ORDER 1. A complaint was filed by the petitioner alleging commission of various offencers under sections 420, 406, 463 and 120B of IPC against the respondents on the allegations that respondents took certain money from the petitioner but with no intention to comply with the obligation which they had undertaken to perform. The petitioner is the tenant of the respondents. According to her, the payments were made for the purpose of purchasing the tenanted property. 2. However, according to the respondents the payment for the balance consideration was not made by the petitioner within time i.e. why the agreement was frustrated. Both sides filed proceedings against each other. The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance on the basis of the alleged payment which were made. Respondents filed suit for eviction. Both the suits were decided in favour of the respondent i.e. to say the suit for specific performance has been dismissed as filed by the petitioner, but the suit for eviction has been decreed in favour of the respondents with a direction to the respondents to pay the money passed over to them as pleaded by the petitioner in her complaint within a specific time. Both the decrees are subject matter of this petition. 3. The question which arises for consideration in these circumstances is even if the allegations of the petitioner is taken as it is i.e. to say that she made certain payments to the respondents towards agreement of sale can it be said that there is a commission of criminal offence. The trial Court dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner vide order dated 24.4.2009. The trial Court dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner vide order dated 24.4.2009. The reasons given by the Judicial Magistrate First Class in dismissing the complaint are as under:- ifjokn i= esa tks rF; mYysf[kr fd;s x;s gSa blls ;g Li”Vr% edku ds cspus dk lkSnk gqvk Fkk bl laca/k esa fcØh lkSnk vuqca/k fnukad 9 uoacj 2006 Hkh laikfnr fd;k x;k gS ftldh QksVks&izfr Hkh vfHkys[k esa layXu gSA iqfyl izfrosnu ds vuqlkj fu;r vof/k esa Qfj;knh }kjk iSls dh O;oLFkk ugha fd;s tkus ds dkj.k vukosndx.kksa us mlds i{k esa jftLVªh ugha dh xbZ gSA lEiw.kZ fjdkMZ ls ;g ekeyk vuqca/k dk ikyu djk;s tkus ckcr~ O;ogkj Á—fr dk gksuk izdV gksrk gSA vr% ;g ekeyk mDr vkijkf/kd /kkjkvksa esa iathc) fd;k tkus ds izFke n`”V;k vk/kkj ugha gSA vr% izLrqr ifjokn i= fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA izdj.k lekIr] vfHkys[k vfHkys[kkxkj esa tek fd;k tkosA 4. A revision was filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order. A revision was filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order. The revisional Court has also dismissed the revision by making following observations:- iqujh{k.k esa vk/kkj fy;s x;s gSa fd fopkj.k U;k;ky; dk vkyksP; vkns’k fof/k vkSj ÁfØ;k ds foijhr gksus ls fujLr gksus ;ksX; gSA v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us /kkjk 406] 420] 463] 120ch Hkk n fo ds vijk/k dh ea’kk dks ugha le>kA nkfo;k edku dk djkj ukek laikfnr fd;k vkSj fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa foØ; i= fu”iknu ugha fd;kA fdjk;snkj dks 50]000@& #i;s fnyok;s] >wBs vk’oklu fn;s] lwpuk i= dk >wBk tokc nsdj cnfu;fr ls vlR; dFku fd;s vkSj /kks[kk/kM+h dh tk jgh gS] blfy;s vkijkf/kd ‘kM~;a= jpdj /kks[kk/kM+h djus dk vijk/k cuus ds ckotwn voS/kkfud vkns’k ikfjr fd;k gSA iqfyl Fkkuk [kjxksu ds tk¡p izfrosnu lkf{k;ksa ds dFku ds vk/kkj ij Hkh vkijkf/kd —R; ugha ekudj voS/kkfudrk dh gSA fopkj.k U;k;ky; dk ;g vfHker Hkh =qfViw.kZ gS fd ‘kM~;a= jpdj /kks[kk/kM+h fcuk izek.k vkSj fcuk dwV ijh{k.k ds ugha ekuk tk ldrkA nhokuh Á—fr dk fu”d”kZ Hkh =qfViw.kZ gS blfy;s vkyksP; vkns’k fujLr fd;k tkos vkSj laKku fy;k tkosA ifjokn ds rF;ksa] iqujh{k.k ds vk/kkjksa ij fopkj djrs gq;s vkyksP; vkns’k ,oa /kkjk 200 n iz la ds izLrqr lk{;] iqfyl ds izfrosnu ij fopkj fd;kA fopkj mijkar iqujh{k.k ds fujkdj.k gsrq fopkj.kh; iz’u mRiUu gksrk gS fd %& D;k vkyksP; vkns’k v’kq)] voS/k nks”kiw.kZ fo’ys”k.k ds fu”d”kksZ ij vk/kkfjr gksus ls vikLr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS\ fu”d”kZ ds vk/kkj iqujh{k.kdrkZ@ifjoknh Jhefr vkHkk ds }kjk ifjokn esa vkSj /kkjk 200 n iz la ds dFku esa foi{kh@vkjksihx.k ds ekydh] LoRo ,oa vkf/kiR; dk edku xzke lkaxoh dqy jdck 2178 oxZQhV dk 11]50]001@& #i;s esa Ø; djus dk vuqca/k fnukad 9-11-2006 dks laikfnr dj 1]00]001@& #i;s vnk fd;s x;s vkSj fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa foi{kh vkjksihx.k }kjk foØ; i= fu”ikfnr ugha djokus ls lwpuk i= fn;k vkSj mlds tokc essa vkjksihx.k us bUdkj fd;kA bl laO;ogkj ij vkijkf/kd U;k; Hkax vkSj Ny dkfjr djus rFkk dwVjpuk ,oa vkijkf/kd ‘kM~;a= djuk cryk;k x;k gSA v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds ewy vfHkys[k esa iqfyl dk izfrosnu fnukad 29-11-2008 layXu gS] ftlesa mHk;i{k ds e/; edku] nqdku dks Ø; djus fdjk;s ij nsus] foØ; i= fu”ikfnr ugha djkus vkSj mlesa vof/k dk egRoiw.kZ rF; fo|eku gksuk crykrs gq;s fdjk;s ds ckjs esa O;ogkj okn Øekad 1,@08 fopkjk/khu gksus ls nhokuh ekeyk cryk;k gSA foi{kh vkjksihx.k dh vksj ls iqujh{kdrkZ@ifjoknh dks lwpuk i= ds tokc esa fy[ks rF;ksa ls vuqca/k gksuk izdV gksrk gS] ysfdu vuqca/k dh ‘krksZa vkSj le;kof/k esa ikyu ugha djus dks fookfnr fd;k x;k gSA bl rjg dk fookn okLro esa O;ogkj Á—fr dk gSA vkijkf/kd U;kl Hkax /kkjk 405 Hkk n fo esa ifjHkkf”kr vuqlkj vko’;d rRoksa dk LFkkfir gksuk izrhr ugha gksrk gSA /kkjk 415 Hkk na fo esa ifjHkkf”kr Ny vuqlkj foi{kh@vkjksihx.k }kjk dksbZ izoapukiw.kZ dFku djrs gq;s diViwoZd ;k csbZekuh ls iqujh{kdrkZ@ifjoknh dk mRiszfjr djus dk rF; fo|eku ugha gSA csbZekuhiwoZd rF;ksa dks fNikuk Hkh izdV ugha gksrk gSA cfYd vuqca/k dh ‘krksZa dk ikyu ugha djus dks fookfnr fd;k x;k gS vkSj bl laca/k esa O;ogkj okn yafcr gksuk Hkh dgk x;k gSA blfy, ekeyk iw.kZr% flfoy Á—fr dk gh izrhr gksrk gSA fopkj.k U;k;ky; us vkyksP; vkns’k esa O;ogkj iz—fr dk ekeyk gksus dk fu”d”kZ nsdj dksbZ voS/kkfudrk dkfjr ugha dh gS] vr% iqujh{k.k dk vk/kkj Lohdkj ;ksX; ugha gS blfy;s iqujh{k.k fujLr dh tkrh gSA 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment delivered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of M Krishanan v. Vijay Singh and another (2001) VII SLT 188. Para 3 of the judgment is relevant which is reproduced as under:- “3. Despite referring to various judgments of this Court relating to the interpretation and scope of section 482 of the Code and the indictment that the High Court should be slow in interfering with the proceedings at the initial stage, the learned Single Judge of the High Court passed the impugned order. The High Court appears to have been impressed by the fact as the nature of the dispute was primarily of a civil nature, the appellant was not justified in resorting to the criminal proceedings.” 6. This judgment helps the case of the respondents and not the petitioner. 7. I find no infirmity in the approach of both the Courts below. No case has been made out by the petitioner for interference by this Court under section 482 CrPC. 8. Dismissed.