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2013 DIGILAW 528 (HP)

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chander Parkash alias Pinku

2013-06-12

RAJIV SHARMA

body2013
JUDGMENT Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. This appeal is filed by the State against the judgment dated 18.1.2006 rendered in Police Challan No. 378-II/2001 (2000)/42-II/2001 under sections 279, 337, 338, 304-A of the Indian Penal Code seeking enhancement of sentence. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this appeal are that on 22.10.2000 at 1.00 P.M., S.H.O. Police Station, Gohar received a telephonic message that at place Kandha, Mauza Kilti, a Jeep bearing No. HP-32-2044 has met with an accident. On the basis of this information, rapat Ex.PW-15/A was registered. The police reached the spot. On inquiry, it was found that at 11.00 A.M. on 22.10.2000, jeep bearing No. HP-32-2044 while carrying 6-7 passengers was going from place Kandha towards Kelodhar. The passengers received injuries. They were taken to C.H.C. Bagsaid. On investigation, it was found that the accident has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver. On the basis of the complaint, rukka Ex.PW-15/B was written and the FIR was registered. Site plan Ex.PW-15/A was prepared. Photographs Ex.P-1 to P-5 alongwith negatives Ex.P-6 and Ex.P-7 were taken. The jeep was taken into possession vide seizure memo Ex.PW-6/B. Broken pieces of glass and rubber of the jeep were taken into possession vide seizure memo Ex.PW-6/A. One of the passengers Lok Pal died and his post-mortem report was obtained. MLCs of other passengers were also issued by the Medical Officer. During the course of investigation, it was found that the jeep was driven by respondent Chander Parkash alias Pinku. The investigation was completed. The challan was put up for offences punishable under sections 279, 337, 338, 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and under section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 2. The prosecution examined number of witnesses to prove its case against the respondent. Statement of the respondent was also recorded under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He has denied that he was driving the jeep at the time of accident and the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the jeep driven by him. He has admitted that injured were taken to hospital and Lok Pal had died. According to him, false case was registered against him. 3. Learned trial court acquitted the respondent under section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act. However, he was convicted under sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. He has admitted that injured were taken to hospital and Lok Pal had died. According to him, false case was registered against him. 3. Learned trial court acquitted the respondent under section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act. However, he was convicted under sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. He was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 279 of the Indian Penal Code. He was also sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 337 of the Indian Penal Code. He was also sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 338 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent was also sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Mr. Pramod Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General has vehemently argued that one person has lost his life and the other passengers have received multiple injuries due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent. He then contended that the sentence imposed upon the respondent is not commensurating with the commission of offences. 5. Mr. R.L. Chaudhary has supported the judgment of the trial court. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records carefully. 7. PW-1 Dr. Deepak Kumar Sharma has examined the injured on 22.10.2000. He has issued MLCs Ex.PW-1/A, Ex. PW-1/B, Ex. PW-1/C, Ex. PW-1/D, Ex. PW-1/E and PW-1/F after examining the injured. 8. PW-2 Dr. Jiwanand has conducted the postmortem of the body of Lok Pal. 9. PW-4 Brestu Ram has carried out technical examination of the jeep bearing registration No. HP-32-2044 on 23.10.2000. He has submitted his report Ex.PW-4/A. According to report Ex.PW-4/A, the steering system had collapsed after the accident. The clutch and brake systems were working properly. 8. PW-2 Dr. Jiwanand has conducted the postmortem of the body of Lok Pal. 9. PW-4 Brestu Ram has carried out technical examination of the jeep bearing registration No. HP-32-2044 on 23.10.2000. He has submitted his report Ex.PW-4/A. According to report Ex.PW-4/A, the steering system had collapsed after the accident. The clutch and brake systems were working properly. The gear box was in order, but it was in third gear. 10. PW-5 Pinki has not supported the prosecution case, though in her examination-in-chief she has admitted that she was sitting in the jeep at the time of accident. 11. PW-6 Subhash Kumar has rescued the passengers. He has proved Ex.PW-6/A. 12. PW-7 Gulab singh has deposed about the handing over of the vehicle on sapurdari. 13. PW-9 Hukkam Chand is the most important witness. He is one of the passengers. According to him, the accident has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent. He was medically examined. Respondent was driving the vehicle at the time of accident. He has denied the suggestion that the vehicle was driven at a low speed. 14. PW-10 Kam Raj has deposed that respondent was driving the vehicle at the time of accident. 15. PW-11 Indu Dev has deposed that he came to know that the jeep has met with accident and Lok Pal died and other passengers received injuries. 16. PW-12 Hoshiar Singh has taken the photographs of the jeep. 17. PW-13 Jalam Singh has deposed that the respondent was driving the jeep at the time of accident. He was sitting by his side. The vehicle rolled down into the Khad. They have received injuries. One of the passengers has died. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that where the accident took place, it was a normal curve and the width of the road was like National Highway. 18. PW-15 Dharam Chand has investigated the case. He has prepared rappat Ex.PW-15/A on the basis of which FIR was registered. He has prepared the site plan Ex.PW-15/C. He has taken into possession broken pieces of glass. According to him, it transpired at the time of investigation that the vehicle was being driven at the excessive speed. These are the material witnesses produced by the prosecution. 19. He has prepared rappat Ex.PW-15/A on the basis of which FIR was registered. He has prepared the site plan Ex.PW-15/C. He has taken into possession broken pieces of glass. According to him, it transpired at the time of investigation that the vehicle was being driven at the excessive speed. These are the material witnesses produced by the prosecution. 19. The case of the prosecution has duly been proved on the basis of the statement of PW-9 Hukam Chand that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent. According to PW-10 Kam Raj and PW-13 Jalam Singh, the vehicle was driven by the respondent. It is clear from Ex.PW15/C that there was a curve on the road leading to Kelodhar. The respondent could not negotiate the curve and the accident took place. Lok Pal has died in the accident and his postmortem was conducted by PW-2 Dr. Jiwanand. The other passengers have also received injuries. The injured persons were medically examined by PW-1 Dr. Deepak Kumar Sharma and their MLCs were issued. The gear box was found intact. However, it was in third gear. If the vehicle was in third gear, it can be safely proved that it was driven at a high speed. The respondent should have tried to negotiate the curve cautiously. According to PW-1 Dr. Deepak Kumar Sharma, injuries No.6 and 7 received by Dishank were grievous in nature. The nature of injuries received by injured vide Ex.PW-1/B to Ex.PW-1/F were simple in nature. 20. What emerges from the evidence discussed hereinabove is that due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent, he has endangered the lives of the passengers travelling in the jeep. His rash and negligent driving has also caused simple as well as grievous injures to the passengers, including death of one of the passengers Lok Pal. One passenger Dishank has received grievous injuries and other passengers have received simple injury. The accident has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent on a public way. The learned trial court has also returned the findings that the accident has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent. He was found guilty of offences punishable under sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, but the sentence imposed by the trial court is on the very lenient side. The learned trial court has also returned the findings that the accident has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent. He was found guilty of offences punishable under sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, but the sentence imposed by the trial court is on the very lenient side. The respondent was acquitted of offence punishable under section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The terrain in the State of Himachal Pradesh is very dangerous. The drivers should drive the vehicle very cautiously. Learned trial court has only sentenced the respondent to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 279 of the Indian Penal Code. He has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 337 of the Indian Penal Code. He has been also sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 338 of the Indian Penal Code. He has also been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rathnashalvan versus State of Karnataka, (2007) 3 SCC 474 have defined the words “rashness”, “negligence”, “criminal rashness” and “criminal negligence” as under: “7. Section 304-A applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. The provision applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section 304-A. Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon the circumstances of each case. The provision applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section 304-A. Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon the circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences will follow but with the hope that it will not. Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence are determining factors. A question whether the accused's conduct amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider it to be sufficient considering all the circumstances of the case. Criminal rashness means hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton and the further knowledge that it may cause injury but done without any intention to cause injury or knowledge that it would probably be caused. 8. As noted above, "rashness" consists in hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality lies in such a case in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence on the other hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. 9. The distinction has been very aptly pointed out by Holloway, J. in these words: "Culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not, and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The imputability arises from acting despite the consciousness (luxuria). The imputability arises from acting despite the consciousness (luxuria). Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him, and that if he had he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of the civic duty of circumspection." (See Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, In re7 Mad HCR 119, Mad HCRpp. 119-20.)” 22. In a case where the driver of a truck carrying more than 50 persons drove the vehicle at a very high speed on public road, as a result of which he lost control and the vehicle went off the road and rolled down the field leaving four persons dead and several other injured, their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuldeep Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh, (2008) 14 SCC 795 have upheld the judgment of this court of conviction under sections 304-A, 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 23. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Braham Dass versus State of Himachal Pradesh, (2009) 7 SCC 353 have held that it must be established that the accused was driving any vehicle on public way in a manner which endangered human life or was likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Their Lordships have held as under: “2. The appellant was the driver of a bus of the Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation (in short the 'Corporation'). According to the prosecution version on 19.11.1991 while he was driving the vehicle, the bus had stopped at a bus stop. One passenger after alighting from the bus went to its roof top for the purpose of unloading his luggage. The accused without waiting for a signal from the conductor and without verifying if all the passengers who were to board, had boarded and who were to alight had alighted, all of a sudden started the bus as a result of which the said passenger fell down and sustained injuries. He was carried to the hospital where he succumbed. 6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no evidence on record to show any negligence. It has not been brought on record as to how the accused-appellant was negligent in any way. He was carried to the hospital where he succumbed. 6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no evidence on record to show any negligence. It has not been brought on record as to how the accused-appellant was negligent in any way. On the contrary what has been stated is that one person had gone to the roof top and driver started the vehicle while he was there. There was no evidence to show that; the driver had knowledge that any passenger was on the roof top of the bus. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that PW1 had stated that the conductor had told the driver that one passenger was still on the roof of the bus and the driver started the bus. 8. Section 279 deals rash driving or riding on a public way. A bare reading of the provision makes it clear that it must be established that die accused was driving any vehicle on a public way in a manner which endangered human life or was likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Obviously the foundation in accusations under Section 279 IPC is not negligence. Similarly in Section 304 A the stress is on causing death by negligence or rashness. Therefore, for bringing in application of either Section 279 or 304 A it must be established that there was an element of rashness or negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto, there was no evidence led to show that any negligence was involved.” 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Guru Basavaraj alias Benne Settappa versus State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734 have held that appropriate sentence should imposed if the charges under sections 304-A, 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code are proved. Their Lordships have explained how the plea of mechanical failure is to be proved. Their Lordships have held as under: “12. First, we shall deal with the facet of rash and negligent driving of the driver. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the vehicle turned turtle due to mechanical failure i.e. non-functioning of the hydraulic system in a proper manner. To appreciate the said submission, we have carefully perused the material brought on record and the analysis made by the courts below. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the vehicle turned turtle due to mechanical failure i.e. non-functioning of the hydraulic system in a proper manner. To appreciate the said submission, we have carefully perused the material brought on record and the analysis made by the courts below. On a careful scrutiny of the same, we find that all the courts have placed reliance on independent witnesses as well as the testimony of PW-10, the Motor Vehicle Inspector. The manner in which the accident occurred due to detachment of the trailer from the tractor and the distance to which the tractor moved vividly reveals that the vehicle in question was driven recklessly at a high speed. The plea of mechanical failure as put forth by the accused was not even suggested to the Inspector. 13. What is sought to be emphasised before this Court is that PW-3 has deposed that the accident occurred due to mechanical failure. The trial court as well as the High Court has not accepted the testimony of PW-3 as he is only an agriculturist while the other technical experts including the Motor Vehicle Inspector have deposed about the rash and negligent driving. Analysing the evidence in entirety, the learned trial judge as well as the appellate judge has returned the finding as regards the rash and negligent driving. The appellate court, on further scrutiny, has found that the evidence on record clearly shows that the driver has taken the vehicle to the left side of the road and, in the process, he moved away from the main road to the 'kachcha' road and thereby the link between the tractor and the trailer got detached. The High Court has opined that the accused has not taken care to see that the speed of the tractor was within limit so that the trailer could not be detached. In our considered view, the analysis of the factual score in this regard cannot be regarded to be perverse and, therefore, not liable to be unsettled by this Court. 19. In our considered view, the analysis of the factual score in this regard cannot be regarded to be perverse and, therefore, not liable to be unsettled by this Court. 19. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju [ (1987) 1 SCC 538 ], while dealing with the concept of adequate punishment in relation to an offence under Section 304-A of the IPC, the Court stated that: “considerations of undue sympathy in such cases will not only lead to miscarriage of justice but will also undermine the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the criminal justice dispensation system. It need be hardly pointed out that the imposition of a sentence of fine of Rs. 250 on the driver of a Motor Vehicle for an offence under Section 304-A of the IPC and that too without any extenuating or mitigating circumstance is bound to shock the conscience of any one and will unmistakably leave the impression that the trial was a mockery of justice.” Thereafter, this Court enhanced the sentence to six months rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000 and, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. 20. In Sevaka Perumal and another v. State of Tamil Nadu [ (1991) 3 SCC 471 ], it has been emphasized that undue sympathy resulting in imposition of inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system and undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. 21. In Jashubha Bharatsinh Gohil and Ors. v. State of Gujarat [ (1994) 4 SCC 353 ], the Court, adverting to the new challenges of sentencing, opined that the courts are constantly faced with the situation where they are required to answer to new challenges and mould the sentencing system to meet those challenges. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. 22. In Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 ], this Court expressed thus: “Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence.” 23. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to highlight what is expected of a professional driver: “A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.” 24. In State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa Basanagouda Aregoudar [ (2002) 3 SCC 738 ], it has been ruled that if the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent driving, courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the courts should have deterrent effect on potential wrong-doers and it should commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Of course, the courts are given discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock of the wide and varying range of facts that might be relevant for fixing the quantum of sentence, but the discretion shall be exercised with due regard to the larger interest of the society and it is needless to add that passing of sentence on the offender is probably the most public face of the criminal justice system. 25. In State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru and Anr. 25. In State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru and Anr. [ (2005) 5 SCC 554 ], it has been ruled that the object should be to protect society and the avowed object of law is achieved by imposing appropriate sentence to deter the criminal. It is expected that the courts would operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be. 26. Yet again in B. Nagabhushanam V. State of Karnataka [ (2008) 5 SCC 730 ], the Court, taking note of the fact that the vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently, opined that six months' simple imprisonment and a direction to the appellant to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for commission of the offence punishable under Section 304-A and simple imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence punishable under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be said to be shocking. 27. Recently, in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh and Ors. [ (2012) 2 SCC 182 ], this Court while dealing with the concept of sentencing, has stated thus: “While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death or injury by rash and negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. The persons driving motor vehicles cannot and should not take a chance thinking that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court”. 28. In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra [ (2012) 2 SCC 648 ], it has been laid down that sentencing is an important task in relation to criminal justice dispensation system. One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacket formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain principles: twin objective of the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. There is no straitjacket formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain principles: twin objective of the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant circumstances. It has been further opined that the principle of proportionality in sentencing a crime-doer is well entrenched in criminal jurisprudence. As a matter of law, the proportion between crime and punishment bears the most relevant influence in the determination of sentencing the crime-doer. The court has to take into consideration all aspects including the social interest and conscience of the society for award of appropriate sentence. 29. In State TR. P.S. Lodhi Colony, New Delhi v. Sanjeev Nanda [ 2012 (7) SCALE 120 ], one of us (K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.), in his separate opinion, pertaining to the conception of adequate sentencing, has expressed thus: “Law demands that the offender should be adequately punished for the crime, so that it can deter the offender and other persons from committing similar offences. Nature and circumstances of the offence; the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offence; to afford adequate deterrence to the conduct and to protect the public from such crimes are certain factors to be considered while imposing the sentence.” 30. From the aforesaid authorities, it is luminous that this Court has expressed its concern on imposition of adequate sentence in respect of commission of offences regard being had to the nature of the offence and demand of the conscience of the society. That apart, the concern has been to impose adequate sentence for the offence punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC. It is worthy to note that in certain circumstances, the mitigating factors have been taken into consideration but the said aspect is dependent on the facts of each case. As the trend of authorities would show, the proficiency in professional driving is emphasized upon and deviation therefrom that results in rash and negligent driving and causes accident has been condemned. In a motor accident, when a number of people sustain injuries and a death occurs, it creates a stir in the society; sense of fear prevails all around. As the trend of authorities would show, the proficiency in professional driving is emphasized upon and deviation therefrom that results in rash and negligent driving and causes accident has been condemned. In a motor accident, when a number of people sustain injuries and a death occurs, it creates a stir in the society; sense of fear prevails all around. The negligence of one shatters the tranquility of the collective. When such an accident occurs, it has the effect potentiality of making victims in many a layer and creating a concavity in the social fabric. The agony and anguish of the affected persons, both direct and vicarious, can have nightmarish effect. It has its impact on the society and the impact is felt more when accidents take place quite often because of rash driving by drunken, negligent or, for that matter, adventurous drivers who have, in a way, no concern for others. Be it noted, grant of compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is in a different sphere altogether. Grant of compensation under Section 357(3) with a direction that the same should be paid to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused has been sentenced has a different contour and the same is not to be regarded as a substitute in all circumstances for adequate sentence. 31. Recently, this Court in Rattiram & Ors. v. State of M.P. Through Inspector of Police [ AIR 2012 SCW 1772 ], though in a different context, has stated that criminal jurisprudence, with the passage of time, has laid emphasis on victimology which fundamentally is a perception of a trial from the view point of the criminal as well as the victim. Both are viewed in the social context. The view of the victim is given due regard and respect in certain countries. It is the duty of the court to see that the victim's right is protected. 32. We may note with profit that an appropriate punishment works as an eye-opener for the persons who are not careful while driving vehicles on the road and exhibit a careless attitude possibly harbouring the notion that they would be shown indulgence or lives of others are like “flies to the wanton boys”. 32. We may note with profit that an appropriate punishment works as an eye-opener for the persons who are not careful while driving vehicles on the road and exhibit a careless attitude possibly harbouring the notion that they would be shown indulgence or lives of others are like “flies to the wanton boys”. They totally forget that the lives of many are in their hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human being is given an indecent burial by their rash and negligent act. 33. There can hardly be any cavil that there has to be a proportion between the crime and the punishment. It is the duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the collective for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored. In Siriya alias Shri Lal v. State of M.P. [ AIR 2008 SC 2314 ], it has been held as follows: -“Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the edifice of “order” should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his “Law in Changing Society” stated that, “State of criminal law continues to be - as it should be - a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society”. Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be.” 25. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, the appeal is allowed. The respondent is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 279 of the Indian Penal Code. He is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 337 of the Indian Penal Code. He is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 337 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent is also sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 338 of the Indian Penal Code. He is also sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month under section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. All the sentences shall run concurrently. Bail bonds are cancelled. The respondent is directed to surrender before the trial court on or before 11.7.2013 to serve the above mentioned sentences.