JUDGMENT Joymalya Bagchi, J. The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 25.04.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting his prayer to award compensation in public law domain for illegal and arbitrary termination of permission to work as a Professional Letter Writer (hereinafter referred to as “PLW”) at Calcutta G.P.O. The facts of the case is that vide Memo dated 11th August, 2004 the petitioner was given permission to work as PLW at Calcutta G.P.O. with effect from 1st February, 2004 for three years. However, on 4th March, 2005 the aforesaid permission was terminated on the basis of complaint lodged by one Anil Sharma alleging that he has misappropriated moneys entrusted to him. Such order of termination was set aside by this Court on 6th July, 2007 in W.P. No. 6082 (W) of 2005 directing the respondent authority to take fresh decision within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order. In terms of the aforesaid order, fresh hearing was held on 30.08.2007 and the petitioner was directed to give his reply to the questionnaire handed over to him by respondent authorities. In the meantime, petitioner submitted a tender form seeking permission to work as PLW from 01.09.2007 to 31.08.2010. By order dated 11.09.2007 his tender was rejected. He challenged such order of rejection before this Court in W.P. No. 22355 (W) of 2007 wherein this Court by order date 11.09.2007 set aside the decision of respondent authorities and directed them to give a fresh hearing to the petitioner. Thereafter, respondent authorities again rejected the prayer of the petitioner by order dated 27.10.2008. Such order was again challenged by the petitioner in W.P. No. 28446 (W) of 2008. The writ petition was dismissed by a Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 02.09.2009. However, in appeal, the Division Bench by order dated 11.12.2010 allowed the prayer of the petitioner and quashed the decision of respondent authorities in rejecting the prayer of the petitioner to work at PLW at Calcutta, G.P.O. Being emboldened by such order of the Division Bench of this Court, petitioner made a representation before respondent authorities seeking compensation for being illegally denied the opportunity to work as PLW at Calcutta, G.P.O. and claimed a sum of Rs. 16,000,50/-as compensation. 16,000,50/-as compensation. As the respondent authorities did not consider such representation, the petitioner filed the instant writ petition praying for compensation in public law domain from the wrongful action of the respondent authorities. Learned Single Judge declined such prayer on the ground that the writ Court is not the appropriate forum for claiming compensation in such cases and granted leave to the petitioner to seek appropriate remedy before the Civil Court. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted it is no longer res integra that the respondent authorities had acted illegally in refusing permission to petitioner to work as PLW at Calcutta, G.P.O. He further submitted that as his fundamental rights were infringed by such wrongful and arbitrary action, he was entitled to be compensated in the public law domain by the respondent authorities. He has relied on D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416 , Nilabati Behera Vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1993 SC 1960 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi Vs. Association, Victims of Uphaar Tragedy, (2012) 1 WBLR (SC) 321 in support of his submission. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent authorities submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order and petitioner has been given liberty to move the Civil Court in accordance with law. The issue which falls for decision is whether in the facts of the case the petitioner is entitled to seek compensation under public law from the respondent authorities. Undoubtedly, in a case of blatant and gross breach of fundamental right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court in a series of decisions has granted the relief of compensation, when no other remedy was available, to vindicate such breach of fundamental right of the victim which shocked the conscience of the Court. The apex Court has succinctly admitted in paragraph 61 of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi Vs. Association, Victims of Uphaar Tragedy (supra) that compensation may be awarded in a fit and proper case although there may not be a system or method to quantify the same. It held as follows:- “61. Law is well settled that a Constitutional Court can award monetary compensation against State and its officials for its failure to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens but there is no system or method to measure the damages caused in such situations. It held as follows:- “61. Law is well settled that a Constitutional Court can award monetary compensation against State and its officials for its failure to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens but there is no system or method to measure the damages caused in such situations. Quite often the courts have a difficult task in determining damages in various fact situations. The yardsticks normally adopted for determining the compensation payable in a private tort claims are not as such applicable when a constitutional court determines the compensation in cases where there is violation of fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens. In D.K. Basu vs. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 416 , a Constitution Bench of this Court held that there is no strait jacket formula for computation of damages and we find that there is no uniformity or yardstick followed in awarding damages for violation of fundamental rights. In Rudal Shah’s case (supra) this Court used the terminology ‘Palliative’ for measuring the damages and The formula of ‘Ad hoc’ was applied in Sebastian Hongary’s case (supra) the expression used by this Court for determining the monetary compensation was ‘Exemplary’ cost and the formula adopted was ‘Punitive’. In Bhim Singh’s case, the expression used by the Court was ‘Compensation’ and method adopted was ‘Tortious formula’. In D.K. Basu v. Union of India (supra) the expression used by this Court for determining the compensation was ‘Monetary Compensation’. The formula adopted was ‘Cost to Cost’ method. Courts have not, therefore, adopted a uniform criteria since no statutory formula has been laid down.” However, in the self-same decision the Supreme Court rung a note of caution stating that such relief may be granted only “in exceptional cases”. In paragraph 63 of the said report, the apex Court held, as follows:- “63. Legal liability in damages exist solely as a remedy out of private law action in tort which is generally time consuming and expensive and hence when fundamental rights are violated claimants prefer to approach constitutional courts for speedy remedy. Constitutional courts, of course, shall invoke its jurisdiction only in extraordinary circumstances when serious injury has been caused due to violation of fundamental rights especially under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Constitutional courts, of course, shall invoke its jurisdiction only in extraordinary circumstances when serious injury has been caused due to violation of fundamental rights especially under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In such circumstances the Court can invoke its own methods depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” (emphasis supplied) A Three Bench of the apex Court had the occasion of dealing with the issue of grant of compensation as a public law remedy in Sube Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2006) 3 SCC 178 . In the said report, the apex Court held that compensation as a public law remedy should be restricted to gross and patent cases of violation of Article 21 which shocks the conscience of the Court. It held as follows:- “46. In cases where custodial death or custodial torture or other violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 is established, courts may award compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 or 226. However, before awarding compensation, the Court will have to pose to itself the following questions : (a) Whether the violation of Article 21 is patent and incontrovertible, (b) whether the violation is gross and of a magnitude to shock the conscience of the court, (c) whether the custodial torture alleged has resulted in death or whether custodial torture is supported by medical report or visible marks or scars or disability. Where there is no evidence of custodial torture of a person except his own statement, and where such allegation is not supported by any medical report or other corroboration evidence, or where there are clear indications that the allegations are false or exaggerated fully or in part, courts may not award compensation as a public law remedy under Article 32 or 226, but relegate the aggrieved party to the traditional remedies by way of appropriate civil/criminal action. 47. ………The public law remedy is additionally available where the conditions mentioned in the earlier para are satisfied.” In Rajender Singh Pathania & Ors. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., (2011) 13 SCC 329 , the apex Court even disapproved the practice of grant of token compensation as a public law remedy in every case. It held as follows:- “20. ………The public law remedy is additionally available where the conditions mentioned in the earlier para are satisfied.” In Rajender Singh Pathania & Ors. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., (2011) 13 SCC 329 , the apex Court even disapproved the practice of grant of token compensation as a public law remedy in every case. It held as follows:- “20. The issue of award of compensation in case of violation of fundamental rights of a person has been considered by this Court time and again and it has consistently been held that though the High Courts and this Court in exercise of their jurisdictions under Articles 226 and 32 can award compensation for such violations but such a power should not be lightly exercised. These Articles cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which could be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary process of courts. Before awarding any compensation there must be a proper enquiry on the question of facts alleged in the complaint. The court may examine the report and determine the issue after giving opportunity of filing objections to rebut the same and hearing to the other side. Awarding of compensation is permissible in case the court reaches the same conclusion on a re-appreciation of the evidence adduced at the enquiry. Award of monetary compensation in such an eventuality is permissible “when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers……..”. (Vide: Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1026 ; Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of J&K, AIR 1986 SC 494 ; Smt. Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 1960 ; D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., AIR 1997 SC 610 ; Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. v. Mrs. Chandrima Das & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 988 ; and S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2005) 10 SCC 1 ). (emphasis supplied) ………………………………….. 22. v. Mrs. Chandrima Das & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 988 ; and S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2005) 10 SCC 1 ). (emphasis supplied) ………………………………….. 22. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court erred in awarding even token compensation to the tune of Rs.25,000/- each as the High Court did not hold any enquiry and passed the order merely after considering the status report submitted by the appellant no.1 without hearing any of the persons against whom allegations of abuse of power had been made. Such an order is liable to be set aside.” It is true in the instant case that a Division Bench of this Court has held that the action of refusing permission to the petitioner was contrary to law. Does it follow as a natural corollary thereto that the petitioner would be entitled to compensation as a public law remedy ? We do not think so. The case of the petitioner by no stretch of imagination can be construed to be one in the realm of a gross and blatant breach of Article 21 of the Constitution resulting from custodial torture and even ensuing death. Neither is it similar to genocide of innocent citizens in a movie hall directly attributable to the culpable connivance of statutory authorities in permitting the owners to run the said hall in palpable breach of safety norms as in Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi Vs. Association, Victims of Uphaar Tragedy (supra). It is not the petitioner’s case that due to the illegal refusal of the respondent authorities all other avenues of livelihood had been obliterated. No factual foundation had been laid by him that, in fact, during the said period he had no means of livelihood or that grant of compensation in public law is the only remedy available to him. It would entail a factual enquiry to establish a reasonable nexus between damages, if any, suffered by the petitioner and the wrongful acts of the respondents prior to grant of compensation and such enquiry can be best done by the appropriate civil Court under ordinary law of the land. It would entail a factual enquiry to establish a reasonable nexus between damages, if any, suffered by the petitioner and the wrongful acts of the respondents prior to grant of compensation and such enquiry can be best done by the appropriate civil Court under ordinary law of the land. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner has been unable to make out a case of gross and blatant breach of his fundamental rights which shocks the conscience of the Court and that compensation as a public law remedy is the only relief available to him. The facts of the case are clearly distinguishable from the cases relied on by the petitioner and we are convinced that this is not a fit case to invoke our extraordinary writ jurisdiction to grant compensation to the petitioner as a public law remedy. The claim of the petitioner may be adjudicated under ordinary law as directed by the learned Single Judge. That apart, the petitioner had not sought for such compensatory relief in the earlier proceeding wherein he challenged the action of respondent authorities in refusing him permission to work as PLW. Such consequential relief, as claimed, flows from the declaration of the Court that the impugned action of the respondents were illegal and ought to have been prayed for in the same proceeding. Having not done so, the petitioner cannot institute this subsequent proceeding to seek such consequential compensatory relief as a public law remedy when he had failed and/or neglected to do so in the earlier proceeding. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal fails. Impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is upheld.