JUDGMENT K. K. Trivedi, J.:- 1. These three revisions have been filed by three persons, who were non-applicants in the eviction proceedings drawn by the non-applicant No. 2 before the Rent Controlling Authority, Bhopal (hereinafter referred to as 'RCA'), against the order of eviction passed on 18-6-2010, therefore, all the three revisions were heard together and are being decided by this common order. 2. The non-applicant No. 2 claiming himself to be the specified landlord, being a handicapped person and a Govt. servant moved an application under section 23-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'Accommodation Act') seeking eviction of the applicant. Initially the application was filed against one Shri Lal Singh and Shri Kuldeep Singh. During the pendency of the application, which is in fact remained pending for enormous reasons as have been reflected in the order-sheet for a long time of 25 years, the original non-applicant No. 1 therein, Lal Singh, died and the substitution of legal representatives was done and the other applicants in other revisions became party to the proceedings. The claim made by the non-applicant No. 2 was that he being the landlord of the demised non-residential accommodation, was required the same for the purposes of establishing his own hospital. A notice was issued to the applicants seeking vacation of the demised premises but since an evasive reply was given, the application was required to be filed. The application was contested and a written statement was filed saying that suit shop was in possession of one Indrajeet Singh Duggal, being son of Shri Lal Singh Duggal, who was running an electrical shop. The family being joint Hindu family, there was no question of sub-letting of the shop. There was no bona fide need available to the non-applicant No. 2 to get an order of eviction. It was denied that the non-applicant No. 2 was physically disabled. After prolonged proceedings, the application for eviction of the tenants has been allowed, eviction order has been passed by the RCA against which these revisions are filed. 3. In fact the application filed by the non-applicant No. 2 was dismissed for want of prosecution on 23-12-2006. It was denied that the non-applicant No. 2 was physically disabled. After prolonged proceedings, the application for eviction of the tenants has been allowed, eviction order has been passed by the RCA against which these revisions are filed. 3. In fact the application filed by the non-applicant No. 2 was dismissed for want of prosecution on 23-12-2006. Upon making an application for restoration of the said application under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure after issuing notice to one of the legal representative, the order was passed by the RCA restoring the eviction application. Against the said order, objection was filed by the applicant in Civil Revision No. 309/2010. The said application was rejected. A civil revision was filed before this Court against the order of restoration of the eviction application being Civil Revision No. 196/2010. However, before even passing any interim order in the said civil revision by this Court, since the final order was passed in the eviction case, ultimately the civil revision was got dismissed as infructuous with liberty to raise the grounds in appropriate manner in appropriate proceedings. The order dated 18-6-2010 is challenged by the applicant in Civil Revision No. 309/2010 only on the ground that such an order has been passed in the proceedings, which were restored without granting any opportunity of hearing to the applicant Poonam Kumar Duggal. It is contended that since Poonam Kumar Duggal was already impleaded as party in the proceedings after the death of original non-applicant Shri Lal Singh, before directing restoration of the eviction application, at least an opportunity of hearing was required to be given to him. From the perusal of the order-sheets recorded in the said case, it is pointed out that the applicant herein was not granted any opportunity of hearing and, therefore, the order dated 18-6-2010 is bad in law. 4. In the other Civil Revision No. 312/2010, almost similar claim has been made. It is pointed out that the order of restoration of the civil suit was erroneously passed. An apprehension was shown by the applicant in the said case that he was having no faith in the Presiding Officer of the RCA that any justice would be done, he had approached the Collector, Bhopal for transfer of the case from the said authority to any other authority but no order was passed within the knowledge of the applicant. An apprehension was shown by the applicant in the said case that he was having no faith in the Presiding Officer of the RCA that any justice would be done, he had approached the Collector, Bhopal for transfer of the case from the said authority to any other authority but no order was passed within the knowledge of the applicant. It is contended that in fact the case was posted for pronouncement of the order in open Court on 18-6-2010 but no order was passed within his knowledge on that date nor any order was shown to him. In fact knowing fully well that a complaint is made against the RCA before the Collector, Bhopal, an antedated order was passed by the RCA to frustrate the interim stay granted by this Court in civil revision. This being so, it is contended that the order passed by the RCA is bad in law. 5. Lastly, in Civil Revision No. 350/2010, the grounds are taken that erroneously the MJC filed by the non-applicant No. 2 for restoration of eviction application was allowed on 3-4-2010. The said order was called in question in a revision before this Court. However, before any interim order could be passed by this Court since the order dated 18-6-2010 was passed, liberty was obtained by the applicant for challenging such order before this Court. Since restoration of the eviction application itself was bad in law, the said order was liable to be set aside. Consequently, the order dated 18-6-2010 is also bad in law and is liable to be set aside. It is contended that from the facts as have come on record, the application filed by the non-applicant No. 2 could not have been allowed without impleadment of the applicant and as such the order is neither binding on him nor is sustainable in the eye of law. On these premises, these revisions have been filed. 6. To understand the controversy involved in the present case, it would be necessary to examine the genealogy. The non-applicant No. 2 is said to be the grandson of Sardar Basant Singh, who has one son Trilok Singh. Trilok Singh had two sons, Gurmeet Singh and Kulwant Singh. According to the non-applicant No. 2, the property was partitioned in between the sons of Shri Trilok Singh and the demised premises fall within the share of non-applicant No. 2. The non-applicant No. 2 is said to be the grandson of Sardar Basant Singh, who has one son Trilok Singh. Trilok Singh had two sons, Gurmeet Singh and Kulwant Singh. According to the non-applicant No. 2, the property was partitioned in between the sons of Shri Trilok Singh and the demised premises fall within the share of non-applicant No. 2. To some extent, this fact is not in dispute in view of the statements recorded by the RCA where the witness of the applicants have admitted such a situation to some extent where they have accepted the relationship of the non-applicant No. 2 with Sardar Basant Singh. Similarly, the applicants herein have a genealogy. Originally Lal Singh was the tenant of Sardar Basant Singh and Trilok Singh, as is admitted by him in the reply to notice as also in the written statement and in the statement given in the Court. Lal Singh had three sons, Indrajeet Singh, Kuldeep Singh and Poonam Kumar Duggal, the applicants in three revisions. The application for eviction was filed against Lal Singh and Kuldeep Singh. However, after the death of Lal Singh, Indrajeet Singh and Poonam Duggal were substituted as his legal representatives. The application itself was filed on 14-11-1985 under section 23-A(b) of the Accommodation Act. It was categorically contended that by virtue of a gift-deed executed on 16-11-1962, Basant Singh gifted the property to the non-applicant No. 2 and his brother Kulwant Singh. Prior to its gift, the property was let out to Lal Singh and Kuldeep Singh by Basant Singh in the year 1960. A partition took place in between non-applicant No. 2 and his brother Kulwant Singh in the year 1981 and the demised premises fall within the share of non-applicant No. 2. The non-applicant categorically contended that he was a handicapped person and was in the Govt. service, The handicap-ness of the non-applicant No. 2 was proved by medical evidence produced on record. He issued a notice seeking vacation of the demise premises on 18-7-1985, which was replied by the applicants, more particularly by Lal Singh and his son Kuldeep Singh. The notice and the reply are available on record as Exhibit P-5 and P-6. The reply was given on 30-8-1985. He issued a notice seeking vacation of the demise premises on 18-7-1985, which was replied by the applicants, more particularly by Lal Singh and his son Kuldeep Singh. The notice and the reply are available on record as Exhibit P-5 and P-6. The reply was given on 30-8-1985. On one count or another, the application remained pending adjudication and on death of Lal Singh, which took place on 21-11-2003, the legal representatives of Lal Singh were substituted on 17-2-2004. As has been referred to herein above, the application for eviction was dismissed on 29-12-2006 and an application under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure was moved on 27-4-2007 by the non-applicant No. 2. A reply to the said application was filed on 13-7-2009 and ultimately the application was allowed on 3-4-2010. With this history of the litigation, it would be necessary to look into the claim made by the applicants in their revision. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant vehemently contended that when the applicant was originally a non-applicant in the eviction application, which was dismissed in default and when an application under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure was made for restoration of the said eviction application, it was necessary for the non-applicant No. 2 to implead him as a party. Deliberately when application under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed, the applicant was not impleaded as a party, as a result the applicant was denied an opportunity of hearing before restoration of the eviction application. That being so, the order passed by the RCA restoring the eviction application was bad in law. Since in the revision filed by Indrajeet Singh Duggal against the order of restoration of the eviction application, liberty was granted to file appropriate application challenging the order of restoration of eviction application, the order dated 18-6-2010 passed in the eviction case is being sought to be challenged with the aforesaid liberty. It is contended that though the applicant was impleaded as a party in the proceedings but was not granted an opportunity of hearing, was not aware of the restoration of the eviction application, the order dated 18-6-2010 would not be binding on him. That being so, the eviction decree cannot be executed against him. It is contended that though the applicant was impleaded as a party in the proceedings but was not granted an opportunity of hearing, was not aware of the restoration of the eviction application, the order dated 18-6-2010 would not be binding on him. That being so, the eviction decree cannot be executed against him. Placing reliance in the case of Nageshar and others v. Bhagy Dubey, AIR 1922 Oudh 160 and in the case of Shamshad Mehdi v. Mahbub Khan and another, AIR 1925 Oudh 205, it is contended by learned Counsel for the applicant that impugned order is, thus, nullity insofar as the applicant is concerned. Further placing reliance in the case of Yashwant Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand, AIR 1951 SC 16 , learned Counsel for the applicant contended that in view of the well settled law, such an order would not be binding on the applicant. In fact there was a fraudulent plan in the mind of the non-applicant No. 2 to obtain an ex parte order against the applicant. Further placing reliance in the case of Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U. P. and another, AIR 2011 SC 1232 , it is contended by learned Counsel for the applicant that ex parte recall of the order for any reason, even on the count that there was a mistake on the part of Counsel, was not permissible and as such the order passed by the RCA restoring the dismissed eviction application was not proper. 8. Per contra it is contended by learned senior Counsel for the non-applicant No. 2 that upon the facts as have come on record, it would be clear that there was no question of impleadment of the applicant in the eviction case. He was in fact impleaded as a legal representative of the original tenant. Since by filing a written statement the original tenant has said that the shop was in fact in possession of Indrajeet Singh, the elder son of the original tenant, who was paying the rent to the landlord of the shop, even if the applicant in this revision was not granted an opportunity of hearing or not even impleaded as a party in the eviction proceeding, the order of eviction so passed cannot be said to be bad in law. Referring to the law laid-down by the Apex Court in several cases, it is contended that there was no question of granting any opportunity of hearing to the applicant. Even otherwise such an opportunity was made available to the original tenant, who was impleaded as a party. It was not a case where the demised premises was sub-let to anyone and, therefore, in such a case, if the order was passed by the RCA restoring the eviction application, no wrong was committed. Taking this Court to the statement filed on record before the RCA, the evidence led by the applicant, it is pointed out that once it is admitted that the demise premises was in occupation of another brother of the applicant, the eviction order could be passed against such a person. It is trite in law that in a case where jointness of a family is claimed, if one of the members of the family in occupation of the demise premises is arrayed as a party in a eviction suit, in fact a decree can be granted by a Court of law. Since such a power is conferred on the RCA under the Accommodation Act, nothing wrong was committed by the RCA in grating decree of eviction. It is further contended that under the scheme of the Act, the proceedings are to be conducted in the manner and procedure prescribed for conducting a small cause suit. Reading the provisions of section 23-D of the Accommodation Act, learned senior Counsel has contended that the procedure as laid-down for the said proceedings is prescribed separately in the Code of Civil Procedure. Referring to section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is contended that limited procedure is prescribed. The judgment and decree in a suit of small cause is passed in different manner after following the provisions as laid-down under Order L of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it would be clear that the rightful procedure was followed by the RCA after a long time. It is pointed out by referring to certain order-sheets that the statements of witnesses were recorded, opportunities were granted to file written arguments and, therefore, there was no need of hearing oral arguments as it is not prescribed for conducting a case of small cause. It is pointed out by referring to certain order-sheets that the statements of witnesses were recorded, opportunities were granted to file written arguments and, therefore, there was no need of hearing oral arguments as it is not prescribed for conducting a case of small cause. Therefore, the order, if passed after recording of these facts in the order-sheets, it cannot be said that the order is bad in law in any manner. 9. This Court is of the considered view that merely because the applicant in Civil Revision No. 309/2010 was not noticed with respect to the filing of application under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no prejudice was going to cause to him. It is a fact that the demise premises was let out and was in possession of Indrajeet Singh as was admitted by the witnesses and more particularly the original tenant and non-applicant in the evidence in his Court statement. This fact was categorically averred not only in the reply to notice of eviction issued to the original tenant but in the written statement filed before the RCA. In view of this and in view of the well settled law, there was no need to grant any opportunity of hearing to the applicant. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the Civil Revision No. 309/2010 is totally misconceived and deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 10. Now coming to the Civil Revision No. 312/2010. This revision is by the person, who is said to be in possession of the demise premises. As far as the order dated 3-6-2010 is concerned, this Court has already held that such an order was rightly passed restoring the eviction application. The pleas raised in this respect are, therefore, not required to be adjudicated once again. Now coming to the defence whether the applicant could be said to be the tenant of non-applicant No. 2 is required to be examined. The original record of the RCA is examined. From the notice of eviction contained in Exhibit P-5, the non-applicant No. 2 categorically demanded vacation of the demise premises from Lal Singh and Kuldeep Singh. It was alleged that these two persons were holding the demise accommodation and were running a shop in the name of Apollo Electricals. Allegation was made that this shop is now handed over to Indrajeet Singh. It was alleged that these two persons were holding the demise accommodation and were running a shop in the name of Apollo Electricals. Allegation was made that this shop is now handed over to Indrajeet Singh. In reply to this notice sent by Shri P.N. Sharma, Advocate, on behalf of Lal Singh and Kuldeep Singh, which is available on record of RCA as Exhibit P-6, it was contended that said persons were not aware whether the non-applicant No. 2 was the landlord or owner of the demise premises but they admitted that they obtained the shop from Dr. Trilok Singh. In paragraph 2 of this notice it was contended while denying the allegations made in the notice that the shop was sub-let to Indrajeet Singh, that Indrajeet Singh was the son of Lal Singh and they are living jointly and, therefore, he is also a joint tenant along with Lal Singh in the demise premises. In the Court statement of said Lal Singh, which was recorded on commission, fact was categorically admitted that the demise premise was in the name of Indrajeet Singh, who was the tenant in the said shop. He again admitted that tenancy had commenced by Basant Singh, who was the father of Dr. Trilok Singh With respect to the execution of the gift dead, he stated that he was not aware of such a gift since it was their domestic affair. He admitted in some way that the non-applicant may be the owner of the demised premise. He admitted that earlier the rent of demise premises was being paid to Basant Singh and subsequently the same was being paid by the non-applicant No. 2 and to his father Trilok Singh. The other witness examined by the tenant was, Kuldeep Singh Duggal In paragraph 2 he said that the demise shop was earlier taken on rent from Dr. Trilok Singh but after obtaining an employment by the said witness Kuldeep Singh, shop was closed and returned back to Dr. Trilok Singh who let it out to Indrajeet Singh, the brother of said witness. Nothing more important is stated by the said person. This witness admits that a notice was received by him of which reply was given. Thereafter, written arguments were filed summarizing the claim made and certain citations were given to the RCA. 11. Trilok Singh who let it out to Indrajeet Singh, the brother of said witness. Nothing more important is stated by the said person. This witness admits that a notice was received by him of which reply was given. Thereafter, written arguments were filed summarizing the claim made and certain citations were given to the RCA. 11. The non-applicant No. 2 for proving his case has not only exhibited the notice of termination of tenancy issued by him but also the reply of the said notice. He placed on record the deed of gift and exhibited it as Exhibit P-1. He also placed on record an order passed in a civil suit filed by Kulwant Singh against the non-applicant as Exhibit P-2 wherein a decree of partition was granted between the non-applicant No. 2 and his brother. The fact was that the non-applicant was in the Govt. service and was a handicap person, which too was proved by recording the evidence of witness PW-3 Dr. Shivaji Prasad. The medical certificate of handicapness of the non-applicant No. 2 was duly proved by the said witness. With this evidence available on record, the RCA reached to the conclusion that after giving due opportunity of hearing, the case was fully proved that the non-applicant No. 2 bona fidely required the demise premise. In view of these findings, it cannot be said that the eviction decree was illegally passed in favour of the non-applicant. The order-sheets indicate that such opportunity of hearing was afforded to all concerned. Therefore, challenge to the eviction order in Civil Revision No. 312/2010 is also not sustainable. The revision stands dismissed. 12. Now the claim made in Civil Revision No. 350/2010 by Kuldeep Singh Duggal is required to be considered. While assailing the order dated 18-6-2010 virtually the applicant in this revision has tried to assail the order dated 3-4-2010 passed in M.J.C. No. 9/MJC/2007 by the RCA on the ground that the said order suffers from non-joinder of necessary party, the applicant herein. It is contended that in terms of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, the applicant was the necessary party. He was already impleaded as a party in the eviction application and was, thus, required to be impleaded as a party in the application filed under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the non-applicant No. 2. It is contended that in terms of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, the applicant was the necessary party. He was already impleaded as a party in the eviction application and was, thus, required to be impleaded as a party in the application filed under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the non-applicant No. 2. Referring to the application filed by the non-applicant No. 2, it is contended that only Indrajeet Singh Duggal and Poonam Duggal were made party in the said application, being the legal representatives of Sardar Lal Singh, the original tenant. However, notice of the said application was never issued to the applicant herein as he was not impleaded as a party. The order was passed by the RCA restoring the eviction application in such illegal manner. When the objections were raised before the competent authority with respect to the maintainability of such eviction application after its restoration, the same was not considered. Prayer was' made for transfer of the eviction application but again the same was not considered and the eviction order was passed. In view of this, it is contended that the order of eviction passed by the RCA is not legal and valid order and need to be set aside by this Court. 13. In considering the claims made in other civil revisions, in foregoing paras of this order, all these aspects have been taken into consideration and this Court has reached to the conclusion that merely because one or another non-applicant in the eviction application was not impleaded as a party in the application for restoration of the eviction application, the said order of restoration of the eviction application cannot be said to be bad in law. Further, learned senior Counsel for non-applicant No. 2 has placed reliance in several cases and has pointed out that if there are more than one tenants or if there is a joint tenancy of a family, if only one member of the family is impleaded as a party in the eviction proceedings, the said proceedings cannot be said to be bad in law. Placing reliance in the case of Manik Mandal and others v. Bharosi Singh, AIR 1959 Patna 225 (DB), learned senior Counsel for non-applicant No. 2 has contended that the failure to comply with the provisions of Order EX, Rule 9(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure in setting aside the order of dismissal without giving notice to the defendant does not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the Court, although in doing so Courts commit an error of law. Since there is no appeal provided against an order affecting the jurisdiction of the Court under section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no appeal would lie against such an order nor the said order could be made a ground for challenging the final order of eviction. In view of this, it is contended that merely because the restoration application was allowed erroneously, the ultimate eviction order passed by the RCA is not to be challenged in present revision. It is further contended that in view of this, challenge put to the order of eviction is misconceived and not sustainable in the eye of law, therefore, the revision is liable to be dismissed. Further placing reliance in the case of Midamati Venkata Narasimham v. Pogaku Nagojirao, AIR 1946 Madras 344, learned senior Counsel contends that since the order setting aside dismissal of the eviction application does not affect the decision of case on merits, it does not come within the scope of section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure and again a challenge on this count would not be maintainable. It is further contended that in view of the fact that the Counsel for the applicant herein was present before the RCA, in view of the law laid-down by the Rajasthan High Court in case of Pannalal and another v. Firm Ballaram Basia, AIR 1957 Rajasthan 391, no error of law was committed by the RCA in restoring the eviction application. It is further contended that in view of the law considered by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Pirag Chand v. Firm Ramlal Channanmal, AIR 1988 Rajasthan 201, again it was not necessary to issue a notice of restoration application to those who proceeded ex parte in the original proceedings. It is further contended that in view of the law considered by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Pirag Chand v. Firm Ramlal Channanmal, AIR 1988 Rajasthan 201, again it was not necessary to issue a notice of restoration application to those who proceeded ex parte in the original proceedings. It is contended that since the applicant herein was not appearing in the said proceedings of eviction application, there was no question of giving him a notice. Therefore, there was no error of jurisdiction committed by the RCA in allowing the application for restoration of eviction application. In the case of Jyoti Prasad Kishan Lal v. Punjab National Bank Ltd. and others, AIR 1963 Allahabad 374, if a notice of such proceeding was given to the Counsel, the said service was treated to be sufficient for the purposes of consideration of the application for restoration. Reiterating such law, the Gauhati High Court in the case of M/s Choukhanybag Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Prabhu Dayal Lohia and others, AIR 1979 Gauhati 37, has upheld the order of restoration on such an application. Merely non-compliance of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of Order EX of the Code of Civil Procedure was not said to be such fatal that the proceedings were to be put at knot. 14. Referring to the order-sheets, learned senior Counsel for the non-applicant No. 2 has contended that the scheme of the Act is required to be seen. Again reading the provisions of section 23-D of the Accommodation Act, learned senior Counsel has contended that the procedure laid-down for the small cause cases was required to be followed as the intention of the legislature was to prescribe a speedy trial for disposal of the eviction application. Drawing attention of this Court to the law laid-down by the Apex Court in the case of Kanji Manji v. Trustees of the Port of Bombay, 1963 MPLJ (S.C.) 450 = AIR 1963 SC 468 , it is contended that in terms of the provisions of section 106 and section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act if there was a joint tenancy, the notice to determine lis to one of the joint tenants was treated to be sufficient. The suit for ejectment against one of the tenants itself was good and, therefore, it was not necessary to issue a notice even of the eviction application to the applicant. The jointness of the tenancy, according to the own statement made in the reply to the notice of eviction, written statement filed before the RCA as also in the Court statement, was enough for the purposes of treating that there was a joint tenancy and, therefore, if the eviction proceedings were done against one of the joint tenant, the same was good enough. It is further contended by learned senior Counsel for non-applicant No. 2 that if the complaint was made against the Presiding Officer, it was required to be presented before the proper forum and authority. Nothing can be alleged against such an authority in casual manner by making application or by firing affidavit. The fact relating to non-representation of applicant herein by the Counsel before the RCA in particular restoration application was never brought to the notice of the Presiding Officer. Such scandalous allegations are being made in the revision only. In view of the law laid-down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and another, AIR 1982 SC 1249 , it is contended that such a stand was not acceptable and, therefore, on this basis also it cannot be said that action taken by the authority was bad in law. Thus, it is contended that in view of the aforesaid, if the grounds set forth in the revisions are looked into, it would be clear that nothing was stated with respect to the merit of the order passed by the RCA except challenging the order dated 3-4-2010 and in view of the aforesaid provisions of law as also the settled position of law, such a revision would not be maintainable. 15. After giving thoughtful consideration to such submissions made by the learned Counsel for the applicant as also the submissions made by learned senior Counsel for the non-applicant No. 2, this Court will not hesitate in holding that such a revision is wholly misconceived. 15. After giving thoughtful consideration to such submissions made by the learned Counsel for the applicant as also the submissions made by learned senior Counsel for the non-applicant No. 2, this Court will not hesitate in holding that such a revision is wholly misconceived. Not a single word is said as to how the order of eviction was bad in law, specially in view of the fact that there was material evidence available on record to show that the non-applicant No. 2 was not only a specified landlord as defined in the Accommodation Act but was also having a bona fide need for getting the shop vacated from the applicant. The manner in which the eviction application was tried by the RCA is really shocking. An eviction application, which ought to be decided within a period of six months as far as possible, as per the scheme made under the Accommodation Act, was kept pending for decision for almost 25 years. The application, which was originally filed on 14-11-1985, was ultimately decided on 18-6-2010. In these revisions, interim stay was granted and the eviction order was not executed. This being so, the revision is wholly misconceived, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 16. Let the order of the RCA be executed immediately and non-applicant No. 2 be delivered the possession of the demise premises within two months from the date of order. Non-applicant No. 2 would also be entitled to the cost of these proceedings from the applicants. The Counsel fee is quantified to Rs. 10,000/-, if precertified. 1-7. The revisions are dismissed with the costs. Revisions dismissed.