ORDER : Paresh Upadhyay, J. Heard Mr. N.M. Kapadia, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Pranav G. Desai, learned counsel for the respondent Bank. 2. Challenge is made in this petition to the final decision of the disciplinary authority of imposing major penalty of removal, on the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner by the respondent Bank. The prayer in the petition reads as under: "... YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any appropriate writ, direction and order and further be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned inquiry and decision of the respondent to impose major penalty on the petitioner at the conclusion of the said inquiry proceedings..." The disciplinary proceedings in question has ultimately culminated in punishment of removal of the petitioner from the service of the Bank vide order dated 01.06.1984. There is controversy with regard to service of that order as well, which is discussed in this judgment subsequently, but the punishment order dated 01.06.1984 is taken on record and the petitioner is permitted to challenge the legality and validity of the said order dated 01.06.1984 as well, along with the principal prayer which is referred hereinabove, and the said challenge is also considered while recording this judgment. 3. Earlier, the petitioner had filed a petition being Special Civil Application No. 3327 of 1984, in which an ex parte order came to be passed on 04.07.1984, which was after the passing of the removal order. The ex parte order passed by this Court, reads as under: "Disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner are still pending. It is stated before me that the eqnuiry is in progress and Final Order has not yet been passed by the Competent authority. This petition must, therefore, be rejected premature. It appears to the court to be just and proper to direct that the order of penalty, if any passed against the petitioners in the disciplinary proceedings shall not be implemented for a period of 15 days from the date of service of such order upon the petitioner in order to enable him to take appropriate proceedings in a proper forum. With the aforesaid direction this petition shall stand summarily rejected as dismissed." 4. Thereafter the present petition was filed in November, 1984, which was sworn on 06.11.1984 with above referred prayer clause. 5. With the aforesaid direction this petition shall stand summarily rejected as dismissed." 4. Thereafter the present petition was filed in November, 1984, which was sworn on 06.11.1984 with above referred prayer clause. 5. This petition was initially allowed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 05.08.1991, solely on the ground that the report of the Inquiry Officer was not supplied to the delinquent- the petitioner, prior to passing of the punishment order. The said judgment was on the basis of the ratio of Honourable the Supreme Court of India in case of Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 . More than one petitions were heard together by this Court and on this pure question of law, those petitions, including this petition, were allowed. The said judgment of this Court dated 05.08.1991 was challenged by the respondent Bank before Honourable the Supreme Court of India by preferring a bunch of SLPs, which also included the present case, which were allowed by Honourable the Supreme Court vide common order dated 13.01.1994. In the said SLPs identical question of law was raised, which was decided by this Court against the Bank. By that time, Honourable the Supreme Court of India in case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 had already taken the view that the mandate in the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) was to operate prospectively and therefore punishment orders which were passed on and after 20.11.1990 only, shall be examined in view of that proposition of law, since the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) was dated 20.11.1990. In the present case, since the inquiry in question as well as the punishment order was much prior to the said cut-off date, the ratio in the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) was not applicable, as recorded above, and that is how Special Leave Petition filed by the respondent Bank was allowed, as noted above, along with other SLPs filed on the same issue, and this matter was remanded back by the Supreme Court to this Court to decide it afresh on all other points, except on the point of non- supply of inquiry report prior to punishment order. That is how this matter is being heard by this Court at that stage. 6. In view of the first ex parte order, passed by this Court on 04.07.1984, the implementation of punishment order was ordered to be deferred for a period of 15 days from the date of its service and it is contended by learned advocate for the petitioner that the said order was not served to the petitioner at the relevant time, and the same is not served even uptil now. To remove this technicality, learned counsel for the respondent bank was requested to keep more copies of the said order ready. One copy is given to the Court which is taken on record and one copy is given to the learned advocate for the petitioner and he has made his submissions with regard to the said order as well. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Kapadia has addressed the Court at length. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the Court through the Articles of Charge, the deposition of original complainant and other material on record. Before the contentions of the petitioner are recorded and gone into, few undisputed facts need to be recorded which are as under. 7.1 The petitioner was working as Head Cashier with the respondent- State Bank of India at Atul (Valsad). In January, 1981, one customer/borrower of the respondent Bank viz. Mr. Sevalal Rajpal had gone to repay Rs.1600/- towards his dues payable to the Bank. Banking hours were over. Petitioner, who was Head Cashier of the Bank at that time, received the said amount, and told the customer that since the banking hours were already over, the amount shall be deposited on the next working day. That amount of Rs.1600/- was deposited by the petitioner in the Bank as late as on 28.07.1981. The said deposit was, after the Bank issued two notices to the said customer intimating him about the outstanding dues and his being a defaulter. 7.2 The case of the petitioner is to the effect that, since he was commuting from Atul to Valsad, the day on which he received that amount from the customer, he lost that amount in transit, before he could deposit it with the respondent Bank on next working day. 7.2 The case of the petitioner is to the effect that, since he was commuting from Atul to Valsad, the day on which he received that amount from the customer, he lost that amount in transit, before he could deposit it with the respondent Bank on next working day. He had contacted the borrower and he (borrower) was given to understand that the said amount shall be deposited by the petitioner in the Bank as per his (petitioner's) convenience, to which, it is stated that, the customer/borrower had no objection. 7.3 Since the money was not deposited with the Bank, the customer received notices, two notices from the Bank, informing him being a defaulter and on receipt of such notices from the Bank, the said customer approached the Manager and informed him that the amount of Rs.1600/-, which was payable by him, was already given to the Head Cashier way-back in January, 1981 and under these circumstances the Manager asked the said customer to give that in writing. The complaint to that effect was given by the customer, based on which proceedings had started and only thereafter the petitioner deposited the amount with the Bank. This is treated to be a misconduct of the petitioner by the Bank. 7.4 Mainly for this misconduct and for other two incidents, charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 05.04.1982. The same was responded by the petitioner. With regard to the first charge, it was sought to be clarified by the petitioner that the person who was a borrower, and who is the complainant, was personally known to the petitioner, at his request money was accepted by the petitioner and it was only loss of money in transit and without any malice the same was deposited on 28.07.1981. After this explanation, regular departmental inquiry was ordered. Before inquiry officer the borrower viz. Mr. Sevaram Rajpal appeared and gave version which benefits the management of the Bank, as well as the petitioner. 8. Taking into consideration the material which had come on record, inquiry officer came to the conclusion that the charges, at least the principal charge against the petitioner, which is discussed above is proved. Thereafter the disciplinary authority issued an order dated 01.06.1984 whereby the order of removal of the petitioner from the service of the Bank was passed. 8. Taking into consideration the material which had come on record, inquiry officer came to the conclusion that the charges, at least the principal charge against the petitioner, which is discussed above is proved. Thereafter the disciplinary authority issued an order dated 01.06.1984 whereby the order of removal of the petitioner from the service of the Bank was passed. It is the case of the Bank that the petitioner did not receive the said order and therefore it was displayed on the notice board of the Bank and it was also sent to the last known address of the petitioner on Bank's record. The petitioner claims that he has never received it. During the course of hearing of this petition, just to see to it that, that technicality does not come in way of deciding the petition on merits, copy of the same is given to the learned advocate for the petitioner and he has made submissions with regard to punishment order as well, and the said order is taken on record. 9. Effectively, the point for adjudication before this Court is, as to whether the petitioner is right in contending that the departmental inquiry initiated against the petitioner vide charge sheet dated 05.04.1982 and its culmination into punishment order dated 01.06.1984 is vitiated on any ground. 10. Learned advocate for the petitioner has raised various contentions. Firstly, it is contended that the inquiry officer as well as disciplinary authority both have not taken into consideration the material which was on record and which could weigh in favour of petitioner. It is also contended that the complaint was solicited by the bank manager from the customer Mr. Sevaram. Not only that, under the threat, the complainant was brought before the inquiry officer and the record shows that in duress he had deposed before the inquiry officer. It is further contended that even if that deposition is taken into consideration, it is not that the said customer-complainant had said everything against the petitioner. According to the petitioner, there was also material to show that there was no malice attributable to the petitioner. Much emphasise is made on the point that the complainant-customer was brought before the inquiry officer under police escort. According to the petitioner, there was also material to show that there was no malice attributable to the petitioner. Much emphasise is made on the point that the complainant-customer was brought before the inquiry officer under police escort. It is also contended that there is no loss caused to the bank, it is the late deposit of money in the bank and under those circumstances the extreme punishment of the economic death of the family of the petitioner, ought not to have been ordered by the authorities. It is also contended that the finding recorded by the inquiry officer is self- contradictory, inasmuch as at one stage the inquiry officer records that money was kept by the petitioner for his personal use and at the same time he also records that it is true that money was lost by the petitioner in transit. It is further contended that in the charge-sheet or before the inquiry officer, no specific rule is pointed out, violation of which is alleged against the petitioner. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to number of authorities in support of his contentions. The said authorities are as under: (i) In case of State of U.P. and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, reported at (2010) 2 SCC 772 (ii) In decision rendered by the Honourable the Supreme Court in case of Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and another, AIR 1985 SC 504 (iii) In case of Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India and others, reported in 2012 (3) SCC 178 (iv) In case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 (v) In case of M.J. Ninama v. Post Master General, reported in 1984 GLH 800 , (vi) In case of decision rendered in Special Civil Application No. 592 of 1989 in case of Prithvi Palsingh v. The Additional Dy. Inspector General of Police, Gandhinagar, (vii) In case of Ravinder Kumar v. Union of India and others, reported in CWP No. 1658/2007 (reported in 2009 Lab IC 2947 (viii) In case of Government of Andhra Pradesh and others v. V. Appala Swamy, reported in 2007 (14) SCC 49 (ix) In case of Gujarat State Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. and another v. Industrial Tribunal, Baroda and another, 2010 (2) GLR 1564 (x) In case of Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration Through Secretary (Labour) and others, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 635 (xi) In case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Sharif (dead) Through Lrs., reported in 1982 (2) SCC 376 (xii) In case of State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal and another, reported in (1998) 6 SCC 651 (xiii) In case of Suresh C. Shah v. Food Corporation of India and another, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 157, (xiv) In case of State Bank of India and others v. K.P. Narayanan Kutty, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 449 (xv) In case of Kolli Madhav Sairam Reddy v. Union of India and others, reported in 2011 (1) GLH 460 , (xvi) In case of Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 539 (xvii) In case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772 (xviii) In case of M.V. Bijalani v. U.O.I., reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 (xix) In case of LIC v. Rampal Singh, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 491 (xx) In case of Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 31 (xxi) In case of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1313 , (xxii) In case of Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India, reported in (1986) 3 SCC 229 (xxiii) In case of Managing Director ECIL v. B. Karunakar, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 (xxiv) In case of PNB v. Kunj Behari, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 (xxv) In case of Lallubhai Jogibhai v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1981 SC 728 , (xxvi) In decision dated 09.09.2009 rendered in Writ Petition No. 3618 of 2008 (reported in (2009) 6 Bom. CR 705) in case of Shri Santosh Kumar s/o Babulal Gupta v. The Sub- Area Manager, (xxvii) In case of Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and another, reported in (2002) 7 SCC 559 (xxviii) In case of Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and others v. K.K. Modi and others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 385 (xxix) In case of State of Maharashtra and others v. ARK Builders Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2011) 4 SCC 616 (xxx) In case of Kamaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and others, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 182 12. On the other hand, learned advocate for the respondent Bank has contended that the departmental inquiry in question was conducted in accordance with rules of the Bank, in due compliance of principle of natural justice, opportunity was given to the petitioner to put his case before the inquiry officer, and even material which was sought to be used against the petitioner was supplied to him, including that the complainant-customer was put to cross examine and he was extensively cross examined also, as is evident from the entire set of deposition, which is placed on record. Learned counsel for the respondent, by referring to various authorities, also contended that the confidence of the bank reposed on the officer like the petitioner was betrayed and no lenient view could have been taken. It is also contended that the lack of bona fide on the part of the petitioner is also evident from the stand of the petitioner with regard to non-supply of the punishment order dated 01.06.1984, coupled with the ex parte order of this Court dated 04.07.1984. It is contended that this Court may not interfere with the finding of the inquiry officer or the ultimate punishment order or even in quantum of punishment. Learned counsel for the respondent Bank, in support of his submissions, has also relied on the judgment of Honourable the Supreme Court of India in case of. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and respondent Bank and having gone through the record, I find that, the petitioner has, from the first stage of filing of the petition, sought to abuse the process of law. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and respondent Bank and having gone through the record, I find that, the petitioner has, from the first stage of filing of the petition, sought to abuse the process of law. Even while filing the earlier petition being Special Civil Application No. 3327 of 1984, though the punishment order dated 01.06.1984 was already passed by the respondent Bank, concealing that fact it was agitated before this Court that disciplinary proceeding is not concluded and the order dated 04.07.1984 as referred above came to be passed ex parte. The said order dated 04.07.1984 is a concluded issue and that point is left there. However, it is clear from the tenor of the said order dated 04.07.1984 that, the petitioner was to be treated in service until the order passed by the Bank is served upon him and it is contended even in the year 2012, that the said order was not served upon the petitioner. Considering the totality, I find that the said order was already served or deemed to have been served on the petitioner at the relevant time, however, as already recorded hereinabove, to remove this technicality, learned counsel for the respondent bank was requested to keep more copies of the said order ready, one copy was given to the Court which is taken on record and one copy was given to the learned advocate for the petitioner and he has also made his submissions with regard to the said order as well. 14. On the merits of the departmental inquiry in question, I find that there is no dispute that the borrower of the Bank, was an illiterate man- a labourer. To earn his livelihood he used to take- out a hand-lorry of vegetables, for which he had taken loan from the Bank. Repayment of dues of Rs.1600/- to the Bank, in the year 1981, for a borrower of this status, was a very big amount. From his deposition before the inquiry officer, satisfaction is recorded by the inquiry officer, through which this Court is taken through by learned advocate for the petitioner, that he is an illiterate villager and his deposition inspires confidence. His both versions, including that the petitioner would be in difficulty by his deposition, is taken into consideration by the inquiry officer. From his deposition before the inquiry officer, satisfaction is recorded by the inquiry officer, through which this Court is taken through by learned advocate for the petitioner, that he is an illiterate villager and his deposition inspires confidence. His both versions, including that the petitioner would be in difficulty by his deposition, is taken into consideration by the inquiry officer. He has also stood by his say that, after money was deposited by the petitioner in the Bank, he had given in writing to the Bank that he does not want to pursue his complaint any further. His this version, does not create any contradiction, as sought to be canvassed by learned advocate for the petitioner, but it shows his truthfulness to his say before the authority. On receipt of the second notice from the bank, intimating him about his being a defaulter, he approached the Manager of the Bank and informed him in writing which gave rise to initiation of departmental proceeding against the petitioner. On money having been deposited by the petitioner, he also gave in writing to the bank that he does not have any grievance against the petitioner. Considering the totality, inquiry officer came to the conclusion that charge is proved. Even otherwise, there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the money was accepted by the petitioner after bank hours with a promise to deposit the same next day, which was deposited after about six months. Even if the explanation of having lost the money in transit by the petitioner is true, the fact remains that the said amount was deposited in bank not before borrower got two notices from the bank and the borrower giving written complaint to the Manager. In my view, this aspect could not have been overlooked either by the inquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority and was rightly not overlooked. In my view, this one misconduct itself was sufficient to remove the petitioner from the service, since I also find that there is no other illegality or procedural lacuna in the departmental inquiry in question. Having gone through the record of the inquiry proceedings which is referred to by learned advocate for the petitioner extensively, I find that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner. Having gone through the record of the inquiry proceedings which is referred to by learned advocate for the petitioner extensively, I find that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner. His say is already taken into consideration and after evaluating the entire material on record, the inquiry officer came to the conclusion that the charge against the petitioner is proved. Much emphasise is made on the point that the complainant was brought under police protection. This contention would cut both the ways. After having gone through the record of the inquiry officer and disciplinary authority, I do not see any force in this argument and it is rejected. On the basis of the proved facts, no interference is called for in the ultimate decision taken by the respondent authorities. The contention about non-application of mind and perversity attributable to inquiry officer and disciplinary authority both, also is not supported from the facts and material on record. In the facts of this case, I find that the inquiry officer as well as disciplinary authority, both have acted in accordance with the rules and in due compliance of the principle of natural justice. I see no force in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner. So far reliance placed on various authorities by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which are referred above, it is recorded that there cannot be any dispute with regard to proposition of law enunciated in the above referred judgments, however in the peculiar fact situation, which is recorded and discussed hereinabove, in my view, none of the above decisions would take the case of the petitioner any further. 15. For the reasons recorded above, this petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.