JUDGMENT N. Chaudhury, J. 1. This second appeal is preferred by plaintiff challenging judgment and decree dated 31.08.2001 passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon in Title Appeal No. 21/2001 dismissing the appeal and upholding the judgment and decree dated 24.04.2001 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), No. 1 Nagaon in Title Suit No. 74/1994. By the said judgment the learned trial Court had dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. I have heard Mr. G.P. Bhowmik, learned counsel for the appellant. None appears for the respondent although name of learned counsel for the respondent has been shown in the Cause List. 2. While admitting the second appeal on 20.12.2002, this court framed two substantial questions of law. They are as follows: 1. Whether the registered sale deed No. 1084/1987 dated 02.11.1987 executed by the defendant/respondent in favour of plaintiff/appellant amounts to a deed of mortgage by conditional sale? 2. Whether the unregistered 'Ekrarnama' (deed of agreement) Ext.- 'X' executed between the parties after absolute sale of the suit land conferred any right for redemption in favour of defendant/respondent? 3. To decide the aforesaid substantial questions of law undoubtedly it is necessary to state the basic facts involved in this case. Plaintiff Sri Jogendra Chandra Das filed Title Suit No. 74/1994 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Nagaon (now designated as Munsiff) stating that suit land measuring 2 bighas covered by Dags No. 331 and 297 under periodic Patta No. 75 (old)/175 (new) of Pub-Amrakanda Kissam in Mouza - Saidoria under the District of Nagaon originally belonged to one Rajani Kanta Namadas @ Ravi and after his death the suit land fell in the share of the principal defendant No. 1, Kritika Devi on amicable partition among the legal heirs. Thereafter on 02.11.1987 said Kirtika Devi sold the suit land to the plaintiff at a consideration of Rs. 12000/- and executed a registered sale deed being No. 1084/1987. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he got vacant possession of the suit land from the defendant No. 1 within 1 week of execution of the sale deed and he obtained mutation in his favour in the records of rights in accordance with law. 12000/- and executed a registered sale deed being No. 1084/1987. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he got vacant possession of the suit land from the defendant No. 1 within 1 week of execution of the sale deed and he obtained mutation in his favour in the records of rights in accordance with law. But the defendant No. 1 filed an application in the Court of Executive Magistrate, Nagaon on 22.01.1990 leading to registration of M.R. Case No. 64/1990 under section 145 Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate also passed an order for attachment of the said land under Section 146 Cr.P.C. and the land was attached from the custody of the plaintiff by police pursuant to the aforesaid order of the Magistrate. The proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was disposed of on 20.03.1993 declaring possession of the second party (defendant No. 1 herein) and this is how defendant No. 1 got possession of the suit land from police although the suit land was taken into custodia legis from the possession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff challenged the order of the Executive Magistrate before the learned Sessions Judge, Nagaon but it was dismissed on 23.12.1993. According to the plaintiff, having sold the land to the plaintiff on 02.11.1987 by execution of a valid registered sale deed, defendant No. 1 Kirtika Devi ceased to have any right, title and interest to the suit land and thus she had no right to possess the same. The plaintiff, therefore, prayed for a decree declaring his right, title and interest over the suit land and also for recovery of khas possession by evicting the defendant No. 1 (Kirtika Devi). 4. Defendant No. 1 by filing written statement contested the suit. Vide paragraph 24 of the written statement the defendant admitted to have executed Ext.-1 deed by herself but claimed that there was an unregistered deed of reconveyance on the same day with the recital that if the consideration of Rs. 12,000/- which was really a loan to the defendant No. 1, was refunded within a period of 2 years from the date of execution of the deed the plaintiff would be bound to execute and register a sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1. 5. 12,000/- which was really a loan to the defendant No. 1, was refunded within a period of 2 years from the date of execution of the deed the plaintiff would be bound to execute and register a sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court claimed as many as 8 issues including an additional issue and the same are as follows:- 1. Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties. 3. Whether the suit is learned by the principle of waiver, estoppel and acqiscence? 4. Whether the suit is hit by Section 34 of the specific Relief Act? 5. Whether the plaintiff has right title and interest over the suit land? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for? 7. What relief or relief's the parties are entitled to? Addl. Issue 8. Whether the transaction in question between the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff was sale or mortgage? 6. Both the parties examined 3 witnesses each on their respective behalf and exhibited documents. Plaintiff exhibited sale deed 3. Whether the suit is learned by the principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence? for the period 1968-69 as Ext.-2, Jamabandi for the period 1930-31 as Ext.-3, revenue receipts vide Ext.-4(1) to Ext. 4(4), order dated 20.03.2013 passed by learned Executive Magistrate as Ext.-5 and order dated 23.12.1993 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Nagaon as Ext.-6. On the other hand, defendant exhibited same order dated 20.03.1993 as Ext.-'ka', the vakalatnama of the plaintiff in the Court of learned Munsiff as Ext.-'kha' and the unregistered Ekrarnama as Ext.-'X'. I have gone through Ext.-'X'. It appears that this Ext.-'X' was shown to have been executed on 15.09.1987. On the other hand it is the case of both the sides that defendant No. 1 executed sale deed in favour of plaintiff on 02.11.1987. If the suit land was sold to the plaintiff only on 02.11.1987 it is not possible that Ekrarnama Ext.-'X' could be executed on 15.09.1987. This unregistered deed, therefore, becomes doubtful and impossible. Moreover, there is recital in Ext.-'X' that land had already been sold to the plaintiff. 7. If the suit land was sold to the plaintiff only on 02.11.1987 it is not possible that Ekrarnama Ext.-'X' could be executed on 15.09.1987. This unregistered deed, therefore, becomes doubtful and impossible. Moreover, there is recital in Ext.-'X' that land had already been sold to the plaintiff. 7. Plaintiff in course of his deposition specifically stated that pursuant to his purchase of the suit land he obtained possession, thereafter, went on enjoying the same and also got his name duly mutated in the records of rights. There is no cross-examination on the point of delivery of possession to the plaintiff. There is no evidence from the side of the defendant as to how did the defendant No. 1 get back possession of the suit land prior to institution of the proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and there is no averment any where in the order dated 20.03.1993 in regard to sale of the land in favour of plaintiff (second party therein) and/or handing over and/or taking over possession of the suit land to and by the plaintiff. The defendant's case in regard to possession of the suit land, therefore, is apparently obscure. 8. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the defendant No. 1 did never intend to sell the suit land to the plaintiff and this is why there was an Ekrarnama executed in favour of defendant No. 1 on the condition that the suit land would be returned by the defendant. The finding of the learned trial Court was that on perusal of Ext.-'X' as well as the sale deed Ext.-1, the transaction between the parties appears to be only a mortgage for securing loan of Rs. 12,000/-. Consequently, the prayer of the plaintiff for declaration of right, title and interest was refused and the suit was dismissed. In so doing, the learned trial Court also came to a finding that the sale deed was not proved by the plaintiff, although execution of Ext.-1 sale deed is admitted by the defendants. 9. The said judgment of the trial Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff passed on 24.04.2001 was challenged in Title Appeal No. 21/2001 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Nagaon. 9. The said judgment of the trial Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff passed on 24.04.2001 was challenged in Title Appeal No. 21/2001 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Nagaon. Learned First Appellate Court observed at paragraph 17 of the judgment that sale deed Ext.-1 and Ekrarnama Ext.-'X' were executed on the same date and this clearly establish, according to the learned First Appellate Court, that the defendant No. 1 really wanted to secure the loan of Rs. 12,000/- received by her from plaintiff and so this was a case of mortgage on conditional sale. The First Appellant Court relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Santakumari v. Lakshmi Amma Janaki Amma reported in AIR 2000 SC 3009 . The said judgment was delivered by a two judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein a sale deed was interpreted to be really a deed of mortgage by conditional sale in view of the fact that on the same day of execution of sale deed there was also a deed of reconveyance executed between the parties. 10. In view of the aforesaid factual situation the first substantial question of law mentioned above was framed by this Court. It is therefore incumbent upon this Court to find out on the basis of the materials on record as to whether Ext.-1 is really a deed of mortgage by conditional sale or as to whether the same is a deed of clear sale. Ext.-'X' the deed of reconveyance is also on record. So the substantial question of law ultimately boils down to the question as to whether on being read together Ext.-1 and Ext.-'X' establish a mortgage by conditional sale or as to whether the same is a sale with condition to repurchase. 11. Before deciding the first substantial question of law referred to above, it is necessary to see as to whether the finding of fact of the learned Courts below in regard to Ext.-1 and Ext.-'X' are perverse or not. The dates of execution of Ext.-1 and Ext.-X are very relevant as well as significant. Ext.-1 was executed on 02.11.1987 whereas Ext.-'X' was executed on 15.9.1987. The dates of execution of Ext.-1 and Ext.-X are very relevant as well as significant. Ext.-1 was executed on 02.11.1987 whereas Ext.-'X' was executed on 15.9.1987. In that view of the matter the finding of the First Appellate Court at paragraph 17 of the judgment that these two documents were executed on the same day cannot be said to be based on materials on record. Apparently this finding is perverse. Admittedly the sale deed Ext. 1 was executed by defendant No. 1. According to the defendant No. 1 although she executed a clear sale deed yet her intention was only to mortgage the land in question so as to secure the loan of Rs. 12,000/- received by her from the plaintiff and this is why she obtained a deed of reconveyance from the plaintiff. Now if the land was sold to the plaintiff on 02.11.1987 there could not have been any occasion for the defendant No. 1 to execute Ekrarnama Ext.-'X' on 15.09.1987 i.e. prior to execution of the sale deed in favour of plaintiff. Unless the plaintiff becomes owner of the suit land by way of purchase, there is no question of his executing Ekrarnama to reconvey the same to the defendant No. 1. Ext.-'X' contains recital that the land was already sold to the plaintiff. In that view of the matter this unregistered deed of reconveyance (Ekrarnama) itself becomes doubtful. This is more so because, the plaintiff specifically stated on oath in course of his deposition that he did never execute any Ekrarnama as claimed by the defendant No. 1. No witness was there in the Ekrarnama except a scribe. Now, if the Ext.-'X' itself becomes doubtful then there is no problem in understanding Ext.-1 as a clear sale deed. 12. There is yet another angle associated with the findings of the learned Courts below to the effect that Ext.-1 was really a deed of mortgage by conditional sale. A mortgage by conditional sale must be distinguished from sale with a condition for repurchase. The two things may resemble each other closely in form but differ widely in their substance. If the transaction is not a mortgage, the right of repurchase being an option must be exercised on the basis of the recital made in the deed. A mortgage by conditional sale must be distinguished from sale with a condition for repurchase. The two things may resemble each other closely in form but differ widely in their substance. If the transaction is not a mortgage, the right of repurchase being an option must be exercised on the basis of the recital made in the deed. This is why prior to 1929 there was an added responsibility on the Courts to decipher the intention of the parties to adjudicate as to whether a sale deed with condition to repurchase would be really a deed of mortgage by conditional sale. Obviously such a responsibility of the Court was a difficult one and there was likelihood of error in arriving at such decision. Perhaps to overcome this mischief a proviso was added to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act vide Section 19 of the Act 20 of 1929. The said proviso is quoted below: Provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the documents which effects or purports to effect the sale. (emphasis supplied) 13. The language of the proviso referred to above is apparently plain and unambiguous. It is the established principle of interpretation that once the language of a statute is clear there is no scope for further interpretation. Literal interpretation of a statute is the normal role. Taking plain meaning, of the proviso referred to above, necessarily connotes that unless the condition of repurchase is embodied in the same document effecting the sale, the transaction should not be deemed as mortgage at all. In case the condition of repurchase is brought in by parties by a separate deed, the first deed effecting sale cannot be deemed to be a mortgage by virtue of proviso to Section 58(c) of the T.P. Act. After 1929 amendment of the T.P. Act, there is no necessity of making any probe to decipher the intention of the parties for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether the transaction was a mortgage with conditional sale or it is a sale with condition to repurchase. 14. The case with identical problem came for adjudication before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Simrathmull v. Nanjalingiah Gowder reported in AIR 1963 SC 1182 . An extract from paragraph 4 of the said judgment is quoted below: ... 14. The case with identical problem came for adjudication before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Simrathmull v. Nanjalingiah Gowder reported in AIR 1963 SC 1182 . An extract from paragraph 4 of the said judgment is quoted below: ... The plea of the plaintiff that the sale deed Ext.-A-1 constituted a transaction of mortgage by conditional sale is inadmissible, because the sale deed and the covenant for reconveyance are contained in separate documents. 15. This observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is in conformity with proviso to section 58(c) of the T.P. Act. This judgment was delivered by a Bench constituting of three Hon'ble Judges. It has been mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this judgment that the learned First Appellate Court relied on a two judges Bench decision of Santakumari (supra) wherein this earlier larger Bench judgment was not considered. In that judgment the latter two judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered a deed of sale and a deed of reconveyance executed separately on the same date and held that intention of the parties was to execute mortgage by conditional sale. It appears the proviso to Section 58(c) did not come-up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that judgment. Be that as it may, in the case in hand Ext.-'X' and Ext.-1 were not executed on the same date and as such the latter judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Santakumari (supra) is distinguishable on facts. Rather the earlier three judges Bench decision in the case of K. Simrathmull v. Nanjalingiah Gowda (supra) is applicable to the case in hand. It is thus clear that Ext.-1 is a clear sale deed and in view of proviso to Section 58(c) of the T.P. Act, Ext.-1 cannot be construed to be a one as a mortgage deed by way of conditional sale. The first substantial question of law, therefore, is decided in the negative and in favour of appellant/plaintiff. 16. in view of the finding with regard to first substantial question of law as referred to above, this Court is constrained to hold that the plaintiff/appellant acquired valid right, title and interest to the suit land and as such the learned Courts below committed error in not decreeing the suit of the plaintiff at least to that extent. 17. 16. in view of the finding with regard to first substantial question of law as referred to above, this Court is constrained to hold that the plaintiff/appellant acquired valid right, title and interest to the suit land and as such the learned Courts below committed error in not decreeing the suit of the plaintiff at least to that extent. 17. This takes us to the second substantial question of law as to whether Ext.-'X' conferred any right of redemption in favour of defendant/respondent. While deciding first substantial question of law, opinion has been expressed about admissibility and truthfulness of Ext.-'X' itself. It is not the case of the defendant that the doctrine feeding the estoppel applies to this case. Even if such an objection was raised, the same perhaps would not have been tenable in view of the fact that once there was no possibility of the plaintiff acquiring any title to the suit land on 15.09.1987 there would not have been any question of application of the doctrine feeding the estoppel. Moreover, by filing the written statement the defendant only made a reference to deed of reconveyance without filing any counter claim for specific performance of contract. The suit was filed in the year 1994 and nearly two decades elapsed in the meantime. It is stated at the Bar that no suit for specific performance of contract has been filed by the defendant as yet. The plaintiff having specifically denied to have executed Ekrarnama in favour of defendant No. 1 and apparent discrepancies being discernible on the face of Ext.-'X' itself substantial incredibility in regard to existence of such agreement for reconveyance looms over the transaction. Moreover, in the absence of any averment as to whether the claim of the plaintiff of getting possession of the suit land pursuant to purchase on 02.11.1987, the stand of the defendant as to how the possession could be taken by her is also not clear. On the other hand, it is the specific case of the plaintiff that the defendant got the possession from police after her possession was declared by Executive Magistrate in a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and that, too, ex-parte against the plaintiff. The plaintiff has really challenged this factum of possession of the defendant as illegal. On the other hand, it is the specific case of the plaintiff that the defendant got the possession from police after her possession was declared by Executive Magistrate in a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and that, too, ex-parte against the plaintiff. The plaintiff has really challenged this factum of possession of the defendant as illegal. In view of the fact that on 15.09.1987 when the Ekrarnama was alleged to have been executed the plaintiff was nowhere in the vicinity of the suit land, no right accrued to the defendant by said document. Even if there was at all any document like Ext.-'X'. Presuming that there was a deed of reconveyance, the same automatically would not confer any right to repossess the land unless either the plaintiff agrees or there is a decree of specific performance. Admittedly there is no prayer from the side of defendant to that effect and as such the question of right of redemption cannot arise. However, in the case in hand the authenticity of Ext.-'X' itself having been not established in view of apparent discrepancies referred to above, the second substantial question of law is also decided in favour of appellant/plaintiff. 18. In the result, this second appeal succeeds. Judgment and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are set aside. Suit of the plaintiff declaring his rights, title and interest over the suit land is decreed. The prayer of the plaintiff for recovery of possession stands decreed. 19. Draw up decree accordingly. 20. No order as to costs. Sent down the case records immediately after drawal of decree. Appeal allowed