Judgment : Dr. B.R. Sarangi, J. The petitioner, which is an educational institution situated in village Balichandrapur in the district of Jajpur and a registered body under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, has filed this writ petition challenging the order dated 17th May, 2007 passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, opposite party no.2 under Section 7-A of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 for the period from August, 1997 to May, 2006 demanding a sum of Rs.4,45,581.00 inclusive of an amount of Rs.1,86,438.00 as penal interest under Section 7Q of the said Act and directed to pay the same within a period of fifteen days. 2. The factual matrix, as revealed from the records available, is that the petitioner-Institution was established in the year 1989 and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 with effect from 26.2.1992. The same has come within the fold of Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, hereinafter to be referred to as “the Act”, in short, with effect from 1.7.2002 having EPF Code No. OR-6306. After coming within the fold of the Act, the petitioner-Institution volunteered for coverage under the Act by submitting relevant form as provided by the Provident Fund authorities as the number of employees during the relevant month had reached 20. The petitioner received a notice on 20.5.2004 from the opposite party no.2 to appear for the purpose of enquiry under Section 7-A of the Act for determination of the dues of the establishment for the period from August, 2002 to March, 2004 on the ground that the petitioner had failed to remit the contribution for the said period. The enquiry under Section 7-A in connection with the notice dated 20.5.2004 under Annexure-1 was taken up on 2.6.2004, 17.2.2004, 27.7.2004 and 26.8.2004, but on the date fixed, neither any statement nor any information was given by the Provident Fund Department in respect of the claim nor any effective hearing took place. After last date, i.e. 26.8.2004 there was no communication whatsoever from the Commissioner. Therefore, it was reasonably construed that Section 7-A enquiry pursuant to Annexure-1 remained inconclusive and without any liability sought to be fastened on the petitioner. After last date, i.e. 26.8.2004 there was no communication whatsoever from the Commissioner. Therefore, it was reasonably construed that Section 7-A enquiry pursuant to Annexure-1 remained inconclusive and without any liability sought to be fastened on the petitioner. While the aforesaid 7-A proceeding was pending for finalization for more than three years, the petitioner received a letter bearing No. 1960 dated 14.3.2007 issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner requesting the petitioner to comply with the provisions of Act from 01.02.1992 till June, 2002 and submit the relevant records in such respect. Since all these staffs engaged in the establishment from 1992 onwards were not continuing in employment, and the existing employees relented payment of contribution for the past period on account of their miserable financial condition and limited salary received during their employment, the petitioner-Institution made a request by their letter dated 16.5.2007 praying for waiver of the employees’ and employer’s share of P.F. contribution from August, 1997 to June, 2002. Though the petitioner has been called upon to comply with the provisions of the Act for the period from January, 1992 to June, 2002, request was made for waiver for the period from August, 1997 to June, 2002 reason being that the required staff strength reached 20 in August, 1997 only and not prior to August, 1997 and therefore, the petitioner-Institution could not be brought within the fold of the Act. In the meantime, the petitioner received a letter on 27.4.2007 regarding the adjourned date of the 7-A enquiry to 17.5.2007. In accordance with the said notice, the petitioner appeared and stated the above facts with regard to their entitlement for assessment and submitted a representation vide Annexure-3. The opposite party no.1 though assured for consideration of the said representation in Annexure-3 dated 16.5.2007, but demand has been made in Annexure-4 without application of mind and without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Challenging the said demand notice under Annexure-4, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 3. The opposite party no.1 though assured for consideration of the said representation in Annexure-3 dated 16.5.2007, but demand has been made in Annexure-4 without application of mind and without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Challenging the said demand notice under Annexure-4, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 3. This Court while issuing notice to the opposite parties, passed an interim order staying operation of the impugned demand notice dated 17.5.2007 under Annexure-4 passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Orissa in a proceeding under Section 7 of the Act keeping in view the fact that even though notice for determination of dues has been issued for the period from August, 2002 to March, 2004, the impugned order has been passed in respect of the period from August 1997 to May, 2006. 4. Pursuant to the notice, the opposite parties appeared in the case and filed their counter affidavit admitting the contentions raised by the petitioner in the writ petition, but stated that the petitioner failed to register the institution under the Act even though it has engaged 20 employees including teaching and non-teaching staff with effect from August, 1997, but admitted the fact that the petitioner volunteered to take registration and submitted information about its employees in the prescribed form during August, 2002 and in response to which code No. OR/6306 has been allotted vide letter No.1538 dated 19.8.2002. But due to failure to comply with the requirement of filing the returns and making deposit of the contributions, proceeding under Section 7-A of the Act was initiated against the petitioner by issuing notice dated 20.4.2004 under Annexure-1 calling upon the petitioner to submit its records pertaining to the period from August, 2002 to March, 2004. During pendency of the enquiry, the fact of registration of the school management as Society with effect from 26.2.1992 came to light and on that basis the notice under Annexure-2 was issued calling upon the petitioner to submit report in respect of the period from February, 1992 to June, 2002 for compliance of the provisions of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder. In response to the said notice, the petitioner in its letter dated 16.5.2007 under Annexure-3 stated that the staff strength reached 20 in August, 2007 and deposits are being made from July, 2002 and therefore, the prayer made for waiver of requirement of the EPF and allied dues from August, 1997 to June, 2002 on the ground of financial constraints. 5. After considering the facts and circumstances, the opposite parties passed the order under Section 7-A of the Act under Annexure-4 determining the amount of contribution payable at Rs.4,73,691.00 for the period from August, 1997 to May, 2006 and also levied interest of Rs.1,86,438/- under Section 7-Q of the Act and as the establishment had paid Rs.2,14,548/-, the balance of Rs.4,45,581/- was demanded. 6. Mr. N.K. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner stated that the demand so made in Annexure-4 is arbitrary and unreasonable and the same has been made without complying the principles of natural justice. 7. Mr. S.K. Patnaik, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the opposite parties stoutly denied the same and submitted that as per the provisions of the Act once the petitioner comes within the purview of the said Act, it is liable to pay the contribution and therefore, the entire action has been taken in conformity with the provisions of law. It is further stated that since the liability of the petitioner is not disputed, the demand raised is to be paid. 8. Considering the above fact and the contentions raised by the parties it can be stated that the petitioner-Institution was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 with effect from 26.2.1992 and it has come within the fold of the Act after being registered with effect from 1.7.2002 pursuant to the letter issued on 19.8.2002 having Code No. OR/6306. The impugned order under Annexure-4 indicates that demand has been made for the period from August, 2002 to March, 2004 but the notice under Annexure-2 indicates the period from February, 1992 to June, 2002, whereas the petitioner in Annexure-3 requested for waiver of the claim of contribution of the provident fund for the period from August, 1997 to June, 2002, because during this period there was no required number of strength of employees, namely, 20, working in the establishment and demand has been indicated for the period August, 1997 to May, 2006. 9. 9. It is found that the opposite parties have raised demands for different periods, i.e. from February, 1992 to June, 2002, August, 2002 to March, 2004, April, 2004 to May, 2005 and out of the said periods, from February, 1992 to July, 1997, the petitioner was not liable to pay as the staff position has not reached 20 and the petitioner has admitted that during the period from August, 1997 to June, 2002 the staff strength has increased to 20, but the employees and employer were not in a position to deposit their respective share during the said period for which they sought for waiver of the dues. That apart, for the said period, neither any enquiry has been caused nor any opportunity has been given to the petitioner. Annexure-1, the demand notice which has been issued to the petitioner only relates to the period from August, 2002 to March, 2004. Though the petitioner appeared in four occasions, i.e. 2.6.2004, 17.2.2004, 27.7.2004 and 26.8.2004, no effective adjudication was made and for the period April, 2004 to May, 2006 neither any notice was given nor any adjudication has been made by the authorities. Therefore, the demand raised in Anenxure-4 without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner is in gross violation of the principle of natural justice. 10. The question comes for consideration whether before raising any demand the authorities are required to comply with the principles of natural justice. 11. Non-compliance with the principles of natural justice is one of the important circumstances under which the writ of certiorari is issued. The concept of natural justice has made great strides during the last few decades. Before the epoch making decision in Ridge v. Baldwin of the House of Lords, 1963 All E.R. 66= 1964 AC 40, it was generally thought that the rules of natural justice applied only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; and so, whenever breach of the rule of natural justice was alleged, courts used to first ascertain whether the impugned action was taken by the authority in exercise of its administrative or quasi-judicial power. The scene has totally changed now. Over the years, natural justice has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. 12. A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 = (1969) 2 SCC 262 , is a landmark in the growth of this doctrine. The scene has totally changed now. Over the years, natural justice has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. 12. A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 = (1969) 2 SCC 262 , is a landmark in the growth of this doctrine. Speaking for the Constitution Bench, Hegde,J. observed thus: “If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry”. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 = (1978) 1 SCC 248 , law has done further blooming of this concept. This decision has established beyond doubt that even in an administrative proceeding involving civil consequences doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi AIR 1978 SC 851 = 1978 (1) SCC 405 added further hue and colour to the expounding horizon. Krishna Iyer,J. observed in his indomitable style as under: “Our constitutional order pays more than lip service to the rule of reasonable administrative process. Our people are not yet conscious of their rights; our administrative apparatus is hard-of-hearing heritage. Therefore, a creative play of fair play, irksome to some but good in the long run, must be accepted as a part of our administrative law”. 13. In Basudeo Tiwary v Sido Kanhu University and others (1998) 8 SCC 194 , the apex Court held that natural justice is an antithesis of arbitrariness. It, therefore, follows that audi alteram partem, which is facet of natural justice is a requirement of Art.14. 14. The apex Court in Uma Nath Panday and others v State of U.P. and others, AIR 2009 SC 2375 , 2009 (1) OLR (SC) 875, held that natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. 14. The apex Court in Uma Nath Panday and others v State of U.P. and others, AIR 2009 SC 2375 , 2009 (1) OLR (SC) 875, held that natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice. 15. Applying the law laid down by the apex Court to the present facts of the case, since the notice has not been given to the petitioner and demand has been raised without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, there is violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, in the fitness of things, the demand notice in Annexure-4 is hereby quashed and the matter is remitted back to the opposite party no.2 for fresh adjudication. The petitioner is directed to appear before opposite party no.2 on 7th January, 2014, on which date the opposite party no.2 will fix up a date of hearing and upon giving an opportunity of hearing adjudicate the dispute in accordance with the provisions of law within a period of four months thereafter. 16. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the writ petition is disposed of. No cost. Petition disposed of.