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2013 DIGILAW 504 (UTT)

Mahendra Singh v. Rahul Dev Shekhavat

2013-08-01

PRAFULLA C.PANT

body2013
JUDGMENT Prafulla C. Pant,J. This second appeal, preferred under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 18.06.2001, passed by District Judge, Nainital, in Civil Appeal No. 30 of 2000, whereby said court has dismissed the appeal, and affirmed the judgment and decree for specific performance of contract passed by the trial court [Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Nainital] in Suit No. 86 of 1998. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties, and perused the lower court record. 3. Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff filed Suit No. 86 of 1998 with the pleading that defendant (present appellant) is Bhumidhar of plot/khasra no. 91m, measuring 0.809 Hct. (approximately 29 acres) situated in Village kalyanpur of Tehsil Kashipur. It is further pleaded by the plaintiff that the defendant agreed to sell the aforesaid land for Rs. 1,20,000/ out of which Rs. 1,00,000/ was paid in advance as part of consideration, and Rs. 20,000/ were required to be paid at the time of the execution of the sale deed. It is further pleaded in the plaint that a registered agreement dated 03.06.1996 was executed between the parties, and the sale deed was to be executed by 25.05.1998. It is also averred by the plaintiff in the plaint that he was ready to get the sale deed executed by making payment of Rs. 20,000/. It is further pleaded that the plaintiff requested the defendant several times to execute the sale deed but he (defendant) avoided the execution. On this, the plaintiff got served the notice on the defendant to appear on 25.05.1998 before the Sub-Registrar to execute the sale deed but he (defendant) did not turn up. It is alleged that the plaintiff remained present in the office of the Sub-Registrar from 10:00am to 5:00 pm., to get executed the sale deed. With these pleadings plaintiff sought relief of specific performance of contract. 4. The defendant contested the suit, and filed his written statement. He denied having executed any agreement of sale. The defendant alleged that actually he took loan of Rs. 60,000/ on interest @ 2% per month on 03.06.1996 from the plaintiff, and returned amount of Rs. 65,000/ to him. The defendant denied that plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. 5. He denied having executed any agreement of sale. The defendant alleged that actually he took loan of Rs. 60,000/ on interest @ 2% per month on 03.06.1996 from the plaintiff, and returned amount of Rs. 65,000/ to him. The defendant denied that plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed by the trial court: (i) Whether the defendant executed the registered agreement dated 03.06.1996 in favour of the plaintiff as alleged in para 1 of the plaint for sale of his land? If so, its effect? (ii) Whether the plaintiff had and always willing and ready to perform his part of contract? (iii) Whether the transaction between the plaintiff and defendant was that of a loan taken by the defendant from the plaintiff? (iv) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled? 6. Plaintiff adduced documentary evidence e.g. agreement, notice served on defendant, and receipt of presence in the office of the Sub-Registrar. He also got examined himself as P.W.1 and in support of his case got examined P.W.2 Jaswant Singh and P.W.3 Vinay Kumar (scribe of the deed). On behalf of the defendant Mahendra Singh, got himself examined as D.W.1 and in his support he got examined D.W.2 Wajir Singh 7. The trial court after hearing the parties decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff, and decreed the suit for specific performance of contract. Aggrieved by said judgment and decree dated 13.07.2000, passed by Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Nainital, in Suit No. 86 of 1998, the defendant filed Civil Appeal No. 30 of 2000, before District Judge, Nainital. (Earlier Tehsil Kashipur was part of District Nainital). District Judge, Nainital, after hearing the parties concurred with the view taken by the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Hence this second appeal. 8. This second appeal was admitted by this Court on 29.04.2004, on following substantial question of law mentioned in the memorandum of appeal: Whether oral evidence could be led to exclude the provisions of section 92 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, especially when the execution of the disputed agreement was challenged to be not intended and not to be acted upon and the agreement being sham? An additional substantial question of law was formulated by this Court on 15.05.2013, which reads as under: Whether the courts below have erred in law in decreeing the suit in absence of pleading of willingness in suit of specific performance of contract? Answer to substantial questions of law 9. There is concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two courts below that the defendant agreed to sale the land of Khasra no. 91 measuring 0.809 hct., situated in Kalyanpur to the plaintiff for an amount Rs. 1,20,000/ out of which Rs. 1,00,000/ was paid to the defendant as part of consideration, and agreement dated 03.06.1996 was executed and registered. As such it cannot be said that the agreement in question was sham. There is nothing on the record which shows that the plaintiff had given any oral evidence against the contents of the written agreement. As such, there is no violation of provision of Section 92 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in the present case. 10. Learned counsel for the defendant/appellant mainly argued the appeal on the additional substantial question of law which pertains to the willingness on the part of the plaintiff to get executed the sale deed. In this connection attention of this Court is drawn to Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act, 1963, and Form No. 47 and 48 mentioned in Appendix ‘A’ of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Clause (c) of section 16 of Specific Relief Act, 1963, requires that a person who seeks specific performance of contract must aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. Form 47 and 48 of the Appendix ‘A’ of Code of Civil Procedure, contain a para stating that the plaintiff had been and still ready and willing to perform his part of contract. 11. Referring the cases of Pukhraj D. Jain vs. G.Gopalkrishna (2004) 7SCC page 251, N.P. Thirugnanam vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao (1995) 5SCC page 115 and Maan Kaur vs. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010) 10SCC page 512, it is argued on behalf of the appellant that since the plaintiff has failed to aver the willingness to perform his part of contract as such the courts below have erred in law in decreeing the suit for specific performance of contract. 12. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff/ respondent relied in the cases of Aniglase Yohannan vs. Ramlatha and others (2005) 7SCC page 534, Sugani vs. Rameshwar Das and anr. (2006) 11 SCC page 587, J.P. Builders vs. A. Ramadas Rao (2011) 1 SCC page 429 and Gurdial Kaur vs. Piara Singh AIR 2008 SC 2019 , and submitted that it is the conduct of the party from which it has to be gathered as to whether it was willing to perform his part of contract or not. It is also contended that there is no straight jacket wordings which constitute willingness. 13. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, this Court went through the copy of the plaint on the record. In paragraph 3 of the plaint it has been stated by the plaintiff that in terms of agreement dated 03.06.1996, the plaintiff was always ready to pay remaining Rs. 20,000/ and from time to time requested the defendant to execute the sale deed. In para 4 of the plaint it has been stated by the plaintiff that when the defendant continued to avoid to execute the sale deed he (plaintiff) got sent a registered notice to the defendant asking him to appear on 25.05.1998 before the Sub-Registrar, Kashipur, to execute the sale deed but he (defendant) did not turn up, and plaintiff remained there and obtained a receipt from the office of the Sub-Registrar regarding his attendance. 14. No doubt ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ are two different expressions. ‘Readiness’ generally refers to the capacity of the plaintiff (as a purchaser) to pay consideration for specific performance of contract, and ‘willingness’ refers to his conduct in getting executed the sale deed. In the present case word ‘willingness’ is not mentioned in the plaint but it is pleaded as well as proved that the plaintiff from time to time continued to request the defendant to execute the sale deed after accepting remaining Rs. 20,000/. Also it is proved that when defendant did not pay any heed, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant and remained present in the office of the Sub-Registrar on the date for which the written notice was also sent to the defendant. 20,000/. Also it is proved that when defendant did not pay any heed, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant and remained present in the office of the Sub-Registrar on the date for which the written notice was also sent to the defendant. Both the courts below after discussing the evidence found that from the oral and documentary evidence it is proved on the record that the plaintiff had always been ready and willing and still ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Said concurrent finding of fact is neither perverse nor against the weight of the evidence on record. 15. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the compliance of clause (c) of Section 16 of Specific Relief Act, 1963, and the language required in the plaint is substantially complied with, as such the courts below have not erred in law in decreeing the suit for specific performance of the contract. Accordingly, both the substantial questions of law stand answered. 16. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent during argument stated that during the pendency of this appeal the defendant has already executed the sale deed on 08.04.2004, which was said to have been registered on 12.04.2004. Learned counsel for the respondent (plaintiff) further told the court orally that possession has also been given to the plaintiff and mutation has also taken place in his favour. (But learned counsel for the appellant pressed that the appeal be heard and decided on merits. Accordingly the appeal was heard on merits). 17. For the reasons as discussed in an answer to substantial questions of law, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 18. Accordingly, the Second Appeal No. 1335 of 2001 is hereby dismissed. However, no order as to costs.