Judgment :- Nagarathna, J. 1. These appeals assail the common order of the learned Single Judge dated 03/01/2013 passed in several writ petitions. 2. The writ petitions were filed by the owners of house sites assailing the preliminary notification issued under Section 4(1) dated 18/08/2009 (Annexure "A") and the declaration and final notification issued under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (for short "the Act"), by the second respondent -Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, dated 04/09/2010 (Annexure "B"). By the said notifications, the State sought to acquire inter alia, petitioners' residential sites for the purpose of construction of a vegetable market. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petitions. Hence, these appeals. 3. We have heard learned senior counsel for the appellants, learned counsel for the caveator respondent and learned AGA for respondent - State. 4. The first contention raised by learned senior counsel was that the acquisition of the sites for the purpose of a vegetable market is irrational and without application of mind as the respondent - authorities failed to notice that about 152 shops were available for establishment of a vegetable market. These vacant shops could have been utilized for the said purpose rather than acquiring sites belonging to the appellants. It was secondly contended that the Town Municipal Council had offered lands available for construction of a vegetable market and therefore, the notifications issued by the State to acquire these sites is illegal. It was specifically pointed out that an extent of 1.32 Acres of land belonging to the Town Municipal Council is available. It was thirdly contended that the appellants have not been heard in the matter prior to the issuance of the declaration and therefore, there is violation of Section 5A of the Act and that these sites are not suitable for the purpose of establishing the vegetable market. 5. Elaborating these contentions, it was stated that the Town Municipal Corporation had allotted these sites to the appellants, long time ago but the sale certificates were issued only in the year 2005. That initially, a notification under Section 4(1) r/w Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act was issued in the year 2007, notifying 31 residential sites for acquisition by invoking the urgency clause. That notification was questioned before this Court in certain writ petitions. The writ petitions were allowed by this Court. That initially, a notification under Section 4(1) r/w Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act was issued in the year 2007, notifying 31 residential sites for acquisition by invoking the urgency clause. That notification was questioned before this Court in certain writ petitions. The writ petitions were allowed by this Court. Thereafter, preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 01/08/2009. The appellants have filed detailed objections to the said notification. However, without considering the objections of the appellants, a report was sent recommending acquisition of the appellants' sites and a final notification under Section 6(1) of the Act was issued on 04/01/2010. 6. Relying on Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana & Ors.[2012 AIR SCW 240], and Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and Others [ (2005) 7 SCC 627 ], it was contended that the approach of the State in acquiring the sites in question is not in accordance with law and that in the absence of an effective hearing given to the appellants under Section 5A of the Act, the declaration made under Section 6(1) is illegal. Learned senior counsel therefore, contended that the acquisition notifications be quashed. 7. Per contra, learned AGA appearing for the State has drawn our attention to the reasoning of the learned Single Judge to contend that the grievance made by the appellants have been answered by the learned Single Judge and that there is no merit in these appeals. He relied upon Land Acquisition Collector And Another v. Durga Pada Mukherjee and Others [ (1980) 4 SCC 271 ] and Shivaram Udupa v. Smt.Sharada Achar And Others [2002 (1) K.L.J. 25 (DB)], in support of his submission. 8. Annexure "A" is copy of the Gazette Notification dated 18/08/2009 by which 31 sites, some of which belonging to the appellants within the limits of Town Municipal Council, Holenarasipur, were sought to be acquired for construction of a well-equipped vegetable market and for a multipurpose commercial complex. The declaration under Section 6(1) was made and notified on 04/09/2010. Under sub-section (3) of Section 6, when once a declaration is made that the land is needed for a public purpose, it is conclusive evidence of the same. Public purpose is defined in Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Act, as amended by the Karnataka Amendment, which is an inclusive definition and not an exhaustive one. Under sub-section (3) of Section 6, when once a declaration is made that the land is needed for a public purpose, it is conclusive evidence of the same. Public purpose is defined in Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Act, as amended by the Karnataka Amendment, which is an inclusive definition and not an exhaustive one. The fact that the acquisition of the sites in question for the establishment of a vegetable market is a public purpose cannot be doubted. 9. However, the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants is that when 152 shops are lying vacant and the same could have been utilized for the vegetable market, there was no necessity for acquiring appellants' sites at all. The learned Single Judge has answered this contention by stating that the vacant 152 shops are built by Karnataka Housing Board, for the purpose of commercial establishment and not for the purpose of a vegetable market and that the Town Municipal Council has no right to utilize the said shops for a vegetable market. Moreover, they were not suitable for establishing a vegetable market. 10. The availability of 1.32 Acres of land on which the Town Municipal Council could establish a vegetable market instead of acquiring the appellants' sites is also an argument which cannot be made by the appellants, as it was for the acquiring authorities to decide upon the suitability of the land having regard to the public purpose for which acquisition was to be made. This Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the acquiring authorities to acquire any piece of land as the exercise of power is within the realm of eminent domain of the acquiring authority, that is, the state in the instant case. 11. As far as the grievance of the appellants that they were not heard before the declaration was made under Section 6 is concerned, the contention of the respondent authorities is that the appellants' objections were considered and thereafter, the declaration to acquire their sites was made. This averment of the respondent authorities has not been countered by the appellants by filing any rejoinder in the writ petition. This averment of the respondent authorities has not been countered by the appellants by filing any rejoinder in the writ petition. More over, the suitability of the land is an aspect which has to be considered by the acquiring authorities and neither the land owners nor this Court can determine as to whether the land proposed to be acquired for a particular purpose was suitable for the purpose. Therefore, learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petitions by answering the contentions raised by the appellants herein. 12. As far as the judgments relied upon by the parties are concerned, Raghbir Singh's case deals with the manner of taking possession when there are standing crops on the land and the same is not applicable to the present case as what is sought to be acquired here are house sites. 13. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has said that formation of opinion as regards the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. That under Section 5A of the Act, a person must be given an effective hearing and that hearing must not be an empty formality. More over, even though sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act renders a declaration to be a conclusive evidence, when the decision making process itself is in question, the power of judicial review can be exercised by the court in the event the impugned order suffers from well-known infirmities viz., illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. There can be no debate on the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court but the appellants have failed to point out that they could succeed on the application of the aforesaid principles. In fact, the appellants have not been able to point out any infirmity in the exercise of power under Sections 4 to 6 of the Act by the respondent - authorities. As already stated, the assertion of the respondents that the appellants have been heard under Section 5A of the Act before making the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act has not been countered by the appellants. Therefore, the aforesaid decision in no way assist the appellants. 14. The case of K.S.Chandrasekhar v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ILR 1991 Kar. As already stated, the assertion of the respondents that the appellants have been heard under Section 5A of the Act before making the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act has not been countered by the appellants. Therefore, the aforesaid decision in no way assist the appellants. 14. The case of K.S.Chandrasekhar v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ILR 1991 Kar. 1314], was also sought to be relied upon by learned counsel for appellants, as it was also cited before learned Single Judge. That judgment is rendered under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 and not under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The scheme of acquisition under the former act is quite distinct and therefore, no reliance can be placed on that decision. 15. Learned AGA has relied upon Land Acquisition Collector And Another v. Durga Pada Mukherjeee And Others [ (1980) 4 SCC 271 ], to contend that in the absence of any mala fides or colourable exercise of power, the conclusive presumption under subsection (3) of Section 6 of the Act cannot be displaced. 16. In Shivaram Udupa v. Smt.Sharada Achar And Others [2002 (1) K.L.J. 25], a Division Bench of this Court has held that the Court cannot interfere with the choice of land for acquisition unless it is shown to be mala fide and the burden of proving of mala fide is on the land-owner making the allegation. It is for him to show that the land in question was not required and that the purpose of acquisition was to deprive him of the property. That is not the case of the appellants herein. 17. Therefore, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the common judgment of the learned Single Judge. The appeals being devoid of merit, they are accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.