is sufficient ground for entering on an investigation even before he starts an investigation into the facts and circumstances of the case as contemplated under clause (b) of proviso to Section 157(1) as clause (b) of the proviso permits a police officer to satisfy himself about the sufficiency of the ground even before entering on an investigation. It postulate that a police officer has to draw his satisfaction only on the materials which were placed before him at that stage namely the first information report together with documents, if any, enclosed. In other words, the police officer has to satisfy himself only on the allegations mentioned in the first information before he enters on an investigation as to whether those allegations do constitute a cognizable offence. 24. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police department. The police has a bounden duty to investigate into a cognizable offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed, it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the court requesting to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed, it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the court requesting to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. Once cognizance of the offence is taken by the court the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provisions contained in Section 173(8) of the Code. 25. The investigating agency may submit a report finding the allegation substantiated. It may submit a report finding no material to support the allegation made in the FIR. There is nothing in the Code which prevents the police from submitting charge-sheet against the informant of the case on whose information the FIR would have been registered or investigation would have commenced. In course of investigation the duty of the police is to find out the actual culprit in respect of cognizable offence and to bring him to book. 26. Under Chapter XII of the Code Section 173 relates to report of police officer on completion of investigation. The important attribute to police power is not only the power to investigate into commission of a cognizable offence but also the power to prosecute by filing report or charge-sheet under Section 173(2) of the Code. The submission of a report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code does not preclude further investigation in a crime by the Investigating Agency. The supplementary report can be submitted by the Investigating Agency to the Magistrate notwithstanding that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under this sub-section. The power of the police to conduct further investigation, after submitting final report is recognized under Section 173(8) of the Code. The matter as to whether there exists sufficient and valid ground for further investigation is entirely for the consideration of the Investigating Officer, and the court cannot restrain the Investigating Officer from conducting further investigation. 27. Though the police has right of further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code but it has no right of fresh investigation or re-investigation. In Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration) since reported in (1979) 2 SCC 322 , the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 20 held as under:— “20. 27. Though the police has right of further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code but it has no right of fresh investigation or re-investigation. In Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration) since reported in (1979) 2 SCC 322 , the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 20 held as under:— “20. .….…………..………..The criticism that a further investigation by the police would trench upon the proceeding before the court is really not of very great substance, since whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate. That the final word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation. We should not, however, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by the court of any offence. We think that in the interests of independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light’’. 28. While acknowledging the power of the police authorities to carry out further investigation in terms of section 173 of the Code, in Ram Lal Narang case (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 21 observed as follows:— “21. ………………………..In our view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as necessary when fresh information came to light. Where the police desired to make a further investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.” 29. In K. Chandrasekhar Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. Where the police desired to make a further investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.” 29. In K. Chandrasekhar Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. since reported in 1998(5) SCC 223 the Hon’ble Apex Court took into consideration the scope and ambit of section 173(2) and 173(8) of the Code and observed, inter alia, in paragraph 24 as follows:— “24. …….……….The dictionary meaning of “further” (when used as an adjective) is “additional; more; supplemental”. “Further” investigation therefore is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation altogether. In drawing this conclusion we have also drawn inspiration from the fact that sub section (8) clearly envisages that on completion of further investigation the investigating agency has to forward to the Magistrate a “further” report or reports -- and not fresh report or reports – regarding the “further” evidence obtained during such investigation.” 30. At this stage, I would like to refer to the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel and Others Vs. State of Gujarat since reported in (2009)6 SCC 332 in paragraph 13 of the said decision the Apex Court had observed as under:— “13. It is, however, beyond any cavil that “further investigation” and “reinvestigation” stand on different footing. It may be that in a given situation a superior court in exercise of its constitutional power, namely, under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India could direct a “State” to get an offence investigated and/or further investigated by a different agency. Direction of a reinvestigation, however, being forbidden in law, no superior court would ordinarily issue such a direction.” 31. Thus, from the discussions made, hereinabove, it is apparent that there is no fetter on the power of police to further investigate into an offence after submission of police report under section 173(2) of the Code but the police has no right under the Code for fresh investigation or re-investigation. Based on the above proposition of law, it is to be seen, in the present case, as to whether the subsequent FIR i.e., Patori P.S. Case No.249 of 2011, instituted by the police amounts to fresh investigation or re-investigation of the allegations made in Patori P.S. Case No. 42 of 2010. Based on the above proposition of law, it is to be seen, in the present case, as to whether the subsequent FIR i.e., Patori P.S. Case No.249 of 2011, instituted by the police amounts to fresh investigation or re-investigation of the allegations made in Patori P.S. Case No. 42 of 2010. If the answer is in affirmative, the institution of second FIR and its investigation would be impermissible in law. 32. In Anju Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. and Anr. since reported in 2013(1) BBCJ IV-211, the Hon’ble Apex Court after taking into consideration the judgments rendered in Ram Lal Narang case (supra), M. Krishna Vs. State of Karnataka since reported in (1999)3 SCC 247 , T.T.Antony Vs. State of Kerala since reported in (2001)6 SCC 181 , Upkar Singh Vs. Ved Prakash since reported in (2004) 13 SCC 292 , Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh Vs. State of Gujarat since reported in (2006) 1 SCC 732 , Vikram vs. State of Maharashtra since reported in (2007)12 SCC 332 , Shiv Shankar Singh Vs. State of Bihar since reported in (2012) 1 SCC 130 , Babu Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors since reported in (2010) 12 SCC 254 , Chirra Shivraj Vs. State of Andhara Pradesh since reported in (2010) 14 SCC 444 , held in paragraphs 41 and 42 as under:— “41. It is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. Such things are to be gathered from the circumstances of a given case indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action, commonality of purpose or design. Where two incidents are of different times with involvement of different persons, there is no commonality and the purpose thereof different and they emerge from different circumstances, it will not be possible for the Court to take a view that they form part of the same transaction and therefore, there could be a common FIR or subsequent FIR could not be permitted to be registered or there could be common trial.” “42. Similarly, for several offences to be part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect, or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Similarly, for several offences to be part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect, or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Thus, where there is a commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences “committed in the course of the same transaction.” 33. It is, thus, obvious from the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the court in order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalize the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of “sameness” to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence or are in regard to incident which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two different occurrences. There cannot be a second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the Investigating Agency, it is always in furtherance of the first information report. If more than one FIR is instituted in respect of same incident and the same occurrence, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly held that it is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. Such things are to be gathered from the circumstances of a given case. 34. Now, I would like to decide the present case in the light of the principles decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments cited above. 35. From the facts of the present case, I find that both the FIRs i.e., Patori P.S. Case No.42 of 2010 and Patori P.S. Case No.249 of 2011 relate to the same occurrence. The issue involved in both the FIRs is recovery of an unlicensed arm. The petitioner had already reported about recovery of pistol, in question, to the police for which investigation was carried on. The issue involved in both the FIRs is recovery of an unlicensed arm. The petitioner had already reported about recovery of pistol, in question, to the police for which investigation was carried on. The Investigating Officer and the supervising authorities, in course of investigation and supervision, had already come to a conclusion that the accused persons were falsely implicated under the Arms Act and it was the petitioner, who was responsible for planting an illegal arm in order to frame the accused persons in a false case under the Arms Act. I find from the charge-sheet submitted in the first case that the supervising authorities had directed the Investigating Officer to institute a separate case under the Arms Act against the petitioner and investigate the same. 36. From the facts of the case, I find that the implication of the accused persons in a false case of recovery of illegal arm had already been investigated upon by the police in the first case and, as such, there was no occasion for the police to institute another FIR and investigate the same. At best, the police would have proceeded with the investigation after submitting the report under Section 173(2) of the Code in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code and submitted an additional report or supplementary report under section 173(2) of the Code instead of instituting a fresh case. 37. As noted above, from the plain reading of Section 173 of the Code it is evident that even after submission of police report under sub section (2), on conclusion of investigation, the police has a right of further investigation under sub section (8) but no “fresh investigation” or “reinvestigation”. Further investigation is continuation of the earlier investigation and, as such, permissible in law but “fresh investigation” or “reinvestigation” is not permissible. If law prohibits reinvestigation or de novo investigation by the Investigating Agency on its own, the same cannot be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same occurrence. 38. While saying so, I am conscious of the fact that a counter case giving two different versions in respect of the same occurrence can always give rise to institution of two separate FIRs. In such a case both the FIRs shall be permissible in law. However, in the present case, there is no counter FIR by the accused or any other person connected with the first FIR. In such a case both the FIRs shall be permissible in law. However, in the present case, there is no counter FIR by the accused or any other person connected with the first FIR. The allegations made in the second FIR are, as a matter of fact, result of the investigation of the first case. 39. For aforementioned reasons, registration of the second FIR i.e., Patori P.S. Case No.249 of 2011 dated 6.12.2011 under section 154 of the Code on the basis of direction of the supervising authorities of Patori P.S. Case No.42 of 2010, is not valid and consequently the investigation made and the cognizance taken pursuant thereto are of no legal consequence. Accordingly, the FIR of Patori P.S. Case No.249 of 2011 dated 6.12.2011 and consequent proceedings in respect of that case are hereby quashed. However, this does not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the court in Patori P.S. Case No.42 of 2010 for making further investigation and filing further report/reports under Section 173(8) of the Code. 40. The writ application stands allowed.