Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 52 (CAL)

SK. Maniruddin v. Soma Banerjee

2013-02-01

MRINAL KANTI CHAUDHURI, TAPAN KUMAR DUTT

body2013
JUDGMENT TAPAN KUMAR DUTT, J. This Court has heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties. The facts of the case, briefly, are as follows: The petitioner/respondent filed a suit against the opposite party/appellant being Matrimonial Suit No.71 of 2006 in the Court of the learned District Judge, Hooghly, at Chinsurah on 01.02.2006. The petitioner/respondent prayed in the said suit for a decree of nullity/annulment of marriage which was registered on 05.01.1998 under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 between the appellant and the respondent. The respondent alleged in her plaint that she was not acquainted with the appellant before July 1997 but thereafter she was acquainted with the appellant through the Performa respondent. It has been alleged in the plaint that all of a sudden on 22.10.1997 the Performa respondent came to the house of the respondent and requested the respondent to sign on some blank forms and the respondent on good faith plainly signed on those blank forms even though the contents of such forms were unknown to the respondent. The further case of the respondent was that on 04.01.1998 the Performa respondent came again with some blank forms for the respondent to sign for canceling and withdrawing the previous forms and the respondent was threatened by the Performa respondent that if the respondent did not sign those forms the affair would come to the knowledge of the respondent’s father. It has been alleged in the plaint that on 05.01.1998 while the respondent was on the way to deposit her father’s electricity bill the appellant along with the Performa respondent and some other unknown persons picked up the respondent and went to the registration office for withdrawing of certain forms but instead of withdrawing such forms the appellant along with his associates including the reformat respondent did the registration of marriage illegally practicing fraud on the respondent. The respondent has alleged in her plaint that on 07.02.1998 the Performa respondent disclosed that the respondent had put her signature on the notice of marriage and ultimately on 05.01.1998 the appellant has got the marriage with the respondent registered and for the first time the respondent came to learn with the appellant is not a Hindu but a Muslim. The respondent has alleged in her plaint that on 07.02.1998 the Performa respondent disclosed that the respondent had put her signature on the notice of marriage and ultimately on 05.01.1998 the appellant has got the marriage with the respondent registered and for the first time the respondent came to learn with the appellant is not a Hindu but a Muslim. The further allegation in the plaint is that the proforma respondent had disclosed that she had put her signature as witness No.3 during the registration of the marriage but the proforma respondent has described herself as Smt. Ankita Banerjee. It is the respondent’s case that she never had any intention to marry the appellant and as such there was no marriage at all on 05.01.1998 and the appellant and the respondent have never lived a single night together as husband and wife. The respondent has also alleged in the plaint that after the registration of the alleged marriage the appellant and the respondent used to reside in their respective houses and, practically, the appellant in collusion with the performa respondent and his other associates by practicing fraud and undue influence and coercion upon the respondent has managed to get the registration done under the Special Marriage Act. The respondent’s case was that there was no co-habitation between the appellant and the respondent and the alleged marriage between the appellant and the respondent is a void able one. The respondent has alleged that owing to misconception of law the respondent had earlier filed title suit No.74 of 1998 before a Civil Court for declaration and injunction and in such suit the respondent prayed, inter alia, for a decree declaring that the marriage certificate was a void one and a paper transaction and was not acted upon and also a decree for declaring that no marriage was held on 05.01.1998. It appears from the plaint that the appellant had challenged the maintainability of such suit and the learned Trial Court by judgment dated 14.11.2002 dismissed the said suit on the ground that the said Trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The respondent has alleged that being misguided she filed title appeal No. 12 of 2003 challenging the aforesaid judgment dated 14.11.2002 passed in the said T.S. 74 of 1998 but the said title appeal was also dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court concerned on 26.09.2005. The respondent has alleged that being misguided she filed title appeal No. 12 of 2003 challenging the aforesaid judgment dated 14.11.2002 passed in the said T.S. 74 of 1998 but the said title appeal was also dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court concerned on 26.09.2005. The respondent contended in the plaint that within one year from the date of her knowledge about the aforesaid alleged fraud in the matter of the alleged registration of the marriage she started the legal proceeding and, therefore, the time taken for pursuing the aforesaid suit and the appeal should be excluded while considering the question of limitation in filing the present suit. The Performa respondent contested the suit by filing a written statement wherein the Performa respondent denied the material allegations made in the plaint. The Performa respondent stated in the written statement that the Performa respondent Anjana Pal is also known as Ankita Banerjee and similarly Anil Pal and Ashim Banerjee is also one and the same person. The Performa respondent stated in the written statement that the Performa respondent is a cousin sister of the respondent and the Performa respondent knew that the respondent loved the appellant for years together prior to their marriage and they used to go to pleasure trips outside and also locally they used to see cinema and also went did marketing at Calcutta. The Performa respondent further stated in the written statement that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent has been known to the locality and members of both the families and the appellant and the respondent and the witnesses put their respective signatures at the time of registration of the marriage. The Performa respondent further stated that the respondent also signed the notice of marriage knowing the contents of the notice. The appellant contested the suit by filing a written statement and stated, inter alia, that the suit is not maintainable and the respondent cannot deny the registration of marriage as she on her own signed and took oath before the Registrar and accepted the appellant as her husband. The appellant stated in his pleadings that the appellant and the respondent were acquainted with each other since 1993. The appellant stated in his pleadings that the appellant and the respondent were acquainted with each other since 1993. The appellant stated in the written statement that in the earlier suit, that is, T.S. 74 of 1998 the respondent had stated a different story as regards her going to the office of the Marriage Registrar and the subsequent registration of marriage. The appellant pleaded that the appellant and the respondent traveled many places together as husband and wife and lived under the same roof and also there was co-habitation between the appellant and the respondent. The appellant pleaded that there was no force or fraud from either of the parties in the matter of marriage and the marriage was an outcome of the pre-marriage love. In the written statement the appellant further stated that the respondent was also known as ‘Manu’ and that the appellant and the respondent had traveled hither and thither and stayed overnight sometimes at Digha, Kamarpukur, Jairambati, Nainital, Ranikhet, Almora and Luck now, and the members of both the families used to visit the house of each other. The appellant has also stated in the written statement that there are several love letters exchanged between the appellant and the respondent. The appellant pleaded that at one point of time the respondent’s father restricted the movement of the respondent when the respondent put pressure upon the appellant to have a legal marriage and compelled the appellant to sign and submit notice of marriage under the Special Marriage Act and for such purpose the respondent procured ration card, admit card to prove her age before the Marriage Registrar. It has been further pleaded in the written statement that on the date of marriage as per of the demand of the respondent, the appellant presented a golden chain and a ring to the respondent and in connection with the registration of marriage there was neither any force nor fraud nor any undue influence. The registration of marriage was a result of free will and volition of the appellant and the respondent. The appellant prayed for dismissal of the suit. The registration of marriage was a result of free will and volition of the appellant and the respondent. The appellant prayed for dismissal of the suit. The said suit came up for hearing when the learned Trial Court by judgment and decree dated 14th January, 2009 decreed the said suit by declaring the said certificate of marriage registered on 05.01.1998 between the appellant and the respondent is null void and the said certificate has no force at all. The learned Trial Court, taking into consideration the earlier proceedings as aforesaid, that is, the said T.S. 74 of 1998 and the subsequent appeal, came to the finding that the present suit was filed well within the time. The learned Trial Court found that “Admittedly the case of the parties that alleged certificate of marriage was done on 05.01.1998”. The learned Trial Court found that it appears from evidence that the respondent was not at all acquainted with the marriage and the so-called love by the appellant and that the Exts. A to A-16 are not at all relevant for deciding the question as to whether the respondent had willingness to marry the appellant or not and the said exhibits are without dates. The learned Trial Court was also of the view that since the appellant and the respondent did not say to each other, as prescribed in the proviso to Section 12(2) of the Special Marriage Act of 1954, that they take each other to be their lawful wife/husband the marriage is null and void. It seems that the learned Trial Court laid much emphasis on the said proviso to Section 12(2) of the said Act of 1954 and the learned Trial Court presumed that the parties to the said alleged marriage did not say to each other that they took each other to be his or her lawful wife or husband, as the case may be, before the marriage officer. The learned Trial Court found that the provisions of Section 12 of the said Act of 1954 is mandatory and if such declaration is not made in between the parties to the marriage in that event the marriage is incomplete and there is no marriage. The learned Trial Court found that the provisions of Section 12 of the said Act of 1954 is mandatory and if such declaration is not made in between the parties to the marriage in that event the marriage is incomplete and there is no marriage. The learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that the marriage which was registered on 05.01.1998 is incomplete and it does not confer any marital status on the parties and, therefore, the marriage dated 05.01.1998 is null and void. The learned Trial Court also found that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the willful refusal of the respondent to consummate the marriage and the consent of the respondent to the marriage was obtained by coercion as defined in the Indian Contract Act. The learned Trial Court ultimately found that the said marriage is void able and the respondent is entitled to get a decree declaring the said marriage to be a nullity. The appellant, being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree dated 14th January, 2009 passed by the learned Trial Court, has preferred the instant appeal. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the learned Trial Court could not have passed the impugned decree in view of the second proviso to Section 25 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The said Section 25 of the said Act is quoted below: Void able marriages . The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the learned Trial Court could not have passed the impugned decree in view of the second proviso to Section 25 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The said Section 25 of the said Act is quoted below: Void able marriages . – Any marriage solemnized under this Act shall be void able and may be annulled by a decree of nullity if, - (I) the marriage has not been consummated owing to the willful refusal of the respondent to consummate the marriage; or (ii) the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner; or (iii) the consent of either party to the marriage was obtained by coercion or fraud, as defined in the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Provided that, in the case specified in clause (ii), the court shall not grant a decree unless it is satisfied, - (a) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged; (b) that proceedings were instituted within a year from the date of the marriage; and (c) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the grounds for a decree: Provided further that in the case specified in clause (iii), the court shall not grant a decree if, - (a) proceedings have not been instituted within one year after the coercion had ceased or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered; or (b) the petitioner has with his or her free consent lived with the other party to the marriage as husband and wife after the coercion had ceased or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered. The said learned Advocate submitted that the instant matrimonial proceedings was not instituted within one year as contemplated in the said proviso to Section 25 of the said Act and the learned Trial Court passed the impugned decree long after such one year had expired. The said learned Advocate submitted that the notice for marriage was given after a proper understanding of the matter. It is necessary that the following facts be recorded: sometime in October, 1997 the notice for intending marriage was given by the parties. The said learned Advocate submitted that the notice for marriage was given after a proper understanding of the matter. It is necessary that the following facts be recorded: sometime in October, 1997 the notice for intending marriage was given by the parties. On 4th January, 1998 some blank forms were signed as would appear from Paragraph 4 of the petition for annulment of marriage. The marriage was registered on 5th January, 1998. A certain title suit being title suit No. 74 of 1998 was filed in the year 1998 itself. On 14.11.2002 the said title suit No. 74 of 1998 was dismissed and the respondent filed an appeal being title appeal No.12 of 2003. The said title appeal No. 12 of 2003 was dismissed on 26.9.2005. The present MAT suit being MAT suit No. 71 of 2006 was filed by the respondent on 1.2.2006. The learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that it will be clear from the aforesaid facts that the learned Trial Court could not have passed the impugned decree in view of the provisions of Section 25 of the said Act of 1954 as the stipulated one year had already expired. The said learned Advocate submitted that the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be applied to the proceedings initiated by the respondent in the instant case in view of the provisions of Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963 which stipulates that “Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such Law”. The said learned Advocate submitted that the Limitation Act may apply to appeals arising out of matrimonial proceedings under the said Act of 1954 but not to the original proceedings under the said Act. According to the said learned advocate, Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned Trial Court did not consider the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Section 25, particularly, its second proviso. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned Trial Court was, therefore, not right in making its finding in this regard. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned Trial Court did not consider the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Section 25, particularly, its second proviso. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned Trial Court was, therefore, not right in making its finding in this regard. The said learned Advocate drew the attention of this Court to Paragraph 6 of the plaint wherein the respondent No.1 has stated to the effect that the alleged fraud was discovered by her on 07.02.1998. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned Trial Court could not have applied Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the present suit brought by the respondent No.1. The said learned advocate cited a decision reported at 1989(2) SCC 613 (Smt. Lata Kamat –V- Vilas). In Paragraph 11 of the said reports it has been observed by the Hon’ble Court to the effect that in so far as Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act is concerned, the impact of it will be that the provisions of the Limitation Act will not apply so far as a suit or an original proceeding under the Act is concerned but the said Sub-section (3) will not govern an appeal. The learned Advocate for the appellant thus submitted that Section 14 of the Limitation Act could have applied to an appeal arising from the matrimonial suit but the said provision of law cannot be applied to the original matrimonial proceeding being the matrimonial suit itself. It will appear from Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act that a ‘suit’ does not include an appeal or an application. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 submitted that it has already been stated in Paragraph 12 of the petition for annulment of marriage that it was due to misconception of law the said title suit No. 74 of 1998 was filed instead of filing any matrimonial suit before the proper forum but the said T.S. 74 of 1998 was filed within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud and the said suit being T.S. 74 of 1998 also contained a prayer for a decree declaring that the certificate of marriage dated 05.01.1998 has not been acted upon, void and no marriage was held on 05.1.01998 between the appellant and the respondent. The said learned Advocate for the said respondent submitted that the principles of Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to the facts and circumstances of the instant case and, therefore, the time taken for proceeding with the said title suit No.74 of 1998 and the consequent appeal should be taken into consideration while considering the provisions of Section 25 of the said Act of 1954. According to the said learned Advocate, the proceedings for declaring the marriage registered on 05.01.1998 as a nullity and void able was thus initiated within a period of one year as stipulated under Section 25 of the said Act of 1954. Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties and having considered the provisions of law and the reported decision cited at the Bar it appears to this Court that the argument made by the learned Advocate for the appellant has substance and the submissions made by the learned Advocate for the said respondent with regard to this point is unacceptable. There is no dispute that the present suit has been filed by the respondent for a decree of nullity/annulment of marriage. Section 25 of the said Act of 1954 is thus applicable in the facts of the present case taking into consideration the plaint of the suit. The facts and circumstances of the case also indicated that Section 25 (iii) has been sought to be relied upon by the said respondent that the consent of the said respondent with regard to the said marriage was allegedly obtained by coercion or fraud. The second proviso to the said Section 25 makes it clear that in such a case the Court shall not grant a decree if the proceedings concerned have not been instituted within one year after the coercion had ceased or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered. According to the plaint, (Paragraph 6 of the plaint) the respondent had discovered such fraud on 07.02.1998 but the present suit has been filed in 2006, that is, long after the stipulated one year. Therefore, a question would definitely arise as to whether or not the learned Trial Court was entitled to grant a decree under Section 25 of the said Act of 1954 since the proceedings had been initiated long after the expiry of the stipulated one year. Therefore, a question would definitely arise as to whether or not the learned Trial Court was entitled to grant a decree under Section 25 of the said Act of 1954 since the proceedings had been initiated long after the expiry of the stipulated one year. In other words, the question can also be asked as to whether or not the learned Trial Court had jurisdiction to grant a decree in the nature of the impugned decree. The learned Advocate for the respondent tried to make a point by submitting that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable in the facts of the present case. According to the respondent, the said T.S. 74 of 1998 was filed due to misconception of law and, therefore, the time taken for proceeding with the said suit including the consequent appeal should be excluded in this regard. This Court is of the view that Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied to the facts of the present case as it would appear from Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act that the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be applied to the present suit which was filed by the said respondent. Section 2(l) of the Limitation Act makes it clear that 'a suit’ does not include an appeal or an application. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has rightly argued that the provisions of the said Limitation Act can be applied to an appeal but not to a suit in the nature of the present suit in which the respondent has prayed for a decree of nullity/annulment of marriage. The decision reported in the case of Smt. Lata Kamat (supra) has been cited by the learned Advocate for the appellant and from Paragraph 11 of the said reports it appears that the said Sub-section 3 of Section 29 stipulates that the provisions of the Limitation Act will not apply to a suit or an original proceeding in respect of marriage and/or divorce but Section 29(3) will not govern an appeal. The word ‘proceedings’ appearing in the second proviso to Section 25 of the said Act of 1954 means the proceedings which may be under consideration before the learned Trial Court in which the plaintiff/petitioner may be expecting a decree to be passed but not an earlier proceeding or any other proceeding. The word ‘proceedings’ appearing in the second proviso to Section 25 of the said Act of 1954 means the proceedings which may be under consideration before the learned Trial Court in which the plaintiff/petitioner may be expecting a decree to be passed but not an earlier proceeding or any other proceeding. In the instant case the matrimonial suit No 71 of 2006 would be the proceedings concerned as contemplated in the second proviso to Section 25. Obviously, such matrimonial suit was filed long after the expiry of the stipulated one year. In view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the opinion that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied to the present case and thus the learned Trial Court acted without jurisdiction in passing the impugned decree in view of the provisions of the second proviso to Section 25 of the said Act of 1954. The learned Advocate for the appellant submitted, by referring to the evidence of P.W.1, that there cannot be any dispute that the respondent No.1 was about 20 years of age at the time of marriage. The said learned advocate also referred to such evidence to show that there also cannot be any dispute that the respondent No.1 was in love with the appellant as the respondent No.1 has clearly admitted in evidence that she used to love the appellant. From the evidence of P.W.1 it further appears that she has admitted that a number of letters were written by her to the appellant and that the appellant had accompanied the respondent and her family members during various trips including the trips to Nainital and Mednipore. The P.W.1 has further stated that her family members had learnt of the love episode in the year 1998. P.W.1 has also admitted that the marriage between the respondent No.1 and the appellant was registered on 05.01.1998 and the respondent No.1 had put her signature for the purpose of such registration. P.W.1 has also admitted that the Performa respondent No.2 (Smt. Anjana Pal) was a witness to the marriage. The respondent No.1 has further stated in evidence that on the date of registration of marriage she had availed of a bus journey from her residence to the marriage registration office being accompanied by the Performa respondent No.2. P.W.1 has also admitted that the Performa respondent No.2 (Smt. Anjana Pal) was a witness to the marriage. The respondent No.1 has further stated in evidence that on the date of registration of marriage she had availed of a bus journey from her residence to the marriage registration office being accompanied by the Performa respondent No.2. The respondent No.1 has admitted in evidence that the marriage registration was done and the parties put their respective signatures in presence of each other and the Marriage Registrar, after such formalities were completed, had declared that the appellant and the respondent No.1 are a married couple. The respondent No.1 has further admitted in evidence that she did not oppose the marriage prior or during the marriage registration. The respondent No.1 has stated in evidence that after one and half months from the date of marriage she felt that fraud has been practiced on her and she came to learn that the appellant is a Muslim by religion and to her caste was a factor. She has also stated in evidence that if the appellant had been a Hindu then there would have been no problem but the appellant had suppressed his religion to the respondent No.1. The respondent No.1 has stated that save and except such suppression with regard to the appellant’s religion there was no other reason for initiating the case. Reading the evidence of respondent No.1 it will appear that the appellant had visited the house of the respondent No.1 repeatedly. The learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the materials on record would show that the respondent No.1 participated in the marriage willfully and voluntarily. The said learned Advocate referred to the evidence of the appellant’s sister to show that there had been a good relation between the inmates of the house of the respondent No.1 and that of the house of the appellant and that the parents and friends of father of the respondent No.1 visited the house of the appellant several times and even the pet dog of the respondent No.1 was kept in the house of the appellant when the family members of the respondent No.1 used to go outside of the State of West Bengal. The appellant’s sister further deposed that the respondent No.1 and her family members knew very well that the appellant is a Mohammedan and the appellant used to spent maximum time of the day at the house of the respondent No.1. The said witness (D.W.2) further stated in evidence that the appellant used to visit different places of India with the family members of the respondent No.1. The said witness further stated that the respondent No.1 cheerfully told her that their marriage has been completed. In cross-examination the said D.W.2 stated that food prepared in the house the appellant used to be sent to the house of the respondent No.1. D.W.3 stated that the respondent No.1 is his so-called cousin sister in relation and that the respondent No.1 and the appellant loved each other. It appears that the D.W.3 corroborated some of the evidence of other witnesses on behalf of the appellant. The proforma respondent No.2 Smt. Anjana Pal stated in evidence that the appellant and the respondent No.1 used to go to pleasure trips and they used to visit cinema house and do marketing in Calcutta and their relationship was known to the locality and the members of both the families. She further stated that the family members of both the houses were on visiting terms and there was a good relation of two houses and both the families used to exchange food. The Performa respondent No.2 further stated that the respondent No.1 and her family members knew very well that the appellant is by caste a Mohammedan. The said witness also gave evidence with regard to the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No.1. The said Performa respondent No.2, it appears from evidence, is a cousin sister of the respondent No.1. The learned Advocate for the appellant referred to letter dated 12.1.1998 (Ext.A/16) written by the respondent No.1 to the appellant in support of his contention that the registration of marriage was clearly admitted by the respondent No.1. The said Performa respondent No.2, it appears from evidence, is a cousin sister of the respondent No.1. The learned Advocate for the appellant referred to letter dated 12.1.1998 (Ext.A/16) written by the respondent No.1 to the appellant in support of his contention that the registration of marriage was clearly admitted by the respondent No.1. The learned Advocate for the appellant referred to the series of letters written by the respondent No.1 to the appellant wherefrom it appears that the respondent No.1 was contemplating marriage between the respondent No.1 and the appellant as she stated in one of the letters (Ext.A) that marriage she will have to act as per instruction of the appellant and she had advised the appellant to inform his family before registration of marriage. In some of the letters the respondent No.1 has clearly declared her love for the appellant with emphasis. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the learned Trial Court did not consider the evidence on record but simply proceeded on the basis of the decision reported at AIR 1997 Allahabad 401 (Nirmal Dass Bose v. Km. Mamta Gulati v) while observing that the P.W.1 and D.W 1 did not state that at the time of the marriage they took oath that they take each other as wife and the husband, by referring to Section 12 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned trial Court wrongfully proceeded on the basis that the parties did not say to each other that they take each other to be the husband and wife. The said learned Advocate submitted that it will appear from Section 13 of the said Act of 1954 that since the certificate has been entered in the Marriage Certificate Book, the certificate should be deemed to be conclusive evidence of fact that the marriage between the parties concerned has been solemnized and all formalities complied with in that regard. The said learned Advocate further submitted that the learned trial Court wrongfully proceeded on the basis that the respondent No.1 willfully refused to consummate the marriage and the consent of the respondent No.1 was obtained by coercion. The said learned Advocate further submitted that the learned trial Court wrongfully proceeded on the basis that the respondent No.1 willfully refused to consummate the marriage and the consent of the respondent No.1 was obtained by coercion. The said learned Advocate referred to AIR 1951 Supreme Court 280 (Bishundeo Narain & Another –V- Seogeni Rai & Others) in support of his contention that in cases where there are allegations of fraud, or undue influence or coercion, the parties making such allegation must furnish full particulars and the case can only be decided on the basis of such particulars and the party concerned cannot be allowed to make any deviation from such pleadings in evidence. The said learned Advocate cited the said reports in support of his submission that general allegations with regard to fraud or undue influence or coercion is insufficient. The said learned Advocate submitted that the decision reported at AIR 1997 Allahabad 401 cannot be of any assistance to the respondent No.1 in the instant case as because the evidence on record clearly suggests that the parties concerned very much loved each other and that they intended to get married and, therefore, there were all things necessary to make the marriage complete in law and there is nothing on record to indicate that the parties did not say to each other the words contemplated in the proviso to Section 12(2) of the said Act of 1954. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 submitted that there is no dispute that the appellant and the respondent No.1 had fallen in love but the question in the present case is as to whether or not the parties concerned intended to get married to each other. According to the said learned Advocate, the parties did not have any such intention to get married. The said learned Advocate submitted that unless both the parties had intended to get married, in spite of the fact that they were in love, there cannot be a valid marriage. The said learned Advocate submitted that the respondent No.1 had signed some blank forms in good faith but the contents of such forms were not known to the respondent No.1 and the respondent No.1 did not expect that on 05.01.1998 the registration of marriage would take place but the said respondent No.1 was expecting that the forms signed earlier were to be withdrawn. The said learned Advocate referred to the written statement of the appellant and submitted, by referring to Paragraph 15 of the said written statement, that the appellant himself has stated that he was pressurized by the respondent No.1 to submit the notice of marriage which shows that even the appellant did not have a free consent to marry the respondent No.1. It will appear from the plaint that on 07.02.1998 for the first time the respondent No.1 came to learn that the appellant was a Muslim by religion and thus there was a suppression on material fact on the part of the appellant. The said learned Advocate submitted that from the record it will appear that the appellant and the respondent No.1 did not even want to live together after the purported marriage. In this regard, it may be noted that the appellant had stated in his evidence that after the registration of marriage the appellant and the respondent No.1 with the consent of each other and the members of their respective families had traveled many places and lived together as husband and wife. The said learned Advocate referred to Ext.7 in support of his submission that the parties concerned did not live together as husband and wife after marriage. He submitted that if the parties had married each other they would have lived together as husband and wife immediately after the marriage or within a reasonable time but the appellant has not taken any step to get back the respondent No.1 to lead a matrimonial life. He submitted that this shows that the parties were not interested to take up the responsibilities of the spouse and there was no talk about family life. According to the said learned Advocate, the said letter must have been written after the purported marriage and yet it does not show that the parties have intended to get married. The said learned Advocate referred to Ext.A/1 and submitted that this letter also shows that the appellant treated the respondent No.1 only as his girl friend but not as his wife and the said letter also does not indicate that the appellant and the respondent No.1 ever lived together. The said learned Advocate referred to Ext.A/2 and submitted that such letter shows that there was a confusion in the mind of the respondent No.1 and she had no clear thought regarding the marriage. The said learned Advocate referred to Ext.A/2 and submitted that such letter shows that there was a confusion in the mind of the respondent No.1 and she had no clear thought regarding the marriage. The said learned Advocate referred to Ext.A/3 and submitted that in such letter there is no expression about any marriage. The said learned Advocate referred to Ext.A/4 and submitted that in such letter the respondent No.1 had asked the appellant to request the latter’s family for finding a girl for the appellant and this shows that the respondent No.1 had refused to marry the appellant. Reference has to be made in Ext.A/5 by the said learned Advocate in support of his submission that such letter is a letter of despair and it does not show that the respondent No.1 was willing to marry the appellant. The said learned Advocate referred to Ext.A/6 and submitted that such letter also discloses a confused state of mind of the respondent No.1 which shifted from topic to topic. The said learned Advocate referred to Ext.A/7 and submitted that the said letter discloses the fact that the respondent No.1 realized that marriage was impossible. The said learned Advocate also submitted that Ext.A/8 indicates that the respondent No.1 did not have the marriage in mind. The said learned Advocate referred to Ext.A/10 which is a letter dated 04.01.1998 written by the respondent No.1 to the appellant. The said learned Advocate submitted that even though the purported marriage took place on 05.01.1998 the said letter does not indicate in any way the impending marriage and it is quite unusual, according to the said learned Advocate, that such letter remains totally silent about the marriage which was supposed to take place on the next day. The said learned Advocate submitted that records would show that the respondent No.1 did not contemplate any marriage with the appellant. The said learned Advocate referred to Section 25(iii) of the said Act of 1954 and submitted that since in the instant case the consent of the respondent No.1 to the marriage was obtained by the appellant by fraud the marriage has become void able and it should be declared to be void by a decree and it has been annulled rightly by a decree of nullity by the learned Trial Court. The said learned Advocate submitted that only because Section 13 says that a marriage certificate shall be deemed to be conclusive evidence of the fact that a marriage under the said Act of 1954 has been solemnized it does not mean that the issue regarding obtaining the consent by a party to the marriage from the other party to the marriage by fraud cannot be raised subsequently. The aid learned Advocate submitted that the appellant had concealed the fact that he is a Muslim by religion and thus the appellant practiced fraud upon the respondent No.1. According to the said learned Advocate, the appellant had the duty to disclose the religion to the respondent No.1 before the purported marriage and the appellant did not suggest to the respondent No.1 in evidence that the appellant had told the respondent No.1 about his religion. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned Trial Court rightly relied upon the fact that the said marriage has not been consummated at all. The said learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 referred to Paragraph 6 of an order dated 9th August, 2010 passed by an Hon’ble Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Crl.M.C.No.299 of 2009 in support of his submission that love between the two persons is one thing and the intention to get married is a different thing and in the instant case even though there was a love affair between the appellant and the respondent No.1, the parties did not intend to get married; at least, the respondent No.1 did not ever have the intention to get married to the appellant. It will appear from the said Paragraph 6 that the Hon’ble Court was considering the nature of relationship where two persons had live-in-relationship and in the said paragraph 6 the Hon’ble Court was pleased to observe that there are no strings attached to such relationship and such relationship does not create any legal bond between the parties which is renewed everyday by the parties but it can be terminated by either of the parties without consent of the other party and one party can walk out at will at any time. The said learned Advocate cited another order dated 21.10.2010 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. The said learned Advocate cited another order dated 21.10.2010 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 2028 and 2029 of 2010 in support of his submission that the parties may live together and be extremely intimate but it does not necessarily mean that such living together and/or relationship will lead to a marriage. According to the said learned Advocate, the appellant and the respondent No.1 did not intend to hold out to the world at large that they ever intended to live as husband and wife and thus it cannot be said that the parties had free consent in the purported marriage. It may be recorded that the learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the parties did intend to get married even though such intention is not sine qua non. The said learned Advocate for the appellant further submitted that the evidence on record would clearly indicate that the parties intended to get married and both the parties gave free consent to such marriage. The said learned Advocate also submitted that there might have been circumstance for the parties to live apart after marriage but such fact of living apart after marriage does not provide any ground for annulling the marriage as a void able one. Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties and also having considered the materials on record this Court is unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the respondent No.1. The said learned Advocate has not disputed the fact that the appellant and the respondent No.1 were in a relationship of love but the said learned Advocate has only disputed the fact that the parties intended to get married. As noted above, the said learned Advocate submitted that unless there is an intention to get married there cannot be a valid marriage even though the parties concerned may be in love with each other. Several letters written by the respondent No.1 to the appellant, copies of which has been included in the paper book, clearly shows that the appellant and the respondent No.1 were indeed in love with each other and they had intended to get married. In Ext.A the respondent No.1 clearly admitted that she has not made any mistake in knowing the character of the appellant and that she knows that the appellant will never deceive her. In Ext.A the respondent No.1 clearly admitted that she has not made any mistake in knowing the character of the appellant and that she knows that the appellant will never deceive her. In the said letter she has even stated that before the registration is done the appellant should inform his family and that would be beneficial for the respondent No.1. In Ext.A/2 the respondent No.1 has inquired of the appellant that if she ever gets married to the appellant the appellant should inform her the work which she will have to do in her married life. It will appear from the Ext.A/2 that there was a clear contemplation of marriage. In Ext. A/6 the respondent No.1 entertains the idea of being a part of the family of the appellant and the respondent No.1 has also stated in the said letter that she trusted no one except the appellant and there is no impurity in the appellant’s love. In Ext.A/8 the respondent No.1 raises a question whether there is any hard and fast rule for the parties to get married if they like each other but she also states that if she had fallen in love then she would surely get married. In the facts of the present case, there can be no question with regard to the fact that the respondent No.1 had fallen in love with the appellant. In Ext.A/8 the respondent No.1 has also stated that she feels sorry by making reference to ‘Caste’. It appears from the tenor of the said letter that the said letter was written before the marriage took place and it indicates that the respondent No.1 was aware of the appellant’s religion. That apart the fact that the appellant had been visiting the house of the respondent No.1 frequently before the registration of marriage clearly shows that it was highly probable that the respondent No.1 was aware of the appellant’s religion. In the letter dated 04.01.1998 (Ext.A/10), that is, just before the date of registration of marriage the respondent No.1 contemplates the marriage and says that if she gets the appellant in her life it would suffice and the respondent No.1 in the said letter repeats the words ‘I Love You’. In the said letter the respondent No.1 refers to the appellant as “My Sweat Heart Jhantu”. In the said letter the respondent No.1 refers to the appellant as “My Sweat Heart Jhantu”. In the letter being Ext.A/12 the respondent No.1 says that she really feels very happy when the appellant visits the house of the respondent No.1 and the appellant must come to the house of the respondent No.1 everyday. The allegation of the respondent No.1 that she had been compelled to sign some blank forms is not supported by the materials on record and it appears that the respondent No.1 was quite aware of the proceedings that were initiated for registration of marriage. It cannot be said from the materials on record that the parties did not have a free consent to marry each other. The respondent No.1 has stated in her evidence that if the appellant had been a Hindu boy then there would have been no problem for her. Thus, the factor of religion was put forward by the respondent No.1 as the only obstacle to give her free consent to the said marriage. But the materials on record clearly show that the respondent No.1 was fully aware of the family background of the appellant and also of the appellant’s religion. The respondent No.1 has stated in her evidence that save and except the suppression of religion there can be no other allegation against the appellant. The letters exchanged between the parties and the other evidence on record clearly show that the appellant was very well-known to the respondent No.1 and this court is unable to come to the conclusion that the respondent No.1 was not aware of the appellant’s religion. The question whether the appellant and the respondent No.1 lived together in the same house as husband and wife after marriage does not affect the fact that the parties concerned had got married by giving free consent to it. There might have been many circumstances which could have prevented the parties concerned to live together as husband and wife in the same house and it was only a question of time when the parties concerned could have decided that it was proper time for them to live together as husband and wife. This Court is unable to come to the conclusion that the appellant had treated the respondent No.1 only as his girlfriend but not as his wife. This Court is unable to come to the conclusion that the appellant had treated the respondent No.1 only as his girlfriend but not as his wife. Referring to some letters, the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 tried to project a picture of the respondent No.1 by submitting that the respondent No.1 was in a confused state of mind. While in relationship the respondent No.1 could have at times said many things but reading the letters and the evidence as a whole the picture that clearly emerges is that the respondent No.1 was in love with the appellant. The respondent No.1 did contemplate the marriage with the appellant and the marriage took place with the free consent of both the parties. The materials on record including the evidences on record do not in any way support the contention of the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 that any fraud and/or coercion was exercised by the appellant upon the respondent No.1. The decision cited by the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 do not in any way help the respondent No.1 in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The question that requires to be answered in the present case is whether or not the appellant and the respondent No.1 had intended to get married to each other. The answer that emerges from the records is that such intention was definitely there. It appears that the learned Trial Court laid much emphasis upon the presumption that the parties did not say to each other that they took each other as their lawful wife/husband in the presence of the Marriage Officer and the witnesses. It appears to this Court that such presumption on the part of the learned Trial Court is unfounded. It is the case of the respondent No.1 that she discovered the fact that the appellant was a Mohammedan by religion only after the marriage took place on 05.01.1998. Thus, according to the respondent No.1, the respondent No.1 did not have any occasion to object to the marriage when the marriage took place on 05.01.1998 since the respondent No.1 has stated in her evidence that apart from the question of religion she had no other objection to the marriage. Thus, according to the respondent No.1, the respondent No.1 did not have any occasion to object to the marriage when the marriage took place on 05.01.1998 since the respondent No.1 has stated in her evidence that apart from the question of religion she had no other objection to the marriage. In such circumstances even according to the respondent No.1 in the normal course of events she could not have objected to the utterance of the declaration as required under Section 12(2) of the said Act of 1954. It will appear from the said provision of law that the verbal declaration is required to be done by the parties concerned in the presence of the Marriage Officer and the witnesses. Thus, it can only be presumed that in the normal course of events the parties concerned had made such declaration. It is not known as to on what basis the learned Trial Court was of the opinion that such declaration was not made by the parties concerned. Of course, the respondent No.1 has not been able to prove that any fraud was practiced upon her by the appellant or any other person in respect of the marriage in question. This Court cannot agree with the finding of the learned Trial Court that from the evidence of the parties and other materials on record it cannot be said that the respondent No.1 was willing to marry the appellant. This Court cannot agree with the finding of the learned Trial Court that Exts. A to A/16 are not at all relevant for the purpose of finding out as to whether or not the respondent No.1 was willing to marry the appellant. It may be noted that a number of such letters being Exhibits are without any date but, nevertheless, the contents of such letters are expressions of feelings by the author of such letters. The learned Trial Court has not discussed such letters in its judgment in any details but has come to the conclusion that the said Exhibits A to A/16 are not relevant for the purpose of finding out the intention of the parties. The learned Trial Court has not discussed such letters in its judgment in any details but has come to the conclusion that the said Exhibits A to A/16 are not relevant for the purpose of finding out the intention of the parties. The learned Trial Court failed to consider in its proper perspective the provisions of Section 13 of the said Act of 1954 which stipulates that a certificate once having been entered in the Marriage Certificate Book by the Marriage Officer, the certificate shall be deemed to be a conclusive evidence of the fact that the marriage has been solemnized. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that the respondent No.1 was not “well-acquainted with the marriage” as found by the learned Trial Court. The letters marked Exhibits which form a very vital part of the evidence have not been considered in any details by the learned Trial Court. In view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the view that the respondent No.1 has failed to prove her case alleged in the plaint and this Court is of the further view that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No.1 was duly solemnized under the relevant provision of law and there is nothing on record to show that the marriage has been vitiated by any alleged fraud or coercion or misrepresentation. In such circumstances, the appeal succeeds and it is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court are set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent certified Xerox copy of this judgment, if applied for, shall be given to the parties on compliance of usual formalities.