JUDGEMNT N.V. ANJARIA, J. 1. By presenting this present Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the appellant wife has sought to challenge judgment and decree dated 06.08.2011 of learned Additional District Judge, Surat at Vyara in Regular Civil Appeal No.32 of 2008, whereby the First Appellate Court confirm the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dissolving the marriage in a petition filed by the respondent-husband. The decree of divorce was prayed for and came to be passed on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. 2. It was on the following substantial question of law formulated by the Court, that the present appeal was admitted: “Whether the lower appellate court was justified in holding that decree of divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 could be granted on the ground of irretrievable break down of marriage?” 3. A profile of facts and events leading to the litigation between the spouses and culminating into the present appeal may be noted with relevance. In the Hindu Marriage Petition No.12 of 2004 filed by the respondent-husband before the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Bardoli under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter mentioned as ‘the Act’ for sake of brevity), divorce was pleaded under Section 13(1)(ia) on the ground that after solemnisation of marriage, wife had treated the petitioner with cruelty. The second ground was under Section 13(1)(ib) that petitioner was deserted for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding to the presentation of the petition. 3.1 It was the case of the husband that after his marriage was solemnized on 27.02.1994 at Vadodara in accordance with the Hindu rites and the community traditions, he was serving at Kakrapar Atomic Power Station and therefore was staying at village Unchamala, Taluka Vyara in the township called Anumala. The Unchamala was a small village. It was stated by the applicant-husband that some time after the marriage, the conduct and behaviour of the appellant was unbecoming of a Hindu wife, and that she used to indulge into petty quarrels and that their parents were prompting her that both should not stay in small village. It was the further case that in view of pregnancy, wife went to the parental house for delivery on or around 08.06.1995 as per the custom. It was the further case that in view of pregnancy, wife went to the parental house for delivery on or around 08.06.1995 as per the custom. Son Abhi was born on 03.12.1995, about which the husband stated that she was not informed about the birth of the son. He averred further that wife did not return to his house and he tried to bring her back by persuasion in vain. Efforts were also made through relatives, through Nari Sarankshan Gruh to call back the appellant but that too did not yield any result. 3.2 It was stated further that thereafter the wife initiated proceedings for maintenance. In the Court at Vadodara. It appears that in the said proceedings, upon intervention and persuasion of the well wishers of the parties, the wife came back to husband’s place in February, 1997 and restarted matrimonial life at Anumala township. It however did not last long. It appeared that a serious quarrel erupted on 25.10.1999; she demanded to go back to parents house with all clothes, articles and ornaments. The husband further stated that he, thereupon had to take the wife in the night at bus station as she wanted to catch the Vadodara-bound bus. At that time, minor son Abhi and father of the wife were with her. Wife’s father, as the facts goes, was called by the wife to husband's house and therefore he was there. 3.3 In the written statement at Exhibit 23, the appellant wife contended that she had never quarreled, nor had complained at any time about her husband living in a rural area or in a small village; on the contrary rural climate was of her liking. According to her, the husband’s attitude and conduct was non-caring. She contended that even after birth of the son Abhi, the husband did not attend them, nor he properly maintained. She stated that on 25.10.1999, she was ill-treated and therefore, had to call her father at husband’s house. Her case was that husband drove her out on the said day and she with her minor child and father had to leave the town in the early morning at 3.30 am spending virtually whole night at the bus station. 3.4 After appellant left husband’s house on 25.10.2010, she started staying with her parents. She thereafter initiated proceedings under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act seeking interim alimony. 3.4 After appellant left husband’s house on 25.10.2010, she started staying with her parents. She thereafter initiated proceedings under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act seeking interim alimony. It may be noted at this stage that interim maintenance of Rs.2,500/-per month to the wife and Rs.1,500/-per month to the son has been ordered in the said proceedings. The son Abhi is 15 years of age at present. The said proceedings being HMP No.412 of 1999 are pending. 3.5 The Trial Court framed two issues at Exhibit 30. Firstly, whether the petitioner proved that after their marriage, the opponent wife was not willing to stay with him at Anumala township as it was a small village. The second issue framed was whether petitioner proved that the opponent wife started to quarrel to give mental torture and left husband’s house without sufficient reasons deserting the husband. The Trial Court appreciated the evidence on record and answered both the issues in affirmative. The Trial Court did not believe the story that the incident of 25.10.1999 was an act of desertion by the husband, but it was found to be otherwise. The Trial Court noted on the basis of the evidence of the wife that she had refused to continue, she was not ready and willing to continue matrimonial life with the husband. The grounds of cruelty and desertion pleaded by the husband were accepted. 3.6 In course of considering the present appeal and before its hearing progressed, endeavours were made through learned advocates for both the sides to get the disputes between the parties settled. For that purpose, the hearing was adjourned from time to time. However any kind of compromise, much less the did not materialised. It was stated by learned advocates after counseling with the respective parties that the settlement was not possible. The talks about settling permanent alimony also failed. A suggestion was made to the parties through learned advocates to go for mediation process to settle the matrimonial dispute, which too was not accepted to the parties. It appeared that those efforts yielded any result out of despair. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Vijay Patel for M/s H.L. Patel Advocates for the appellant contended that the ground which weighed with the first appellate court was that there was a irretrievable breakdown of marriage between the parties, and for that reason, it confirmed the decree of divorce. It appeared that those efforts yielded any result out of despair. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Vijay Patel for M/s H.L. Patel Advocates for the appellant contended that the ground which weighed with the first appellate court was that there was a irretrievable breakdown of marriage between the parties, and for that reason, it confirmed the decree of divorce. According to his submission, irretrievable breakdown of marriage being not a ground in law under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for granting the divorce, the impugned judgment and decree could not be allowed to be sustained. It was submitted that with regard to such finding recorded to be the basis for allowing divorce, substantial question of law as framed was arising. He further submitted that it was husband who was responsible for deserting the wife, when he on 25th October, 1999, drove away the wife and son with father of the wife out of his matrimonial house, whereupon they all were forced to leave in the midnight for parental home. It was submitted that neither the ground of desertion or the ground of cruelty was established. It was further submitted that the burden to prove the desertaion was on the party seeking relief, however, the respondent-husband not only failed to discharge the said burden, but on the contrary, it was he who was guilty of deserting the wife. It was submitted that the burden to prove the desertion was on the party seeking relief, therefore, it was for the husband to discharge that burden. In the submission of learned advocate, respondent-husband not only failed to discharge the said burden, but the facts and circumstances established otherwise. 4.1 Learned advocate for the appellant relied on decision in Neelam Kumar vs. Dayarani (AIR 2011 Supreme Court 193), for the proposition that irretrievable breakdown is not a ground for granting divorce. According to learned advocate for the appellant, in the present case also there was nothing to show that the appellant contrinuted to the breakdown and husband was himself responsible, therefore, he cannot be allowed to get the marriage ennuled. Another decision in Piyasa Ghosh Vs. Somnath Ghosh (AIR 2009 Cal. According to learned advocate for the appellant, in the present case also there was nothing to show that the appellant contrinuted to the breakdown and husband was himself responsible, therefore, he cannot be allowed to get the marriage ennuled. Another decision in Piyasa Ghosh Vs. Somnath Ghosh (AIR 2009 Cal. 900) wherein the similar law was laid down by the Calcutta High Court that mere irretrievcable breakdown of marriage is not ground for divorce and such a power was confirmed on the Supreme Court only for doing complete justice between the parties, which could be exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, however, no such powers can be exercised by other Courts. 4.2 On the other hand learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the spouses were separated since more than a decade. Learned advocate for the respondent-wife sought to highlight that the wife had refused to stay with husband. Countering the submission of learned advocate for the appellant, he further submitted that the solitary instance allegedly took place on 25th October, 1989 could not be a ground for concluding that husband deserted the wife. According to the submission of learned advocate for the wife, on the contrary, the evidence with regard to the said instance showed that wife had left the matrimonial house, whereafter she never returned back. It was next submitted that when the facts and circumstances in totality indicated that the marriage had broken down without any hope for revival of the ties, said circumstance could not be discarded and was, in fact, a relevant factor justifying grant of divorce. The husband filed affidavit and raised factual and legal contentions. 4.3. Learned advocate for the respondents placed reliance decision of this Court in PURVIBEN W/O. CHETANKUMAR VISHNUBHAI PATEL Vs. CHETANKUMAR VISHNUBHAI PATEL [ 2009 (2) GLR 1298 ], to buttress his contention on the aspect of Irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Furthering his arguments, he relied on the decision in Kashmir Singh Vs. Harnam Singh [ (2008) 12 SCC 796 ], to submit that the question of law framed by the Court at the time of admission could not be said to be arising as substantial question of law. He submitted that the plea of divorce was upheld by both courts on valid grounds. The marriage had broken down irretrievably. It was a valid aspect and could be considered by the courts. He submitted that the plea of divorce was upheld by both courts on valid grounds. The marriage had broken down irretrievably. It was a valid aspect and could be considered by the courts. He submitted that the question was already settled and therefore a question which was settled can not become a substantial question of law. 5. Proceeding to consider the controversy in light of the facts on record, submissions made by both the sides, from the evidence referred to and discussed by the Courts below, it appeared that almost from the inception, the matrimonial life of the appellant and respondent was not sailing smooth. The testimony of the wife, who deposed at Exhibit 69, revealed her complaints, which were about her husband had not given her a neckless (Mangalsutra) on the first night of the marriage. She complained that the same was in the custody of her sister-in-law; that it was selected by her Jethani. She stated that her husband was not allowing her to sit in balcony, was not permitting her to go in the open environment, was not allowing to operate tape recorder and was not giving the keys. The first appellate court observed with reference to the said aspects of evidence of the wife, that none of such allegations were found in the evidence in the proceeding HMP No.412 of 1999 pending with Vadodara Court. The evidence recorded in the said proceedings (at Exh.30, Exh.41 and Exh.47) was on record of the present proceeding at Exhibit 44 to 46. It also came out from the evidence that the wife wanted to insert her joint name in the bank deposits and in the LIC policy and on that count disputes were simmering. 5.1 The matrimonial warmth was not regained even after birth of son. The matrimonial discord appeared to have grown greater as wife opted to start maintenance proceedings in the year 1996 soon after the birth of the child. The compromise was brought about by the well-wishers of the spouses in the said maintenance proceedings, the wife was somehow persuaded to return to husband’s house in 1997. The reunion did not work; the disputes continued to crop up and as noted above, assumed seriousness and on 25.10.1999 when wife again left husband’s home and started residing at Vadodara at her parental house. The reunion did not work; the disputes continued to crop up and as noted above, assumed seriousness and on 25.10.1999 when wife again left husband’s home and started residing at Vadodara at her parental house. The said event marked the virtual end of the matrimonial life and intention to cohabit. Immediately whereafter, the wife issued notice dated 01.11.1999, replied by husband on 15.11.1999. The events culminated into initiation of proceedings by the wife against husband under Section 18 of the Hindu Maintenance and Adoption Act by filing HMP Petition No.412 of 1999. 5.2 As regards the event of 25.10.1999, both the sides put forth their own story. It appeared that the wife called her father to come to husband’s house pursuant to some quarrel having taken place. The quarrel precipitated and wife left with her son and father to go back to Vadodara. It was wife’s allegation that on that day she was driven out by the husband and had to spent night hours at the bus station and had to leave Vadodara in the early morning bus at 3.30 am. According to wife, the husband deserted her, whereas the husband pleaded that the wife herself left after indulging into a quarrel and that she was guilty of desertion. Considering the evidence pertaining to the said incident, the first appellate court recorded that allegations of the wife and her theory did not find any support from the related evidence. It was noticed and observed by the courts that wife’s own father Sundarlal, in his evidence (Exh.74) stated that he had never gone to Anumala. He denied the occurrence of any such incident as alleged to have happened on 25.10.1999. It was further suggested that there was no Vadodara-bound bus in the night hours and the first such bus was in the early morning only. The appellant wife took such bus at 3.30 hours and left for Vadodara. Thus, the wife's case that she was deserted on the night of 25.10.1999 did not inspire credibility. The evidence in that regard was equivocal, weak and insufficient to justify a conclusion that the wife had to lave the place of husband on account of husband deserting her or that it was husband’s act of desertion. Thus, the wife's case that she was deserted on the night of 25.10.1999 did not inspire credibility. The evidence in that regard was equivocal, weak and insufficient to justify a conclusion that the wife had to lave the place of husband on account of husband deserting her or that it was husband’s act of desertion. 5.3 In order to reach conclusion as to which party deserted other, the concept of desertion has to be comprehended, which means intentional, permanent, forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations arising out of the marriage. So far as deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must exist to constitute desertion, namely, factum of separation and the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, which is also called animus deserendi. Similarly, two elements are necessary so far as deserted spouse is concerned. The first is absence of consenting and the second is absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home. Whether the desertion is proved or not, necessary inference has to be drawn from facts of particular case, and the desertion is viewed always in light of the facts revealed by the acts or conduct as well as the intention of spouse. 5.4 The Supreme Court in Savitri Pandey Vs Prem Chandra Pandey [2002 (2) GLR 1369 SC], explained the concept of desertion as under: “Desertion” for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. In other words, it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations i.e., not permitting or allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties. The proof of desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalizes the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of children. The proof of desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalizes the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case.” (Para 8) “To prove desertion in matrimonial matter, it is not always necessary that one of the spouses should have left the company of the other as desertion could be proved while living under the same roof. Desertion cannot be equated with separate living by the parties to the marriage. Desertion may also be constructive which can be inferred from the attending circumstances. It has always to be kept in mind that the question of desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case.” (Para 10) 5.5 The 'mental cruelty' as ground for divorce has been explained by the apex court in several decisions. In Samar Ghosh Vs Jaya Ghosh [ (2007) 4 SCC 511 ], the Supreme Court explained stated that the concept cannot be circumscribed in a precise definition. It observed that there cannot be a comprehensive definition of mental cruelty and no Court should even attempt to give a comprehensive definition. For deciding as to what constitutes mental cruelty in matrimonial matters, there can never be any straightjacket formula or fixed parameters. The prudent way is, it was observed, to assess, value an adjudicate each case on the basis of its peculiar facts and circumstances. In that case, there was a long period of continuous separation, on the basis of which it was concluded that the matrimonial bond was beyond repair. The Court took into account the fact that the parties were living separately for more than 16 years, it ruled that by refusing to sever matrimonial tie, the law in such cases did not serve the sanctity of marriage, but rather showed scant regard for feelings and emotions of the parties. The Supreme Court took view that in such a situation, it may lead to mental cruelty. 5.6 In the said decision, the Supreme Court listed the instances as to what could amount to mental cruelty. The Supreme Court took view that in such a situation, it may lead to mental cruelty. 5.6 In the said decision, the Supreme Court listed the instances as to what could amount to mental cruelty. One of the parameters to judge and to conclude what amounts to a cruelty was described thus- “Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.” 5.7 In K. Srinavas Rao vs. D. A. Deepa [ 2013 (5) SCC 226 ], the principles regarding mental cruelty in Sumar Ghosh (supra) were reiterated including one reproduced hereinabove. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that merely because the husband and wife were staying in the same roof was not a precondition for mental cruelty. The spouse can cause mental cruelty by his or her conduct even while he or she does not stay under the same roof. It again reiterated the principle that long period of separation between husband and wife leaving separately for more than 10 years (in that case) and refusing to sever tie, it was observed, can constitute mental cruelty. From the view taken by the Apex Court in the decisions noted above, it can be very well deduced that where the matrimonial relation is shattered and the spouses have separated since long years, and the matrimonial bond has gone dead, a spouse refusing to sever the relationship for the sake of a mere refusal, it becomes a facet of cruelty on the other side par taking the mental cruelty known to law. 5.8 In Satish Sitola (supra), the appellant-husband had filed divorce petition on the ground of cruelty and desertion. The parties were separated for 14 years out of 16 years of marriage life. The marriage was found dead for all practical purposes and there was no chance of it being retrieved. The Supreme Court in such facts took view that continuance of such marriage would itself amount to cruelty. The parties were separated for 14 years out of 16 years of marriage life. The marriage was found dead for all practical purposes and there was no chance of it being retrieved. The Supreme Court in such facts took view that continuance of such marriage would itself amount to cruelty. In so concluding, the Apex Court relied on its own decision in Romesh Chander Vs Savitri [ (1995) 2 SCC 7 ]. 5.9 In Navin Kohli Vs Neelu Kohli [ (2006) 4 SCC 558 ], the facts before the Supreme Court were that the spouses were staying separate for more than 10 years, the wife had filed several cases against the husband, the relationship was marred with allegations and counter allegations and the wife was not prepared to have decree for divorce even at the stage of appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed:- “Once the parties have separated and separation has continued for a sufficient length of time and one of them have presented a petition for divorce, it can well be presumed that the marriage has broken down. The Court, no doubt, should seriously make and endavour to reconcile the parties; yet, if it is found that the break down is irreparable, then divorce should not be withheld. The consequences of reservation in law of the unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be effective are bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties.” 5.6.1 Taking note of facts of the case, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court ought to have visualized that the preservation of such a marriage is totally unworkable which has ceased to be effective and would be greater source of misery for the parties. It stated. “A marriage between the parties is only in name. The marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of slavage, public interest and interest of all concerned lies in the recognisation of the fact and to declare defunct de jure what is already defunct de facto. To keep the sham is obviously conducive to immorality and potentially prejudicial to public interest than a dissolution of the marriage bond.” 6. Returning to the facts of the case highlighted above, the scenario of married life between the parties was one of continuous discord. The matrimony between them had strewn apart spread over long. To keep the sham is obviously conducive to immorality and potentially prejudicial to public interest than a dissolution of the marriage bond.” 6. Returning to the facts of the case highlighted above, the scenario of married life between the parties was one of continuous discord. The matrimony between them had strewn apart spread over long. Out of the total period of 17 years of marriage, the husband and wife stayed together for about three years and four months only. The attempts of reconciliation and settlement met the dead end. From the facts noted above, their cohabitation even when happened was short lived. It was possible to conclude that the emotional bond had become dray and the matrimonial warmth went increasingly missing. The state of affairs had reached point of no return. The bond was in the name only, which was a burdensome bond. The intention to revive the matrimony had ceased since long. 7. Adverting now to the aspect which was emphasised most by learned advocate for the appellant and also reflected in the question of law formulated at the time of admission of the appeal, the contention raised was that the first appellate court passed decree of divorce resting on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. From the attentive reading of the judgment of the first appellate court, it could be seen that the first appellate court unequivocally recorded its positive finding on the aspect of cruelty and desertion, confirming those findings reached by the Trial Court by observing in no uncertain terms that the findings of the lower court with regard to cruelty were absolutely right and called for no interference. The first appellate court further concluded, as could be clearly seen from paragraph 20 of the judgment, that “in the instant case, the evidence suggests that the husband has not withdrawn from the matrimonial home, therefore, I do not find any force in the submissions made by learned advocate for the appellant.” It would be wholly erroneous to read the first appellate court’s judgment as one which passed the decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable break down of marriage. 7.1 The first appellate court reasoned that the marriage between the parties was found to have been died down and there was no chance of the relationship being retrieved. 7.1 The first appellate court reasoned that the marriage between the parties was found to have been died down and there was no chance of the relationship being retrieved. While concurring and conforming with the Trial Court on the aspect of cruelty and desertion, the first appellate court took into account the state of affairs in the matrimony between the parties. 7.2 It is true that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not provided as one of the ground in law by the legislature for grant of divorce, and Section 13 of the Act does not mention the irretrievable breakdown of marriage to be the ground, the factum obtained in a give case that the marriage life of husband and wife has reached a state of nadir and is beyond repair and therefore, the marriage has irretrievably broken down, is certainly a relevan circumstance. This circumstance will have a reinforcing effect when any of the ground under Section 13 of the Act for grant of divorce is found to be proved. A marriage which is dead and reached a stage where it is not possible to infuse life into it, the Supreme Court has observed that the public interest and interest of parties lie in permitting such a marriage to be dissolved. 7.3 In Purviben (supra), this court held and observed as under: “However, though the Hon'ble the Apex Court made a reference to the exercise of the powers under Art. 142, has nevertheless referred to the aspect of irretrievably breaking down of marriage where it is not possible to reconcile and when the parties have reached such a stage that instead of refusing such divorce, it is desirable to clear up an insoluble mess in the interest of both the parties. It is required to be mentioned that the judgment of the Hon'ble the Apex Court reported in 2007 (2) GLR 1520 (SC), is a subsequent judgment given by three Judge Bench again referring to all these aspects where they have particularly laid down guidelines as discussed hereinabove and it has also made a reference to irretrievable break down of marriage as one of the aspects to be considered. In other words, even though it may not be a ground, but when the divorce is sought on the ground provided in the statute, Hindu Marriage Act, like desertion and cruelty and on appreciation of evidence and also considering the cumulative effect thereof, if ultimate conclusion or the picture that emerges is that the parties have reached a point of no return and the marriage has broken down irretrievably, coupled with the fact that the long separation, which has been indicative of total snap of ties, emotions or the mutual feelings, meaning thereby, the substratum is lost, then it is also required to be considered. Thus, it is the cumulative effect of the entire evidence which has to be considered. Therefore, considering this aspect, the only point, which is required to be considered, can the impugned judgment and order, after considering the aspect of desertion and cruelty, be said to be erroneous.” (Para 19) Similarly, V. Bhagat Vs. D. Bhagat, [ (1994) 1 SCC 337 ] while dealing with a divorce petition which was pending for 8 years and despite long years, having been consumed in litigation, no end was visible, nor reunion of the spouses was possible, the court viewed that it presented a situation where marriage had been irretrievable broken down. Divorce was granted on the ground of mental cruelty by the Apex Court observing as under: “Irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is not a ground by itself. But while scrutinizing the evidence on record to determine whether the ground(s) alleged is/are made out and in determining the relief to be granted, the said circumstance can certainly be borne in mind. The unusual step as the one taken by us herein can be resorted to only to clear up an insoluble mess, when the court finds it in the interest of both the parties.” (Para 21) 7.5 Thus, it could be seen that the situation of irretrievable breakdown of marriage when obtained between the spouses to be a factor with the other grounds of divorce, the same is a consideration for supporting a decree of divorce passed on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 13 of the Act. That aspect has a reinforcing effect on the decree of divorce passed on the grounds mentioned in the Section 13 of the Act. That aspect has a reinforcing effect on the decree of divorce passed on the grounds mentioned in the Section 13 of the Act. If the first appellate court has taken into account of irretrievable break down of marriage while confirming the decree of the trial court passed on the ground of cruelty and desertion, no fault can be found with it. 7.6 In Navin Kolhi (supra), the Supreme Court made a recommendation to the Union of India that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 be amended to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce. 7.7 On the basis of facts and evidence, as noted above, the two Courts concurrently found that the grounds of cruelty and desertion pleaded by the respondent-husband were satisfied and established. In light of the principles discussed above, in the facts of the case, the findings and conclusion arrived at by the Courts were reasonable and proper. They were based on correct appreciation of evidence and in no way could be said to be perverse. 8. The submission of learned advocate for the appellant that on the aspect of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the law was settled deserved to be accepted. More particularly when it was notice hereinabove that decree of divorce was on legally acceptable grounds held proved further by the factor of irretrievability of the matrimony, the question framed could not be said to be a substantial question of law. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Kashmir Singh Vs Harnam Singh [ (2008) 12 SCC 796 ] that–– “The question of law raised will not be considered as a substantial question of law, if it stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court. Where the facts required for a point of law have notbeen pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in RBI Vs. Ramkrishna Govind Morey [ (1976) 1 SCC 803 ] held that whether the trial court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference. (See Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [ (1999) 3 SCC 722 ].) (Para 20) “The phrase ‘substantial question of law’ as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying ‘question of law’ means—of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with—technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. (Para 21) 9. In view of the discussion above and the reasons recorded, the decree of divorce granted by the Trial Court and confirmed by the first appellate Court deserves to be sustained, and need no interference in this Second Appeal. On closer consideration and analysis of facts of the case, the question framed by the Court was not found to be arising as substantial question of law. 10. The appeal deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed.