COMMON ORDER Thomas P. Joseph, J. 1. These review petitions are preferred by the appellant, in A.S. Nos. 254 of 1999 and 238 of 1999 seeking review of the judgment dated 20.10.2011 in the said appeals. 2. The respondent filed O.S. No. 150 of 1993 in the Sub Court, Palakkad for a decree for specific performance of an oral agreement for sale and produced original documents of title of the petitioner. He alternatively prayed for recovery of advance money and damages. Petitioner filed O.S No. 430 of 1993 in the same court for a decree directing the respondent to return those documents of title and claiming damages. 3. The issue involved in the suits were whether there was any oral agreement for sale as pleaded by the respondent or whether the documents of title happened to be in the custody of the respondent in the way suggested by the petitioner. Trial court found in favour of existence of oral agreement for sale pleaded by the respondent. O.S. No. 150 of 1993 was decreed directing petitioner to execute a sale deed on receipt of the agreed sale consideration less the advance amount paid. O.S. No. 430 of 1993 was dismissed. 4. Aggrieved, petitioner filed A.S. Nos. 254 and 238 of 1999 challenging the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 430 and 150 of 1999. This court by common judgment dated 20.10.2011 confirmed the verdict of the trial court. 5. Petitioner attempted at appeals before the Supreme Court but the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed as per order dated 08.05.2012. Thereafter, petitioner has sought review of the common judgment of this court. 6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the review petitions in view of the dismissal of the special leave petitions on merit. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the review petitions are maintainable and placed reliance on the decision in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, 2000 (3) KLT 354 followed in Koshy Daniel v. Rajan, 2012 (4) KLT 687 . It is argued that the SLPs were dismissed without giving reasons. 7. In Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (supra)z the Supreme Court has pointed out that when the special leave petition is dismissed with the observation "dismissed on merit" without giving reasons or referring to the law on the point, a review is not barred. It is argued that the SLPs were dismissed without giving reasons. 7. In Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (supra)z the Supreme Court has pointed out that when the special leave petition is dismissed with the observation "dismissed on merit" without giving reasons or referring to the law on the point, a review is not barred. That decision is followed by this court in Koshy Daniel v. Rajan (supra). The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petitions in this case as under: "We find no merit in these petitions for special leave. They are dismissed.". 8. Reading the judgment, it is clear that it does not contain reason for holding that there is no merit in the special leave petitions. Therefore, principle of merger of the common judgment and decree of this court in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the special leave petitions does not arise. As such a review is competent. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that this court was not right in going into the question of discretion under Sec.20 of Specific Relief Act (for short, "the Act") in so far as it was obligatory for the trial court to have gone into that question. The trial court did not consider the question whether discretionary relief of specific performance should be granted to the respondent even though the respondent had in the plaint itself quantified damages payable to him in case specific performance is denied. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions in Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawal and others, (1996) 4 SCC 593 and Malapalimunaswamy Naidu v. P. Sumathi, (2004) 13 SCC 365 . It is contended that this court also has not seriously considered the issue regarding discretionary relief. According to the learned counsel, merely for the reason of petitioner denying that there was any oral agreement for sale, discretionary relief should not have been refused to him. Reliance is placed on the decision in Aliyas v. Aboobacker, 2006 (4) KLT 282 . 10. In response, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent has contended that the scope of review is limited to the circumstances provided under Sec. 114 and Rule I of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, "the Code"). It is contended that under the garb of a review, this court cannot re- hear the appeal since a review is not a substitute for an appeal. It is contended that under the garb of a review, this court cannot re- hear the appeal since a review is not a substitute for an appeal. It is also contended that to say that there is an error apparent on the face of the record a mere perusal of the record must reveal that. If an in-depth study into the question is required, it is not an error apparent on the face of the record. The learned Senior Advocate also submitted that assuming that the trial court has not decided the issue regarding specific performance, it is not as if the appellate court has no power to decide that question at the first instance. The appellate court gets all the powers of the trial court by virtue of Sec.107(2) and Rule 24 of Order 41 of the Code. 11. Rule I of Order 47 of the Code states that on the discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the party or could not be produced by him at the time the decree was passed or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reasons, it is within the power of the court to order a review. The expression "other sufficient reasons" must be read as ejusdem generis. In this case, the only ground upon which the petitioner has sought a review is 'mistake or error apparent on the face of the record'. 12. I have gone through the judgment of the trial court where there is no reference to the question of exercise of discretion to grant specific performance in favour of the respondent. I have also gone through a copy of the written statement of the petitioner given to me for perusal. I find that apart from denying the transaction pleaded by the respondent, petitioner has not pleaded any hardship or pleaded for the exercise of discretionary relief in his favour. In Prakash Chandra V. Narayan, (2012) 5 SCC 403 it is held that the discretion not to decree specific performance in case of hardship of the defendant can be exercised only when the defendant takes a defence of hardship and brings on record evidence in support of such defence. In Prakash Chandra V. Narayan, (2012) 5 SCC 403 it is held that the discretion not to decree specific performance in case of hardship of the defendant can be exercised only when the defendant takes a defence of hardship and brings on record evidence in support of such defence. The question of hardship is one of fact in respect of which the court must frame an issue. Here, no such plea was raised by the petitioner in his written statement and no issue was consequently framed. In such circumstances, it was not necessary that the court should go into the question of comparative hardship and discretion. 13. Assuming that the trial court was required to go into the question of comparative hardship and decide the question of discretion but it did not do so, I must notice that the petitioner raised that question in the appellate court, which in paragraphs 22 to 27 has referred to the rival contentions in that regard and has come to the conclusion that this is a fit case where a decree for specific performance should be granted (in favour of the respondent). 14. It is not as if the appellate court has no power to consider the question at the first instance. Rule 24 of Order 41 and Sec.107(2) of the Code give ample power to the appellate court to decide what the trial court should have decided when sufficient evidence is on record, the appellate court shall not order a remand for a decision of the question. Instead, the appellate court has to decide the issue. I must also notice that this is not a case where the petitioner wanted any additional evidence to be let in regarding the discretionary relief he is now claiming ( and not pleaded in the written statement). In the circumstances, there is nothing wrong in this court in the appeals deciding the question of discretionary jurisdiction. 15. The question decided in Aliyas v. Aboobakcer (supra) was whether on the face of denial of the agreement for sale, the vendor could seek advantage of Sec.20 of the Act ? This court held that mere denial of the transaction would not deprive the vendor of the right to seek discretionary relief. 16. 15. The question decided in Aliyas v. Aboobakcer (supra) was whether on the face of denial of the agreement for sale, the vendor could seek advantage of Sec.20 of the Act ? This court held that mere denial of the transaction would not deprive the vendor of the right to seek discretionary relief. 16. For the mere reason that the respondent prayed for an alternative relief of recovery of the advance and damages (which he is otherwise entitled to claim under the Act) relief of specific performance if he is otherwise entitled to it cannot be disallowed. 17. On going through the common judgment of this court, I do not find any error apparent on the face of the record. As held in K.A. Mohammed Ali v. C.N. Prasannan, AIR 1995 Supreme Court 454) if an in-depth study into the matter is required, the error is not apparent on the face of the record and no review would lie. In such a situations, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not by way of review but by way of an appeal or in any other manner challenge the judgment and decree of this court. Petitioner has unsuccessfully attempted at that remedy. Resultantly, 1) The review petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. 2) Parties shall suffer their cost in these petitions.