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2013 DIGILAW 503 (KAR)

Venkatamma v. Ankamma

2013-04-10

A.S.PACHHAPURE

body2013
JUDGMENT A.S. Pachhapure, J.—The appellants have challenged the Common Judgment and Order dated 16.06.2009 in R.A. Nos. 272 and 273/2009 [Old Nos. 311 and 328/2003] modifying the Judgment and Decree in O.S. No. 156/1992 by dismissing the former appeal and allowing the latter. Brief facts for the purpose of these appeals are as under: Deceased Venkatamma [plaintiff No. 1] was the second wife of late Mudde Gowda, whereas Giriyamma was his first wife. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein [defendant Nos. 1 to 4] i.e., Ankamma, Shivamma, Deveeramma and Savitramma are the daughters born to Mudde Gowda through his first wife-Giriyamma, whereas appellant No. 5 and respondent No. 8 herein [plaintiff Nos. 4 and 3] i.e., Gayathri and Rukmini are the daughters born to Mudde Gowda through his second wife-Venkatamma i.e., deceased appellant No. 1. Plaintiff No. 2-Puttaswamy [deceased appellant No. 2] was the son of Venkatamma through her former husband and he is the foster son of Mudde Gowda. Venkatamma married Mudde Gowda after the death of his first wife. The daughters of the first wife-Giriyamma are married and residing with their respective husbands. The suit properties belong to late Mudde Gowda and on 31.12.1962, Mudde Gowda bequeathed the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs [appellants and respondent No. 8 herein] and at that time, his daughters through the second wife-Venkatamma were minors. During his lifetime, Mudde Gowda executed a Gift Deed of certain properties in favour of Shivamma, respondent No. 2 and as she declined to accept the gift, he is said to have executed a registered Sale Deed in favour of her husband. Mudde Gowda is said to have sold item No. 3 amongst the suit property during his lifetime. It is in these circumstances that the appellants and respondent No. 8 herein instituted a suit before the trial Court to declare that they are the absolute owners of the suit properties, for an injunction and in the alternative a decree for partition and separate possession of their shares in the suit property. The suit was contested by respondent Nos. 1 to 7 herein. They disputed the execution, attestation and validity of the Will and the other respondents contended that the transfer of item No. 3 is valid in law. After framing the issues, the trial Court recorded the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 9, documents Exs. P1 to 88 were marked in their evidence. 1 to 7 herein. They disputed the execution, attestation and validity of the Will and the other respondents contended that the transfer of item No. 3 is valid in law. After framing the issues, the trial Court recorded the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 9, documents Exs. P1 to 88 were marked in their evidence. The defendants examined D.Ws. 1 to 4, documents Exs. D1 to 26 were marked in their evidence. The trial Court after hearing learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the material on record, decreed the suit partly in respect of item Nos. 1, 2, and 4 of the suit properties and in respect of item No. 3, the suit came to be dismissed. The trial Court held that late Mudde Gowda executed the Will on 31.12.1962 and bequeathed the suit items 1, 2 and 4 in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence granted a relief of declaration and possession in favour of the plaintiffs, whereas in respect of item No. 3, the suit came to be dismissed. Aggrieved by the Judgment and decree, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal in R.A. No. 272/2009, whereas defendant Nos. 1 to 4 preferred R.A. No. 273/2009. The first appellate Court has dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs [appellants and respondent No. 8 herein] and allowed the appeal of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 [respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein] by modifying the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court and granting alternative relief of partition and separate possession of the shares of the plaintiffs [appellant Nos. 1 to 5 and respondent No. 8] herein and formally dismissed the suit in relation to item No. 3 in the suit property. Aggrieved by the Judgments and Decrees of the courts below, the present appeals have been filed by the plaintiffs. 2. Vide Order dated 10.03.2013 the following substantial question of law has been raised for consideration: In RSA No. 173/2013: In the face of several mortgage deeds that: were produced by the appellants to assert ownership over the suit property and in the absence of any evidence on behalf of the defendants, whether the Courts below were justified in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs insofar as suit schedule item No. 3 is concerned? In RSA No. 174/2010: Whether the first Appellate Court was justified in coming to a conclusion that there was any legal presumption of a person suffering from illness would also not be in sound disposition of mind in executing the Will? 3. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the due execution of the Will-Ex. P1 has been proved and there is nothing unnatural about its due execution and any discrepancy in the evidence of the attestor would not vitiate the execution of the Will and exclusion of the daughters of the first wife is itself insufficient to generate any suspicious about validity of the Will. He would further contend that the Will itself is a document which generally debars the natural heirs and it is not a ground to invalidate the Will executed by late Mudde Gowda. Though Mudde Gowda was unwell at the time of execution of the Will, is not a ground to raise any presumption that he was not in a sound state of mind. So also he would contend that the active participation of the beneficiaries i.e., the appellants herein itself is insufficient to reject genuineness of the Will and as the execution and attestation has been proved by examining the attestor and also the scribe, Ex. P1 has been proved even as required under Section 71 of the Evidence Act. So also, he would submit that the presence of the beneficiaries under the Will cannot be considered as dominating factor as the executor had the mental capacity and there is no chance of he coming under the influence and therefore, he would contend that the Will cannot be attacked on the ground of dominating presence or influence. He would also contend that though the trial Court on the basis of the evidence on record held that the Will as valid, the first appellate Court was wrong in reversing the finding by re-appreciating the evidence as it was not its duty to do so as the trial Court had the advantage of observing demeanor of the witnesses. He would also submits that when the appellants had examined the scribe, the mere fact that the attesting witness has turned hostile would not have been a ground for the first appellate Court to reject the finding relating to the validity of the Will. He would also submits that when the appellants had examined the scribe, the mere fact that the attesting witness has turned hostile would not have been a ground for the first appellate Court to reject the finding relating to the validity of the Will. On these grounds, he has sought for setting aside the Judgment of the first appellate Court and to restore that of the trial Court. So far as the finding relating to item No. 3 of the suit schedule property is concerned, he contends that the Courts below on the face of several Mortgage Deeds produced by the plaintiffs to assert the ownership over item No. 3 and in the absence of any evidence, committed an error in dismissing the suit by rejecting the relief sought for by the appellants in relation to item No. 3 of the suit schedule property. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contends that the Will was not proved and so also its execution and attestation. He submits that a scribe or a sub-Registrar who registered the Will cannot be substituted in the place of an attesting witness and as he has not supported the version of the appellants, the question of validity does not arise for consideration at all. He would further contend that mere registration of the document itself is insufficient to prove its validity unless the due execution and the attestation is proved. He would also submit that the suspicious circumstances that arose from the evidence on record cannot be explained by the appellants and therefore, the counsel contends that the first appellate Court is justified in modifying the Judgment and decree of the trial Court. 5. Ex. P1 is the Will said to have been executed by late Mudde Gowda on 31.12.1962. Admittedly, Mudde Gowda breathed his last on 05.03.1963. At the time when the Will was executed in the house of the plaintiffs, P.W.1 states that the Will was written in the village and at that time P.W.2-Srinivasaiah, P.W.5-Ramadase Gowda, Masthi Gowda i.e., the brother of Mudde Gowda, Kempegowda, Nanjunde Gowda and others were present. According to him, Mudde Gowda gave all the particulars relating to the properties and instructed P.W.2-Srinivasaiah who wrote the Will according to the dictation of the testator. At the time of its execution, Mudde Gowda was 65 years old and he had no male issues. According to him, Mudde Gowda gave all the particulars relating to the properties and instructed P.W.2-Srinivasaiah who wrote the Will according to the dictation of the testator. At the time of its execution, Mudde Gowda was 65 years old and he had no male issues. His daughters through the first wife were married and they were residing the house of their respective husbands. After the death of his first wife-Giriyamma, Mudde Gowda married plaintiff No. 1-Venkatamma. On the date of execution of the Will, plaintiff No. 3-Rukmini was 4 years old and plaintiff No. 4-Gayathri was 2 years old. These minor daughters are born to Mudde Gowda through the second wife, whereas P.W.1-Puttaswamy is the son of his second wife-Venkatamma through her former husband. He was suffering weakness due to the progress in the illness day by day and therefore said to have decided to execute the Will to protect the interest of his second wife, her son and his daughters who are minors. As he has no sons, was expecting that plaintiff No. 1-Puttaswamy would perform the rituals on his death and also stated in the Will that he has given some property to his daughter Shivamma, which is in his possession. 6. To prove the Will-Ex. P1, it is in the evidence of P.W.1-Puttaswamy a beneficiary under the Will, P.W.2-Srinivasaiah, the scribe and P.W.5-Ramadase Gowda, the attestor. P.W.2-Srinivasaiah, the scribe states in his evidence that Mudde Gowda dictated the contents of Ex. P1 and affixed his thumb impression on it, amongst the present one said to be (1) Masthi Gowda, the younger brother of late Mudde Gowda (2) Nanjunde Gowda and (3) Kempegowda who have signed at Exs. P1(c) and (d) respectively and these persons were dead on the date and were not available for examination. So, P.W.5-Ramadase Gowda is the only witness, it is in the evidence of P.W.2-Srinivasaiah that Mudde Gowda was in sound disposing state of mind and Ex. P1-Will is said to have been written in his house itself. This Will-Ex. P1 was taken to Mysore for registration before the Sub-Registrar. The plaintiffs also examined P.W.6-M. Guruswamy, the Sub-Registrar, Mysore Taluk, who registered the Will-Ex. P1. The scribe-Srinivasaiah-P.W.2 except identifying the signatures of the attesting witnesses does not say anything about the presence of the attestors at the time of execution of the documents. This Will-Ex. P1 was taken to Mysore for registration before the Sub-Registrar. The plaintiffs also examined P.W.6-M. Guruswamy, the Sub-Registrar, Mysore Taluk, who registered the Will-Ex. P1. The scribe-Srinivasaiah-P.W.2 except identifying the signatures of the attesting witnesses does not say anything about the presence of the attestors at the time of execution of the documents. So also, he does not say that the attesting witnesses put their signatures having confirmed the execution of the document by its executers. In order to prove the Will, it is necessary for the propounder to prove the execution, its attestation and also the fact that at the time when the Will was executed, the executor was in sound disposal state of mind. It is necessary to the plaintiff to comply with Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act. To prove the execution of the Will which is required by law to be attested, such document cannot be admitted in the evidence/cannot be used as evidence unless one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. 7. The Apex Court in a decision reported in AIR 1959 Supreme Court 443 [H. Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and others] held as to the procedure relating to the due execution and the attestation of the Will and in case if the execution is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, the propounder has to explain the circumstances to over-come the same and to accept the bequest. 8. Though P.W.2-Srinivasaiah, the scribe, cannot be identified to be of same status as that of an attesting witnesses and unless the animus to attest is available in his evidence, he cannot be a witness to the Will and would be a mere writer. If the evidence of the Scribe-P.W.2-Srinivasaiah is perused, he does not say anything with respect to signature on the document in the presence of the executor with an intention to sign the said document as an attesting witness. So also, he does not say even the presence of the other attesting witnesses and their signature in token of their presence at the time of execution of the document by Mudde Gowda. 9. The Apex Court in the decision reported in N. Kamalam (Dead) and Another Vs. So also, he does not say even the presence of the other attesting witnesses and their signature in token of their presence at the time of execution of the document by Mudde Gowda. 9. The Apex Court in the decision reported in N. Kamalam (Dead) and Another Vs. Ayyasamy and Another, (2001) 6 AD SC 37 had an occasion to consider this aspect and has held as under: Effect of subscribing a signature on the part of the scribe cannot be identified to be of same status as that of the attesting witnesses. Signature of the attesting witness as on a document, required attestation (admittedly in the case of a Will the same is required), is a requirement of the statute thus, cannot be equated with that of the scribe. In such a case, it could not be said that in the event of there being an intent to attest, that itself should be sufficient compliance of the requirement of law. The animus to attest is not available, so far as the scribe is concerned; he is not a witness to the Will but a mere writer of the Will. The statutory requirement as noticed above cannot thus be transposed in favour of the writer and it could go against the propounder where both the witnesses were named in Will with detailed address and no attempt was made to bring them or to produce them before the Court so as to satisfy the judicial conscience. Presence of scribe and his signature appearing on the document does not by 'itself be taken to the proof of the due attestation unless the situation is so expressed in the document itself. In a later decision, reported in JT (2010) 4 SC 296 , the Apex Court considering the said aspect and held as under: In the present case, none of the attesting witnesses have been examined. The scribe, who was examined as D.W.2, has not stated that he had signed the will with the intention to attest. In his evidence, he has merely stated that he was the scribe of the will. He even admitted that he could not remember the names of the witnesses to the will. In such circumstances, the test that the witness should have put his signature animo attestandi, has not been satisfied. Therefore, the signature of the scribe could not be taken as proof of attestation. He even admitted that he could not remember the names of the witnesses to the will. In such circumstances, the test that the witness should have put his signature animo attestandi, has not been satisfied. Therefore, the signature of the scribe could not be taken as proof of attestation. The execution of a will can be held to have been proved when the statutory requirements for proving the will are satisfied. Thus, it is evident that the will has not been duly proved. So, the scrutiny of the evidence of P.W.2-Srinivasaiah, scribe does not reveal animus to attest the documents though he is a writer and put his signature on Ex. P1-Will. Though P.W.1 was also present at the time when the Will was executed, he is a beneficiary and being the foster son of late Mudde Gowda was in a dominating position and even if his evidence is looked into, he states that the scribe wrote the Will and it was attested by the witnesses and the execution of the document was in the house. As P.W.1 has an extreme interest in the bequest, his evidence is of no help to prove the document and he cannot be a substitute for an attesting witness. The scrutiny of the evidence of P.W.5-Ramadase Gowda, the attesting witness reveals that he does not supports the plaintiffs. He states in the following words: I have not attested any document written by Mudde Gowda nor I was present when the document was written. I can recognize my signature if shown to me. The witness sees Ex. P1. I cannot say whether it is my signature. It is marked as Exs. P1(h). He also states he do not remember who dictated the contents of Wil-Ex. P1. Though this witness has not spoken anything with regard to his animo attestandi, the plaintiffs have not treated him hostile. There is no cross-examination by the plaintiffs. Therefore, whatever P.W.5 states in the chief-examination has to be accepted and though the defendants cross-examined-P.W.5 he admits in the cross-examination that Mudde Gowda was suffering from Asthama and other disease, his condition was not well, he was mentally also not well and further states that at that time, Mudde Gowda was lying on the cot, he was operated prior to that date. He also admits that Mudde Gowda was under the domination of plaintiff No. 1-Venkatamma. He also admits that Mudde Gowda was under the domination of plaintiff No. 1-Venkatamma. So, with this evidence of P.W.5, the court below has come to the conclusion that attestation on Ex. P1 is not proved. 10. The Apex Court in the decision reported in Madhukar D. Shende Vs. Tarabai Aba Shedage, AIR 2002 SC 637 held that requirement of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act are to be satisfied in addition to the evidence tendered in proof of the Will. So, it is the facts and circumstances emanating from the material available on record, if the Court considers the existence of such fact so probable that any prudent person or to any option is presumed that the Will was duly executed by the testator, the factum of execution of the Will and is said to have been proved. It is necessary for the propounder to satisfy the consciousness of the Court while adducing evidence to over come any suspicious or unnatural suspicions attached to the Will. Further more, in the decision reported in P.P.K. Gopalan Nambiar Vs. P.P.K. Balakrishnan Nambiar and others, AIR 1995 SC 1852 , the Apex Court observed that the discrepancy in the evidence of the testator would not vitiate the validity of a registered Will which was duly endorsed by the Registrar and when the whole estate was given to the son, exclusion of the daughter, it held that this itself is not sufficient to generate suspicion. In Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and another Vs. Panchanan Banerjee (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1995 SC 1684 ; wherein, the Apex Court held debarring the natural heir should not raise any suspicion. Anyhow, from the evidence of P.W.5-the attesting witness, when the due attestation of the Will-Ex. P1 is not proved and his evidence cannot be held as evidence to prove his attestation in the absence of any material even in the evidence of the scribe-P.W.2-Srinivasaiah and the interested testimony of P.W.1-Puttaswamy. The said discrepancy cannot be a minor discrepancy and when the plaintiffs are not able to prove the execution and attestation, I do not think that they can take the benefit of the principles laid-down in the aforesaid decision. 11. The said discrepancy cannot be a minor discrepancy and when the plaintiffs are not able to prove the execution and attestation, I do not think that they can take the benefit of the principles laid-down in the aforesaid decision. 11. In the context of PW5 the attesting witness, having not supported the propounder, a reliance is placed on the decision of Bombay High Court reported in Lakshman Punju Shet Vs. Krishnaji Maharu Bhoi, (1927) 29 BOMLR 1425 , wherein the attesting witness had denied the execution of a mortgage deed. The Court held that the Deed may be proved by calling its writer under Section 71 of the Evidence Act to depose to the execution of the Deed by the mortgagor and to its attestation by the true witnesses. Even this Court in a decision reported in 1980(1) KLJ 89 in the case of (Ganapathsa Govindsa and others Vs. Ningappa Ramappa and others)/; was of the same opinion and it held that the Court is competent to disregard the testimony of the attesting witnesses and pronounce in favour of the Will on other evidence. The Apex Court had an occasion to consider a case in relation to the proof of a Will by attestation and held that when a witness did not state in its examination-in-chief that they signed the Will in the presence of the testator, the question relating to the proof of the Will would depend on the other circumstances elicited in the evidence and that this is a pure question of fact depending on the appreciation of evidence. To consider the aforesaid aspect in the decision referred to supra, it is relevant to note that the propounder relies upon the evidence of PW1 who is a beneficiary under the Will, the scribe PW2, the attesting witness PW5, who do not support the execution and PW6-the Sub-Registrar who registered the Will-Ex. P1. Even as could be seen from the provisions of Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act which is extracted herein under for the sake of convenience which reads thus: If the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, its execution may be proved by other evidence. 12. P1. Even as could be seen from the provisions of Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act which is extracted herein under for the sake of convenience which reads thus: If the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, its execution may be proved by other evidence. 12. It is no doubt true that when PW5 do not support the execution of the Will and its attestation, the plaintiffs are at liberty to establish the due execution of the Will on the basis of other material placed on record. The other evidence which is made available is that of PW1- the beneficiary, PW2- the scribe and PW6- the Sub-Registrar. As stated above, there is nothing in the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 5 about the due execution of the Will and the interested testimony of PW1 cannot be accepted and he does not speak to its execution in detail. Admittedly, the testator was suffering from diabetes, his hand was amputated, to avoid the gangrene, surgery was done a month earlier to the execution and in this context if the evidence of the plaintiffs is looked into, carrying the testator in a cart to a distant place for registration of a Will, also raises serious doubt. The reasons as to why the evidence of PW2 cannot be accepted, has been stated above. The only evidence that is made available is that of PW6-the Sub-registrar and he admits in the cross-examination that he did not see the person who presented the Will for registration prior to or after the registration, he does not know the testators of the scribe personally and he did not see the testators and was not aware as to when Will-Ex. P1 was written. He did not even remember as to what transcribe between him and the executant of Will-Ex. P1 on the date of presentation of Ex. P1 on that day. So, in the context of this admission, the evidence of PW6-the Sub-Registrar is of no help to the propounder for the reason that PW6 has no animus to attest the execution of the Will by the testator. 13. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court reported in M. L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib Vs. P1 on that day. So, in the context of this admission, the evidence of PW6-the Sub-Registrar is of no help to the propounder for the reason that PW6 has no animus to attest the execution of the Will by the testator. 13. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court reported in M. L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib Vs. M. V. Venkata Sastri and Sons and Others, AIR 1969 SC 1147 , wherein the Apex Court referring to the word "attested" held: E. The word "attested" occurs in Section 3, T.P. Act as part of the definition itself. To attest is to bear witness to a fact. The essential conditions of a valid attestation under Section 3 of T.P. Act are: (1) two or more witnesses have seen the executant sign the instrument or have received from him a personal acknowledgment of his signature; (2) with a view to attest or to bear witness to this fact each of them has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant. It is essential that the witness should have put his signature animo attestandi, that is, for the purpose of attesting that he has seen the executant sign or has received from him a personal acknowledgment of his signature. If a person puts his signature on the document for some other purpose, e.g., to certify that he is a scribe or an identifier or a registering officer, he is not an attesting witness. So, unless there is anything in the evidence of the Sub-Registrar to establish that he was a witness to a fact and that he put the signature on the Will with a view to attest or to compare the witness to the fact of each of them, have signed the instrument in the presence of the executant. The evidence of the Sub-registrar will be of no. help to prove the Will-Ex. P1. 14. In Benga Behera and Another Vs. Braja Kishore Nanda and Others, JT (2007) 8 SC 86 the same question came for consideration, wherein a Will was registered with the Sub-Registrar and it is held by the Apex Court which reads thus: F: Animus attestandi" is a necessary ingredient for proving the attestation. If a person puts his signature in a document only in discharge of his statutory duty, he may not be treated to be an attesting witness. If a person puts his signature in a document only in discharge of his statutory duty, he may not be treated to be an attesting witness. A certificate by Sub-Registrar at the time of registration proves attestation. A Sub-Registrar in the matter of registration of a document acts under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. So, in view of the absence of animus of PW6- the Sub-registrar to attest the Will-Ex. P1 in his capacity as Sub-Registrar, his evidence is of no help to the propounder to prove the Will-Ex. P1. 15. Though the trial Court was of the opinion that Ex. P1 has been proved on the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that due execution and attestation of Ex. P1 is not proved. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Sarju Pershad Vs. Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and Others, AIR 1951 SC 120 , wherein the Apex Court held that, though the Appellate Court is undoubtedly one of fact, it has to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they depose in Court. This certainly does not mean that the Appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact, but was of the opinion that it is a rule of practice that unless there is special feature about the evidence of a particular witness having escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion, the Appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge. Anyhow, perusal of the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court reveals, that none other except PW1 the beneficiary spoke to the due execution of the Will and its attestation and it is for this reason the Lower Appellate Court rejected the finding of the trial Court and held that the said material is insufficient to prove the execution of Will-Ex. P1 and its attestation. In my opinion, though the principle stated by the Apex Court could be accepted, but the Lower Appellate Court had justification to interfere with the findings. P1 and its attestation. In my opinion, though the principle stated by the Apex Court could be accepted, but the Lower Appellate Court had justification to interfere with the findings. So, a perusal of the findings of the Lower Appellate Court, there appears reasons to reverse the finding of the trial Court in relation to execution and attestation of the Will-Ex. P1. 16. The appellants placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and another Vs. Panchanan Banerjee (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1995 SC 1684 , wherein it is held that the exclusion of a daughter or a natural heir, does not generate suspicion and considering the Will Ex. P1 it may be true that, as the daughters born to the second wife were minors at the time of Ex. P1 and the testator has no male issue, the mere fact that the testator did not bequeath any property to the married daughters of the first wife cannot be said to be a suspicion circumstances. 17. In R. Joseph Vs. R. Aralappa, ILR (1987) KAR 1225 the question was when the testator was not well and his health condition was critical, when his mental capacity to execute the Will was proved, the Courts held that the physical incapacity or critical health condition is itself insufficient to hold that it is a suspicious circumstances. Even on this aspect of the matter it is not possible to hold that the testator was not in a sound disposing state of mind at the time of execution of the Will and there is insufficient material on record to prove this fact. 18. In Subhas Chandra Das Mushib Vs. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib and Others, AIR 1967 SC 878 the Apex Court held that, in trying a case of undue influence, the Court must consider two things, (1) are the relations between the donor and the donee such that the donee is in a position to dominate the Will of the donor; and (2) has the donee used that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the donor?" 19. This aspect is also held by the Apex Court in a decision reported in Naresh Charan Das Gupta Vs. Paresh Charan Das Gupta, AIR 1955 SC 363 , in Smt. Malkani Vs. This aspect is also held by the Apex Court in a decision reported in Naresh Charan Das Gupta Vs. Paresh Charan Das Gupta, AIR 1955 SC 363 , in Smt. Malkani Vs. Jamadar and Others, AIR 1987 SC 767 and in 1982(1) KLJ 242 in the case of (Vokkaligara Laxmaiah Vs. Vokkaligara Devegowda and another). To consider the principle aforesaid in the decisions, PW1 is the beneficiary under the Will being the elderly person in the house and the faster son of the testator and when except the evidence of PW2-the scribe, there are no other witnesses examined by the propounder to prove the due execution and attestation, his presence at the time of execution would generate suspicion in the due execution and attestation of the document, particularly when the attesting witness has not supported the due execution of the document and there is no other material on record to prove its execution and when there are no independent witnesses present at the time of the execution of Ex. P1, the presence of PW1 at the time of writing the Will-Ex. P1 is a circumstance which raises suspicion. When PW1 states in his evidence that the Will was executed in the house of the testator, the evidence of PW5 would show "that his signature was taken on the Will in Mysore near the office of the. Sub-Registrar. So, whether the Will was executed in the village particularly in the house of the testator or in Mysore is also a doubtful circumstance for which there is no clarification. The evidence of PW1 itself is insufficient to overcome even the due execution of the Will-Ex. P1 and undue influence on the executor. 20. So, from perusal of the material placed on record in the context of the decision referred to supra, it is clear that there is insufficient material on record that the testator was not in a sound state of mind and his hand was amputated. Though, the law does not raise any legal presumption, the appellants have failed to prove execution, attestation of the document and the capacity of the testator to execute the Will and also his sound disposing state of mind. Hence, the First Appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding of the trial Court. 21. So far as the suit item, item No. 3 is concerned, it pertains to the land bearing Sy. Nos. 99/3, 99/4. Hence, the First Appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding of the trial Court. 21. So far as the suit item, item No. 3 is concerned, it pertains to the land bearing Sy. Nos. 99/3, 99/4. Both the trial Court and also the First Appellate Court on the basis of the material placed on record have held that the plaintiffs appellants have not established any right or title in the said item of the property. There are concurrent findings and as could be seen from a substantial question framed by this Court, there is no substantial question of law involved. So, in view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below, I do not find any justification in interfering with the said findings. In that view of the matter, the finding of the First Appellate Court in relation to the illness of the testator and the failure of the propounder to prove the due execution and attestation of a Will- Ex. P1, the substantial question raised are answered accordingly upholding the decision of the Lower Appellate Court. In the result, the appeals fail and they are dismissed.