Judgment : Heard Sri P.Suresh Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri W.B.Srinivas, the learned counsel for petitioner and Sri E.Sambasiva Pratap, the learned Standing Counsel for the United Commercial Bank (Bank). 2. The petitioner who was an employee of the Bank was earlier in a departmental appeal retired compulsorily from service by way of punishment by the General Manager (Personnel) – Operations of the Bank at Calcutta on eight charges of misconduct modifying the order of dismissal passed by the original authority i.e. the concerned Deputy General Manager of the Bank’s regional office at Hyderabad branch. The petitioner questioned that order in W.P.No.13052 of 2007. That writ petition was allowed on 01.08.2008 by this Court setting aside the said compulsory retirement order and directing reinstatement of the petitioner into service. However, this Court in the said writ petition left it open to the second respondent therein i.e. the Deputy General Manager of the Bank’s regional office at Hyderabad (1st respondent in the present writ petition) to continue the proceedings from the stage preceding submission of the report of the Enquiry Officer (EO). 3. Thereafter the petitioner was reinstated into service on 03.10.2008. However, he was placed under suspension on 04.10.2008 and the disciplinary proceedings against him were again taken up. This time the EO was changed and the new EO who is the second respondent herein conducted fresh enquiry and submitted his report dated 24.11.2008 to the first respondent who is the disciplinary authority. The said enquiry report was communicated by the first respondent by his letter dated 01.12.2008 to the petitioner advising him to send his comments/explanation. After the petitioner submitted his explanation the first respondent passed the order dated 04.08.2009 awarding him the punishment of compulsory retirement. The petitioner this time without availing the departmental remedy of appeal filed the present writ petition questioning the said order of compulsory retirement. 4. It is not necessary to go into details of service of the petitioner relating to his appointments and postings as there is no dispute about the same. It would be sufficient to note that the disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner was initiated following detection of certain irregularities committed by him in connection with sanction and disbursement of loans under “UCO Mega Cash Loan Scheme” in the Rajahmundry branch of the Bank. Eight charges were framed against the petitioner. It would be sufficient to note that the disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner was initiated following detection of certain irregularities committed by him in connection with sanction and disbursement of loans under “UCO Mega Cash Loan Scheme” in the Rajahmundry branch of the Bank. Eight charges were framed against the petitioner. These were the charges which were the basis for earlier punishment order of compulsory retirement which was set aside leaving it open to the Bank to take up fresh proceedings from the stage preceding submission of the prior enquiry report. The allegations which led to the said eight charges against the petitioner can be stated thus. 5. At the relevant time i.e. in the year 2002, the petitioner was working in the cadre of Assistant Manager as Recovery Officer in the Bank’s branch at Rajahmundry. As part of his duties he was also allotted the duty of processing loan applications under the above scheme. It is mentioned that there were six loanees namely K.Mohan Babu, P.Narasimha Murthy, M.Raja Rao, U.Deva Das, D.Umamaheswara Rao and China Veeranna. There was also another loanee in connection with another loan pertaining to charge No.7. The main case of the Bank is that the petitioner committed several irregularities in processing the loan applications of the aforesaid six loanees inasmuch as he did not properly verify the creditworthiness of the aforesaid loanees and recommended loans for them. The defence of the petitioner is that he verified the loan applications of Mohan Babu and Narasimha Murthy alone but not others. He further pleaded that he was only a subordinate officer who did his duties as per rules and the Manager of the Bank and other higher officials who sanctioned the loans were responsible for any irregularities. The above explanation was rejected by the first respondent and the other higher officials and ultimately the following eight charges were framed against the petitioner. “1. Sri J. Srinivasa Rao had failed to process and appraise the loan proposals under UCO Mega Cash as per the bank’s guidelines and he had fabricated the salary certificates and violated the lending norms. Sri Srinivasa Rao had thus failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty which is violative of Regulation 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 197, as amended. 2. Sri Srinivasa Rao had thus failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty which is violative of Regulation 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 197, as amended. 2. Sri J. Srinivasa Rao had misguided his higher officials to get the confirmation with regard to sanction of UCO Mega Cash loans taking the plea that the assets of NPA accounts will be purchased by these UCO Mega Cash loanees availing the loan from the bank to adjust the NPA accounts. Sri Srinivasa Rao had thus failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty which is violative of Regulation 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 197, as amended. 3. Sri J.Srinivasa Rao failed to ensure full adjustment of outstanding NPA accounts with the loans disbursed under UCO Mega Cash and he himself paid the amounts to the borrower of NPA account for conversion of the sale proceeds of their assets. Sri Srinivasa Rao had thus failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty which is violative of Regulation 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 197, as amended. 4. Sri J.Srinivasa Rao had allowed the borrowers under UCO Mega Cash to avail loans for much higher amount than the sale deeds executed for purchasing assets of NPA accounts of the branch. Sri Srinivasa Rao had thus failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty which is violative of Regulation 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 197, as amended. 5. Sri J.Srinivasa Rao had intentionally inflated the area of the shops, rental value, valuation certificate as well as the value of the property purchased by the borrowers under UCO Mega Cash to allow these borrowers to avail higher amount of loan in excess of their eligibility to defraud the bank. Sri Srinivasa Rao had thus failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty which is violative of Regulation 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 197, as amended. 6. Sri J.Srinivasa Rao had failed to ascertain the identity and the credentials of the proposed borrowers before lending the bank’s funds under UCO Mega Cash. Sri Srinivasa Rao had thus failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty which is violative of Regulation 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 197, as amended. 7. 6. Sri J.Srinivasa Rao had failed to ascertain the identity and the credentials of the proposed borrowers before lending the bank’s funds under UCO Mega Cash. Sri Srinivasa Rao had thus failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty which is violative of Regulation 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 197, as amended. 7. Sri J. Srinivasa Rao had misguided the bank by giving false inspection report dated 19.12.2002 for giving a loan of Rs.80,000/- in addition to earlier sanction of Rs.4.00lacs under UCO Shelter. Sri Srinivasa Rao had thus failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty which is violative of Regulation 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 197, as amended. 8. Sri J. Srinivasa Rao had intentionally processed and recommended loans under UCO Shelter for amounts higher than the eligibility to defraud the bank. Sri Srinivasa Rao had thus failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty which is violative of Regulation 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 197, as amended.” 6. A presenting officer was appointed and the petitioner was also given opportunity to defend his case. In the enquiry witnesses were examined and documents were marked. The subsequent EO as already mentioned submitted his report dated 24.11.2008 to the first respondent. That report shows that the EO found that charges 2, 3 and 8 were not proved but the other charges i.e., 1, 4, 5, and 7 were proved. The first respondent communicated the same to the petitioner and called for his explanation and received it and thereafter by his impugned order dated 04.08.2009, awarded the punishment of compulsory retirement. 7. In the impugned order, the first respondent after considering the enquiry report however concluded that charges 2, 3 and 8 were also proved in addition to charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 which were held proved by the EO and he agreed with the EO on all other aspects and accordingly passed the impugned order. It is thus clear that the first respondent disagreed with the EO regarding charges 2, 3 and 8 and held them also to be proved. 8. In his pleadings in the writ petition, the petitioner raised several pleas and contentions both on questions of fact and law for questioning the impugned order. The first respondent filed counter affidavit opposing all the said pleas and contentions of the petitioner. 8. In his pleadings in the writ petition, the petitioner raised several pleas and contentions both on questions of fact and law for questioning the impugned order. The first respondent filed counter affidavit opposing all the said pleas and contentions of the petitioner. The petitioner also urged that from the date of his initial suspension to the date of reinstatement ordered by this Court in the previous W.P.No.13052 of 2007, he has not been paid his full salary and allowances and he is entitled to the same throughout including promotions and other benefits. This is however denied by the Bank. 9. On the pleadings of both sides and the contentions advanced on their behalf in the course of arguments, the following points arise for determination in this writ petition. Points: (i) Whether or not the impugned order is illegal insofar as charges 2, 3 and 8 are concerned on the grounds urged and argued on behalf of the petitioner and, if so, whether it can be upheld on charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 as argued by the Bank’s counsel or the entire impugned order has to go by reason of its defect in respect of charges 2, 3 and 8. (ii) Whether a joint enquiry ought to have been held against the petitioner and the Manager of the Bank’s branch at Rajahmundry and since that was not held, whether the impugned order has to be set aside on that ground. (iii) Whether the petitioner even if the charges framed against him are held proved, should have been let off with a minor punishment as in the case of Manager. (iv) Whether the petitioner is entitled to allowances and other benefits as claimed by him for the relevant periods. (v) Which is the relief to be granted in this writ petition. The pleas and contentions of both sides shall be referred to in detail under the relevant points. 10. Before the points are taken up, it must be mentioned here that at the time of arguments, it was pointed out on behalf of the Bank that the petitioner without availing the remedy of departmental appeal against the impugned order straightaway approached this Court and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable. 10. Before the points are taken up, it must be mentioned here that at the time of arguments, it was pointed out on behalf of the Bank that the petitioner without availing the remedy of departmental appeal against the impugned order straightaway approached this Court and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable. Sri Suresh Reddy pointed out that as there are violations of Regulation 7(2) of the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 197 (for short Regulations) and principles of natural justice and procedure as pleaded under point No.1, this Court can entertain the writ petition despite the existence of alternative remedy. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai ( AIR 1999 SC 22 ). That decision supports the above contention of the petitioner’s counsel. Further having regard to the contentions raised by both sides under point No.1, as will be presently seen on charges 2, 3 and 8 and as the Bank also contested the matter which is of 2009 on merits, I am of the opinion that the writ petition can be entertained on merits. Point No.(i) 11. The argument of Sri Suresh Reddy on this point is that the first respondent ought to have given prior notice of his intention to disagree with the EO on charges 2, 3 and 8 and communicated his tentative reasons for disagreeing with the EO and called for an explanation once again from the petitioner and should have also given an opportunity of hearing to him on that aspect before passing the impugned order and since the above procedure was not followed by the first respondent, the impugned order is invalid. He also pointed out that the first respondent did not give any specific reasons for disagreeing with the EO on charges 2, 3 and 8 as required by Regulation 7(2) of the Regulations and therefore the impugned order is invalid in respect of those charges on the said ground also. He says that Regulation 7(2) was totally violated. In support of this contention he relied upon Yoginath D.Bagde v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1999 SC 3734 )and LAV Nigam v. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd. (200 ) 9 SCC 440). 12. He says that Regulation 7(2) was totally violated. In support of this contention he relied upon Yoginath D.Bagde v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1999 SC 3734 )and LAV Nigam v. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd. (200 ) 9 SCC 440). 12. Sri Suresh Reddy further argued that even in respect of charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 also, the first respondent merely accepted the report of the EO and the findings of the both on the said charges are also not based on any evidence and consequently the whole order should be set aside. He also pointed out that the first respondent must be held to have imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement as a cumulative effect of holding all the charges as proved and therefore the punishment order cannot be sustained when once it is held to be bad in respect of charges 2, 3 and 8 on the above grounds and it cannot be upheld on charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 also. 13. On the other hand, the argument of Sri Sambasiva Pratap is that Regulation 7(2) empowers the first respondent to disagree with the findings of the EO without giving any further notice of such disagreement to the delinquent and therefore the complaint of the petitioner in that behalf cannot be a ground by itself to set aside the impugned order. He also pointed out that the findings of the EO on charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 which are distinct can be said to be based upon evidence and the first respondent also accepted the same giving sufficient reasons and they are enough to sustain the impugned order, even if it is held to be bad in respect of charges 2, 3 and 8. 14. He alternatively argued that even on charges 2, 3 and 8, the first respondent considered the evidence and his conclusions on the same cannot be said to be unreasonable. He also relied upon Managing Director, ECIL v. B.Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 ) and State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.Sharma (199 ) 3 SCC 3 4)to show that mere violation of principles of natural justice or procedure cannot be a ground by itself to interfere with the punishment order when it can be sustained otherwise on the material on which it is based. He pointed out that the argument of the petitioner’s counsel that the entire order should be set aside cannot be accepted on any ground. 15. The argument of Sri Suresh Reddy that the impugned order is violative of Regulation 7(2) even on merits in respect of charges 2, 3 and 8 is first taken up. At the risk of repetition, it may be noted that the EO on evidence giving his reasons held that the said charges were not proved, whereas the first respondent disagreed with him on those charges and concluded that they were also proved. Regulation 7(2) says that when the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the EO, he has to record his specific reasons on the evidence. It may be noted that this requirement is more when the disciplinary authority concludes that charges held not proved by the EO are also proved. It has now to be seen whether the impugned order satisfies the requirements of Regulation 7(2) with regard to giving of reasons by the first respondent insofar as it relates to charges 2, 3 and 8. For this purpose, charges 2, 3 and 8 and the findings of the EO and the first respondent can be briefly considered. 16. Charge No.2 is that the petitioner misguided his higher officials to sanction the UCO Mega Cash Loans taking the plea that the assets of NPA accounts will be purchased by the above UCO Mega Cash Loanees. Charge No.3 is that the petitioner failed to ensure full adjustment of outstanding NPA accounts with the loans disbursed under the UCO Mega Cash Loan scheme. Charge No.8 is that the petitioner intentionally processed and recommended loans under the above scheme for amounts higher than the eligibility of the loanees to defraud the Bank. The EO discussed the evidence on the said three charges and held that so far as charges 2 and 3 are concerned the higher officials should have also been careful and therefore the petitioner cannot be said to have misguided them and that he also did not commit irregularities with regard to adjustments in the NPA accounts. So far as Charge No.8 is concerned, the EO held that there was no intention to help the loanees and what all that was committed by the petitioner was a mere irregularity and was not proved. So far as Charge No.8 is concerned, the EO held that there was no intention to help the loanees and what all that was committed by the petitioner was a mere irregularity and was not proved. The EO recorded his reasons on the evidence in reaching the conclusions which he reached on the above charges. 17. In the impugned order the first respondent did not specifically deal with the reasons given by the EO and did not mention anything as to how the reasons given by the EO and his conclusions on the said charges cannot be accepted. It may here be noted that Regulation 7(2) says that the disciplinary authority if it disagrees with the findings of the EO on any article of charge should record its reasons with reference to evidence for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge or charges if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. Thus the first respondent being the disciplinary authority should have given reasons on evidence and should have shown as to how the findings of the EO on charges 2, 3 and 8 are wrong and not acceptable on evidence. This the first respondent has not done. 18. On the other hand, the first respondent in the impugned order proceeded on the premise that the EO found charges 2, 3 and 8 also as proved and this is clear when he stated that “I concur with the findings of the enquiry officer in respect of the charges levelled against Sri J.Srinivasa Rao in respect of charges 1 to 8 in the charge sheet dated 02.09.2003 wherein I find that the basis of various exhibits produced during the enquiry, the enquiry officer has held all charges from 1 to 8 as proved”. This is factually incorrect as the EO did not find charges 2, 3 and 8 also as proved. The impugned order does not show that the first respondent has recorded clear-cut reasons to support his disagreement with the EO on charges 2, 3 and 8. It can thus be said that the first respondent has violated Regulation 7(2) in recording his disagreement with the EO on charges 2, 3 and 8 inasmuch as he failed to record reasons for such disagreement. It can thus be said that the first respondent has violated Regulation 7(2) in recording his disagreement with the EO on charges 2, 3 and 8 inasmuch as he failed to record reasons for such disagreement. This circumstance itself shows that the impugned order cannot be sustained insofar as charges 2, 3 and 8 are concerned as the first respondent violated Regulation 7(2) by failing to give his reasons for holding them as proved overruling the conclusions of the EO. 19. In addition to the above violation of Regulation 7(2), it may be noted that the first respondent merely communicated the enquiry report to the petitioner without communicating his tentative opinion to disagree with the EO on charges 2, 3 and 8 and the reasons for his disagreement to the petitioner and did not call for petitioner’s explanation and give any opportunity of hearing also to him on that aspect. It is true that the above requirement is not found in Regulation 7(2) going by its language. In Yoginath D.Bagde’s case (2 supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court however laid down that in a case or situation like this the disciplinary authority is bound to give the delinquent prior notice of its intention to disagree with the findings of the EO communicating its tentative opinion also with reasons and therefore call upon the delinquent to submit his explanation and also give him an opportunity of hearing on that aspect also, in case it proceeds to impose a penalty on that premise. 20. In Yoginath D.Bagde’s case (2 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with a disciplinary enquiry ordered against a Judicial Officer which resulted in his dismissal from the service. There the EO in his report held that the two charges framed against the delinquent therein were not proved. The disciplinary authority however disagreed with the EO and it also communicated its reasons to the delinquent as to why it was disagreeing with the EO, but failed to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent to represent his case regarding its disagreement. In such a situation the Supreme Court held that the disciplinary authority should not only communicate its tentative reasons for disagreement but should also give an opportunity of hearing. In such a situation the Supreme Court held that the disciplinary authority should not only communicate its tentative reasons for disagreement but should also give an opportunity of hearing. So holding, it was held that even in the absence of such a provision in the relevant rule, the same must be read into the rule and on that ground also, among other grounds, it was held that the impugned order therein was bad as violative of principles of natural justice and fair procedure. 21. Thus going by the said proposition it follows that in the present case also the impugned order must be held to be bad on that ground in addition to the first ground which I have already mentioned. The decision in Yoginath D.Bagde’s case (2 supra) was followed in LAV Nigam’s case (3 supra). 22. Sri Sambasiva Pratap however relied upon B.Karunakar’s case (4 supra) and S.K.Sharma’s case (5 supra) to show that mere violation of rules of procedure and failure to give opportunity of hearing cannot be a ground by itself to set aside a punishment order in disciplinary matters. It is true that such a proposition is laid down in the above cases and there cannot be any dispute about the validity of such a proposition. It may however be noted that the application of the above proposition depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In Yoginath D.Bagde’s case (2 supra) the Supreme Court considered B.Karunakar’s case (4 supra) and distinguished it and held that such a proposition cannot be accepted in a situation like this where the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the EO. S.K.Sharma’s case (5 supra) was a case where though the copies of statements of witnesses were not initially furnished to the delinquent he was however permitted to see them sufficiently in advance before the commencement of the enquiry and therefore having regard to that fact and the other circumstances therein it was held that the mere violation of procedure did not result in any prejudice to the delinquent. 23. Thus the two cases relied upon by Sri Sambasiva Pratap are distinguishable and cannot help the Bank. In other words, it follows that the impugned order insofar as it relates to charges 2, 3 and 8, for the aforesaid reasons, must be held to be bad on the above two grounds as contended by the petitioner’s counsel. 23. Thus the two cases relied upon by Sri Sambasiva Pratap are distinguishable and cannot help the Bank. In other words, it follows that the impugned order insofar as it relates to charges 2, 3 and 8, for the aforesaid reasons, must be held to be bad on the above two grounds as contended by the petitioner’s counsel. 24. It has now to be seen whether the impugned order is sustainable on charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 which have been held proved both by the EO and the first respondent. It must be mentioned here itself that the petitioner’s counsel has not been able to show that charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 are inseperably connected to charges 2, 3 and 8 and therefore if the impugned order is held to be bad in respect of charges 2, 3 and 8 the whole order must go. Even otherwise it may be noted that charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 relate to actual processing of loan applications of the loanees which was done by the petitioner as will be presently seen and therefore it can be said that they stand on a different footing from charges 2, 3 and 8. In fact, charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 pertain to the discharge of his duties by the petitioner himself and therefore they pertain to his derelictions in discharge of his duties and they have nothing to do with the actions of the Manager. Therefore, the said charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 can be said to be distinct from the other three charges. 25. It may be noted here that the first respondent did not specifically give any reasons for upholding the same. He stated that he has gone through the evidence and was agreeing with the findings of the EO on the charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 and then mentioned about their seriousness. The EO also gave sufficient reasons in upholding the same on evidence. Regulation 7 does not say that where the disciplinary authority is affirming the findings of the EO it has to give separate reasons again. In view of this, it would be sufficient if it is examined whether the findings of the EO on charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 are based on evidence and if it is held so this Court cannot now sit as an appellate court over the said findings. 26. In view of this, it would be sufficient if it is examined whether the findings of the EO on charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 are based on evidence and if it is held so this Court cannot now sit as an appellate court over the said findings. 26. To examine the above aspect, charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 and the findings of the EO thereon have to be looked into. These charges, to repeat, relate to actual processing of loan applications by the petitioner. Charge No.1 is that the petitioner failed to process and appraise the loan proposals under the UCO loan scheme as per lending norms of the Bank and he also fabricated the salary certificates. Charge No.4 is that the petitioner allowed the borrowers under the above scheme to avail loans for much higher amounts than the sale deeds executed for purchasing assets of NPA accounts. Charge No.5 is that the petitioner intentionally inflated the area and valuation of the properties and their rental values. Charge No. is that the petitioner failed to ascertain the identity and the credentials of the proposed borrowers. Charge No.7 is that the petitioner misguided the Bank by giving a false inspection report dated 19.12.2002 to enable a loanee by name V.V.Satyanarayana Murthy to get a loan of Rs.80,000/-beyond his eligibility. The EO discussed each of the above charges and concluded that they were proved and he also gave reasons. 27. It may be noted that all the above charges i.e. charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 are interconnected and relate to processing of loan applications. So far as charge No.1 is concerned, the EO found that the petitioner himself has admitted that he verified the loan applications of one Sri K.Mohan Babu and P.Narasimha Murthy and this is also admitted in the pleadings in the writ petition. The EO found that K.Mohan Babu was placed under suspension some 3 or 4 months prior to the date of sanction of loan to him and the petitioner submitted the salary certificates of the said Mohan Babu for a period prior to his suspension without any verification and enabled him to get the loan. The EO found that K.Mohan Babu was placed under suspension some 3 or 4 months prior to the date of sanction of loan to him and the petitioner submitted the salary certificates of the said Mohan Babu for a period prior to his suspension without any verification and enabled him to get the loan. So far as P.Narasimha Murthy is concerned he did not verify about a suit which was already filed against him by the Eluru branch of the Bank in connection with a loan recovery and the above two circumstances show that the petitioner did not do the verification properly and enabled them to get the loans. It is also found by the EO that the loanees purchased the properties from one Sunita Devi and the loans were sanctioned under some purchase agreements or sale agreements executed by her and though the legal opinion obtained by the Bank showed that Sunita Devi alone was not competent to execute the said documents. He of-course found that the fabrication charge was not proved but the petitioner concealed the above facts and thus held that charge No.1 was proved to the above extent. 28. Under charge No.4, which related to charge No.1, the EO found that the petitioner was responsible for processing the loan applications without proper verification of the values and also he processed the loan applications on the primary documents i.e. agreements to purchase obtained by the loanees. Under charge No.5 which is also related, the EO found that the petitioner has inflated the rental values of the properties i.e. shops and their areas also and did not verify the same properly from the concerned documents. So far as charge No. is concerned, which is also related to the previous charges, the EO found that he did not visit the office of Sri K.Mohan Babu to ascertain about his suspension though he claimed to have ascertained the same. The EO again found that the petitioner did not verify about the suit filed by the Eluru branch against P.Narasimha Murthy for recovery of a loan which made him ineligible. The EO also found that the record disclosed that petitioner claimed TA bills showing that he verified the creditworthiness of the other four borrowers also but did not do any verification work and without raising any credit report, he certified about their eligibility. The EO also found that the record disclosed that petitioner claimed TA bills showing that he verified the creditworthiness of the other four borrowers also but did not do any verification work and without raising any credit report, he certified about their eligibility. Then coming to charge No.7, the EO found that the petitioner followed an irregular procedure and recommended for the additional amount of Rs.80,000/- but there was no fraud in it and therefore held that charge proved only to that extent. This sum of Rs.80,000/- pertains to one Satyanarayana Murthy who was different from the above six loanees under the UCO loan scheme. 29. Thus what should be noted is that so far as charges 1, 4, 5, and are concerned, the findings of the EO show that the petitioner did not properly verify the creditworthiness of K.Mohan Babu and P.Narasimha Murthy and enabled them to obtain loans against the Bank’s norms and rules relating to lending. His findings would also show that he did not verify the loan applications of all the six loanees properly. His contention is that he did his job and it was the Manager who has to finally check everything and that no financial loss was caused to the Bank. May be, no financial loss was caused to the Bank but it may be noted that the above charges 1, 4, 5 and would show that the petitioner did not properly verify and process the loan applications under the UCO cash loan scheme and he enabled Mohan Babu who was under suspension and another Narasimha Murthy who was already facing a civil action by another branch of the Bank for recovery of the loan to get the loans. Not only this, he did not verify the relevant sale deeds and agreements of sale and showed inflated values in his recommendations about the properties offered as security by the loanees. This is an activity which the petitioner as a Bank officer ought not to have indulged in in the interests of the Bank which deals with the depositors money. The EO discussed the evidence and reached the above conclusions on the aforesaid charges 1, 4, 5 and and therefore the said findings cannot be said to be perverse. This is an activity which the petitioner as a Bank officer ought not to have indulged in in the interests of the Bank which deals with the depositors money. The EO discussed the evidence and reached the above conclusions on the aforesaid charges 1, 4, 5 and and therefore the said findings cannot be said to be perverse. Even on charge No.7 the conclusion of the EO that it is an irregularity can be said to be well-founded and it is accepted by the first respondent. 30. The first respondent went through the evidence and accepted the findings of the EO on the above charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 and agreed with the said findings. This court to repeat cannot act as a court of appeal and therefore the conclusions of the first respondent in the above circumstances and for the aforesaid reasons cannot be interfered with now. The petitioner in his wisdom did not file the departmental appeal but straightaway approached this court. It is well settled that this court can only look into any violation of procedure which may cause prejudice or only when the findings are based on no evidence at all. Having regard to the limitations of this court in the matter, it follows that there is no ground to interfere with the first respondent’s conclusions on charges 1, 4, 5, and 7. 31. It is true that a higher official has to again check from his side about the actions of the subordinate, but the subordinate official is also expected to perform his duties as required with utmost integrity and in the case on hand it is clear that the petitioner did not discharge those duties in good faith and violated all the Bank norms and rules of lending which have the effect of placing the Bank’s interest in jeopardy. One more aspect pointed out is that by the actions of the petitioner the Bank gave the loans for a purpose other than which the loans were meant for and higher officials were also responsible for the same. May be that may also be true but even in that case a proper verification ought to have been done by the officer in the first instance regarding the creditworthiness of the borrowers, the values of the properties offered as security and it is here the petitioners lapses are important. May be that may also be true but even in that case a proper verification ought to have been done by the officer in the first instance regarding the creditworthiness of the borrowers, the values of the properties offered as security and it is here the petitioners lapses are important. Hence the findings of the EO which were confirmed by the first respondent on the above charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 cannot be disturbed. 32. Regarding the sustainability of the impugned order on charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 especially when it is held to be bad on charges 2, 3 and 8, the argument of the petitioner’s counsel is that the first respondent must be held to have imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement having taken all the charges cumulatively into account and further minus charges 2, 3 and 8 he may not have imposed that punishment and therefore the whole order should be set aside. It is also argued that since impugned order is vitiated on charges 2, 3 and 8, the whole order can be set aside on that ground alone. It is difficult to accept this contention. It may be noted that the impugned order would show that charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 themselves stand on a different footing. The first respondent considered each of the said charges also which shows that they are serious in nature. In fact, each one of them could be a ground for compulsory retirement as contended by Sri Sambasiva Pratap. It would be useful to note here the relevant portion in the impugned order regarding the findings of the first respondent and the conclusion which he reached about the punishment. “In view of the above, I hereby award the following punishment to Sri J.Srinivasa Rao in terms of Regulation 4 of the UCO Bank Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 197, as amended. PUNISHMENT AWARDED The above punishment will have concurrent effect.” Charge No.1 Proved ) Charge No.2 Proved ) Charge No.3 Proved ) Charge No.4 Proved ) Sri J.Srinivasa Rao is Charge No.5 Proved ) Compulsorily Retired Charge No. Proved ) from Bank’s Service. Charge No.7 Proved ) Charge No.8 Proved ) 33. A perusal of the above portion of the other would show that the first respondent has imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement on each charge though the language is not clear. Charge No.7 Proved ) Charge No.8 Proved ) 33. A perusal of the above portion of the other would show that the first respondent has imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement on each charge though the language is not clear. Even if charges 2, 3 and 8 are excluded it can be said that it can be sustained even on each of the other charges or put them together. It may be noted that Regulation 7(3) says that if the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge may impose any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 which deals with penalties. It is thus clear that the first respondent has imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement indicating that he imposed that punishment for each charge. Thus even if charges 2, 3 and 8 are separated still it follows that the impugned order can be sustained on charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 which are distinct. It may be noted that a penalty order, if it is sustainable on other charges or grounds in a disciplinary matter it cannot be set aside just because it is held not sustainable on some other charges when the former are distinct from the latter. It can be said, in my opinion, that such a conclusion also stands to reason. No decision or any legal principle has been brought to my notice to hold otherwise. When once the said charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 are found to be serious irregularities it follows that the present punishment of compulsory retirement cannot also be said to be a disproportionate one. Accordingly point No.1 is decided in favour of the Bank. Point No.(ii) 34. This point has been framed on the plea of the petitioner that joint enquiry should have been held as contemplated under Regulation 10 against him and the Manager of the Bank against whom a separate enquiry was held and since that is not done prejudice has been caused to him. First of all it is not shown by the petitioner’s counsel as to how the petitioner suffered a prejudice on that count. First of all it is not shown by the petitioner’s counsel as to how the petitioner suffered a prejudice on that count. It is true that Regulation 10 of the Regulations says that where two or more officers/employees are concerned in a case, the authority competent to impose a major penalty on all such officer employees may make an order directing that disciplinary proceedings against all of them may be taken in a common proceeding. 35. It may be noted that the language of Regulation 10 shows that it is only directory. Such provision is found in several disciplinary proceedings rules pertaining to Government servants and in other public undertakings and private organisations also. It is only a matter of convenience. It may be noted that if a separate enquiry is held against each and every officer that cannot be faulted unless prejudice is shown by the charge sheeted officer in conducting the enquiry. The petitioner has not been able to show any such prejudice. On the other hand, it should be noted that where a separate enquiry is held that would be more conducive and provides a more than sufficient opportunity to the charge sheeted officer to defend himself. Thus this point is also decided against the petitioner. Point No.(iii) 36. This point has been framed on the plea of the petitioner and the argument of Sri Suresh Reddy that though the Manager is also involved in these irregularities, the petitioner has been visited with the punishment of compulsory retirement whereas the Manager has been let off with a minor punishment of reduction of basic pay by two stages for a period of one year in a separate enquiry held against him and therefore the petitioner also should be let off with such a minor punishment. In para 13 of the counter meeting the above plea of the petitioner, it is stated that in the enquiry held against the Manager, it was found that the said Manager has sanctioned the loans basing on the recommendations made by the petitioner and it was also found that the petitioner was the key person in verification of documents and credentials of the borrowers and processing of the loan proposals and recommending for their sanctions. It is therefore stated that as the petitioner was found to be the key person, he has been visited with the major penalty and therefore his case cannot be compared with that of the Manager of the branch. 37. Sri Suresh Reddy in connection with the above plea of the petitioner placed reliance upon Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd’s case (2 supra) to show that the petitioner should also have been let off with a minor punishment in the circumstances of this case. It is difficult to accept this contention. It may be noted that in Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd.’s case (2 supra), the misconduct against three workmen therein was in respect of an incident relating to “drunkenness, fighting or riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour or any act subversive of discipline or efficiency”. There the said charge did not in substance relate to discharge of duties of the workmen in that case and was a case of more rough and riotous behaviour. It was in those circumstances, the Supreme Court did not interfere with the impugned judgment therein by which the High Court directed that all the three workmen involved in the above incident be treated equally with regard to punishment and modified the punishment of dismissal imposed upon one of the three workmen into a minor punishment while retaining him in the job like the other two workmen. That case is not comparable here. 38. In the present case, it is the specific version of the Bank that the Manager acted on the recommendations of the petitioner and it was the petitioner who played the key role in these lending transactions and because of that the petitioner was visited with the penalty of compulsory retirement. It is true that the Manager of the Bank also had a duty to verify the loan proposals and recommendations made by the petitioner but it is not out of place to mention here that superior officer always act on the recommendations of the subordinate officer. Even otherwise the subordinate officer is not supposed to scrutinise and submit the loan proposals in violation of Bank’s lending norms and having committed such serious irregularities as in this case, he cannot escape from his liability pleading that the superior officers were bound to check everything. Even otherwise the subordinate officer is not supposed to scrutinise and submit the loan proposals in violation of Bank’s lending norms and having committed such serious irregularities as in this case, he cannot escape from his liability pleading that the superior officers were bound to check everything. The version of the Bank is that the petitioner was the key person in the whole lending transactions in question. Thus the Bank explains that having regard to the result of the disciplinary action taken against the Manager he was visited with a minor penalty and this can be accepted. In the enquiry report, it is true that as contended by petitioner’s counsel, at some places the EO mentioned that petitioner was also one of those responsible for the irregularities indicating that some others were also involved and he made this also a ground for letting off the petitioner with a minor penalty as in the case of Manager. It may however be noted that the acts attributed to the petitioner as charges 1, 4, 5, and 7 would show that as part of his duties he was required to process and submit the loan applications and proposals in a vary diligent manner and he was solely responsible for his own acts under the above charges which were serious and therefore his contention that he should be let off with a minor penalty by this Court cannot be accepted. 39. Thus the petitioner’s plea, in the above circumstances, that the punishment is also disproportionate cannot be accepted. One contention raised was that the acts of the petitioner did not result in any loss to the Bank. It is true that nothing is placed on record to show that the amounts advanced to the loanees have become bad debts or otherwise irrecoverable or the petitioner took bribes from the loanees. If that had been established, especially the latter aspect, dismissal or removal from service would have been the proper punishment. It appears that because of the absence of the above aspects the petitioner was punished with the punishment of compulsory retirement which will enable him to get some service benefits as his continuance in service was found to be not in the interests of the Bank. This point is also therefore decided against the petitioner. Point No.(iv) 40. It appears that because of the absence of the above aspects the petitioner was punished with the punishment of compulsory retirement which will enable him to get some service benefits as his continuance in service was found to be not in the interests of the Bank. This point is also therefore decided against the petitioner. Point No.(iv) 40. This point has been framed on the plea of the petitioner that though he was reinstated on 03.10.2008 into service following the judgment of this court in the earlier Writ Petition No.13052 of 2007 he was again placed under suspension on 04.10.2008 and he has not been paid the salary amounts due from the date of his initial suspension to the date of reinstatement i.e. 03.10.2008 and this fresh enquiry was taken up. So far as taking up of a fresh enquiry is concerned that cannot be said to be illegal as it was permitted by the order of this Court in W.P.No.13052 of 2007. So far as payment of salary from the date of initial suspension to the date of reinstatement i.e. 03.10.2008 is concerned, the learned counsel for the Bank stated across the Bar that all those amounts have been paid adjusting the subsistence allowance. 41. It may be noted here that the order in the earlier Writ Petition No.13052 of 2007 can be said to have the effect of terminating the earlier punishment order and even the earlier suspension order and the petitioner must be deemed to be in service upto 04.10.2008 on which date he was again suspended. In that order the petitioner was also granted the relief of consequential benefits. In view of this and the proposition laid down in R.S.Misra v. Union of India (2012) 8 SCC 558 )it can be said that the petitioner is entitled to full monetary benefits including increments if any subject to his eligibility for the same for that period upto 04.10.2008 subject to adjustment of the subsistence allowance already paid to him. If the petitioner had not been paid the same, he shall be paid the same within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by the Bank. If the petitioner had not been paid the same, he shall be paid the same within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by the Bank. With regard to suspension from 04.10.2008 onwards is concerned, the petitioner cannot complain about the same and he shall be entitled only to the subsistence allowance payable as per rules from that date to the date of the impugned order. This point is accordingly decided partly in favour of the petitioner. 42. In view of the decision under point Nos.(i), (ii) and (iii), the writ petition is dismissed so far as the impugned order is concerned, but the petitioner shall be entitled to the benefits as indicated under point No.(iv). No costs.