JUDGMENT M.M. DAS, J. : The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the legality of the order dated 1.10.2011 under Annexure-4 passed in T.S. No.10 of 1995 by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Baripada. 2.Facts of the case in gist are that Hindustan Petroleum Corporation-opposite party No.1 filed T.S. No.10 of 1995 against the opposite parties 2 to 4 as defendants seeking a decree for permanent injunction and mandatory injunction against them with other ancillary reliefs in which the defendants have appeared and filed their counter claim seeking appropriate relief i.e. for declaration of title over the disputed property on the basis of their valid purchase of the suit land after expiry of the lease period. 3.The plaintiff has stated that originally the landlord, namely, Surendranath Banarjee, executed a lease deed on 15.12.1973 in favour of the plaintiff-opposite party No.1 herein in respect of the suit land retrospectively with effect from 1.12.1971 for a period of ten years. The period of lease was till 1.12.1981. The defendants-opposite parties 2 to 4 purchased the suit land from its rightful owner by registered sale deed dated 27.9.1993 after expiry of the lease period and the plaintiff used to pay Rs.150/- as monthly rent to the defendants. The defendants also claimed in their cross-claim for enhancement of the rent. 4.It is pertinent to mention that after obtaining the lease of the suit land, the plaintiff-opposite party No.1 established a Petroleum Pump over the suit land and authorized the petitioners/intervenors to run the said Petroleum Pump as Agent of the plaintiff. 5.After expiry of the leasehold period on 1.12.1981 and the lease having not been renewed, the learned Addl.District Magistrate, Baripada cancelled the N.O.C. granted earlier in favour of the plaintiff by exercising his statutory power under the Petroleum Act by order dated 10.5.1993. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff-opposite party No.1 preferred an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Central Division, Cuttack, which was also dismissed by order dated 21.8.1993. The plaintiff thereafter filed OJC No.6960 of 1993 before this Court challenging the orders dated 10.5.1993 and 21.8.1993 respectively in which these opposite parties as well as the petitioners/intervenors were impleaded as opposite parties 4 to 7 and the said writ petition was allowed by quashing the impugned orders passed by the Addl.District Magistrate, Baripada and the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Central Division, Cuttack. This Court in the said order held that the opposite party No.1-Corporation is entitled to remain in possession till 30.11.2011 and on that ground, set aside the orders of the lower authority. The present opposite parties 2 to 4 filed Civil Appeal No.4889 of 2005 before the Hon’ble Apex Court, which was disposed of by order dated 10.2.2011. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while disposing of the Civil Appeal held as follows : “During the course of hearing of this appeal, the learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Corporation, in response to a pointed suggestion from the Court, stated that notwithstanding the various contentions and pleas raised by the Corporation in the appeal, it is willing to wind-up its business on the land in question by 30th November, 2013. It is submitted that with effect from 30th November, 2013, the Corporation shall not have any claim whatsoever as against the appellants herein. However, the learned counsel for respondent No.5 submitted that his possession in respect of the land in not under any license or authorization granted by the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. but under an agreement of sale purported to have been executed by the predecessor in title of the appellants. The fifth respondent herein claims to have purchased the property under an agreement of sale from the original landholder even prior to the purchase of the said land by the appellants herein. That dispute between the appellants and the fifth respondent is the subject matter of the appeal pending in the High Court of Orissa. It is also brought to our notice that the High Court has granted an order of status quo by virtue of which he is continuing in possession of the land. However, in view of the undertaking given by the Corporation that it shall cease all its operations on the land in question with effect from 30th November, 2013, the fifth respondent cannot be allowed to carry on any operation and business in petroleum products since his authorization from the Corporation would automatically come to an end with effect from 30th November, 2013. However, we do not wish to say anything about the physical possession of the land in question which is the subject matter of the appeal in the High Court. However, we do not wish to say anything about the physical possession of the land in question which is the subject matter of the appeal in the High Court. In the light of the consensus arrived at during the hearing of this appeal, we direct the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., the first respondent herein, to wind up its business on the land in question with effect from Ist December, 2013. The authorization granted by the first respondent-Corporation in favour of the fifth respondent shall also come to an end thereby the fifth respondent shall not be allowed to carry on any business whatsoever in petroleum products since the authorization granted by the Corporation shall come to an end under this direction by 30th November, 2013. The Corporation as at present is stated to be paying a sum of Rs.150/- per month towards the lease amount. There is a claim made by the appellants herein demanding the lease amount at the rate of Rs. 7,500/- per month in the year, 1995 which is stated to be the subject matter of dispute in a civil suit. However, the first respondent-Corporation shall pay sum of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand only) per month from 1st December, 2011 to end of November, 2013. The Corporation shall file an appropriate undertaking in this Court, within four weeks from today, duly undertaken that it shall wind-up all its business operations on the land in question and also undertaking that it shall pay a sum of Rs.15,000/- per month with effect from 1st December, 2011 till they vacate the premises by the end of November, 2013. The claim, which is stated to be pending in the civil Court in respect of enhancement of the rent, shall, however, be adjudicated on its own merits, uninfluenced by the observations made in this order. We make it clear that the dispute between the appellants and the fifth respondent in respect of the land and its possession may have to be considered by the High Court in the pending First Appeal, uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of. We make it clear that the dispute between the appellants and the fifth respondent in respect of the land and its possession may have to be considered by the High Court in the pending First Appeal, uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.” 6.While the matter stood thus, the petitioners/intervenors filed T.S. No.103 of 2004 against the original landlord as well as the present opposite parties 2 to 4 seeking a decree for specific performance of contract and confirmation of possession, which was dismissed on merit and against the said judgment, the opposite party No.1 has filed F.A. No.185 of 1997 before this Court, which is sub-judice. 7.In the suit filed by the Corporation-opposite party No.1 i.e. T.S. No.10 of 1995, the petitioner No.1 filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. to be impleaded as a party. The said application was rejected by the impugned order. 8.Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently urged that since the petitioner No.1 is vital interested in the subject matter of the suit, the trial Court has committed an illegality in rejecting the application of the petitioners by holding that the petitioner No.1 is not a necessary party and cannot be impleaded as a party in the suit. He further submits that the petitioner No.1 having filed a separate suit, being T.S. No.103 of 2004, for specific performance of contract and confirmation of possession, which is now pending in the First Appeal before this Court, it cannot be said that the petitioner No.1 has no interest in the suit property and this Court has already laid down in the case of Sk. Siraj and others v. Nilamani Mohapatra and others, 2009 (I) OLR 407 , that the power of the Court to implead a person as a party is not dependant solely on the question whether such party has any interest in the suit property. Rather the Court is to consider whether the right of the said person may be affected if it is not added as to party to the suit. Rather the Court is to consider whether the right of the said person may be affected if it is not added as to party to the suit. He further submitted that while considering the application under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C., the Court is not to consider the merit of the case but has to take into account as to whether the intervenor has a valid question to raise and if he will not be permitted to be impleaded as party, it will lead to the multiplicity of the litigation. 9.Learned counsel for the opposite parties 2 to 4, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner along with other intervenor was a party in the Civil appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court has specifically directed the plaintiff-opposite party No.1 to pay a sum of Rs.15,000/- per month to the opposite parties 2 to 4. He further submitted that the application for impletion of a party was filed in collusion with the plaintiff-Corporation-opposite party No.1 herein, who also in spite of valid service of notice did not appear before this Court in the present writ petition. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its order has directed that the plaintiff-opposite party No.1 is permitted to continue his business till 30th November, 2013 over the disputed property. It has also observed that with regard to the dispute over the possession of the suit land, the same may have to be considered by this Court in the pending First Appeal. 10.Considering the facts of the present case, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C.P.C., a party can apply to impleaded as a party in the proceeding whose right may be affected by the ultimate decree. 10.Considering the facts of the present case, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C.P.C., a party can apply to impleaded as a party in the proceeding whose right may be affected by the ultimate decree. Considering the nature of the present case, such a question does not arise in view of pendency of the First Appeal filed against the judgment and decree passed in the suit filed by the petitioner No.1 in respect of which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the dispute with regard to possession of the suit land between the opposie parties 2 to 4 herein and one of the petitioners may have to be considered by this Court in the said pending first appeal, on influenced by any of the observation made in the said order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. On appreciation of the materials on record and the facts of the case, this Court is of the view that the lower Court has committed no error in rejecting the application under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. filed by the petitioner No.1 by the impugned order as the petitioner No.1 cannot have any vital interest in the issues raised in the suit filed by the opposite party No.1 against the opposite parties 2 to 4. This Court also confirms the finding that the petitioner No.1/intervenor is not a necessary party nor a proper party to the pending suit i.e. T.S.No.10 of 1995. 11.In view of the above, this writ petition holds no merit and is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, without cost. 12.The interim order passed earlier staying further proceedings in the suit stands vacated. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the suit expeditiously as the matter is pending since 1995 and dispose of the same at an early date, preferably by the end of June, 2014. Petition dismissed.