ORDER :- All these petitions are the outcome of order dated 18-5-2011 passed by the learned Sessions Judge Anti Corruption, Jammu, in File No.30/Challan, in case, titled as, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Lalit Aditya Kachru & Ors., whereby the trial Court prima facie came to the conclusion that there are grounds to presume that the petitioners-accused are involved in the commission of offence punishable under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Corruption Act (for short ' PC Act' ) and Section 120-B read with Section 420 of the Ranbir Penal Code (for short, ' RPC' ) registered with the CBI vide FIR No. RC0042009A0010 and, accordingly, directed for framing of charges against them. 2. Petitioners in 561-A No. 220/2011 have questioned the impugned order on the grounds that no case is made out against them. It has been pleaded that the transactions made between the petitioners and the State Bank of India, Jammu Cantt. were purely civil one; therefore, by no stretch of imagination the same can be construed to be a criminal liability. The petitioners have given in detail how the same can be said to be civil transactions. It is contended that petitioner No.1 is an industrialist and an established businessman, is engaged in the manufacturing of Allopathic as well as Ayurvedic Drugs since 1972. 3. Petitioner in 561-A Nos. 113/2012 and 258/2011 has sought quashment of the impugned orders on the ground that he has not committed any offence nor there is any legal evidence on the file to the same effect. It is contended that he was posted as a Chief Manager, State Bank of India, Jammu Cantt. with effect from 27-4-2007 to 8-6-2009. During his posting the deposits of the Branch increased from Rs. 83.67 crores to 121.03 crores and also there was increase in advances also. Respondent No.2, Mr. Satish Kumar Gupta, who was the Head of M/s. Vaid Milk Products, had to launch two new projects namely Tetrapack and Dairy Farm worth Rs. 50 Crores, therefore, he opened a current account with the Bank. It is contended that private respondents were genuine persons and no case of impersonation was ever reported. It is further contended that he never misused his official position in any way nor ever he gave any favour to any person. 50 Crores, therefore, he opened a current account with the Bank. It is contended that private respondents were genuine persons and no case of impersonation was ever reported. It is further contended that he never misused his official position in any way nor ever he gave any favour to any person. In nutshell, it is contended no case is made out against him, but despite that he has been charge sheeted for the aforesaid offences. 4. Cr. Rev. No. 74/2011, though has been filed under Section 561-A Cr. P. C., but the same has been treated as criminal revision. In this petition, petitioner, Satish Kumar Gupta, while seeking quashment of the charges framed against him has stated that he is the Managing Director of M/s. Vaid Milk Products Pvt. Ltd., a largest milk supplier in the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the brand name of ' M/s. Surya Milk and Milk Products- and has more than 60/70 crore yearly turnover. It is contended that as per the policy of the Government of India, the supplier of milk and milk products are being granted special incentives. Petitioner- s bank is State Bank of India, Branch Jammu Cantonment and the bank has earned crores of rupees from the petitioner. Initially he was having dealings with some other Banks, but the authorities of State Bank of India after taking into consideration his huge dealings convinced him to have the entire business transactions through State Bank of India. He has given in detail how the loan transactions were made with the Bank, viz., how cheques were issued and how overdraft was made in order to show that he was not involved in the commission of offence nor did he play any role with criminal intention to defraud the bank, thus has prayed for quashing of the impugned order. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have argued that basically the transactions made were of civil nature and if at all there was any dispute the same is civil one. None of the petitioners were involved in the commission of any offence nor were the documents made intentionally to defraud the Bank. They further argued that there was no criminal mens rea or criminal intention on the part of petitioners right from the very beginning till lodging of the FIR. The entire liability is civil one and cannot be fastened with criminal liability. 6. They further argued that there was no criminal mens rea or criminal intention on the part of petitioners right from the very beginning till lodging of the FIR. The entire liability is civil one and cannot be fastened with criminal liability. 6. Mr. Pangotra, learned ASGI, argued that as the petitioners/accused were involved in the commission of crime, therefore, FIR was rightly lodged against them. During investigation material documents were seized by the Investigating Agency and prima facie it came to the conclusion that the petitioners/accused were involved in the commission of aforesaid offences. Accordingly, Charge Sheet in terms of the mandate Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, Cr. P. C.) came to be presented before the Court of Special Judge Anti Corruption, Jammu. Learned trial Court after examining the final report, the evidence collected during investigation, the documents seized and thrashing out the arguments advanced at the stage of framing of charges prima facie came to the conclusion that there were grounds to presume that the petitioners-accused were involved in the commission of offence punishable under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1) (d) of the PC Act and Section 120-B read with Section 420 of the RPC. Accordingly, the trial Court directed for faming of charges against them vide impugned order dated 18-5-2011. Petitioners/accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. It is beaten law of the land that power under Section 561-A Cr. P. C. is to be exercised cautiously, carefully and sparingly and the same should not be used in order to scuttle away the investigation en-route. It cannot be used as a weapon to stall the proceedings, which prima facie do disclose the commission of any offence. 8. It would be appropriate to reproduce Section 561-A Cr. P. C. herein:- ' 561-A. Saving of inherent power of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.' 9. This remedy can be invoked/pressed into service or may be exercised in the following circumstances:- (i) To pass orders in order to give effect to an order passed under Cr. This remedy can be invoked/pressed into service or may be exercised in the following circumstances:- (i) To pass orders in order to give effect to an order passed under Cr. P. C.; (ii) to prevent abuse of process of Court; (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice; and (iv) to prevent mis-carriage of justice. 10. The Apex Court reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960 Cri LJ 1239); AIR 1964 SC 01; AIR 1972 SC 484 : (1972 Cri LJ 298); AIR 1974 SC 1146 : (1974 Cri LJ 802); AIR 1977 SC 1489 : (1977 Cri LJ 1125); AIR 1977 SC 2229 : (1977 Cri LJ 1900); AIR 1980 SC 326 : (1980 Cri LJ 98); AIR 1989 SC 01 : (1989 Cri LJ 1005); AIR 1990 SC 494 : (1990 Cri LJ 920); AIR 1991 SC 1260 ; (1991 Cri LJ 1438) AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992 Cri LJ 527); AIR (sic) 1992 SC 892: AIR 1996 SC 309 : (1996 Cri LJ 381); AIR 1996 SC 2983 : (1996 Cri LJ 1878); AIR 1999 SC 3596 : (1999 Cri LJ 4599); AIR 1999 SC 1044 : (1999 Cri LJ 1623); AIR 1999 SC 1216 : (1999 Cri LJ 1833); AIR 2002 SC 671 : (2002 Cri LJ 998); AIR 2004 SC 3967 : (2004 Cri LJ 3845); AIR 2005 SC 3212 ; SLJ 2005 Vol-I 118; 2008 AIR SCW 1003 : (2008 Cri LJ 1610); 2008 AIR SCW 1993 : ( AIR 2008 SC 1702 ); 2008 AIR SCW 1998 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 341); 2008 AIR SCW 4614 : ( AIR 2008 SC 2778 ); 2008 AIR SCW 7680 : ( AIR 2009 SC 552 ); 2008 AIR SCW 2778 (sic); AIR 2010 SC 201 : (2009 Cri LJ 4642); 2010 AIR SCW 6462 : (2011 Cri LJ 89); 2010 AIR SCW 6738; 2011 AIR SCW 5313 : (2011 Cri LJ 4949) and 2012 AIR SCW 5333 : (2012 Cri LJ 4934) has discussed the scope of Section 561-a Cr. P. C., corresponding to Section 482 Cr. P. C. of Central Code, while laying down the following tests: 1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint even if are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. P. C., corresponding to Section 482 Cr. P. C. of Central Code, while laying down the following tests: 1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint even if are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 11. Now the question arises for consideration is: whether the petitioners, applying the test as laid down by the Apex Court read with mandate of Section 561-A Cr. P. C, have made out a case for quashment of the impugned order? The answer has to be negative for the following reasons: 12. 11. Now the question arises for consideration is: whether the petitioners, applying the test as laid down by the Apex Court read with mandate of Section 561-A Cr. P. C, have made out a case for quashment of the impugned order? The answer has to be negative for the following reasons: 12. In terms of the final report submitted by the investigating agency, Chief Manager, State Bank of India, Branch Jammu Cantt. had sanctioned three loan accounts in favour of petitioner/accused Kulbhushan Nahar in the name of M/s. Leo Pharmaceuticals, M/s. Humane Laboratory and M/s. Wintoss Remedies, by way of which he availed a total limit to the tune of Rs. 359.39 lacs. The said loan had been secured by mortgaging properties to the tune of Rs. 324.04 lacs. He, however, failed to repay the instalments and the said loan accounts ultimately became non-performing assets (for short NPAs). 13. The positive case of the prosecution is that the Chief Manager, accused No.1 in the final report, in conspiracy with accused No. 2, namely, Kulbhushan Nahar, allowed operation of 15 different accounts in his name, in the name of his family members and even in the name of his employees. Not only this, Chief Branch Manager by misusing his official position allowed overdrafts of crores of rupees into these accounts beyond his financial powers and competence and even without the request of the borrowers, which was completely in violation of Know Your Customer (KYC) norms. Subsequently, accused No. 2 withdrew the proceeds of the said accounts and utilised the same for his own purpose and not for the purpose these proceeds were meant for. It has also been alleged that eight accounts out of fifteen came to be closed and, in the remaining seven accounts, an amount of Rs. 3.30 crores was allowed by Chief Manager, that too, as per the details given by the investigating officer in the final report and as substantiated by the documents, was not properly secured. Subsequently, the said accounts too became NPAs or irregular and the Bank is said to have suffered a loss to the tune of Rs. 3.30 crores. 3.30 crores was allowed by Chief Manager, that too, as per the details given by the investigating officer in the final report and as substantiated by the documents, was not properly secured. Subsequently, the said accounts too became NPAs or irregular and the Bank is said to have suffered a loss to the tune of Rs. 3.30 crores. The investigating officer after scrutinizing the documents came to the conclusion that the Chief Manager has misused his official position, even accused No.2, Kulbhushan Nahar not only abused the relationship of master and servant but also exploited his employees, i.e., A-3, A-4, and A-6 as per the final report. Not only this, he even used his father, i.e., A-5 to earn through illegal means. The investigating officer has disclosed that accused No.2 used the amount, allowed through overdrafts in the accounts of accused Nos. 3, 4, 5 & 6, for his own purpose. And this could be only possible with the help of accused No.1, who by misusing his official position allowed such overdrafts. 14. Under Section 561-A Cr. P. C. this Court only has to ascertain whether the allegations levelled in the final report do or do not disclose the commission of offence and whether the order made by the trial Court is prima facie correct. 15. In order to return a finding, this Court has to see whether there are grounds to presume that the accused were involved in the commission of offence. 16. It is beaten law of the land that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to examine the facts brought out by the investigating officer before the Court; and the same cannot be brush aside by arguing that the transactions made were of civil nature. 17. As discussed hereinabove, prima facie it appears that no case is in favour of the petitioners. The way the things had been planted and the documents prepared, I am of the considered view that no case for interference is made out in terms of Section 561-A Cr. P. C. and the petitioners/accused are debarred from claiming remedy under this section. 18. The way the things had been planted and the documents prepared, I am of the considered view that no case for interference is made out in terms of Section 561-A Cr. P. C. and the petitioners/accused are debarred from claiming remedy under this section. 18. The Apex Court in AIR 2004 SC 3967 : (2004 Cri LJ 3845), AIR 1972 SC 484 : (1972 Cri LJ 298)(sic) AIR 1974 SC 1446, AIR 1977 SC 2229 : (1977 Cri LJ 1900); AIR 1989 SC 01 : (1989 Cri LJ 1005) has laid down the same principle. It would be appropriate to reproduce paragraphs 10, 13, 14, 15, 17 & 19 out of the judgment titled as Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka, reported in 2008 AIR SCW 1003 : (2008 Cri LJ 1610) hereunder. ' 10. In a catena of decisions this Court has deprecated the interference by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code in a routine manner. It has been consistently held that the power under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in rarest of rare cases. Exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not the rule but it is an exception. The exception is applied only when it is brought to the notice of the Court that grave miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is allowed to proceed where the accused would be harassed unnecessarily if the trial is allowed to linger when prima facie it appears to Court that the trial would likely to be ended in acquittal. In other words, the inherent power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked by the High Court either to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.' ' 13. In State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanha (1980) 1 SCC 554 : (1980 Cri LJ 98) this Court pointed out at SCC p. 574: ' The High Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction committed a grave error by making ovservations on seriously disputed questions of facts taking its cue from affidavits which in such a situation would hardly provide any reliable material. In our opinion the High Court was clearly in error in giving the direction virtually amounting to a mandamus to close the case before the investigation is complete. We say no more.' 14. In Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad, (1972) 1 SCC 452 : (1972 Cri LJ 298) this Court at SCC p. 455 pointed out: ' In exercising jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court can quash prodceedings if there is no legal evidence or if there is any impediment to the institution or continuance of proceedings but the High Court does not ordinarily inquire as to whether the evidence is reliable or not. Where again, investigation into the circumstances of an alleged cognizable offence is carried on under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not interfere with such investigation because it would then be the impeding investigation and jurisdiction of statutory authorities to exercise power in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.' 15. In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration (1974) 4 SCC 522 the application filed by the accused under Section 561-A of the old Code for quashing the investigation was dismissed as being premature and incompetent on the finding that prima facie, the allegations in the FIR, if assumed to be correct, constitute a cognizable offence.' ' 17. In State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan (1988) 4 SCC 655 : (1989 Cri LJ 1005) this Court held that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and has given the working that in exercising that jurisdiction, the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not.' ' 19. We may observe here that despite this Court consistently held in catena of decisions that inherent power of the High Court should not be exercised according to whims and caprice and it has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, we often come across the High Court exercising the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a routine manner at its whims and caprice setting at naught the cognizance taken and the FIR lodged at the threshold committing grave miscarriage of justice. While it is true that so long as the inherent power of Section 482 is in the Statute Book, exercise of such power is not impermissible but it must be noted that such power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, the sole aim of which is to secure the ends of justice. The power under Section 482 is not intended to scuttle justice at the threshold.' 19. The Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab Gawali, 2010 AIR SCW 6462 : (2011 Cri LJ 89) has held as under: ' 12. The power of quashing criminal proceedings has to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases and the Court cannot be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in the FIR/Complaint, unless the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion. The extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. However, the Court, under its inherent powers, can neither intervene at an uncalled for stage nor it can ' softpedal the course of justice- at a crucial stage of investigation/proceedings. The provisions of Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as ' Cr. P. C.- ) are a device to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The power of judicial review is discretionary, however, it must be exercised to prevent the miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave errors and to ensure that esteem of administration of justice remains clean and pure. However, there are no limits of power of the Court, but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. (Vide State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 949 : (1982 Cri LJ 819); M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 128 : (1997 AIR SCW 4084) : (1998 Cri LJ 1); G. Sagar Suri & Anr. (Vide State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 949 : (1982 Cri LJ 819); M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 128 : (1997 AIR SCW 4084) : (1998 Cri LJ 1); G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U. P. & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 754 : (2000 AIR SCW 296) : (2000 Cri LJ 824) and Ajay Mitra v. State of M. P. & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1069 : (2003) AIR SCW 592) : (2003 Cri LJ 1249).' 20. In Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Incorporated, 2010 AIR SCW 6738 : ( AIR 2011 SC 20 ), the Apex Court has held as under : ' 42. A bare perusal of the aforesaid section would show that it can be conveniently divided into two parts. The first part makes it necessary that the deception by the accused of the person deceived, must be fraudulent or dishonest. Such deception must induce the person deceived to: either (a) deliver property to any person; or (b) consent that any person shall retain any property. The second part also requires that the accused must by deception intentionally induce the person deceived either to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit, if he was not so deceived. Furthermore, such act or omission must cause or must be likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. Thus, it is evident that deception is a necessary ingredient for the offences of cheating under both parts of this section. The complainant, therefore, necessarily needs to prove that the inducement had been caused by the deception exercised by the accused. Such deception must necessarily produce the inducement to part with or deliver property, which the complainant would not have parted with or delivered, but for the inducement resulting from deception. The explanation to the section would clearly indicate that there must be no dishonest concealment of facts. In other words, non disclosure of relevant information would also be treated as a mis-representation of facts leading to deception. It was, therefore, necessary for the High Court to examine the averments in the complaint in terms of the aforesaid section. The explanation to the section would clearly indicate that there must be no dishonest concealment of facts. In other words, non disclosure of relevant information would also be treated as a mis-representation of facts leading to deception. It was, therefore, necessary for the High Court to examine the averments in the complaint in terms of the aforesaid section. The High Court upon detailed examination of the 1992 PPM, the Stock Purchase Agreements and the 1995 PPM concluded that even if the averments made in the complaint are accepted on their face value, it would only disclose a civil dispute between the parties.' ' 45. In such circumstances, in our opinion, the High Court ought to have refrained from indulging in detailed analysis of very complicated commercial documents and reaching any definite conclusions. In our opinion, the High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceeding in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. The High Court noticed that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. ' the complaint in its entirety will have to be examined on the basis of the allegations made therein. But the High Court has no authority or jurisdiction to go into the matter or examine its correctness. The allegations in the complaint will have to be accepted on the face of it and the truth or falsity cannot be entered into by the Court at this stage.' Having said so, the High Court proceeded to do exactly the opposite.' 21. The Apex Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012 AIR SCW 5333 : (2012 Cri LJ 4934), has held as under: ' 40. In Ashok Sadarangani and Anr. v. Union of India and others, the issue under consideration was whether an offence which was not compoundable under the provisions of the Code could be quashed. That was a case where a criminal case was registered against the accused persons under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC. The allegation was that accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilized such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening Letters of Credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the Bank to negotiate the Letters of Credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash credit facility.....' 22. Applying the test as laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, the trial Court has rightly made the order and the same cannot said to be abuse of process of law. 23. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argued that the transactions-in-question were purely of civil nature, therefore, the entire proceedings along with framing of charges be quashed. 24. However, the trial Court on examination of the material produced before it prima facie came to the conclusion that a case do exist against the petitioners herein and, accordingly, framed charges against them. 25. The Apex Court in Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2009 SC 2195 , has held that when prima facie a case is found, no interference is required. It would be appropriate to reproduce paragraph 23 herein:- ' 23. The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is not in dispute. Exercise of such power would, however, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and this Court, in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India, would not direct quashing of a case involving crime against the society particularly when both the learned Special Judge as also the High Court have found that a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant herein for framing charge.' 26. The Apex Court in State of M. P. v. S. B. Johari, AIR 2000 SC 665 : (2000 Cri LJ 944), has held that at the time of framing charge, the trial Court is not required to scan materials on record, but only has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused. 27. However, the Apex Court in Sushil Suri v. C. B. I., AIR 2011 SC 1713 : (2011 Cri LJ 2939), has held that when charge sheet prima facie discloses the commission of offence that too when the bank is duped of public exchequer of crores of rupees and was involved in the process of cheating, remedy under Section 561-A Cr. P. C. cannot be pressed into service. It would be appropriate to reproduce paragraphs 20 and 21 herein. ' 20. P. C. cannot be pressed into service. It would be appropriate to reproduce paragraphs 20 and 21 herein. ' 20. A bare reading of the afore-extracted paragraphs would indicate that the question posed for consideration in that case was with regard to the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings in the facts and circumstances of a given case and not in relation to the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. The Court came to the conclusion that it was a fit case where it should exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. In our opinion, Nikhil Merchant (2008 AIR SCW 7501 : AIR 2009 SC 428 ) (supra) does not hold as an absolute proposition of law that whenever a dispute between the parties, having overtones of civil dispute with criminal facets is settled between them, continuance of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and, therefore, should be quashed. Similarly, in B. S. Joshi & Ors. (2003 AIR SCW 1824 : AIR 2003 SC 1386 ) : (2003 Cri LJ 2028) (supra), which has been relied upon in Nikhil Merchant (supra), the question for consideration was whether the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or Complaint for offences which are not compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr. P. C. It was held that Section 320 cannot limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C., a well settled proposition of law. We are of the opinion that Nikhil Merchant (supra) as also the other two judgments relied upon on behalf of the appellant are clearly distinguishable on facts. It needs little emphasis that even one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases and blindly placing reliance on a decision is never proper. It is trite that while applying ratio, the Court may not pick out a word or sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which the said question arose for consideration. In this regard, the following words of Lord Denning, quoted in Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. It is trite that while applying ratio, the Court may not pick out a word or sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which the said question arose for consideration. In this regard, the following words of Lord Denning, quoted in Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr., are also quite apt: ' Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.' 21. In the present case, having regard to the modus operandi adopted by the accused, as projected in the Charge-sheet and briefly referred to in para 17 (supra), we have no hesitation in holding that it is not a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. as also by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. As noted above, the accused had not only duped PSB, they had also availed of depreciation on the machinery, which was never purchased and used by them, causing loss to the exchequer, a serious economic offence against the society.' 28. The Apex Court has also held that even if the dues of the bank have been paid up, the same cannot be a ground for quashing of the criminal proceedings. It would be appropriate to reproduce paragraph 23 hereunder. ' 23. We respectfully concur with the afore-extracted observations. In the final analysis we hold that merely because the dues of the bank have been paid up, the appellant cannot be exonerated from the criminal liability. Therefore, the Charge-sheet against him cannot be quashed.' 29. Having said so, I am of the considered view that no case for interference is made out. It pains me to record herein that the petitioners have stalled the proceedings of the trial Court right from the last about two years, i.e., with effect from 16-9-2011, which is against the concept of speedy trial. 30. Having said so, I am of the considered view that no case for interference is made out. It pains me to record herein that the petitioners have stalled the proceedings of the trial Court right from the last about two years, i.e., with effect from 16-9-2011, which is against the concept of speedy trial. 30. In the given circumstances, I deem it proper to dismiss all these petitions with costs of Rs. 50,000/- each. It is so ordered. Let the amount of costs be deposited within a period of one month from today, to be utilized for the welfare of orphans by the Social Welfare Department. This judgment is announced by me in terms of S. 138(3) of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Rules, 1999. Petitions dismissed.