ORDER : J.K. Maheshwari, J. This appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been filed against the award dated 26/9/2008 passed by 1st Additional Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Mandsaur in Claim Case No. 74/2007 assailing the finding of liability to pay compensation fastened against the son of the appellants though not, the registered owner. The facts, in brief are that on 30/10/2006 at about 8.00 p.m. deceased-Vikram Singh went on motorcycle with Guddu and Talveer Singh to Sitamau to purchase medicines, while coming back, Tempo bearing registration No. M.P. O7-T/2041 driven rashly and negligently by the driver namely Kushal Singh dashed the standing motorcycle on the bank of the road. These persons sitting or the motorcycle fell down and sustained injuries out from Vikram Singh succumbed due to those injuries. Thus seeking compensation to the tune of Rs. 20,40,000/- application u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act was filed by the claimants. 2. The Driver Kushal Singh filed the written statement, inter-alia, contending that he was engaged as driver by the owner Pradeep Kumar and driving the offending vehicle on the date of accident. The fact regarding commission of accident, and other claim averments have also been denied by him. 3. Respondent-Pradeep Kumar filed written statement, inter-alia, contending that the vehicle in question has been sold to Bhanu Pratap Singh vide agreement dated 31/12/2005, however, for the accident, if any, took place, he is not responsible to pay the amount of compensation. It is further contended that deceased himself driving the motorcycle in a drunken position, however, he himself was negligent, therefore, he is not liable to pay any amount of compensation for the negligence of the deceased himself. 4. Respondent-Bhanu Pratap Singh, by filing written statement, who is heavenly aboard during pendency, stated that he is neither the registered owner nor in possession of the offending vehicle. In fact, the vehicle was of the ownership and possession of respondent-Pradeep Kumar, however he is responsible to the accident and also liable to pay compensation. It is also contended that the accident has taken place due to negligence of the deceased himself, therefore, claim petition may be dismissed. 5. Learned Claims Tribunal, after considering the evidence brought on record and relying upon the affidavit Ex. D/1, intimation in writing Ex. D/2 and U.P.C. Ex. It is also contended that the accident has taken place due to negligence of the deceased himself, therefore, claim petition may be dismissed. 5. Learned Claims Tribunal, after considering the evidence brought on record and relying upon the affidavit Ex. D/1, intimation in writing Ex. D/2 and U.P.C. Ex. D/3 and also the seizure memo held that the vehicle in question was in the possession of respondent Bhanu Pratap Singh after the purchase from respondent Pradeep Kumar, therefore, compensation calculated Rs. 2,16,000/- is payable by Bhanu Pratap Singh, and absolved the respondent Pradeep Kumar, from the liability to pay the amount of compensation. 6. Assailing the said finding, father and mother of respondent Bhanu Pratap Singh since deceased have filed this appeal, inter-alia, contending that for the purpose of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988. (For brevity it be referred as M.V. Act) and the definition of owner specified u/s 2(30), deceased-Bhanu Pratap Singh cannot be treated to be the owner, therefore, the impugned award passed by the Claims Tribunal directing to pay the amount of compensation by him is unsustainable in law. In support of such contention, reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Vs. Chatru Lal (1995) ACJ 533, Satish Sanghi Vs. Mihir Kumar Joshi and Others, (1993) ACJ 893, the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Hamid Khan Vs. Guddibai and Others (2003) ACJ 521, Aditya Khare v. Jamuna Prasad Kahar and four Ors. 2085, the Division Bench judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Vipin Kumar Sharma Vs. Jagwant Kaur and Others (2007) ACJ 1249, and another judgment of the Single Bench of the same High Court in the case of Niranjan Singh Vs. Zeena and Others (2008) ACJ 973, and the judgment of Gauhati High Court in the case of Smt. Lili Bora Vs. Smt. Nishi Rani Hazarika and Others (2008) ACJ 2003, and lastly a judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Pushpa @ Leela and Others Vs. Shakuntala and Others (2011) 2 SCC 240 . In view of the aforesaid, it is submitted that the Claims Tribunal has committed an error in fastening the liability against the son of the appellants by passing the impugned award. 7. Shakuntala and Others (2011) 2 SCC 240 . In view of the aforesaid, it is submitted that the Claims Tribunal has committed an error in fastening the liability against the son of the appellants by passing the impugned award. 7. Per contra, Shri Satish Jain, learned counsel for respondent No. 7, has strenuously urged that the Claims Tribunal, after appreciating the evidence brought in para-14 of the impugned award, rightly recorded the finding that the son of the appellants has become the owner in view of sale agreement and the other documents filed by respondent-Pradeep Kumar. It is further submitted that the vehicle in question was in possession of respondent-Bhanu Pratap Singh, therefore, for all practical purposes and for the purpose of civil liability, son of the appellants shall be the owner, therefore, the finding recorded by the Claims Tribunal do not warrant any interference. Learned counsel referring the definition of Section 2(30) and Section 50 of the M.V. Act, has contended that as per the definition of the owner, it is clear that the motor vehicles which is the subject matter of a hire purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, if possession thereof is with a person under the agreement, then he is liable to pay the amount of compensation. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed on the judgment of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Dhulchand Vs. Kanti Lal and others, AIR 2004 Raj. 267 . It is further contended by him that learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Madhav Singh Vs. Ratna and Others (2011) ACJ 577, after considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Kailash Nath Kothari and other etc. (1997) 7 SCC 481 , and the Apex Court judgment in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Deepa Devi and Others (2008) 1 SCC 414 , held that if a person is having possession and actual control on the offending vehicle then the finding recorded by the Claims Tribunal to fasten the liability upon him as owner cannot be said to be illegal. Reliance has also been placed on the Division Bench judgment of the Court in the case of Brijlal Khilwani Vs. Reliance has also been placed on the Division Bench judgment of the Court in the case of Brijlal Khilwani Vs. Sohan and Others (2007) ACJ 1666, and contended that if a person is in the control of vehicle under an agreement and the amount has not been paid, in such circumstances, registration of the vehicle would have no relevance and the liability has rightly been fastened against a person having overall control of the vehicle. In view of forgoing, prayer is made to dismiss the appeal filed by the appellants upholding the finding recorded by the Claims Tribunal. 8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties up to considerable length, to appreciate their rival contentions in the present case, it is to be seen that definition of owner as specified in the M.V. Act would cover the registered owner only or it also includes the person who is in possession of the vehicle under an agreement. To appreciate the aforesaid issue, definition so specified under the Motor Vehicles Act is required to be noted which is reproduced as under:- 2(30) "owner" means person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement", or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement. 9. It is relevant to mention here that under the Old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the definition of the owner was different than the definition as specified in the New M.V. Act. The definition of the owner under the old Act was found in Section 2(19) which is also reproduced as under : 2(19)" owner" means, where the person, in possession of a motor vehicle is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle, which is the subject of a hire purchase agreement, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement. 10. 10. After careful reading of the definition of owner under the old Motor Vehicles Act, it is apparent that if a person is in possession of the motor vehicle or in case of a minor guardian of such minor, and if said motor vehicle is purchased under hire-purchase agreement, then person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement has been described as owner. As per the New M.V. Act, it is clear that a person would be owner of the motor vehicle in whose name it stands registered and in case of minor, guardian of such minor, and if the motor vehicle is subjected to hire purchase agreement, lease agreement, hypothecation agreement, than a person in possession of vehicle under such agreement. While appreciating the definition of the owner under the old M.V. Act, Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Kailash Nath Kothari and other etc. (1997) 7 SCC 481 , in para-1/observed as under: 17. The definition of owner u/s 2(19) of the Act is not exhaustive. It has, therefore to be construed, in a wider sense, in the facts and circumstances of a given case. The expression owner must include, in a given case, the person who has the actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose directions and commands the driver is obliged to operate the bus. To confine the meaning of "owner" to the registered owner only would in a case where the vehicle is in the actual possession and control of the hirer not be proper for the purpose of fastening of liability in case of an accident. The liability of the owner" is vicarious for the tort committed by its employee during the course of his employment and it would be a question of fact in each case as to on whom can vicarious liability be fastened in the case of an accident. In this case, Shri Sanjay Kumar, the owner of the bus could not ply the bus on the particular route for which he had no permit and he in fact was not plying the bus on that route. The services of the driver were transferred along with complete "control" to RSRTC, under whose directions, instructions and command the driver was to ply or not to ply the ill-fated bus on the fateful day. The services of the driver were transferred along with complete "control" to RSRTC, under whose directions, instructions and command the driver was to ply or not to ply the ill-fated bus on the fateful day. The passengers were being carried by RSRTC on receiving fare from them. Shri Sanjay Kumar was therefore not concerned with the passengers traveling in that bus on the particular route on payment of fare to RSRTC. Driver of the bus, even though an employee of the owner, was at the relevant time performing his duties under the order and command of the conductor of RSRTC for operation of the bus. So far as the passengers of the ill-fated bus are concerned, their privity of contract was only with the RSRTC to whom they had paid the fare for traveling in that bus and their safety therefore became the responsibility of the RSRTC while traveling in the bus. They had no privity of contract with Shri Sanjay Kumar, the owner of the bus at all. Had it been a case only of transfer of services of the driver and not of transfer of control of the driver from the owner to RSRTC, the matter may have been somewhat different. But on facts in this case and in view of Conditions 4 to 7 of the agreement (supra), the RSRTC must be held to be vicariously liable for the tort committed by the driver while plying the bus under contract of the RSRTC. The general proposition of law and the presumption arising therefrom that an employer, that is the person who has the right to hire and fire the employee, is generally responsible vicariously for the tort committed by the employee concerned during the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority, is a rebuttable presumption. If the original employer is able to establish that when the servant was lent, the effective control over him was also transferred to the hirer, the original owner can avoid his liability and the temporary employer or the hirer, as the case may be, must be held vicariously liable for the tort committed by the employee concerned in the course of his employment while under the command and control of the hirer notwithstanding the fact that the driver would continue to be on the payroll of the original owner. The proposition based on the general principle as noticed above is adequately rebutted in this case not only on the basis of the evidence led by the parties but also on the basis of Conditions 6 and 7 (supra), which go to show that the owner had not merely transferred the services of the driver to the RSRTC but actual control and the driver was to act under the instructions, control and command of the conductor and other officers of the RSRTC. This Court was also having occasion to consider the definition of the owner under the old MV Act as well as under the new MV Act. While considering the aforesaid, in the case of Leelawati and Others Vs. Ravindra Kumar and Others (1998) ACJ 1306, observed as under:- 13. Now, the next point that comes for determination is that as to whether all the three respondents (in M.A. No. 335 & 1989) are jointly and severally liable or whether the D.D.C. Ltd. or the insurance company stands exonerated? As accident occurred in the year 1983 the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 shall be attracted. Section 2(19) defines word 'owner' as under : Section 2(19): 'owner' means, where the person in possession, of a motor vehicle is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement the person in possession of the vehicle under the agreement. Thus, the person in possession and having control over the vehicle will be deemed to be the owner of the vehicle. We have perused the agreement, Exh. D/1, entered into between D.D.C. Ltd. and Ravindra Kumar Sharma, whereby D.D.C. Ltd. has taken the service of the vehicle. On the basis of agreement the vehicle was within the command and control of D.D.C. Ltd. and on the date of accident it was being driven under the command and control of D.D.C. Ltd. 15. We would further like in observe that this proposition of law may not hold good after change in the definition of word 'owner' vide Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but as the present accident occurred much prior to coming into force of the amended Act, the person in possession will be deemed to be the owner of the vehicle. We would further like in observe that this proposition of law may not hold good after change in the definition of word 'owner' vide Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but as the present accident occurred much prior to coming into force of the amended Act, the person in possession will be deemed to be the owner of the vehicle. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that as per the language of the definition, of the owner under the old M.V. Act and the new M.V. Act, the change has been brought regarding registration of the vehicle in the RTO in the name of the person, having much relevance leaving three conditions as specified therein. Otherwise as per the old Act if a person is in possession and control over the vehicle shall be called as owner differentiating from registered owner. 11. At this juncture, the arguments advanced by Shri Satish Jain, learned counsel, referring the definition of Section 2(30) indicating the comma after the word hire-purchase and thereafter agreement, the legal sanction to the word 'agreement' different than hire purchase, requires consideration. In this respect Editorial of a Bare Act of Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi has been seen, which is reproduced as under : Ed.- In clause (30) (relating to "owner") after the words "hire-purchase" and before the word "agreement" there is a comma as printed in the Government publication (Acts or Parliament, 1988), whereas there should be no comma after the words "hire-purchase" and before the word "agreement" hence comma has been deleted. In this respect, see Dhulchand Vs. Kanti Lal and Others (2006) ACJ 276. Bare reading of said editorial it is clear that comma after the word "hire-purchase" and further the word "agreement" so put forth in Gazette of M.V. Act is merely a mistake, in fact, the comma should not be used after hire-purchase and it should be used after hire-purchase agreement. Kanti Lal and Others (2006) ACJ 276. Bare reading of said editorial it is clear that comma after the word "hire-purchase" and further the word "agreement" so put forth in Gazette of M.V. Act is merely a mistake, in fact, the comma should not be used after hire-purchase and it should be used after hire-purchase agreement. If the said editorial is ignored and the definition in whole as dictated in the New Motor Vehicles Act is appreciated, then also it is clear that if a person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered and if such person is minor, then the guardian, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is a subject matter of hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement would be the owner. On microscopic reading thereof, it is apparent that the motor vehicle ought to be registered in the name of a person, in case of minor in the name of Guardian, is a condition precedent, therefore, the word "stand registered" has been used in the said definition. Thereafter on reading the other stipulations in the definition it is clear that, in case of hire-purchase, lease or hypothecation, agreement the person in possession under the agreement shall be the owner. The intention of the Legislature is not that "hire-purchase" is distinct then the word "agreement". If it was so then construction of sentence along with hire-purchase, lease and hypothecation the word agreement was not required to be suffixed. On perusal of the sentence, it is clear that any motor vehicle if subjected to hire-purchase agreement, agreement of lease, agreement of hypothecation, then person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement may be the owner. By adding the word 'agreement' along with hire-purchase, lease, hypothecation, then specifying that the person in possession of the vehicle under "that agreement" emphasises that the possession of the vehicle would be relevant as per that agreement entered between the parties. If the intention of the Legislature was to put the word 'agreement' independent it to hire-purchase, in the definition then it was not required to be emphasized after specifying different three agreements, that the person in possession of the vehicle under "that agreement." Thus, the word "that agreement" qualifies either hire-purchase agreement or agreement of lease or agreement of hypothecation any one of them. In such circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court editorial written in the Bare Act of the Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi indicates the real interpretation of the definition, and offers the right direction to understand the meaning of word "owner" in the definition clause specified in the M.V. Act. In this respect, it is to be observed that if Rajasthan High Court in the case of Dulichand (supra) has considered the meaning of comma after hire purchase and thereafter "agreement" relying upon Government publication, then in view of forgoing discussion, this Court is respectfully disagree by the analogy so taken in the said judgment. Here it is required to be observed that meaning of the definition should be construed in the manner, and for the purpose it was specified in the Act, it cannot be read in different context to its real meaning. In addition to the aforesaid discussion, my view fortifies by 'various precedents of Hon'ble the Apex Court, this Court and other High Courts as described in succeeding paras. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. T.V. Jose Vs. Chacko P.M. and others, 2001 ACJ 2059, in para. 9 and 10 has observed as under : 9. Mr. Iyer appearing for the appellant submitted that the High Court was wrong in ignoring the oral evidence on record. He submitted that the oral evidence clearly showed that the appellant was not the owner of the car on the date of the accident. Mr. Iyer submitted that merely because the name had not been changed in the records of the R.T.O. did not mean that the ownership of the vehicle had not been transferred Mr. Iyer submitted that the real owner of the car was Roy Thomas. Mr. Ayer submitted that Roy Thomas had been made party respondent No. 9 to these appeals. He pointed out that an advocate had filed appearance on behalf of Roy Thomas but had then applied for and was permitted to withdraw the appearance. He pointed out that Roy Thomas had been duly served and a public notice had also been issued. He pointed out that Roy Thomas had chosen not to appear in these appeals. He submitted that the liability if any, was of Roy Thomas. 10. We agree with Mr. He pointed out that Roy Thomas had been duly served and a public notice had also been issued. He pointed out that Roy Thomas had chosen not to appear in these appeals. He submitted that the liability if any, was of Roy Thomas. 10. We agree with Mr. Iyer that the High Court was not right in holding that the appellant continued to be the owner as the name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O. There can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. The evidence on record shows that ownership of the car had been transferred. However, the appellant still continued to remain liable to third parties as his name continued in the records of R.T.O. as owner. The appellant could not escape that liability by merely joining Roy Thomas in these appeals. Roy Thomas was not a party either before the MACT of the High Court. In these appeals we cannot and will not go into the question of inter se liability between the appellant and Roy Thomas. It will be for the appellant to adopt appropriate proceedings against Roy Thomas if in law, he is entitled to do so. 13. The judgment of T.V. Jose has been considered in the case of P.P. Mohammed Vs. K. Rajappan and others, (2008) 17 SCC 634, and in para-4 has observed as under. 4. These appeals are filed by the appellants. The insurance company has chosen not to file any appeal. The question before this Court is whether by reason of the fact that the vehicle has been transferred to Respondent No. 4 and thereafter to Respondent No. 5, the appellant got absolved from liability to the third person who was injured. This question has been answered by this Court in T.V. Jose (Dr.) Vs. Chacko P.M. wherein it is held that even though in law there would be a transfer of ownership of the vehicle, that, by itself, would not absolve the party, in whose name the vehicle stands in RTO records, from liability to a third person. We are in agreement with the view expressed therein. Merely because the vehicle was transferred does not mean that the appellant stands absolved of his liability to a third person. So long as his name continues in RTO records, he remains liable to a third person. 14. We are in agreement with the view expressed therein. Merely because the vehicle was transferred does not mean that the appellant stands absolved of his liability to a third person. So long as his name continues in RTO records, he remains liable to a third person. 14. Thereafter in the case of Pushpa alias Leela (supra) the Apex Court after considering the definite on of the owner in the same context has discussed herein above relying upon the judgment of T.V. Jose (supra) and distinguishing the judgment of Deepa Devi and others (supra), held as under:- 9. The question of the liability of the recorded owner of the vehicle has to be examined under different provisions of the Act. Section 2(30) of the Act defines "owner" in the following terms : 2(30) "owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement; (Emphasis added) 10. Then, section 50 of the Act lays down the procedure for transfer of ownership. It is a long Section and insofar as relevant it is reproduced below : 50. Transfer of ownership. (1) Where the ownership of any motor vehicle registered under this Chapter is transferred,- (a) the transferor shall,- (i) in the case of a vehicle registered within the same State, within fourteen days of the transfer, report the fact of transfer, in such form with such documents and in such manner, as may be prescribed by the Central Government to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the transfer is to be effected and shall simultaneously send a copy of the said report to the transferee; and (ii) xxxxxxx (b) the transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer, 'report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he has the residence or place of business where the vehicle is normally kept, as the case may be, and shall forward the certificate of registration to that registering authority together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the report received by him from the transferor in order that particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in the certificate of registration. (2)-(5) x x x (6) On receipt of a report under sub-section (1), on an application under sub-section (2), the registering authority may cause the transfer of ownership to be entered in the certificate of registration. (7) A registering authority making any such entry shall communicate the transfer of ownership to the transferor and to the original registering authority, if it is not the original registering authority. 11. It is undeniable that notwithstanding the sale of the vehicle neither the transferor Jitender Gupta nor the transferee Salig Ram took any step for the change of the name of the owner in the certificate of registration of the vehicle. In view of this omission Jitender Gupta must be deemed to continue as the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of the Act even though under the civil law he ceased to be its owner after its sale on February 2, 1993. 15. Learned counsel for the insurance company submitted that even though the registered owner of the vehicle was Jitender Gupta, after the sale of the truck he had no control over it and the possession and control of the truck were in the hands of the transferee, Salig Ram. No liability can, therefore, be fastened on Jitender Gupta, the transferor of the truck. In support of this submission he relied upon a decision of this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Deepa Devi (2008) 1 SCC 414 . 16. The facts of the case in Deepa Devi ere entirely different. In that case the vehicle was requisitioned by the District Magistrate in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In that circumstance, this Court observed that the owner of the vehicle cannot refuse to abide by the order of requisition of the vehicle by the Deputy Commissioner. While the vehicle remained under requisition, the owner did not exercise any control over it: the driver might still be the employee of the owner of the vehicle but he had to drive the vehicle according to the direction of the officer of the State, in whose charge the vehicle was given. Save and except the legal ownership, the registered owner of the vehicle had lost all control over the vehicle. Save and except the legal ownership, the registered owner of the vehicle had lost all control over the vehicle. The decision in Deepa Devi was rendered on the special facts of that case and it has no application to the facts of the case in hand. 15. On the said issue this Court in the case of Chatru Lal (supra), in para-8 and 9 has observed as under : 8. Section 2(30) of the Act reads as follows : Owners means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and were such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement. 9. On a plain reading of definition it is evident that a person in possession of the vehicle under an agreement of lease may also be treated to be an owner of the vehicle. Once this plea of agreement of lease has been raised it is but necessary that it ought to have been entertained and the matter should have been adjudicated taking into consideration the plea so raised. 16. In the case of Satish Sanghi (supra) this Court in para. 9 and 11 has held as under: 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the definition of owner given in section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act refers to the independent agreement as well, as there is a comma after word 'hire-purchase' and a further comma after the word 'agreement' and this agreement can be other than the agreement of hire-purchase, lease or hypothecation. This contention of the learned counsel does not appear to be very sound. However, even if this contention is accepted, there is no document of independent agreement. There is a variance in the pleadings and proof. The document regarding alleged agreement has been withheld from the court and, therefore, in the opinion of this court it has rightly been held that the appellant was the owner of the vehicle at the relevant period, i.e. at the time of accident. 11. As against it learned counsel for the respondents has referred to cases reported in Shankerlal v. Shankerlal 1988 A.C.J. 866 (Raj) United India Fire Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. Vs. 11. As against it learned counsel for the respondents has referred to cases reported in Shankerlal v. Shankerlal 1988 A.C.J. 866 (Raj) United India Fire Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. Vs. Kanchanbai, 1981 ACJ 554 (M.P.) and Geetabai Vs. Hussainkhan 1985 ACJ 44 (M.P.) and submitted that since the appellant continued to be the registered owner and this accident was caused to a third party and, therefore, registered owner is liable to satisfy the award. I am in agreement with the proposition referred to above. In the opinion of this court, therefore, the appellant has rightly been held liable to satisfy the claim along with other NAs. 17. Thereafter in the case of Hamid Khan (supra) Division Bench of this Court in the context of definition of owner under New Motor Vehicles Act has observed as under; 8. In the circumstances, it is absolutely clear that the deceased was traveling in the jeep as fare paying passenger. That being so, terms and conditions of insurance policy prohibited the owner from doing so. Consequently, the owner of the jeep and its driver breached the policy conditions by carrying fare paying passengers in the jeep, therefore, the insurance company is absolved of the liability to pay compensation. Contention of Mr. Imtiyaz Hussain that after the transfer of vehicle in favour of Gangabai (respondent No. 6), the appellant is not liable to pay compensation, is not sustainable since. Hamid Khan is still the registered owner of the vehicle and transfer has not been effected in the name of Gangabai. 18. In the case of Aditya Khare (supra), Single Bench of this Court has observed as under- The contention cannot be countenanced. In view of the definition of "owner" under Sub-section (30) of Section 2 of the Act the person in whose name a vehicle stands registered continues to be the owner of the vehicle till the name of the transferee is substituted in the record of the R.T.O. The name of the respondent was transferred on 17-12-91 i.e. long after the date of the accident. It is true that the definition of "owner" under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was different. In the earlier enactment the definition was not exhaustive, therefore, it included the person in whom the proprietary title vested. It is true that the definition of "owner" under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was different. In the earlier enactment the definition was not exhaustive, therefore, it included the person in whom the proprietary title vested. In the earlier definition the word "owner" included the registered owner as well as unregistered owner or transferee of the vehicle but after the change of the definition in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the definition of "owner" is exhaustive. The judgment in Sanjay Singh's case (supra) relates to the definition of the "owner" under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The judgment of Apex Court in Panna Lal's case (supra) also relates to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Judgment in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra) relates to hirer in possession. Sub-section (30) of section 2 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not say that moment the price is paid and the possession of motor vehicle is delivered to the purchaser, the registered owner is absolved of his liability. What is required for the purpose of Sub-section (30) of Section 2 of the Act is that the name of the purchaser is recorded in the registration certificate. Unless the name of the person is registered he cannot become the owner of the vehicle. Thus, on the date of the accident the respondent No. 4 did not become the owner of the offending vehicle and the appellant continued to be the owner thereof. The respondent No. 4 became the owner only on 17-12-91 when his name was transferred in the record of the R.T.O. Therefore, in view of the definition of the "owner" under Sub-section (30) of Section 2 of the Act the appellant alone was the owner of the offending motor cycle on the date of the accident. He was, therefore, responsible for the vicarious liability and respondent No. 4 is not liable as purchaser in whose name the vehicle was not transferred till the date of the accident. 19. Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Vipin Kumar Sharma (supra) after considering the definition of the word "owner" relying upon the judgment of Dr. T.V. Jose (supra) of Apex Court, in paras. 12, 13 and 14 has observed as, under : 12. 19. Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Vipin Kumar Sharma (supra) after considering the definition of the word "owner" relying upon the judgment of Dr. T.V. Jose (supra) of Apex Court, in paras. 12, 13 and 14 has observed as, under : 12. A combined reading of the aforesaid provisions would show that the owner is a person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered with the registering authority and the transfer of the vehicle takes place only when the requirements prescribed under the Act have been complied with the registering authority and who enters the same in its record. 13. Therefore, it is hold that reference to "owner" in Section 168 of the Act is to the registered owner of the vehicle. 14. The Apex Court in Dr. T.V. Jose v. Chacko P.M., 2001 ACJ 2059 (SC), in para. 10 had held that an owner continued to remain liable to third parties as his name had not been changed in the records of the RTO. It further held that there can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the vehicle, but an owner still continues to remain liable to third parties as long as his name continued in the records of the RTO as the owner. The Apex Court observed that the owner could adopt appropriate proceedings against the vendee if in law, he was entitled to do so. The aforesaid view of the Division Bench has been reiterated by the Single Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Niranjan Singh (supra). 20. In the case of Lili Bora (supra), Gauhati High Court has considered the same issue and after considering the definition of the owner under the old Motor Vehicles Act as well as New Motor Vehicles Act in para. 14 held as under : 14. What further follows from the above discussion is that in the M.V. Act, 1939, emphasis for being regarded as 'owner' of a vehicle was on the control and possession of the vehicle; whereas in the M.V. Act, 1988, emphasis has shifted from 'possession' to 'registration' and accordingly, unless a vehicle is registered in the name of a person, he cannot be regarded an owner of the vehicle. This general principle is, however, subject to three specified exceptions, namely, that a person in possession of a vehicle may also be regarded as owner thereof provided that he comes into possession of the vehicle in any of, the said three specified modes of agreement namely, (i) hire-purchase agreement, (ii) agreement of lease, or (iii) agreement of, hypothecation. Thus, while under the MV. Act, 1939, even a person, who might have had stolen a vehicle and committed an accident, could have, perhaps, been regarded as the owner of the vehicle, for, he had the control and possession of the vehicle, the definition of owner, now given under M.V. Act, 1988, makes it clear that the possession of a vehicle has to be acquired through the three specified mode, as given u/s 2(30), in order to treat a person as owner of a vehicle on the basis of his possession alone. This change, in the mode of definition of 'owner', appears to have been made by the legislature in order to help the victims of road traffic accidents. A vehicle, in order to be used in a public place, needs to have compulsory insurance, in terms of section 147 of the M.V. Act, 1988, so as to safeguard the interest of a third party. Whoever may come to possess the vehicle, the registered owner of the vehicle would be regarded as the owner of the vehicle and the insurer would remain liable to pay compensation to a third party even if the, vehicle meets with an accident, when the registered owner of the vehicle did not have the control and possession over the vehicle. 21. In view of forgoing legal position as apparent from reading the definition of word "owner" specified under the New Motor Vehicles Act, it is clear that motor vehicle in whose name it has been registered in the RTO. and if such person is minor, then it should be registered in the name of guardian, is called as 'owner' in the definition, it has further been clarified that if the said motor vehicle is a subject of hire-purchase agreement, lease agreement and hypothecation agreement; then in these three contingencies, a person who is in possession of the said vehicle under the said agreement, would be called as "owner". While under the Old Motor Vehicles Act, was defined that if a person is in possession or having control over the motor vehicle would be called as owner or also in case of hire-purchase under the said agreement. The basic distinction in between the definition of owner under the Old Act and the New Act is of the word "stands registered" of the vehicle in the name of transferee, however, the said word has significance to make change under the new enactment which cannot be ignored. 22. Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Pushpa alias Leela and others (supra), has made it clear after going through the definition of word "owner", that a person in whose name the vehicle has been registered shall be deemed to continue as owner for the purpose of Motor vehicles Act though under the civil law he may have ceased to be the owner of the vehicle. In the said judgment, the judgment of Deepa Devi (supra) of the Apex Court relied upon by learned counsel representing respondent, has been distinguished. It has been held that in a case of Deepa Devi (supra), the District Magistrate in exercise of power under the Representations of People Act requisitioned the offending vehicle, which was being driven under the control of the said authority. However, on account of requisitioning the vehicle under the statute which is having a overriding effect in the peculiar facts, the State Government or the Officers of the State has been deemed to be owner to pay the compensation. Thus, looking to the peculiar facts of the case of Deepa Devi (supra), it was distinguished by Hon'ble the Apex Court, interpreting the definition of the owner. Thus in the considered opinion of this Court, the definition of owner as per new M.V. Act, the person in whose name the vehicle has been registered in the RTO, would be said to be the owner. In case the possession of the vehicle has been pleaded on the basis of alleged hire-purchase agreement, lease agreement or hypothecation agreement, then on its proof, the person in possession as per said agreement may also be the owner of the vehicle in question. 23. In view of forgoing discussion, the judgment of Division Bench of this Court, relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No. 7 in the case of Brijlal Khilwani (supra) requires consideration. 23. In view of forgoing discussion, the judgment of Division Bench of this Court, relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No. 7 in the case of Brijlal Khilwani (supra) requires consideration. In the said case, this court has considered the definition of the owner under the Old Motor Vehicles Act as well as under the New Motor Vehicles Act and thereafter because under an agreement the possession was delivered and the installments were required to be paid and as per the terms of the agreement after payment of such installments the vehicle was required to be registered, therefore, the transferee was accepted as owner of the vehicle, however, on facts, the said case is distinguishable. Similarly, the case of learned Singe Judge in the case of Madhav Singh (supra) and another judgment passed in M.A. No. 78/2013 (Pankaj Vs. Smt. Rajni and others) decided on 17th January, 2013, is of no help in the light of the recent pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Pushpa alias 'Leela and others (supra). Thus, the argument of Shri Satish Jain, learned counsel, relying upon the aforesaid judgment to accept the son of the appellants as owner though he was not the registered owner in RTO cannot be accepted and is hereby repelled. In view of forgoing discussion the only inescapable conclusion can be arrived that a person who is the registered owner of a motor vehicle can be termed as "owner" for the purpose of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act unless other party is in position to establish that it is a case of hire purchase agreement, lease agreement and hypothecation agreement and on its proof, the person in possession of the vehicle may also be called as owner. 24. At this stage, the arguments advanced by Shri Jain, learned counsel for respondent No. 7 showing distinction from the judgment of Pushpa alias Leela and others (supra), on the facts of present case, further requires consideration. It is his contention that as per the agreement executed by way of affidavit on 31/12/2005, motor vehicle i.e. Tempo in question was transferred in the name of Bhanu Pratap Singh-The intimation of such sale was given by the transferor to the RTO as specified u/s 50(1)(a)(i) of the Act. The documents to that effect Ex. D/1 to Ex. D/3 are available on record. The documents to that effect Ex. D/1 to Ex. D/3 are available on record. To deal the said contention, the provisions of Section 50 are required to be taken note of which is reproduced as under; 50. Transfer of ownership. (1) Where the ownership of any motor vehicle registered under this Chapter is transferred,- (a) the transferor shall,- (i) in the case of a vehicle registered within the same State, within fourteen days of the transfer, report the fact of transfer, in such form with such documents and in such manner, as may be prescribed by the Central Government to the registering authority with whose jurisdiction the transfer is to be affected and shall simultaneously send a copy of the said report to the transferee; and (ii) in the case of a vehicle registered outside the State, within forty-five days of the transfer, forward to the registering authority referred to in sub-clause (i)- (A) the no objection certificate obtained undo section 48; or (B) in a case where no such certificate has been obtained,- (i) the receipt obtained under sub-section (2) of section 48; or (ii) the postal acknowledgment received by the transferee if he has sent an application in this behalf by registered post acknowledgment due to the registering authority referred to in section 48, together with a declaration that he has not received any communication from such authority refusing to grant such certificate or requiring him to comply with any direction subject to which such certificate may be granted; (b) the transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer, report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he has the residence or place of business where the vehicle is normally kept, as the case may he, and shall forward the certificate of registration to that registering authority together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the report received by him from the transferor in order that particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in the certificate of registration. (2) xxx (a) xxx (b) xxx (3) If the transferor or the transferee fails to report to the registering authority the fact of transfer within the period specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1), as the case may be, or if the person who is required to make an application under sub-section (2) (hereafter in this section referred to as the other person) fails to make such application within the period prescribed, the registering authority may, having regard to the circumstances of the case, require the transferor or the transferee, or the other person, as the case may be, to pay, in lieu of any action that may be taken against him u/s 177 such amount not exceeding one hundred rupees as may be prescribed under sub-section (5) : Provided that action u/s 177 shall be taken against the transferor or the transferee or the other person, as the case may be, where he fails to pay the said amount. (4) xxx. (5) xxx. (6) xxx. (7) xxx. 25. After careful examination the aforesaid provision, it is clear that, if transfer of a registered vehicle has been made within the State, then within 14 days of such transfer in the manner prescribed by the Central Government along with such documents an intimation to the registering authority in whose jurisdiction the transfer is to be made effective is required to be given. Simultaneously, a copy of the said report is also required to be furnished to the transferee. The manner has been prescribed under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Rule 55 deals the said contingencies, whereby it is clear that on transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle, transferor is required to report the said feet on form No. 29 to registering authority having jurisdiction. Along with said form, certificate of registration, certificate of insurance and fee as specified under Rule 81, is required to be affixed. 26. Thus, if compliance as specified u/s 50(1)(a)(i) and Rule 55 has been made by the transferor i.e. respondent No. 7, then compliance as specified u/s 50 may be accepted, otherwise the case in hand is not distinguishable from the case of Pushpa alias Leela and others (supra). On perusal of the record of present case, document Ex. D/1 is an affidavit of Pradeep and Bhanupratap Singh, Ex. On perusal of the record of present case, document Ex. D/1 is an affidavit of Pradeep and Bhanupratap Singh, Ex. D/2 is an intimation given to RTO, Mandsaur by respondent No. 7 along with copy of affidavit. Ex. D/4 is the UPC indicating name of RTO, Mandsaur and the Insurance Company. Thereby it is clear that Form No. 29 as prescribed under Rule 55 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules has net been sent. The registration certificate, insurance policy and fees have also not been attached. Intimation to the transferee has also not been given as apparent from the UPC. In such circumstances, respondent No. 7 has not shown the compliance of the provisions of Section 50(1)(a)(I) of the Motor Vehicles Act, as prescribed in rules. 27. Learned counsel for respondent No. 7, again at this stage, referring Section 50(1)(b) and 50(3) of Motor Vehicles Act, has contended that it is not only the duty of the transferor but it is also the duty of the transferee to intimate regarding sale of transaction to the registering authority in whose jurisdiction registration of the vehicle is there. As the transferee has also failed to produce any document to comply the said provision, however, in consequence thereof as per Section 50(3), transferee or transferor would be liable to pay the penalty only as specified u/s 177. In such circumstances, applying the principle of equity and good conscience and looking to the transaction of the sale it be presumed that the ownership was transferred and son of the appellants was the owner of offending vehicle on the date of accident. It is further his contention that non-compliance of provision of Section 50(1)(a)(i) would only lead to penal consequence and it is having nothing to do with the compliance of the provisions of the Act. After hearing him and on going through the aforesaid provisions, no doubt, it is dear that the transferor and transferee, both were required to intimate to the registering authority in a manner so prescribed. But, in the present case son of the appellants have denied his ownership disputing the agreement to sale. It is respondent No. 7-Pradeep Kumar who has stated that Bhanu Pratap Singh, son of the appellants is the owner, however, burden of proof lies on him. But, in the present case son of the appellants have denied his ownership disputing the agreement to sale. It is respondent No. 7-Pradeep Kumar who has stated that Bhanu Pratap Singh, son of the appellants is the owner, however, burden of proof lies on him. As stated, respondent No. 7 is transferor, thus, to prove the fact that the vehicle after sale was in possession of Bhanu Pratap Singh, is required to be proved by respondent No. 7. As per the defence taken by respondent No. 7, he has proved that as per Section 50(1)(a)(i) the registering authority was intimated by him as per procedure prescribed. In absence of the said proof and looking to the defence taken by Bhanu Pratap Singh that he is not the owner of the vehicle and his name was not registered in R.T.O., and it is not a case of hire-purchase hypothecation or lease agreement, thus the contention advanced by Shri Jain, is devoid of any substance, hence, repelled. 28. It is not disputed by respondent No. 7 that on the date of accident, the vehicle in question was registered in the RTO in his name, however, in the fact of this case he can only be described is a "owner" for the purpose of Section 158 of the Motor Vehicles Act and to carry out the purpose of the M.V. Act. In such circumstances, the finding to absolve him from the liability to pay compensation and to fasten such liability against the son of the appellants as recorded by the Claims Tribunal is not in conformity to the provisions of law, hence set aside. In consequence thereto, it is directed that registered owner of the vehicle may satisfy the liability to pay compensation under the impugned award. In view of for going discussions, this appeal is allowed, the finding of liability recorded against the son of the appellants by the Claims Tribunal to pay the amount of compensation stands set aside and in consequence thereto registered owner (respondent No. 7) is directed to discharge the liability under the impugned award. The amount so deposited by the appellants to maintain this appeal may be refunded back on applying before the Claims Tribunal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own cost.