JUDGMENT : 1. All the above mentioned appeals shall stand decided by this common order and judgment as they have been filed against the same impugned decree and judgment dated 26.10.2012 passed by Additional District Judge No. 3, Udaipur, vide which the Trial Court rejected the objection petitions filed by the appellants under Order XXI, Rule 97 and 99 rent with Section 151 of the C.P.C. on the application of the plaintiff-decree holder filed under Section 11 and Order VII, Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. 2. The facts in short are that the respondent-decree holder had filed a suit for declaration and possession against the State of Rajasthan on 16.02.1978, in which it was stated that on the merger of the Mewar with the State of Rajasthan, a list of private properties of the Ruler of Mewar was prepared. The same was approved by the Government of India. Accordingly, the then Ruler of Mewar, the plaintiff decree-holder was held to be the owner of the property named as Devasthan Ki Kachahari. The said property was held to be part of the City Palace. On account of lack of space, the State of Rajasthan requested the respondent-decree holder to allow them to keep the possession of the Devasthan Ki Kachahari for the purpose of offices till as such time the State in able to find another place for its offices. Thus, the Government office of the Devasthan Department continued to run its office from the said premises belonging to the erstwhile Ruler. Subsequently, when the defendant-State refused to vacate the premises, the erstwhile Ruler Maharana Bhagwat Singh was forced to file the suit for declaration and possession against the State of Rajasthan. Written statement was filed by the State of Rajasthan claiming that the property belongs to the State of Rajasthan and is occupied by the Devasthan Department. Subsequently, the said written statement was amended. An additional plea was raised in the amended written statement supported by an affidavit sworn by the then Assistant Commissioner of the Devasthan Department. As per the additional plea, the suit property belonged to the deity "Shri Jawati Swaroopeshwar Ji". Thus, along with the 9 issues, which were framed prior to the amendment of the written statement, issue No. 10 was also framed, which is as under:- "10. Whether Statute of Jawanshwarupeshwar is necessary party in this suit? As per the additional plea, the suit property belonged to the deity "Shri Jawati Swaroopeshwar Ji". Thus, along with the 9 issues, which were framed prior to the amendment of the written statement, issue No. 10 was also framed, which is as under:- "10. Whether Statute of Jawanshwarupeshwar is necessary party in this suit? The said suit for possession was decreed in favour of the plaintiff Maharana Bhagwat Singh. All the issues regarding ownership of the suit property as well a the question of impleading Devasthan Department as necessary party were decided against the defendant-State of Rajasthan vide order and judgment dated 19.09.1997 and it was held that the property in question was the personal property of the plaintiff Maharana Bhagwat Singh. Civil First Appeal No. 191/1997 was filed by the State of Rajasthan against the aforementioned judgment and decree. The said appeal came to be dismissed by this Court for non-prosecution vide order and judgment dated 13.10.2000. S.B. Civil Restoration Petition No. 06034/2007 was filed against the order dated 13.10.2000 passed by this Court. The same was also dismissed vide judgment dated 05.09.2008. The State filed SLP No. 15029/2009 before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The said SLP was too dismissed vide order dated 21.07.2009 and the judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997 passed by the Trial Court was affirmed. The State filed Review Petition No. 312/2010 against the order and judgment passed to the Hon'ble Court which was also dismissed on 16.02.2010. 3. During the pendency of the execution proceedings, on 03.07.2008 present 8 appellants and four others (total 12 objections petitions) filed objection petitions under Order XXI, Rule 97 and 99 and Section 151 of the C.P.C. one objection petition No. 38/2008 (Civil Miscellaneous) filed by one Manoj Shah was withdrawn by him as his shop was not situated within the four boundaries as described in the decree. Out of (1 applications filed under Order XXI, Rule 102 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. by the respondent-decree holder, 3 applications were allowed by the Executing Court and rejected the objection petitions vide its order dated 01.09.2008. Respondent-decree holder took possession of these three shops, which are situated on the ground floor of the building situated within the four boundaries as described in the decree. Three appeal i.e. S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1338/2008 (Ganpat Lal Shah v. LRs. Respondent-decree holder took possession of these three shops, which are situated on the ground floor of the building situated within the four boundaries as described in the decree. Three appeal i.e. S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1338/2008 (Ganpat Lal Shah v. LRs. of Maharana Bhagwan Singh Ji) , 1339/2008 (Ganpat Lal Shah v. LRs. Maharana Bhagwat Singh Ji) and 1340/2008 (Mahaveer Chand v. LRs. of Maharana Bhagwat Singh Ji) were preferred before this Court by the objection petitioners against the order dated 01.09.2008. This Court dismissed all the 3 appeals vide its order dated 05.04.2012. 4. Shri R.K. Thanvi, Senior Advocate and Shri Tribhuwan Gupta, learned Counsel for the appellants contended that although the matter was fixed for evidence an application was filed under Older XXL Rule 97. 99 and 102 of the C.P.C. for rejection of the objection on the ground that the sini premises was given on rent during the pendency of the suit. However, the said application was dismissed vide order dated 01.09.2008 wherein it was held that shops were given much prior to filing of the suit. Thereafter, the decree holder filed another application for review of the order dated 01.09.2008. The said review' application' was also dismissed by the Court on 06.11.2011 and issues were framed on 20.11.2008. Another application was moved by the decree-holder to delete the issue No. 1 framed in the basis of the objection petitions. However the said application was also dismissed vide, order dated 15.01.2009. In spite of the similar applications with similar averments having been dismissed, the application under Order VII, Rule 11 read with Section 151, C.P.C. for rejection of the objection petition was filed by the decree holder on 03.09.2012 was accepted which amounts to review of the earlier order and hence the application under Order VII, Rule 11 is barred by the principle of res judicata. 5. Secondly the appellants are the tenants of the shops which are the property of deity "Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji". The deity "Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji was not a party to the suit proceedings. The temple was being managed by Devasthan Department. 5. Secondly the appellants are the tenants of the shops which are the property of deity "Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji". The deity "Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji was not a party to the suit proceedings. The temple was being managed by Devasthan Department. The Devasthan Commissioner/Devasthan Department was not party in the suit and suit was only against the State Government and it was in account of this fact that objections petition filed by the appellants was admitted and therefore, the order rejecting the objection petitions on the application of the decree-holder under Order VII, Rule 11 is bad in eye of law. 6. Further, the appellants are paying rent to Devasthan Department which is the trustee of the property of Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji temple. The department is taking rent on account of the temple. The decree is not against the temple and therefore neither the temple nor the Devasthan Department is bound by the said decree. Hence the appellants who are the tenants cannot be evicted from the shops without following the due procedure of law. 7. It was further argued that objection petitions of the appellants could not have been dismissed simply on the basis of tin application moved under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. as the issues are arguable and the same could have only been decided after leading evidence. The said application was moved by the plaintiff-respondent after lapse of 4 years when the ease has progressed and the documents which had never seen the light of the day had been brought on the record to show that the property belonged to the deity. Therefore, to throw away the objection at his stage was illegal. 8. It was submitted that the Jagir Commissioner had passed the order and judgment dated 18.04.1963. As per the said order the deity was held to be the owner of the property in question. Earlier, the said issue had been decided against the State as the State had not brought on record the said order. In case the appellants were allowed to lead their evidence, they could have proved the existence of the order dated 18.04.1983 which would have let to the finding that the deity was the owner and hot the State of Rajasthan. 9. The learned Counsel submitted that learned Trial Court presumed that its department is barred by judgment and decree passed against the State. 9. The learned Counsel submitted that learned Trial Court presumed that its department is barred by judgment and decree passed against the State. This finding of the learned Trial Court is erroneous and against the law. In the case at hand the decree is only against the State Government and no department was impleaded as party respondent. The Commission of the Devasthan Department is custodian and trustee, and duty hound to safe guard the property of the temple/deity which is minor and have its independent status and can sue or be sued independently and even question the decision of the State if it is affecting the property of which it is custodian/trustee. The property in question is of the deity Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji and Devasthan Department is managing the affairs and therefore, the decree cannot be said to be binding on the Devasthan Commissioner and/or Devasthan Department and, therefore, deserves to lie quashed and set aside. 10. The objection of the appellants was that they are tenants of the Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji temple, which is managed by the Devasthan Commissioner/Devasthan Department and as they are tenants since prior to the institution of the suit and they were not party in the suit/decree, therefore they cannot be evicted without following the due procedure of law in the execution. In fact Rent Control Act and Transfer of Property Act prohibits the eviction of the tenant without following the procedure prescribed therein and without fulfilling the conditions prescribed in the Rent Act of the State Government/TP Act the issue was framed for this purpose but the learned Trial Court without averting to the facts and circumstances, and the issues wrongly rejected the objection petitions of the appellants while allowing the application of the respondent-decree holder filed under Order VII. Rule II of the C.P.C. 11. It was argued that to invoke the provisions of Section 11 of res judicata against appellant, it was necessary to implead them as party to the earlier proceedings and show that both the first proceedings are same. In the case at hand the appellants were not the party to the suit even they are in possession of the shops as tenant even prior to the filing of the suit. Even Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji Temple was not a party to the suit or decree. In the case at hand the appellants were not the party to the suit even they are in possession of the shops as tenant even prior to the filing of the suit. Even Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji Temple was not a party to the suit or decree. Therefore the principle of res judicata cannot be applied on the basis of the findings and issues, which were decided in between the State Government and decree holder alone. 12. Learned Counsel for the appellants relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Nanu Ram Sharma and another v. Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No. 2 Jaipur District Jaipur and others and in the case of Kamala and others v. K.T. Eshwara Sa and others, (2008) 12 Apex Court Cases 661 to contend that the matter involved disputed questions of law and, therefore, the application under Order VII. Rule 11 of the C.P.C. could not be decided without recording evidence. Similarly reliance was also placed on the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Payappar Sree Dharmasastha Temple Advisory Committee v. A.K. Josheph and others, (2009) 14 Apex Court Cases 628 . 13. Reliance was made to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Bhau Ram v. Janak Singh and others, 2012 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 254, to state that averments made in the plaint have to be looked into while deciding the application under Order VII, Rule 11 and not the written statement filed by the defendant. It was further stated that the principle of res judicata is both an issue of fact and law. As such the same cannot be decided without recording evidence. 14. Reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by Orissa High Court in the case of Smt. Sairindi Sahau and another v. Pitabas Mahara and others, 1992 (1) Ori. 345 while arguing that the issues which were raised in the application under Order VII, Rule 11 had already been raised at number of times by the decree holder but were rejected by the Trial Court vide orders dated 5.7.2008, 1.9.2008 and 15.1.2009. The very application under Order VII, Rule 11 is res judicata. Reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.V. Rajasthan and another v. N.M. Mohammed Kunhi, AIR 2003 Apex Court 649 . 15. The very application under Order VII, Rule 11 is res judicata. Reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.V. Rajasthan and another v. N.M. Mohammed Kunhi, AIR 2003 Apex Court 649 . 15. Learned Counsel for the appellants further submitted that as per the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shreenath and another v. Rajesh and others, (1998) 4 Apex Court Cases 543 the objection petition under Order XXI, Rule 97(1) and (2) was maintainable as the word 'any person' occurring in Rule 97(1) includes person who is not party to the suit or claims that he is not bound by the decree. 16. Learned Counsel for the appellants raised yet another argument and submitted that as per the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta and others, AIR (2007) 10 Apex Court Cases 59 , a plaint should not be rejected at a belated stage after filing of written statement framing of issues and cross-examination. The said judgment was also relied to substantiate the argument that few lines or the passage should not be read in isolation and the pleadings should be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. Meaning thereby that the objection petition should be read as a whole and few lines should not be picked up from her and there to read that the appellants admitted that State of Rajasthan was the landlord. 17. It was further submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deewan Singh and others v. Rajendra Pd. Ardevi and others, AIR 2007 Apex Court 767(1) has specifically held that Devasthan Department was the statutory authority and is not an agency of the State. It was a separate entity, meaning thereby that since the Devasthan Department was not party the decree is neither binding on the deity nor on the Devasthan Department. 18. Shri L.R. Mehta, Senior Advocate and Shri Manish Shishodia learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff while opposing the contention of learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that die decree dated 19.09.1997 became final on 21.07.2009 when the same was affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Hence, it cannot be re-visited interpreted in the garb of objection petition filed in the execution petition. Hence, it cannot be re-visited interpreted in the garb of objection petition filed in the execution petition. Any adjudication would mean going behind the decree, which had attained finality at the hands of the persons who are admittedly not claimant title to the same. 19. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellants are claiming them selves as tenants in the property of Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji Temple which were tented out to them by Assistant Commissioner Devasthan Department. It is admitted by them that they are paying the rent to Devasthan Department and while deciding issues No. 4, 8 and 10, the learned Trial Court in its judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997 have already decided that Devasthan Department is the part of the State Government and the suit is filed against the State. Thus, the judgment-debtor cannot be allowed to raise the claim with respect to the ownership as vesting in deity Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar J. Further the appellant is paying the rent to the Devasthan Department and therefore, the appellant is tenant of Devasthan Department and they cannot have a better title than the landlord because they are stepping in the shoe of their landlord. Learned Trial Court has already passed judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997 against the State of Rajasthan and the Devasthan Department held to Ire part of the State is bound by the said judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997. 20. It was further contended that State of Rajasthan relied on the Rajasthan Gazette notification dated 27.04.1981 to prove that the temple belonged to the Government as it was included in the list of temples belonging to the Government. The Court after considering the same recorded a finding that the temple was a personal property of the plaintiff. Hence, the question of the temple belonging to the deity does not arise. Issues No. 4, 8 and 10 along with other issue having been decided against the State of Rajasthan in the original decree of 1997, no further adjudication on the same issue at the instance of a different party can be permitted in execution proceedings. Further, it was submitted that in the original suit when the defendant State Government/Devasthan Department filed amended written statement, issue No. 10 was added precisely to adjudicate whether the deity Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji is a necessary party in the suit or not. Further, it was submitted that in the original suit when the defendant State Government/Devasthan Department filed amended written statement, issue No. 10 was added precisely to adjudicate whether the deity Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji is a necessary party in the suit or not. The learned Trial Court by the decree under execution dated 19.9.1997 (Annexure-R/1) while relying inter alia on the doctrine of jus tertii gave a categoric finding that the suit property cannot be said to be belonging to the deity. 21. Thus, issues which were raised in the objection petitions, have already been decided by the learned Trial Court in the original suit way back in the year 1997 and according to Section 11 of the C.P.C. appellants cannot be permitted to raise the same issue which has already been decided. As such, appellants are stepping into the shoes of their landlord and the learned Trial Court has already passed the judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997 against the Devasthan Department through the State of Rajasthan. 22. It was argued that the appellants in their appeals have incorporated various facts and grounds, which were not averred in the objection petitions, and the appellants are, therefore, required to confine their arguments strictly within four-corners of the objection petitions placed on record as Annexure-R/2 in all the appeals. It was also submitted that in judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997 amongst various issues framed and answered in favour of the respondent-decree holder, the issue regarding ownership of the suit property as well as issue regarding Devasthan Commissioner being a necessary party, were framed and decided in favour of the respondent decree-holder. Further, it was the then Assistant Devasthan Commissioner who had verified and signed the amended written statement filed on behalf of the State. It was further stated that issue No. 4 regarding Devasthan Commissioner being necessary party was not pressed and given up by the defendant/judgment-debtor and the Court has recorded a categoric finding that since Devasthan Commissioner comprises of one of the departments of the State Government, and the suit has been filed against the State Government, therefore, Devasthan department is not a necessary party. 23. It was contended that by virtue of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and by virtue of the clear admission by the appellants, the appellants are estopped from challenging title of the suit property or the tenanted premises. 23. It was contended that by virtue of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and by virtue of the clear admission by the appellants, the appellants are estopped from challenging title of the suit property or the tenanted premises. Further, if the objections put forward by the appellants were to be sustained then in every case, where a decree is put into execution by landlord/owner of property, a tenant or licensee as the case may be would not only deny the title of the landlord despite having no locus in eyes of law to do so but would also try to establish title of a third person in place of his landlord only to prolong execution of the decree. Estoppel tinder Section 116 of the Evidence Ad is provided for in order to meet such circumstances and a tenant or a licence opposing eviction from the suit premises cannot be allowed to agitate or question the defect if any in title of his landlord. 24. It was further contended that the appellants cannot raise the argument that the properly belongs to the deity on the basis of the order dated 18.04.1963 alleged to have been passed by the Jagir Commissioner as the property in question does neither fall within the purview of the Act of 1952 nor does order dated 18.04.1963 (Annexure-A/1) had any bearing on the property in question. The plaintiff/decree holder were absolute owner of the property and where infect the givers of Jagir rather than Jagirdars as wrongly assumed by the appellants and therefore, the Act of 1952 has no application. Moreover, the findings on issue No. 8 have been recorded against the Government of Rajasthan and the said finding along with the judgment of 1997 having attained finality, the same cannot be permitted to be reopened or re-agitated at the instance of objectors-tenant, who admittedly are not claiming title to the property on strength of the said judgment of the Jagir Commissioner or otherwise. The findings on the said issue are binding on all parties to the proceedings as well as their successors. 25. Learned Counsel for the parties were heard at length. 26. The appellants are not claiming the title of the shop in question. Thus, only assertion is that they took the shops on rent from Devasthan Department and they are paying rent to Devasthan Department. 25. Learned Counsel for the parties were heard at length. 26. The appellants are not claiming the title of the shop in question. Thus, only assertion is that they took the shops on rent from Devasthan Department and they are paying rent to Devasthan Department. No doubt, the suit was filed by the plaintiff, the then Ruler of Mewar against State of Rajasthan and neither the deity nor the Devasthan Department was made a party to the suit and the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff Maharana Bhagwat Singh. However, three issues of the main suit are relevant for the purpose of the specific objections raised by the appellants. They are issues No. 4, 8 and 10, they read as under:- "4. Whether Devasthan Commission is necessary party? ... defendant. 8. Whether after declaration of this property to be the private property of Devasthan on 18.04.1963 by the Additional Collector, Jagir for the reason this decision is final?.... defendant." 10. Whether Statute of Jawanshwarupeshwar is necessary party in this suit? .....defendant." 27. All the three issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff-respondent vide judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997. 28. The said judgment and decree has been upheld uptil the Hon'ble Apex Court. Thus, the objection petitions moved by the appellants in the execution petition filed by the plaintiff-decree holder on the ground that they are the tenants of the Devasthan Department and since neither the deity nor the Devasthan Department nor the appellants were made party to the suit, the said decree is not binding on them, have been rightly dismissed on the ground that the said issues raised in the present petition have already been decided by the Trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997, which is under execution and is upheld until the Supreme Court. The said objection petitions have been dismissed by the Trial Court in pursuance to an application under Order VII, Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. 29. The first argument raised by learned Counsel for the appellants that similar applications with same prayer were dismissed by executing Court vide orders dated 07.07.2008, 01.09.2008 and 15.01.2009 and therefore, the present application filed by the plaintiff-decree holder amounts to review and recall of the earlier order, which is not permissible and it is barred by principle of res judicata, cannot be sustained. A perusal of the order dated 05.07.2008 shows that infect both the parties agreed that the application under Order IX, Rule 27 of the C.P.C. was not maintainable and only agitated the prayer under Order XXI, Rule 99 of the C.P.C. By the same order, the Court directed that the question was triable and fixed the proceedings for evidence. The said order in itself does not bar an application under Order VII, Rule 11 as the provision of Order VII. Rule 11 can be invoked at an time. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society represented by its Chairman v. Pooniammam Educational Trust reported by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, 2012 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 211 : (2012) 8 SCC 706 held in no uncertain terms that the application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. can be moved at any stage and held in para 25 as under:- "25. The stand taken by the appellant, who has filed the application for rejection of the plaint, is sustainable and acceptable. We have already adverted to the averments in the plaint and we have held that the plaint has not shown a complete cause of action of privity of contract between the plaintiff and the first defendant or on behalf of the first defendant. To reject the plaint even before registration of the plaint on one or more grounds mentioned in Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code, the other defendants need not necessarily be heard at all as it does not affect their rights. As a matter of fact, this Court in Saleem Bhai, (2003) 1 SCC 557 held that the plaint can be rejected even before the issuance of summons. This Court has taken a view that the Trial Court can exercise its power under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code at any state of the suit i.e. before registering the plaint or after issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. We respectfully agree with the said view and reiterate the same." 30. Moreover, interlocutory orders cannot be a res judicata for passing a final order. We respectfully agree with the said view and reiterate the same." 30. Moreover, interlocutory orders cannot be a res judicata for passing a final order. Explaining the difference and the consequence of passing the interlocutory orders on the main order and judgment, a Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court comprising of Hon'ble three judges in the case of Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and others, AIR 1964 SC 993 held in para 13 as under:- "13. It is needless to point out that interlocutory orders of various kinds; some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the Court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders are based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of the Court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of Court. There are other orders which are also interlocutory, but would fall into a different category. The difference from the ones just now referred to lies in the fact that they are not directed to maintaining the status no or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication, but are designed to ensure the just, smooth, orderly and expeditious disposal of the suit. They are interlocutory in the sense that they do not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to the litigation." 31. They are interlocutory in the sense that they do not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to the litigation." 31. The Hon'ble Court went on to point out the difference between the principle of res judicata and a rejection on the ground that no new facts have been adduced to justify a different order, as under: "The principle that repeated applications based on the same facts and seeking the same reliefs might be disallowed by the Court docs not however necessarily rest on the principle of res judicata. Thus is an application for the adjournment of a suit is rejected, a subsequent application for the same purpose even it based on the same facts, is not barred on the application 'of any rule of res judicata, but would be rejected for the same grounds on which the original application was refused. The principle underlying the distinction between the rule of res judicata and a rejection on the ground that no new facts have been adduced to justify a different order is vital. If the principle of res judicata is applicable to the decision on a particular issue of fact, even if fresh facts were placed before the Court, the bar would continue to operate and preclude a fresh investigation of the issue, whereas in the other case, on roof of fresh facts, the Court would be bound to take those into account and make an order conformably to the facts freshly brought before the Court." 32. Now let us apply the test in the present case. The first order relied on by learned Counsel for the appellants was passed on 05.07.2008. By this order, the Court gave direction to take evidence for disposal of the application under Order XXI. Rule 97 and 99 of the C.P.C. The second order as relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellants was passed on 01.09.2008. By this order, the application moved by the decree-holder under Order XXI, Rule 102 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. was dismissed. The third order was passed on 15.01.2009. As per the said order, the application of the respondent-decree holder under Order XIV. Rule 5(2) of the C.P.C. praying for deleting the issue No. 1 was dismissed. Meanwhile, on 21.07.2009. The third order was passed on 15.01.2009. As per the said order, the application of the respondent-decree holder under Order XIV. Rule 5(2) of the C.P.C. praying for deleting the issue No. 1 was dismissed. Meanwhile, on 21.07.2009. the SLP filed by the State of Rajasthan against the order and judgment dated 13.10.2000 passed in Civil First Appeal No. 191/1997 filed by the State of Rajasthan against the impugned judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997 and judgment dated 05.09.2008 passed in S.B. Civil Restoration Petition No. 06034/2007, was dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court thereby confirming the decree dated 19.09.1997. Subsequently the review' petition against the order dated 21.07.2009 passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court was also dismissed. Thus, it was after the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the SLP Filed by the State of Rajasthan and the decree dated 19.09.1997 was affirmed that the respondent-decree holder filed application under Section 11 and Order VII, Rule 11 read with Section 151, C.P.C. on 03.09.2012. In such circumstances, the Court rightly allowed the application and dismissed the objection petitions of the appellants as the Court could not have gone behind the decree which was affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in which the issues raised by the appellants objector stood considered and decided. If the argument of learned Counsel for the appellants is to be accepted then in that eventuality an order passed on application for interim injunction cannot be altered while deciding the suit for permanent injunction. Even otherwise, the very purpose of Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. would stand defeated. The remedy of an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. is an independent remedy to be decided as per the provisions provided therein. Under Order VII. Rule 11, one of the grounds on which the plaint can be rejected is: "11. Rejection of plaint. - The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:- (a) (b) (c) (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law." 33. While deciding the said application, plaint as well the document as referred in the plaint and placed on record can be taken into consideration along with plaint as held by this Court in the case of Bhagwan Das v. Goswami Brijesh Kumarji and others, AIR 1983 Raj. 3 . 34. While deciding the said application, plaint as well the document as referred in the plaint and placed on record can be taken into consideration along with plaint as held by this Court in the case of Bhagwan Das v. Goswami Brijesh Kumarji and others, AIR 1983 Raj. 3 . 34. In the case of Association of Radha Swami Dera Bah Bagga Singhli v. Pratap Singh and others, 1984 WLN (UC) 284 , this Court, in para 9 held, as under:- 9. It is trite law that Order VII, Rule 11(d), C.P.C. authorises the rejection of a plaint where the suit appears, from the statement in the plaint, to be barred by any law. For this purpose, only the allegations and averments made in the plaint would be looked into. The Court cannot travel beyond what has been averred and alleged in the plaint. In order to decide whether the suit appears to be barred by any law, the Court can also look into the documents filed with the plaint. 35. Similar view was also held by the Single Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Tara Devi (deceased by LRs.) and others v. The District Judge, Basti and others, AIR 2003 All. 64 . 36. In the present case, judgment dated 19.09.1997 is referred. The same, therefore, can definitely be looked into to see whether the issues raised in the objection petitions are already decided, especially when the same judgment is under execution. 37. Thus, the interim orders dated 05.07.2008, 01.09.2008 and 15.01.2009 as referred above in the facts of the present case do not amount to res judicata and do not come in the way for deciding the application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. 38. The Second argument raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the shops were given on rent by the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department and Devasthan Department was the institution and trustee of the deity "Sri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji" and since they were not impleaded as party in the suit, the department and the deity are not bound by the said decree. These objections were dealt in the main judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997. As already stated above, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed issues No. 4 and 10 as under:- "4. Whether Devasthan Commission is necessary party?.... defendant. These objections were dealt in the main judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997. As already stated above, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed issues No. 4 and 10 as under:- "4. Whether Devasthan Commission is necessary party?.... defendant. 10. Whether Statute of Jawan Swaroopeshwar is necessary in the suit?..... Defendant." 39. The issue No. 10 was framed after an amendment was made in the written statement that the property in question was stated to be self-defendant property of Shri Jawan Swaroopeshwar Ji temple and there is control of Devasthan Department on all the self-dependents under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act. All the three issues were decided in favour of the respondent-plaintiff i.e., decree holder and against the State. 40. Even otherwise, although the appellants in their objection petitions have stated that the disputed property was rented to them by Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department and that the appellants are paying the rent to Devasthan Department, the document Annexure-R/3 is the rent note executed between the State of Rajasthan and the appellants wherein it is clearly mentioned that the State of Rajasthan through the Devasthan Department is executing the rent-note in favour of the appellants qua the suit property. Thus, the appellant cannot go beyond the rent-note. 41. In the case of Sita Ram Dangayach v. Suraj Narain and others, 1985 RLR 806 . decree holder filed execution petition praying for delivery of possession of suit premises from the judgment-debtor. However, one "S" filed application under Order XXI, Rule 36 of the Rent Control Act contending that he is an old tenant and had been paying the rent to judgment-debtor and he should not be dispossessed; this Court held that "S" is bound by decree against the judgment-debtor and not entitled to protection under Order XXI. Rule 36 of the Act as he is a person in subordinate position as he was inducted into possession by judgment-debtor. It was held that when the possession of judgment debtor was extinguished by valid decree, possession of "S" also became unlawful. It was further held that Executing Court had no jurisdiction to start inquiry regarding possession at the instance of "S" i.e. the third party and held as under:- 9. Now, the main question to be determined this is, whether Sita Ram is bound by the decree passed against Gordhan son of Udai Narain. It was further held that Executing Court had no jurisdiction to start inquiry regarding possession at the instance of "S" i.e. the third party and held as under:- 9. Now, the main question to be determined this is, whether Sita Ram is bound by the decree passed against Gordhan son of Udai Narain. Before considering this aspect of the matter it would be proper to consider as to who is a person bound by a decree. This question has been considered at length in the case of Hansa Lal v. Champalal Gopikishan Sabu Trust, 1960 RLW 429 , of this Court, in which the following broad narration of persons who can be held bound by the decree is given: (1) A person getting into possession of the property by succession of subsequent to the institution of the suit which results in a decree for possession. (2) a person getting possession on transfer under sale or mortgage subsequent to the institution of the suit etc. and (3) a person in subordinate possession which expression includes under-lessees, licensees and other persons getting into or let into possession by the judgment debtor or any person bound by the decree otherwise than in their own right and title. (a) in any case, if they get into possession subsequent to the suit, and (b) if they get into possession prior to the institution of the suit provided their interest becomes extinguishes on the passing of a decree for possession. 10. In the application by Sita Ram before the Executing Court, as already stated above. Sita Ram merely stated that he was the tenant inducted by Udai Narain and was paying rent to him. Will in favour of Udai Narain was made some where in June 1956. and immediately thereafter testator Smt. Gopal Devi died. The said will became operative after the death of Smt. Gopal Devi. For resolving the controversy it may be assumed that Sita Ram might have been inducted as a menant by virtue of his right under the will. Will in favour of Udai Narain was made some where in June 1956. and immediately thereafter testator Smt. Gopal Devi died. The said will became operative after the death of Smt. Gopal Devi. For resolving the controversy it may be assumed that Sita Ram might have been inducted as a menant by virtue of his right under the will. Even if this position is taken it does not help Sita Ram in any way, as in the decree dated 12th March, 1073, in the civil suit No. 54 of 1961, it is clearly held that the will in favour of Udai Narain did not give him any right, the letters of administration granted by the Probate Court were held to be ineffective in this view of the matter, any person claiming through Udai Narain cannot claim to have better interest or right than that possessed by Udai Narain and, if a decree for possession has been passed against Udai Narain (after his death against his son Gordhan). Sita Ram cannot claim to have any right, to resist possession or for not giving delivery of possession in any manner. 42. This Court in the case of Navneet Kumar v. Mahesh Chand Gupta and others, 2008 (1) WLC (Raj) 227 (DB) in almost identical facts and while relying on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Suresh Chand Jean v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Mathura, (2001) 10 SCC 508 and other judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court held:- 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suresh Chand Jain, supra, in which also the suit was decreed ex parte against a tenant and sub-tenant sought to raise some what similar objections in execution proceedings, held in para 6 as under: We have heard learned Counsel for the respondents and we find the argument raised in well substantiated. From the facts narrated above. (b) if they get into possession prior to the institution of the suit provided their interest becomes extinguished on the passing of a decree for possession. 10. In the application by Sita Ram before the Executing Court as already stated above, Sita Ram merely stated that he was the tenant inducted by Udai Narain and was paying rent to him. Will in favour of Udai Narain was made some where in June 1956, and immediately thereafter testator Smt. Gopi Devi died. 10. In the application by Sita Ram before the Executing Court as already stated above, Sita Ram merely stated that he was the tenant inducted by Udai Narain and was paying rent to him. Will in favour of Udai Narain was made some where in June 1956, and immediately thereafter testator Smt. Gopi Devi died. The said will became operative alter the death of Smt. Gopi Devi. For resolving the controversy it may be assumed that Sita Ram might have been inducted as a tenant by virtue of his right under the will. Even if this position is taken it does not help Sita Ram in any way, as in the decree dated 12th March, 1973, in the civil suit No. 54 of 1961. it is clearly held that the will in favour of Udai Narain did not give him any right, the letters of administration granted by the Probate Court were held to be ineffective. In this view of the matter, any person claiming through Udai Narain cannot claim to have better interest or right than that possessed by Udai Narain and, if a decree for possession has been passed against Udai Narain (after his death against his son Gordhan), Sita Ram cannot claim to have any right, to resist possession or for not giving delivery of possession any manner. 43. This Court in the case of Navneet Kumar v. Mahesh Chand Gupta and others, 2008 (1) WLC (Raj) 227 (DB) in almost identical facts and while relying on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Suresh Chand Jain v. IIIrd Additional District Judge. Mathura, (2001) 10 SCC 508 and other judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court held:- 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suresh Chand Jain, supra, in which also the suit was decreed ex parte against a tenant and sub-tenant sought to raise somewhat similar objections in execution proceedings, held in para 6 as under: We have heard learned Counsel for the respondents and we find the argument raised is well substantiated. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that so far as the tenant Sardar Pritam Singh was, concerned, the decree for ejectment against him attained finality. The sub-tenant did not have any independent right or (sic) to raise any objection before the executing Court. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that so far as the tenant Sardar Pritam Singh was, concerned, the decree for ejectment against him attained finality. The sub-tenant did not have any independent right or (sic) to raise any objection before the executing Court. The subtenants were legally bound by the orders passed against the main tenant particularly when the ejectment decree against the main tenant because final and his objection before the executing decree against the main tenant became final and his objection before the executing Court was rejected by the Additional District Judge and upheld by the High Court. Further, we find that the sub-tenants in their objection on have not pleaded any right independent to the rights of the main tenant. They merely reiterated the objections of the main tenant, namely that the ejectment decree passed by the small cause Court is a nullity and that they were not parties to the eviction suit. Under such circumstances the High Court was not right in allowing the writ petition filed by the sub-tenants. We, accordingly set aside the order and judgment of the High Court dated 17.4.1997 and restore that of the Additional District Judge, Mathura dated 17.2.1986 (sic). The appeal is allowed but there will be no order as to costs." 9. In the present case too, all that the judgment-debtor Murari Lal wanted to establish is that he was owner of the disputed property and not tenant and in fact he went to the extent of filing injunction suit against original owner Smt. Shanti Devi which was dismissed and what is being now canvassed by the respondent No. 1 (objector herein) is exactly that he (the defendant judgment-debtor) was not the tenant of Smt. Shanti Devi but was owner of the disputed property. Obviously, to permit the respondent No. 1 to lead evidence would result in again recognising the legitimacy of an otherwise unsubstantiated claim. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rupchand, supra had the occasion to consider a similar matter in which also the landlord brought a suit against his lessee for ejectment without impleading the sublease as defendant. The lessee, like in the present case, did not contest the suit in pursuance of his agreement with the plaintiff landlord and an ex parte decree was passed. The lessee, like in the present case, did not contest the suit in pursuance of his agreement with the plaintiff landlord and an ex parte decree was passed. The sub-lessee thereupon brought a suit against the landlord and the lessee for a declaration that he was not bound by the decree which had been obtained by collusion between the defendants in order to injure the plaintiff and to evict him from the premises without a decree being passed against him. Their Lordships while repelling this argument in para 12 of the report held as under: "it is quite clear that the law does not require that the sub-lessee need be made a party. It has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that in all cases where the landlord institutes a suit against the lessee for possession of the land on the basis of a valid notice to quit served on the lessee and does not implead the sub-lessee as a party to the suit, the object of the landlord is to eject the sub-lessee from the land in execution of the decree and such an object is quite legitimate. The decree in such a suit would bind the sub-lessee. This may act harshly on the sub-lease; but this is a position well understood by him when he took the sublease. The law allows this and so the omission cannot be said to be an improper act." 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court again reiterated this view in Rupchand, supra in the case of Balavant N. Viswamitra, supra, in which also the sub-tenant in execution of a decree passed in suit for possession raised somewhat similar objection that though a necessary party, he was not joined as defendant in the suit, and, therefore, the decree passed in the suit would be nullity and not executable against him. Their Lordships while rejecting the argument, in para 28 of the judgment held as under: "In our considered opinion, the present respondents could not be said to be "necessary party" to the suit. Non-joinder of respondents, hence, would not make a decree passed by the Court of small Causes, Bombay nullity or in-executable. Their Lordships while rejecting the argument, in para 28 of the judgment held as under: "In our considered opinion, the present respondents could not be said to be "necessary party" to the suit. Non-joinder of respondents, hence, would not make a decree passed by the Court of small Causes, Bombay nullity or in-executable. The High Court erroneously proceeded against the well settled principle of law by observing in the impugned judgment that since the respondents (petitioners before the High Court) were claiming through Papamiya and as they were not joined as "party' in the suit, the orders passed by the Court "would in no way affect or bind them." The above observations, in our opinion, did not lay down the law correctly." 44. The appellants are seeking their right through the Devasthan Department. The Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department had filed the written statement. The Devasthan Department was not even held to be a necessary party. Even the Devasthan Department itself did not think it proper to implead itself as party nor has filed any objection in the execution petition. It is evident that the Devasthan Department by implication has given up its claim, if any. Thus, a re-trial at the behest of the appellants, who are claiming their right through the said department, is prohibited. 45. The Trial Court by the decree now put in execution dated 19.9.1997 while relying inter alia, on the doctrine of jus tertii gave a categoric finding that the suit property cannot be said to be belonging to the deity. 46. The respondent had relied on the Gazette notification dated 27.04.1981 to show' that the temple in question belongs to the Government of Rajasthan as notified in the said notification. The Court however rejected the notification and held it to the private property of the erstwhile ruler. Thus no further adjudication on the same issue at the instance of different party can be permitted in execution proceedings. 47. So far as the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants with respect to the order dated 18.04.1963 passed by Jagir Commissioner is concerned, there is no reference to the same in the objection petitions. While deciding petition under Order VII. Rule 11, only the contents of the plaint were required to be taken into consideration and whereas in the said objection petition (plaint) there is no reference to the said order. While deciding petition under Order VII. Rule 11, only the contents of the plaint were required to be taken into consideration and whereas in the said objection petition (plaint) there is no reference to the said order. Moreover, in the original suit, a specific issue No. 3 was framed as under:- "8. Whether after declaring of this property to be the private property of Devasthan on 18.04.1963 by the Additional Collector, Jagir, for the reason this decision is final? defendant." 48. The said issue also stood decided against the defendant State of Rajasthan. The finding on issue No. 8 having been recorded against the State and the said finding having attained finality, the same cannot be allowed to be raised at the behest of the appellants who have stepped into the shoes of the landlord. 49. The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the said issue was decided against the State because they could not produce the copy of the order dated 18.04.1963 passed by the Additional Collector Jagir and that in case the appellants were allowed to lead the evidence they would have produced the said order, does not help in view of the estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act reads as under:- "116. Estoppel of tenant and of licensee of person in possession. - No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given. 50. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of S. Thangappan v. P. Padmavathy, AIR 1999 SC 3584 held in para 15 and 16 as under:- "15. Similarly in D. Satyanarayan (supra) also this Court holds in para 4: "The rule of estoppel embodied under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is that, a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title, however defective it may be... Similarly, the estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is restricted to the denial of the title at the commencement of the tenancy." 16. Similarly, the estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is restricted to the denial of the title at the commencement of the tenancy." 16. Now reverting to the facts of the present case, we find, admittedly the appellant were inducted into tenancy by the predecessor of Respondent No. 1 in 1962 and he continued to pay rent to Respondent No. 1 since 1980. There is no case or any evidence that since thereafter Respondent No. 1 lost his title to the disputed premises. Or the contrary denial of title in the present case is based on some information that Devasthanam is the owner of the property since inception. No Case. Devasthanam became owner of this property after 1962. In other words, the denial of title by the appellant against his landlord is from the very inception. This is forbidden under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. So both on law and facts we do not find the submissions for the appellant is sustainable. All the Courts below rightly concluded that denial of title by the appellant was not bona fide and hence non payment of rent to him amounts to wilful default." 51. A perusal of the Section 116 of the Evidence Act reproduced above shows that tenant ora licence or a licence or a sub-licence cannot oppose eviction from the suit premises or to question the title of his landlord. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that the rent note was executed between the State of Rajasthan through the Devasthan Department. It cannot now turn around and say that his landlord is not the State of Rajasthan but the Devasthan Department and that the premises belonged to the deity. Thus, the appellant cannot say that they had raised a triable issue by raising an illusory issue. 52. At this stage, learned Counsel for the appellants has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta and others (supra), in which it was held that a plaint should not be rejected after filing of written statement, framing of issues and cross-examination. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the said judgment. However, in the said case, the application for rejection of plaint was filed after 15 years of the institution of the suit. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the said judgment. However, in the said case, the application for rejection of plaint was filed after 15 years of the institution of the suit. In the present case, the suit is decided in favour of the plaintiff. The judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court was affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Thereafter, the execution petition was filed. The appellants herein filed objections in the said execution petition. It is at this stage that an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. was filed by the plaintiff for dismissal of the objection petitions filed by a third party, who was not a party to the suit. Thus, the judgment rendered in the case of Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta and others (supra) does not help the appellants. Frivolous litigation's are required to be nipped in the bud at the earliest possible stage as the sole object of the frivolous litigation is to drag the adversary in the litigation till it is dismissed consuming several years in trial. In case, the Court comes to the conclusion that the said objection or the suit are perverse, they should not hesitate to exercise their jurisdiction to dismiss such a plaint or objections while exercising their power under Order VII. Rule 11 of the C.P.C. in fact, this Court in the case of temple of Thakur Shri Mathuradassji, Chhota Bhandar v. Shri Kanhaiayalal and others, 2008 (2) RLW 1390 (Raj) went ahead further and held that if the suit is abuse of process of the Court and cannot be dismissed under Order VII. Rule 11, C.P.C., then the Court is not helpless and can dismiss the suit invoking powers under Section 151 of the C.P.C. Thus, the original judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997 has merged with the decision of Hon'ble the Apex Court. It has attained finality. The appellants entire objections is founded on issues No. 4, 8 and 10. These issues have been decided against the State of Rajasthan, Devasthan Department. Issue No. 10 was framed on the basis of the written statement filed by the Assistant Commissioner; Devasthan Department. The said issue was also decided against them. Neither the Devasthan Department impleaded itself as party nor has filed any objections. These issues have been decided against the State of Rajasthan, Devasthan Department. Issue No. 10 was framed on the basis of the written statement filed by the Assistant Commissioner; Devasthan Department. The said issue was also decided against them. Neither the Devasthan Department impleaded itself as party nor has filed any objections. The present appellants, who are claiming their right through Devasthan Department cannot be allowed to agitate the issue afresh as they do not have a better right than the State of Rajasthan or the Devasthan Department, as the case may be. 53. All the above appeals are accordingly dismissed being devoid of merit.The records of the Court below be sent back forthwith.Appeal dismissed.