JUDGMENT K. KANNAN, J. I. The lis – Could a later arbitral award be made rule of Court under Arbitration Act, 1940, if the earlier award had remained without Court's imprimatur? 1. The revision is against the order of the Appellate Court setting aside the order of the Additional Senior Sub Judge, Ludhiana. The Court of First Instance entertained a petition under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 directing the Arbitrator to file an award dated 02.08.1983 regarding two properties which were house and industrial plot with business carried at the industrial plot but dismissed the petition. The Appellate Court allowed the appeal and granted a judgment in terms of the award. 2. The petition had been filed in a case where the Arbitrator was deciding the dispute with reference to the properties belonging to the parties. When notice of the petition had been served, the petitioner before this Court and Surjit Singh, Sewa Singh and Chetan Singh, who were respondent Nos. 2 to 4, filed objections under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Arbitration Act pleading that the Arbitrator, after his appointment, had given his award on 13.08.1982 which was accepted by all the parties had become functus officio. He could not, therefore, amend his award and give any other award and he had no authority to give an award on 02.08.1983. There could be, therefore, no justification for the Court to pass a decree in terms of the said award. It was stated in objection that the Arbitrator had mis-conducted himself in the proceedings and had given subsequent award without any jurisdiction. The subsequent award was, therefore, vitiated by fraud and illegality and inoperative. It was also stated by them in their objections that there had been a suit instituted by Tarlok Singh and Sewa Singh against PSEB as well as the objectors. That suit was allowed to be withdrawn when the applicants made a statement before Court that the parties would be bound by the terms of the award dated 13.08.1982. II. Award not made rule of Court is still not a waste paper, it will operate as estoppel, the basis for objection before Courts below. 3. Admittedly, the award dated 13.08.1982 had not been made the rule of Court. II. Award not made rule of Court is still not a waste paper, it will operate as estoppel, the basis for objection before Courts below. 3. Admittedly, the award dated 13.08.1982 had not been made the rule of Court. The Court of First Instance reasoned that the earlier award which was not brought before the Court to make it an executable decree does not become void ab initio or non est. It is at least binding between the parties and constitute an estoppel. He referred to judgment of the Supreme Court in Satish Kumar and Others vs. Surinder Kumar and Others, AIR 1970 SC 833 to observe that the award is indeed a final adjudication of a Court of the parties' own choice and was conclusive upon the merits of controversy submitted. As between the parties and their privies, an award is entitled to that respect which is due to judgment of a court of last resort. He also referred to a decision of Allahabad High Court in Kedar Nath vs. Ambika Prasad and Others, AIR 1974 Allahabad 37 that held that an award which was not yet made the decree of Court, shall not be treated as a mere waste paper. The Mysore High Court in M.S. Ramaiah vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1973 Mysore 17 had held that a dispute, which was once referred to Arbitrator and considered as award does not survive for another reference. It became extinguished and merged with award even though not made a rule of the Court. A similar view was also expressed by the Orissa High Court in Gobinda Gonda vs. Kalu Hauda and Another, AIR 1966 Orissa 228. After setting out the objections with particular reference to the decisions referred to above, the Court of First Instance held that a subsequent application filed by the applicants to make the subsequent award rendered by this Arbitrator as rule of Court was incompetent. He upheld the objections and dismissed the petition. This judgment of the Additional Senior Subordinate Judge was a subject of appeal to the Additional District Judge. The Additional District Judge by his decision dated 09.03.1990 set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance and allowed the appeal. It is against this judgment that the revision has been filed. III. Order refusing to make an award the rule of Court is appealable 4. The Additional District Judge by his decision dated 09.03.1990 set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance and allowed the appeal. It is against this judgment that the revision has been filed. III. Order refusing to make an award the rule of Court is appealable 4. It is contended in revision that the appeal before the lower Appellate Court itself was not maintainable since the order passed rejecting a petition under Section 14 and 17 was not appealable under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. It is also contended that the Court of First Instance had correctly decided that the award was not a waste paper and the award which was affirmed before the Civil Court on the basis of which a suit against the PSEB had been allowed to be withdrawn cannot be discarded. The Arbitrator, who assumed jurisdiction subsequently had no competence to enter into any adjudication. Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the revision petitioners would contend that the subsequent award that had been passed was purported to be on the basis of statement given in writing by all the parties seeking for a fresh adjudication. The counsel would argue that the revision petitioners had specifically denied that they had made any such reference to the Arbitrator and he would also rely on a notice issued by the counsel to the Arbitrator that they had not given any authority for a fresh adjudication and that he shall not carry on with the adjudication in the manner that he was attempting to do. This, according to the learned Senior Counsel, would amount to denial of the subsequent arbitral reference and the challenge to the authority of the Arbitrator to enter into an adjudication. According to him, the award passed subsequently was, therefore, totally non est in law. 5. This contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioners is contested stoutly by the counsel on behalf of the person, who propounded the subsequent award. The learned counsel points out that the first award purported to have been passed on 13.08.1982 was not an award in the eye of law but it merely referred to an attempt to sort out the differences in a particular manner and providing for a scope for returning to the Arbitrator if they were not sorted out amongst themselves. The learned counsel points out that the first award purported to have been passed on 13.08.1982 was not an award in the eye of law but it merely referred to an attempt to sort out the differences in a particular manner and providing for a scope for returning to the Arbitrator if they were not sorted out amongst themselves. Differences were indeed only with reference to a house and industrial shed with the business in the industrial shed. The learned counsel would make elaborate references to the terms of the so-called award dated 13.08.1982 and would contend that since they could not sort out the differences, they sought for a fresh reference to Arbitrator by a document signed in writing by all the parties on the basis of which the Arbitrator commenced its arbitral proceedings. The Arbitrator had examined himself before the Court of First Instance as well and brought proof of the notices issued to the parties to contend that the revision petitioners had at all times known the arbitral proceedings before the Arbitrator and their objections could not have been merely by issuing notice to Arbitrator but they ought to have participated in the proceedings before the Arbitrator to contest that the Arbitrator was not either competent to carry on with adjudication or to plead that the document on the basis of which a reference had been entered by the Arbitrator was not a valid document and therefore, he should not have passed an award. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents would contend that the petitioners having opted out of the arbitral proceedings shall be incompetent to point out that the first award itself had been acted upon and that there was no scope for the Arbitrator to pass a subsequent award. 6. On the maintainability of the appeal itself, the petition filed under Sections 14 and 17 must be seen as the preliminary stage for securing a decree in terms of the award. Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 merely prescribes the manner of drafting the award. It should be signed and filed in Court. Section 17 refers to the power of the Court to render a judgment in terms of the award. If the Court renders a judgment in terms of the award, then Section 32 bars any suit to set aside the award. It should be signed and filed in Court. Section 17 refers to the power of the Court to render a judgment in terms of the award. If the Court renders a judgment in terms of the award, then Section 32 bars any suit to set aside the award. Before a decree is passed and the award is filed into Court, the procedure is to file an application to set aside the award under Section 30 on the grounds which are available that includes a situation where the Arbitrator or Umpire had mis-conducted himself in the proceedings and that an award had been improperly procured or otherwise invalid. It is a matter of record that after the award was passed, the petitioners themselves had not moved any petition for setting aside the award. On the other hand, they had stated their objections, which I would understand is itself an attempt to set aside the award and when the Court was, therefore, dismissing the application and upholding the objection, it held that no decree was possible. If there was no decree, which could have been lawfully passed in terms of the award, then the only provision which could still be attracted is the provision set forth under Chapter VI, Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, sets out the several circumstances when appeals could be filed. An order passed by a Court setting aside the award or refusing to set aside is itself appealable. In this case, there was an attempt of the objectors to show that the award which is sought to be made the rule of Court could not be acted upon. The objection was an attempt to set aside the award while the persons, who had filed the copy of the award and seeking for decree were literally attempting to enforce the award as being competent. Section 39 Clause (vi) provides for an appeal against an order "setting aside or refusing to set aside an award." The order of the 1st Court, therefore, surely allowed for a prayer for coming by means of an appeal to contend that the award should have been accepted. The appeal by the respondents to the Additional District Court herein was, therefore, fully competent. IV. Factors that weighed with Appellate Court for reversing the decision of the 1st Court 7. The appeal by the respondents to the Additional District Court herein was, therefore, fully competent. IV. Factors that weighed with Appellate Court for reversing the decision of the 1st Court 7. The District Judge on appeal reversed the finding of the Court of First Instance and held that the first award given by the Arbitrator did not decide all disputes and it was even admitted by the objecting respondent that the dispute relating to properties had not been adjudicated by the Arbitrator in the first award. Secondly, the District Judge also found that even if the Arbitrator had become functus officio after passing the first award, the second award that came to be passed was a fresh reference made to him and consequently, he had the competence to decide the same. Adverting to an objection that the objectors had not actually signed the arbitral agreement and that their signatures obtained by the Arbitrator on blank paper had been used by him, the Court rejected the contention but also reasoned that an arbitral agreement does not require to be signed by both parties. It referred to judgment of the Lahore Court in AIR 1936 East Punjab 199 and held that a reference made in writing to Arbitrator and accepted orally by the other side was sufficient to constitute a valid agreement. V. Issue of fact – content of first award 8. The most crucial point was whether the first arbitration award had concluded all the proceedings and therefore, the Arbitrator had become functus officio and had lacked the competence to enter into an adjudication afresh. Admittedly, the first so called arbitral award dated 13.08.1982 had not been a rule of Court. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner could contend that even if the award is not the rule of Court, it cannot be still treated as a waste paper. A party to the award cannot simply ignore the same. I have already extracted the judgment rendered to this said effect. In a still later judgment in Satwant Singh Sodhi vs. State of Punjab and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 487 if an award is intended to finally determine the rights of parties, it will have the force of complete award and will continue to have effect even after the final award is delivered. In a still later judgment in Satwant Singh Sodhi vs. State of Punjab and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 487 if an award is intended to finally determine the rights of parties, it will have the force of complete award and will continue to have effect even after the final award is delivered. The Arbitrator would thus become functus officio as regards the claims covered under such award and such claim cannot be re-determined. An award is complete as soon as it is made and signed. Delivery, pronouncement or filing in Court is not necessary for making the award complete. Since both the judgments make it clear that if a judgment had not been delivered on the basis of award by a Court, it will not cease to have effect and it will be final as regards the matter concluded by the Arbitrator, it becomes essential to examine whether the first award dated 13.08.1982 concludes any issue in favour of both the parties. The binding effect of the first award is relied heavily by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner only by the fact that the person, who was trying to execute the second award had actually admitted before the Civil Court in the suit filed by the objectors against the Electricity Board that the parties had compromised the matter in terms of the first award. (i) The text of 1st award 9. The first award dated 13.08.1982 has been drawn in Punjabi and a free translation in English has been filed by both the parties. I, therefore, proceed to reproduce the relevant portions of the first award from the translated copy given by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. "By repairing pucca site plan of the present division of factory and residential house the separate registries will be executed in the Court, they every owner may construct a share according to his wish and he will have a right to construct his share according to his desire. The place adjacent to the house of Amar Singh and Tarlok Singh (share holder) where Chetan Singh has installed a nickel factory, Chetan Singh can sell this land by taking money as per market rate. The place adjacent to the house of Amar Singh and Tarlok Singh (share holder) where Chetan Singh has installed a nickel factory, Chetan Singh can sell this land by taking money as per market rate. The price of this land will be settled by the Arbitrator Amar Singh and two agents from market and after obtaining money as per decision will execute the registry in the name of Tarlok Singh. Chetan Singh will have no right to sell to any other person. If Chetan Singh violates the decision then Chetan Singh will be responsible to a levy of fine of Rs. 10,000/- for if the land is sold to any other person then there will be no privacy in the use. If Tarlok Singh refused in writing to purchase the land, then Chetan Singh will have a full right to sell the land to any other person. Now I decide about the factory. The present transaction of the factory of Amar Engineering Company will be the responsibility of Surjit Singh because at this moment the factory is with Surjit Singh (share holder). The machinery installed in the factory will come to the shares of remaining three share holders, every share holder having taken their respective sales tax registry numbers. A loan from State Bank of India is outstanding. The rental income is accrued from plot No. 265, situate in industrial area and with that the Government loan will first be paid. Out of the balance amount, Rs. 5,000/- shall be paid to Surjit Singh for the marriage of his daughter. Sewa Singh will also be given monetary benefit for marriage of his daughter out of the income of the plot. The income from House No. 265 shall be jointly recovered by Amar Singh and Chetan Singh. Details of income and expenditure will be the responsibility of Tarlok Singh and he will prepare six copies of details and keep one copy with them and supply one copy each to the other shareholders. Telephone No. 24458 installed in the name of Amar Engineering Company will be transferred to Surjit Singh on his paying Rs. 5,000/- to all others. If Surjit Singh did not want to keep the telephone then any other share holder, who was prepared to pay Rs. 5,000/- can obtain the installation in his own name. Telephone No. 24458 installed in the name of Amar Engineering Company will be transferred to Surjit Singh on his paying Rs. 5,000/- to all others. If Surjit Singh did not want to keep the telephone then any other share holder, who was prepared to pay Rs. 5,000/- can obtain the installation in his own name. As regards plot No. 265, it is in the occupation of persons, who were not paying rent and they were also not giving up their illegal possession. Property of lacs of rupees has been wasted due to disunity and any two shareholders out of the five shareholders would have to the responsibility to take action and the illegal possessors will be ordered to be ejected. After resuming possession, the property will be given to Amar Singh and after his death all the four brothers will have equal shares in the plot No. 265. If any one share holder wanted to do his business in plot No. 265 then he would be at liberty to do so by constructing a building and installing a machinery and shall pay 10% more rent. However, if the property was to be divided, the person who puts up a construction will remove the debris and the division will be amongst the four sharers after the death of Amar Singh. The manner of allotment will be picked up by lots. Factory which was run in 307, Mohalla Nankpuri was a subject of litigation as regards certain electricity payable. Sewa Singh and Tarlok Singh can have their separate connections and Chetan Singh can also install a separate connection after installation of connection by Sewa Singh and Tarlok Singh. The case filed against Chetan Singh by Amar Singh shall be withdrawn by Amar Singh on 15.08.1982. If there is any obstruction with regard to the electricity connections, the Arbitrator himself will have the power to remove the obstructions and also impose fine of Rs. 20,000/- against the person, who was causing the obstruction. All the five shareholders are requested that they should sit and immediately decide about plot No. 265 and if there is any misunderstanding then the Arbitrator Amar Singh can make an amendment of the same afresh." 10. I have taken some liberties in trying to split sentences and make the translation readable. All the five shareholders are requested that they should sit and immediately decide about plot No. 265 and if there is any misunderstanding then the Arbitrator Amar Singh can make an amendment of the same afresh." 10. I have taken some liberties in trying to split sentences and make the translation readable. It is clear that as regards the plot No. 265, it makes a suggestion of the property to be enjoyed by Amar Singh and after his death, the brothers to divide the property. In the manner of such division, it shall be worked out by draw of lots. This was expected to be done immediately and if it was not possible, the Arbitrator himself will suggest the manner of division. As regards the factory in plot No. 307, it allowed for the independent applications of electricity connections first in the name of Sewa Singh then in the name of Tarlok Singh and later by Chetan Singh. If again there was any obstruction in obtaining connections, the Arbitrator will remove those obstructions. All the five parties namely father Amar Singh and four sons namely Surjit Singh, Sewa Singh, Chetan Singh and Tarlok Singh have signed the document. The manner in which the arbitral award has been rendered through the award dated 13.08.1982, it allowed for the parties to divide the properties in a particular fashion. The Arbitrator himself had not stipulated any portion as exclusively allotted to any one of the parties. Both as regards the residential house as well the industrial shed, the Arbitrator had only suggested the continuance of enjoyment by the parties and a manner of division that the parties will work out amongst themselves. If subsequent to this award, the case against Electricity Board was withdrawn and the parties had stated that they had compromised the matter through the Arbitrator, it was to be understood as a statement made by parties that they were not having any dispute amongst themselves and they would divide the properties in the manner that they would themselves work out. (ii) The source of power to Arbitrator for 2nd award 11. The subsequent award that was passed on 02.08.1983 in terms of which a decree has been passed by the Appellate Court could be seen as either binding or not valid depending on what had transpired between the document dated 13.08.1982 and 02.08.1983. (ii) The source of power to Arbitrator for 2nd award 11. The subsequent award that was passed on 02.08.1983 in terms of which a decree has been passed by the Appellate Court could be seen as either binding or not valid depending on what had transpired between the document dated 13.08.1982 and 02.08.1983. If the Arbitrator was bringing up the issue of a fresh division without any further arbitral agreement then surely in terms of the decision cited by the learned Senior Counsel, the Arbitrator would have become functus officio and he would have no jurisdiction to draw up a fresh award. On the other hand, if in the manner of exercise of liberty given by the Arbitrator for division amongst parties, parties themselves had encountered fresh difficulties and they had entrusted the matter back to the Arbitrator to arbitrate and divide the properties again afresh, there ought not to be anything inherently wrong. In such a situation, the Arbitrator's power to arbitrate and make a division would arise by an authority that comes subsequently through a fresh agreement. Without such a fresh agreement, the Arbitrator would have never had authority. It is this authority, which is referred to by one of the brothers, Tarlok Singh as having arisen by a statement given to the Arbitrator on 23.05.1983. The document which has been filed as OW4/A reads as under:- "We all four brothers and father 1. Amar Singh son of Nikka Singh 2. Surjit Singh son of S. Amar Singh 3. Sewa Singh son of S. Amar Singh 4. Chetan Singh son of S. Amar Singh 5. Tarlok Singh son of S. Amar Singh residents of House No. 307, Mohalla Nanakpuri, Millar Ganj, Ludhiana. That an adjudication was made by Amar Singh son of Dial Singh (Arbitrator) residing at 390-L, Model Town, Ludhina. We have reserved to ourselves the right of amendment. We all give the right to partition with consent. We all append our signatures with consent. Document is signed by all the five persons on 23.03.1983." Again this is followed with a signature of Tarlok Singh on 23.05.1983 i.e. two months later to the effect that as per the directions of Surjit Singh, Sewa Singh, Chetan Singh and Amar Singh, Tarlok Singh was submitting to suggestion for division regarding the house in 307, Nanakpuri, Ludhiana and plot No. 265, Industrial Area-A, as regards Amar Engineering Company immediately. This has been received by the Arbitrator on 23.05.1983 in the presence of Achhar Singh. Tarlok Singh's specific endorsement is said to have been made in the presence of one Avtar Singh. This document which is made on 23.03.1983 and subsequent endorsement again made on 25.03.1983 by Tarlok Singh will make it appear that all the parties had given authority to the Arbitrator to make a division afresh. It is this document which is being assailed in the revision petition before this Court by two of the parties namely Surjit Singh and Chetan Singh as revision petitioners. Incidentally, Surjit Singh first revision petitioner is reported to have died and his legal representatives have been added. Surjit Singh was the 2nd respondent and Chetan Singh was the 4th respondent before the Court of First Instance namely the Additional Senior Sub Judge, Ludhiana and only Tarlok Singh, who had filed the petition before the Additional Senior Judge, was preferring an appeal to the District Judge seeking for a judgment in terms of the award passed subsequently the second time. 12. While the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would contend that the second arbitration did not proceed on any fresh agreement and in fact a notice had been given by Chetan Singh informing the Arbitrator Amar Singh that he had already passed an award on 13.08.1982 and that he shall not proceed with any further enquiry. From the notice, it is clearly revealed that Surjit Singh was taking exception to the issue of notice by the Arbitrator setting out the fresh date for conduct of the arbitral proceedings. The Arbitrator himself has replied to this notice to the effect that award dated 13.08.1982 itself provided for a fresh division when circumstances so necessitated and that subsequently by a fresh document dated 23.03.1983, he had been given power by all the parties concerned to amend the award passed on 13.08.1982 in any manner. The matter did not evidently conclude by exchange of notices and it was further escalated by a rejoinder issued on 16.07.1983 where it was contended that the document alleged to have been executed on 23.03.1983 authorizing the Arbitrator to make or amend an earlier award was a mere forgery and fabrication. It was, however, contended that he had not authorized the Arbitrator to issue any other instrument. It was, however, contended that he had not authorized the Arbitrator to issue any other instrument. (iii) The 2nd award owed its origin to a fresh arbitration agreement 13. With allegations and counter allegations running against the subsequent authority dated 23.03.1983, it is most essential to see whether this document is true. If it was not, the subsequent award itself would be invalid and the one passed by an Arbitrator would be without any authority. If on the other hand, this document is true, the first award would cease to operate and the second award must be taken as in supercession of the earlier award and there would be nothing wrong in rendering a judgment in terms thereof. We have already examined that there was a contest as regards the manner of authority given to the Arbitrator on 23.03.1983 and it was contended by Chetan Singh that it was a forgery. The Arbitrator Amar Singh himself has given evidence before the Court on First Instance as OW4. He has stated in his evidence that:- "Second reference was given to him in May, 1983. Reference was not written in my presence when parties had brought the same to him. Second reference was given to him in the presence of Achhar Singh probably on 22, 23 or 24.05.1982 (1983) but I am not sure about the date. I got signatures of Achhar Singh on the reference while the signature of the parties were already there. I did not get the signatures of any other person in my presence on the second reference." He was cross-examined by counsel appearing on behalf of the father Amar Singh and Sewa Singh. I do not even see that Chetan Singh has cross examined the Arbitrator, who had given evidence about the fact that a fresh reference had been made on 23.05.1983. However, Chetan Singh has given evidence as OW5 and he has stated that:- "It is incorrect that a reference to arbitration was made on 23.05.1983. I do not know any Achhar Singh. It is incorrect that reference was made to Amar Singh in May, 1983 in the presence of Achhar Singh." There is no clear finding by the Court of First Instance that the document was not executed on 23.05.1983. However, the Appellate Court has discarded evidence of Chetan Singh and has held that they were parties to the second reference. It is incorrect that reference was made to Amar Singh in May, 1983 in the presence of Achhar Singh." There is no clear finding by the Court of First Instance that the document was not executed on 23.05.1983. However, the Appellate Court has discarded evidence of Chetan Singh and has held that they were parties to the second reference. The Court has also held that even if the signature of Chetan Singh must be taken as brought about by fabrication, Tarlok Singh had spoken about his own plea for a reference and the evidence of the Arbitrator Amar Singh that he had served notices to all the parties was itself sufficient to show that the document was true. (iv) Arbitral agreement in writing, even if not signed by one party is valid (1940 Act). 14. The arbitration agreement under Section 2 (a) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is slightly at variance with the definition that obtains in the subsequent enactment of the year 1996. The arbitration agreement is defined under Section 2(a) as follows:- "Arbitration agreement means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration whether an arbitrator is named therein or not." 15. There could be no doubt that an arbitral agreement is required to be in writing. There cannot be an oral arbitral agreement. The arbitration agreement does not require to be signed by all the parties in the manner contemplated in the 1996 Act. If there is, therefore, an arbitration agreement initiated at the instance of one of the parties and it is brought out in evidence that either party has concurred in such appointment and if at all, at the instance of one party, the Arbitrator proceeded to act after notice to all the persons and if the person objecting to the Arbitrator did not participate in the arbitral proceeding or when the arbitration award was filed in Court and judgment was sought in terms of the award by a person, who was interested in securing a judgment, the Court was fully competent to examine whether one of the parties, who was objecting to the reference was concurring party to the reference itself. If the Arbitrator has assumed jurisdiction on a reference and was serving notices to all parties, a unilateral withdrawal by a party, who had already signed shall not be effective. If the Arbitrator has assumed jurisdiction on a reference and was serving notices to all parties, a unilateral withdrawal by a party, who had already signed shall not be effective. If it were not to be so, it will allow for parties to walk out of proceedings at the whims of any one party and make ineffective the arbitral award. In this case, the evidence is that Chetan Singh was a matriculate and he knew to read Punjabi. He also knew a little bit of English. The authorization in writing is in Punjabi. The signatures in the document dated 23.05.1983 follow immediately after a request of all the parties, who have had the arbitration reopened at the instance of the Arbitrator. I cannot believe that Chetan Singh could have simply signed a blank paper. Initially, the party who had applied before the Court for passing a judgment was only Tarlok Singh and I affirm the finding of the Appellate Court that Chetan Singh was a willing party to the subsequent arbitration reference and he was bound by the subsequent award, which was passed since there was nothing amiss in the arbitral proceedings itself that culminated in the second award. VI. There is no ground to set aside 2nd award which was validly passed 16. That would leave us for consideration of the issue of whether the Arbitrator had followed the procedure that would justify a Court to pass judgment in terms of the award in the manner contemplated under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The judgment which the Court shall pass under Section 17 contemplates the power of the Court to modify the award under Section 15 when the award is signed and filed in Court. The award had been signed and filed in Court and Tarlok Singh had sought for passing of the judgment in terms of the award. The Court has also power to modify the award or remit the award. The Court chose to do neither, for it found no circumstance as provided either under Section 15 or 16 to modify or remit the award respectively. The judgment that the Court will pass in terms of the award under Section 17 can be stalled only if there are grounds for setting aside the award under Section 30. The Court chose to do neither, for it found no circumstance as provided either under Section 15 or 16 to modify or remit the award respectively. The judgment that the Court will pass in terms of the award under Section 17 can be stalled only if there are grounds for setting aside the award under Section 30. That is precisely an objection that came at the instance of the father and other brothers of Tarlok Singh as respondents before the Court of First Instance. Section 30 reads as follows:- "Grounds for setting aside award- An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely:- (a) That an arbitrator or umpire has mis-conducted himself or the proceedings. (b) That an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35. (c) That an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid." The above section sets out three circumstances namely – (i) that the arbitrator must have mis-conducted himself, (ii) the award had been made after the issue of an order of the Court superseding the arbitration, (iii) the award had been arbitrarily procured or otherwise invalid. The misconduct which is attributed against the Arbitrator is that he did not have an authority. We have already seen that the document dated 23.05.1983 was valid and constituted an authority to the Arbitrator. There was no misconduct which could be attributed to the Arbitrator. There were no proceedings by the Court superseding the arbitration or to make it invalid under Section 35 of the Act. Section 35 of the Arbitration Act of 1940 makes invalid of the arbitral proceedings if there had been stay of proceedings under Section 34. There was no stay of proceedings under Section 34. The third circumstance is whether the award is otherwise improperly procured or invalid. The invalidity of the award is attributed to the alleged act of the Arbitrator in assuming jurisdiction without express authority. We have already rejected that contention. The first award did not really conclude anything. They allowed for the parties to divide the properties again and that evidently was not done. The respondents had a case to contend that the parties had compromised the matter and had brought about a division amongst themselves in August, 1983. We have already rejected that contention. The first award did not really conclude anything. They allowed for the parties to divide the properties again and that evidently was not done. The respondents had a case to contend that the parties had compromised the matter and had brought about a division amongst themselves in August, 1983. No details of the compromise had been given nor was there any proof that such a division was brought about between the parties subsequent to the award passed in the year 1982. There could not have been such a proceeding especially when the parties have referred to the arbitration again through a second reference which I have upheld in the earlier paragraph. VIII. Summary 17. On a consideration of the relevant facts, therefore, I would uphold the judgment of the lower Appellate Court and hold that the first award was not complete, for the parties who were given liberty to divide the properties in a particular manner had chosen not to divide the properties. They had sought for reference again by a document dated 23.03.1983 and still later by an endorsement by Tarlok Singh on 23.05.1983 and second award which was passed by the Arbitrator was on a reference which had superseded the first award. There had been no proceedings of the Court superseding the award. The respondents in the Court of First Instance and the revision petitioners before the Court were served with notices by the Arbitrator and if they had chosen not to participate in the proceedings, it shall not avail any of the grounds as mentioned under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act to assail the same. The second award that was passed was, therefore, perfectly valid and a judgment rendered in terms of award under Section 17 is not liable to be interfered with. 18. The revision petition is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 10,000/-.